FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
November 24, 2008
PUBLISH Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
DAVID SANDOVAL,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v. No. 07-2082
ROBERT ULIBARRI, Warden, Southern
NM Correctional Facility,
Respondent - Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
(D.C. No. Civ. 6:05-CV-1252 MV/ACT)
Brian A. Pori, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for the Petitioner - Appellant.
Steven S. Suttle, Special Counsel, Albuquerque, New Mexico, (Gary K. King, Attorney
General of New Mexico, with him on the brief), for the Respondents - Appellees.
Before LUCERO, HOLLOWAY and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges.
HOLLOWAY, Circuit Judge.
I
This appeal is from the district court’s denial of a state prisoner’s petition for habeas
corpus relief brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court granted a certificate of
appealability on three issues. Appellant Sandoval raises as a fourth issue the denial of an
evidentiary hearing in the federal district court. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§
1291 & 2253(c).
Mr. Sandoval challenges in these proceedings his conviction in New Mexico state
court on charges of aggravated battery and shooting at a motor vehicle, two of the four
charges he had faced at trial.1 The appellate court affirmed the convictions on those two
counts, and the Supreme Court of New Mexico denied review. Mr. Sandoval then brought
further proceedings in the trial court. First he filed a pro se application for writ of habeas
corpus, followed by a second application brought with the assistance of counsel. In each of
those proceedings, the trial judge denied relief and the Supreme Court of New Mexico denied
a petition for certiorari.
Mr. Sandoval then filed his petition under section 2254 in the federal district court,
assisted by counsel. The case was assigned to a magistrate judge for report and
recommendation. The magistrate judge issued a carefully considered report and
recommended that the district judge deny relief. The district judge adopted the report and
recommendation and dismissed the petition. As noted, the judge later granted a certificate
of appealability.
II
The following summary of the trial evidence is taken from the opinion of the Court
of Appeals of New Mexico. We note at the outset that no trial transcript has been provided
1
The jury had acquitted Mr. Sandoval of one count of aggravated assault. He had
been convicted at the same trial on a third charge, tampering with evidence, but that
conviction was reversed on direct appeal to the Court of Appeals of New Mexico.
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for our review, nor was one provided for the benefit of the federal district court as best we
can discern. Under Rule 5(c), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, the state should have
included in its answer information regarding the availability of transcripts or tapes of the
state trial and other proceedings. This apparently was not done, but Mr. Sandoval does not
appear to have raised any issue about the sufficiency of the record in the federal district
court, nor does he on appeal.2
The victim of the aggravated battery, a man named Parra, had an ongoing feud of sorts
with the Sandoval family. The origin of the feud was the alleged rape of appellant’s daughter
by Parra. That alleged offense was not prosecuted. But Parra and appellant’s son, David
Sandoval, Jr., had a “history of fighting” as a result.
On Easter Sunday evening in 2000, Parra and a companion, Bruhn, were driving in
appellant’s neighborhood. About a block from appellant’s house, they encountered
Sandoval, Jr., and his 13 year-old cousin, Daniel Jimenez. A quarrel ensued and soon moved
to the front of appellant’s house, at which point Daniel Jimenez ran inside and announced
that Parra and Bruhn were outside. When Mr. Sandoval saw Parra’s car, he ran upstairs and
got his wife’s rifle. Mr. Sandoval testified at trial that Parra had repeatedly threatened the
Sandoval family, and that he consequently believed that Parra had come to kill his family.
2
In appropriate circumstances, federal courts have several times disapproved of
using state appellate court summaries of the evidence in lieu of the actual record. See 1
Randy Hertz & James S. Liebman, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice & Procedure § 19.2
at 850 n.10 (5th ed. 2005) (collecting cases). But when, as here, the petitioner has
acquiesced in the practice and the state has not been shown to have acted improperly, the
practice has been held acceptable. See Baker v. Estelle, 711 F.2d 44, 46 (5th Cir. 1983).
