FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
August 28, 2008
PUBLISH Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
THE JOHN ALLAN COMPANY,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 07-3193
THE CRAIG ALLEN COMPANY
L.L.C.; CRAIG ALLEN TATRO;
ERIK DAVID LESCHUK,
Defendants - Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
(D.C. NO. 05-CV-1150-MLB)
Kenneth L. Bressler, Blank Rome LLP, New York, New York (Charles E. Millsap
and Lyndon W. Vix, Fleeson, Gooing, Coulson & Kitch, L.L.C., Wichita, Kansas,
with him on the briefs), for Plaintiff - Appellant.
Todd N. Tedesco, (James M. Armstrong with him on the brief), Wichita, Kansas,
for Defendants - Appellees.
Before MURPHY, HOLLOWAY, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
MURPHY, Circuit Judge.
I. Introduction
The John Allan Company initiated a trademark infringement lawsuit against
The Craig Allen Company pursuant to the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114 and
1125(a). The case was tried before the district court. It concluded the use of the
name “Craig Allen’s” for a grooming salon in Wichita, Kansas did not infringe on
the mark “John Allan’s.” Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 we
reverse and remand for further proceedings.
II. Background
In 1988, John Allan Meing opened a men’s grooming salon near Wall
Street in New York City. The salon, John Allan’s, was designed to provide salon
services for men in a club-like environment. Since that time, the company has
grown. At the time of the bench trial, The John Allan Company operated two
club locations and two smaller non-clubs in New York City. The salons are
furnished with leather chairs at styling stations as well as antique barber chairs
where patrons sit while receiving a hot towel treatment and shoe shine. The
salons are equipped with a pool table, bar, and, until recently, a cigar room.
Patrons wear black smoking jackets while at John Allan’s, and the employees
wear black smocks, decorated with the salon’s logo. In addition to its salons, The
John Allan Company markets its grooming products nationwide. In 1996, it
registered the mark “John Allan’s & JA Circle Design” for “men’s and women’s
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haircutting services, namely haircutting, manicures, facials, and massage services;
retail counter in the field of hair and skin products” (the “J.A. Circle Design”). 1
The Craig Allen Company opened a men’s salon, “Craig Allen’s,” in
Wichita, Kansas after its owners visited John Allan’s in New York. The owners
of The Craig Allen Company, Craig Allen Tatro and Erik Leschuk, 2 settled on the
name “Craig Allen’s” after learning about John Allan’s. The duo hired a designer
to create a logo for Craig Allen’s and provided the designer with materials created
by The John Allan Company. Although the designer expressed concerns about
copying another mark, Tatro and Leschuk suggested they were working with John
Allan’s, and thus had permission to use a similar design. The result was a logo,
nearly identical to the trademarked J.A. Circle Design:
1
The John Allan Company owns a total of four federally registered service
marks, including the J.A. Circle Design and the mark “A Return to A Simpler
Time.” In addition to the J.A. Circle Design, The John Allan Company also used
an unregistered trademark consisting of the circular design, without the name of
the salon. Craig Allen’s also used a similar mark. The district court concluded
John Allan’s had a protectable mark and the defendants infringed on the mark. In
this opinion we refer to any mark including the circle design as the J.A. Circle
Design.
2
On appeal, the defendants, at times, spell Leschuk’s first name “Erick.”
The district court and the Notice of Appeal, however, refer to Defendant Leschuk
by the name “Erik” and we therefore use this spelling.
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Further, Craig Allen’s shared many of the features of John Allan’s clubs,
including outside windows with frosted glass embossed with the Craig Allen
Circle Design logo (“C.A. Circle Design”) and the phrase “A Return to A Simpler
Time,” which also appeared on the frosted windows of John Allan’s clubs. Craig
Allen’s also provided black smoking jackets for its patrons to wear and was
furnished with leather chairs, antique barber chairs for hot towel treatments, a
bar, and a pool table.
In 2005, attorneys representing The John Allan Company contacted The
Craig Allen Company concerning the alleged trademark infringement. Tatro and
Leschuck ultimately removed the C.A. Circle Design from everything in Craig
Allen’s as well as the protected slogans from the windows. They also created a
new logo:
The interior design and furnishings, however, were not changed. Nor did Craig
Allen’s change its name.