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Mr. Sandoval admitted, however, that at first he had not seen any weapon in Parra’s hands.
From this point forward in the chronology, the testimony at trial was sharply
conflicting. Defense witnesses – including Daniel Jiminez, appellant himself, appellant’s
son, and at least one other relative – testified that Parra went back to his car and emerged
brandishing a gun and advancing on appellant’s son. When appellant saw Parra with a gun,
he tried to shoot him, but the rifle’s safety was still on. As he released the safety lock, he
testified, he saw Parra look up at him and taunt him with an obscenity. Appellant also
testified that he heard his son yell, “No, Dad, no!” By this time, Mr. Sandoval had emerged
from a second-floor window to the balcony. Parra and Bruhn turned to run, but Mr.
Sandoval started shooting, hitting Parra. Parra fell to the ground but then got back up and
made it to his car.
Appellant testified that he then decided to shoot at the car to disable it, so that Parra
would not be able to dispose of his weapon before police came. He said that as he resumed
firing, the smell of the gunpowder and the shouting caused a flashback in which he believed
that he was back in Vietnam fighting against the Viet Cong. He kept firing until his clip was
empty, but he testified that he had no recollection of that.
The prosecution’s evidence was that Parra and Bruhn were unarmed and only verbally
quarreling with appellant’s son when appellant started shooting. Bruhn was able to avoid
getting hit by getting behind a car. Parra was hit three times – once in the back and then,
after he got into the car and was trying to get away, he was hit once in the hand and once in
the knee. Several other bullets went into the car, shattering windows and blowing out two
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tires. In spite of that, Parra and Bruhn were able to leave the scene in the car.
Within two to four minutes, the victim’s car was stopped by a police officer as Bruhn
tried to take Parra to a hospital. There was disputed evidence from different police officers
about whether the route they were on was the shortest route to the nearest hospital. No
weapon was found in the car when they were stopped, nor was any weapon that Parra might
have had ever recovered.
When officers arrived at the Sandoval home, Mr. Sandoval quickly admitted the
shooting. He said that he had shot Parra for harassing his family. At that time he apparently
did not say that Parra had been carrying a gun, nor did other witnesses report that at the
scene, although several later testified to that effect.
III
A
We have noted that Mr. Sandoval was convicted at trial on three counts (with
conviction of one count having been reversed on direct appeal) and acquitted on a fourth.
We will briefly note other developments at trial that are significant as context for this appeal.
The victim, Mr. Parra, did not appear at trial. The prosecution moved for admission in
evidence of Parra’s testimony from the preliminary hearing, informing the court that it had
tried for a period of one year to locate Mr. Parra to secure his attendance at trial, but had been
unsuccessful. Counsel for Mr. Sandoval told the judge that it was essential to the defense to
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have the opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Parra in front of the jury.3 The prosecution then
summarized the efforts it had made to locate Mr. Parra and informed the court and defense
counsel that it was prepared to present testimony to establish the extent of those efforts. At
this point, defense counsel decided to stipulate that the state had made adequate efforts to
locate Parra for appearance at trial. This stipulation cleared the way for Parra’s testimony
from the preliminary hearing to be admitted at trial under an exception to the hearsay rule.
The attorney who represented Mr. Sandoval at trial and who stipulated to the
admission of Parra’s testimony from the preliminary hearing was the second attorney to
represent Mr. Sandoval in the trial court. The cross-examination of Parra at Sandoval’s
preliminary hearing had been conducted by Mr. Sandoval’s first appointed attorney. That
lawyer later was replaced by a second court-appointed attorney after he failed to maintain
contact with Mr. Sandoval and could not be located by the state. He was later disbarred and
was revealed to have had a substance abuse problem.