The John Allan Company sought injunctive relief for, inter alia, the
defendant’s use of the name “Craig Allen’s,” including the name “The Craig
Allen Company, LLC” and the original C.A. Circle Design. The district court
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concluded the C.A. Circle Design infringed on The John Allan Company’s J.A.
Circle Design. It declined, however, to enjoin Craig Allen’s use of the C.A.
Circle Design, finding it was unnecessary as the defendants had expended more
than $20,000 to change to its new logo. Unlike the logo, the court concluded the
use of the name “Craig Allen’s” did not infringe on the unregistered mark “John
Allan’s.”
On appeal, The John Allan Company argues the district court erred in (1)
finding the Craig Allen’s mark does not infringe on the John Allan’s mark; and
(2) failing to apply the “safe distance rule” to enjoin the use of the Craig Allen’s
mark based on the conclusion that the Craig Allen’s Circle Design infringed John
Allan’s Circle Design.
III. Alleged Infringement of “John Allan’s” Mark
The Lanham Act prohibits, in connection with any good or service, the
unauthorized use or misleading representation of “any word, term, name, symbol,
or device” in a way that “is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A). 3 “Confusion occurs when consumers make
an incorrect mental association between the involved commercial products or
3
Here, the mark “John Allan’s” is unregistered, and thus The John Allan
Company was required to show the mark is protectable. Utah Lighthouse
Ministry v. Found. for Apologetic Info. & Research, 527 F.3d 1045, 1050 (10th
Cir. 2008). The district court found “John Allan’s” had acquired a secondary
meaning and was therefore a protectable mark. The Craig Allen Company does
not challenge this finding on appeal nor do we find any error in the district
court’s conclusion.
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their producers.” Jordache Enter. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1484 (10th
Cir. 1987) (quotation omitted). Further, confusion results when a mark is likely
to deceive purchasers or users as to the source, endorsement, affiliation, or
sponsorship of a product. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A); see also Amoco Oil Co. v.
Rainbow Snow, 748 F.2d 556, 559 (10th Cir. 1984). Whether the use of a mark
will result in a likelihood of confusion, and thus violate the Lanham Act, is a
question of fact we review for clear error. Heartsprings, Inc. v. Heartspring, Inc.,
143 F.3d 550, 553 (10th Cir. 1998). In an appeal from a bench trial, we review
the district court’s legal conclusions de novo. Keys Youth Servs., Inc. v. City of
Olathe, 248 F.3d 1267, 1274 (10th Cir. 2001).
To determine whether a likelihood of confusion exists, this court examines
six, non-exhaustive, factors:
(1) the degree of similarity between the marks; (2) the intent of the
alleged infringer in adopting the mark; (3) evidence of actual
confusion; (4) similarity of products and manner of marketing; (5)
the degree of care likely to be exercised by purchasers; and (6) the
strength or weakness of the marks.
Sally Beauty Co. v. Beautyco, Inc., 304 F.3d 964, 972 (10th Cir. 2002). No one
factor is dispositive. Id. Nevertheless, “the final determination of likelihood of
confusion must be based on consideration of all relevant factors.” Heartsprings,
Inc., 143 F.3d at 554. “The party alleging infringement has the burden of proving
likelihood of confusion.” Utah Lighthouse Ministry, 527 F.3d at 1055.
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The John Allan Company argues the district court committed clear error in
light of evidence that actual confusion existed and of Craig Allen’s intent to copy
its marks. Specifically, it contends the district court committed clear error (1) by
failing to apply a rebuttable presumption based on evidence that the defendants
intended to confuse customers and (2) refusing to find a likelihood of confusion
based on evidence that consumers were confused. Although the district court
need not apply a rebuttable presumption based on a finding of intent to copy, it
did err by failing to consider evidence that consumers were confused by the two
names of the salons. The district court’s opinion also contains internal
inconsistencies complicating several of its findings and requiring a remand.
A. The District Court’s Internally Inconsistent Findings
In its assessment of the six factors, the district court found three factors
weighed in the favor of The John Allan Company: the similarity of the marks,
albeit only slightly weighing in the plaintiff’s favor; the intent to copy; and the
strength of the mark. It found two factors were neutral, weighing in favor of
neither the plaintiff nor the defendants: the similarity of products and manner of
marketing; and the degree of care exercised by consumers. Finally, it found The
John Allan Company had not presented any evidence of actual confusion, and that
weighed in favor of the defendants, The Craig Allen Company. It then concluded,
however:
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After reviewing all of the applicable factors, the court
finds that a likelihood of confusion does not exist between the
mark John Allan’s and Craig Allen’s. While there is some
similarity and John Allan’s does have a protectable mark, the
other factors are neutral or weigh in favor of the defendants.
The court is reluctant to find that the use of Tatro’s middle
name, and a common one at that, violates the plaintiff’s mark
without a stronger showing by plaintiff. See Sardi’s Rest.
Corp. v. Sardie, 755 F.2d 719, 725 (9th Cir. 1985); Brennan’s,
Inc. [v. Brennan’s Restaurant, L.L.C.], 360 F.3d [125], 131-32
[(2d Cir. 2004)].
This conclusion is inconsistent with the court’s previous findings that three
factors weighed in favor of The John Allan Company, while only one factor, the
absence of actual confusion, weighed in favor of The Craig Allen Company.
Initially, the court found that the defendants “purposefully used the mark
Craig Allen’s to take advantage of plaintiff’s goodwill” and therefore concluded
that The Craig Allen Company intended to copy the mark “John Allan’s.” It
stated, “[t]he fact that Craig Allen’s was named after one of the partners, Craig
Allen Tatro, seems too coincidental given defendants’ purposeful copying of
plaintiff’s registered marks and other features of plaintiff’s salons.” The district
court then proceeded to ignore this finding in resolving that Tatro’s use of his
own name, without more, was insufficient to establish a trademark violation.
“Evidence that the alleged infringer chose a mark with the intent to copy, rather
than randomly or by accident, typically supports an inference of likelihood of
confusion.” Utah Lighthouse Ministry, 527 F.3d at 1055. The focus is on
whether the defendant sought “to derive benefit from the reputation or goodwill
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of the plaintiff.” Universal Money Ctrs., Inc. v. AT&T, 22 F.3d 1527, 1532 (10th
Cir. 1994) (quotation omitted). In refusing to enjoin the use of the name Craig
Allen’s, the district court wholly ignored its prior finding that The Craig Allen
company sought to benefit from the reputation and goodwill of John Allan’s. 4
Although this court will not set aside findings of fact unless clearly
erroneous, internally inconsistent findings constitute clear error. See Mendiola v.
United States, 994 F.2d 409, 410 (7th Cir. 1993) (“Findings are clearly erroneous
if the trial court’s interpretation of the facts is implausible, illogical, internally
inconsistent, or contradicted by documentary or other extrinsic evidence.”). Thus,
further proceedings in the district court are necessary. Mor-Cor Packaging
Prods., Inc. v. Innovative Packaging Corp., 328 F.3d 331, 336 (7th Cir. 2003)
(remanding on basis of internally inconsistent findings in the district court).
4
Evidence of intent to copy does not create a rebuttable presumption of
likelihood of confusion, thereby shifting the burden to the defendant, as The John
Allan Company argues. Instead, the intent of the alleged infringer remains but
one factor in our analysis. A finding that the infringer intended to copy may lead
to an inference of confusion, even a strong inference, but the inference is a
permissive one. See Sally Beauty Co. v. Beautyco, Inc., 304 F.3d 964, 973 (10th
Cir. 2002) (“Proof that a defendant chose a mark with the intent of copying the
plaintiff’s mark may, standing alone, justify an inference of likelihood of
confusion.” (emphasis added)); Jordache Enter. Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d
1482, 1485 (10th Cir. 1987) (“A conscious choice of a mark similar to a mark
already in the marketplace usually supports a finding of likelihood of confusion
. . . .” (emphasis added)); Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 805 F.2d
920, 927 (10th Cir. 1986) (explaining “deliberate adoption of a similar mark may
lead to an inference of intent to pass off goods as those of another which in turn
supports a finding of likelihood of confusion” (emphasis added)).
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The district court appears to have given substantial weight to the fact
“Allen” is Craig Tatro’s middle name. Courts are generally reluctant to enjoin an
individual from using their own name. See E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle
Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1288 (9th Cir. 1992). This reluctance, however, “does not
extend to cases where there has been an attempt to confuse the public.” Id.
(upholding injunction on use of mark “Gallo” on retail cheese packages where
defendant intended to capitalize on reputation and selling power of Gallo
Winery). Because the district court found The Craig Allen Company chose the
name Craig Allen’s “to take advantage of plaintiff’s goodwill,” its reluctance was
misplaced. As the Second Circuit explained:
[I]f an individual enters a particular line of trade for no apparent
reason other than to use a conveniently confusing surname to his
advantage, the injunction is likely to be unlimited.
If, however, the second comer owns the company himself and
evinces a genuine interest in establishing an enterprise in which his
own skill or knowledge can be made known to the public, that argues
in favor of allowing him to use his own name in some restricted
fashion.
Taylor Wine Co. v. Bully Hill Vineyards, Inc., 569 F.2d 731, 735 (2d Cir. 1978)
(citations and footnote omitted). Notably, the two cases upon which the district
court relied were factually inapposite: both cases included findings that the junior
user acted in good faith and had not attempted to appropriate the name to take
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advantage of the senior user’s reputation or goodwill. See Brennan’s Inc., 360
F.3d at 130; Sardi’s Rest. Corp., 755 F.2d at 722. 5
The Craig Allen Company fails to cite to any precedent where a junior user
was permitted to use his given name in spite of an intent to benefit from the
reputation and goodwill of the senior user. On remand, the district court must
properly weigh the use of Tatro’s first and middle name, with its finding that The
Craig Allen Company’s adoption of the name “Allen” “seems too coincidental
given defendants’ purposeful copying of plaintiff’s registered marks and other
features of plaintiff’s salons.” Part of this process will require consideration of
Tatro’s historical failure to use the name “Allen” in a personal or professional
capacity. Cf. Brennan’s Inc., 360 F.3d at 131-32.
B. Actual Confusion
The district court also erred in its findings related to actual confusion. It
found that The John Allan Company “failed to establish actual confusion as to the
John Allan’s Mark.” The appellant argues that the district court ignored evidence
of actual confusion and this finding is therefore clear error. “Actual confusion in
the marketplace is often considered the best of evidence of likelihood of
confusion.” Universal Money Ctrs., 22 F.3d at 1534. A plaintiff, however, “need
not set forth evidence of actual confusion to prevail in a trademark infringement
5
The Craig Allen Company admits Tatro “had no previous experience in the
men’s grooming industry” and does not suggest it is entitled to use the name
“Allen” based on Tatro’s reputation.
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action.” King of the Mountain Sports, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 185 F.3d 1084,
1092 (10th Cir. 1999). A court may disregard as de minimis isolated instances of
actual confusion. Id.
The John Allan Company presented evidence from two witnesses who
testified about the confusion between the salons’ names. Although one witness,
Steve Alvarez, appears to have been primarily confused by the logo, he also
testified the name Allan’s/Allen’s was a source of his confusion:
Q: What role in that mental process of formulating those
associations did the fact that both businesses were using the
second name Allan’s/Allen’s in their business play in you
arriving at [the conclusion that Craig Allen’s was associated
with or a franchise of The John Allan Company]?
A: After the logo, it was the second indicator that they were
connected.
Q: How did the fact that both of these businesses decided to use
the name Allan’s/Allen’s as the second name of their business
affect you when you first saw a written depiction of this new
Wichita business?
A: I was excited that something as neat as in New York was
coming to Wichita; that it was a great opportunity.
A second witness, Chad Green, testified he was confused by the similarity
of the name Allan’s/Allen’s. He testified:
Q: Did you have any impression of John Allan’s when you went
in the first time to have your full service?
A: I thought it was very similar to Craig Allen’s as far as the look
and feel inside.
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It looked classy; leather chairs, the same as Craig
Allen’s; a bar, the same as Craig Allen’s; a pool table,
the same as Crag Allen’s; et cetera.
Q: Did you speak to anybody at John Allan’s about Craig Allen’s?
A: Yes.
Q: Do you recall that conversation?
A: It was a very short conversation. It was with my stylist.
Q: Do you recall what you said to her?
....
A: I said, “This place is a lot like Craig Allen’s. Is it owned by
the same person?” She said, “No.”
....
Q: When you asked the stylist whether John Allan’s and Craig
Allen’s were owned by the same people, what led you to
believe that they were owned by the same people?
A: The name was the first thing that came to mind. I thought
maybe it was a chain, maybe they were brothers, something
like that.
Here, the district court limited its inquiry and did not consider the potential
for confusion created by an appearance that the two salons had a common
sponsorship or affiliation. Amoco Oil Co., 748 F.2d at 559; see also First Sav.
Bank F.S.B. v. First Bank Sys., Inc., 101 F.3d 645, 652 (10th Cir. 1996)
(explaining “the ultimate question is whether” the use of a mark is “likely to
cause consumers to believe there is an affiliation” between the parties). The
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district court misapplied federal law by solely focusing its analysis on whether the
evidence established “that the companies were the same.” Green’s testimony
clearly established he was confused as to affiliation, which is probative of actual
confusion under our precedent. Alvarez’s testimony also indicated the use of the
name Allan’s/Allen’s confused him as to whether the two salons had a common
sponsorship or affiliation. Although this evidence may be de minimis, we leave
this determination for the district court to make in the first instance, on remand.
Likelihood of confusion is a question of fact and it is therefore within the district
court’s province to determine how this evidence factors into its findings. See
Heartsprings, Inc., 143 F.3d at 553.
IV. Injunctive Relief
The John Allan Company also challenges the district court’s refusal to
enjoin The Craig Allen Company’s use of the mark “Craig Allen’s” based on its
findings that Craig Allen’s Circle Design infringed on John Allan’s Circle
Design. We review a district court’s decision to issue or deny a permanent
injunction for an abuse of discretion. Harolds Stores, Inc. v. Dillard Dept.
Stores, Inc., 82 F.3d 1533, 1555 (10th Cir. 1996). “A district court abuses its
discretion when it issues an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly
unreasonable judgment.” Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation v. Wagnon, 476 F.3d
818, 822 (10th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted). Pursuant to the Lanham Act, the
district court has the “power to grant injunctions, according to the principles of
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equity and upon such terms as the court may deem reasonable, to prevent . . . a
violation [of the Act].” 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a).
The John Allan Company invokes the “safe distance rule,” which was
created to protect against defendants, found to have infringed upon a trademark
from
preserv[ing] . . . good will acquired through fraud. The due
protection of [trademark] and similar rights requires that a
competitive business, once convicted of unfair competition in a given
particular, should thereafter be required to keep a safe distance away
from the margin line—even if that requirement involves a handicap
as compared with those who have not disqualified themselves.
Taubman Co. v. Webfeats, 319 F.3d 770, 779 (6th Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted).
Like the original infringement itself, the safe distance rule is “founded on a
likelihood of confusion standard.” Id. Where confusion lingers, the infringer
must “not only [] secure a new non-infringing name (or other infringing
characteristic) for his product, but [choose] one so far removed from any
characteristic of the plaintiff so as to put the public on notice that the two are not
related.” Id.
In this case, the district court concluded The Craig Allen Company
infringed on three of John Allan’s protected marks: the J.A. Circle Design (both
the logo by itself and the logo with John Allan’s name) and the mark “A Return to
A Simpler Time.” The district court declined to enjoin The Craig Allen Company
from using these marks, however, because it found “[d]efendants ceased using
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these marks approximately two years ago and expended more than $20,000 to
effect the changes.” It therefore concluded it was “highly unlikely . . . defendants
will return to using the plaintiffs marks.” The John Allan Company does not
appeal this determination. Nor does it argue The Craig Allen Company is
continuing to use these offending marks with only minor modifications. Instead,
it suggests the district court had a legal obligation to apply the safe distance rule
to enjoin the defendant’s use of the name “Craig Allen’s” even if it found there
was no likelihood of confusion with respect to the name.
The John Allan Company misperceives the safe distance rule. Even if the
rule is applicable, it does not create a legal duty under which The Craig Allen
Company is obligated to act. See Badger Meter, Inc v. Grinnell Corp., 13 F.3d
1145, 1155-56 (7th Cir. 1994) (explaining the safe distance rule “addresses the
evidentiary issues of how carefully a district court must scrutinize new trade dress
of a prior infringer, not . . . the issue of the infringer’s legal duty to the first
user”). Although a district court may require a prior infringer to choose a mark
that avoids all possibilities of confusion, it is “not required as a matter of law to
do so.” Id. at 1156. The district court was well within its discretion to deny The
Craig Allen Company injunctive relief on these grounds. On remand, however,
should the district court determine the mark “Craig Allen’s” creates a likelihood
of confusion with “John Allan’s,” the court should revisit the issue of whether
injunctive relief is necessary.
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V. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, this court reverses the judgment of the district
court and remands for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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