Appellant Sandoval testified in his own defense at trial, and his attorney called several
other witnesses who had been present at the scene of the shooting. The defense also called
a psychotherapist, Dr. Evelyn Sandeen, who had treated Mr. Sandoval for post-traumatic
stress disorder. The defense lawyer had failed, however, to give advance notice of the
proposed expert testimony as required under New Mexico court rules. Consequently, the
trial judge limited Dr. Sandeen’s testimony to the general nature of post-traumatic stress
3
Again, we take the facts from the opinion of the New Mexico Court of Appeals,
having no recording or transcript of the trial proceedings for our use.
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disorder and did not permit her to testify that Mr. Sandoval had been diagnosed with the
disorder, had been treated for it, and had been rated disabled by the Veterans Administration
based on this condition. Nor was Dr. Sandeen allowed to give her opinion that Mr. Sandoval
did experience symptoms of the disorder at the time of the incident in question.4
B
On direct appeal, the New Mexico Court of Appeals addressed two of the issues that
are now before this court. The appellate court held that the trial court had not abused its
discretion in admitting Mr. Parra’s testimony from the preliminary hearing in view of defense
counsel’s stipulation that the State had made a reasonable effort to locate Parra and have him
appear at trial. The appellate court rejected Sandoval’s contention that his defense had been
prejudiced by the lack of an opportunity to cross-examine Parra about medical tests that
showed the presence of alcohol in his bloodstream after the shooting. The court found that
Sandoval had failed to show that he had preserved that issue for review.
C
The state court trial judge was also the judge who reviewed and rejected Mr.
Sandoval’s two applications for habeas relief from the state courts. As noted, the New
Mexico Supreme Court denied certiorari review each time. The only substantive ruling from
the state court habeas proceeding is a two-page order issued by the state trial judge in
4
Facts recited in this paragraph of the text are from Sandoval’s brief on appeal,
which the state did not contest in its brief. There is one exception: Sandoval submitted a
letter from Sandeen which summarized testimony she could have given at the trial had it
been allowed.
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denying Sandoval’s second petition (on which he was represented by current counsel). The
ruling is so succinct that we re-produce it here almost in its entirety. The state habeas judge
held:
1. The factual assertations [sic] contained in the petition and including [sic]
supplemental affidavits are inconsistent with evidence introduced at trial and
in each instance are not necessarily probative of the defense theories advanced
by Petitioner or are merely cumulative to evidence heard and reviewed by the
trier of fact herein.
2. The hypothesis of self defense or defense of others propounded by
Petitioner herein, is inconsistent with the Petitioners [sic] own testimony at
trial and is self contradictory [sic] with the post traumatic stress syndrome
defense now asserted.
3. Petitioner herein has utilized four different attorneys, all having scrutinized
the performance and competence of his [sic] predecessor based upon
inconsistent theories of defense or justifications for the acts of Petitioner which
are not in dispute.
4. All of the factual, procedural and ancillary questions now raised by the
Petitioner were available to Petitioner prior to direct appeal herein and in fact
were presented as the basis therefore [sic].
The Court concludes Petitioner has not stated a legal claim for relief and
further, that the record herein conclusively evidences that Petitioner is not
entitled to the relief sought[;] this matter is therefore dismissed.
Aplt. App. 178-79.
IV
A
Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), a federal court
may not issue a writ of habeas corpus with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits in
state court unless that adjudication:
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(1) . . . was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States; or (2) . . . was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in
light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2).
As to the “unreasonable application” standard, we have held that:
only the most serious misapplications of Supreme Court precedent will be a
basis for relief under § 2254. In our view, a decision is “objectively
unreasonable” when most reasonable jurists exercising their independent
judgment would conclude the state court misapplied Supreme Court law. It is
not enough that the decision is clearly wrong or that the reviewing court would
have reached a contrary decision. . . . [T]he state court decision must be at
such tension with governing U.S. Supreme Court precedents, or so
inadequately supported by the record, or so arbitrary as to be unreasonable.
Maynard v. Boone, 468 F.3d 665, 671 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1819 (2007).
Finally, as a more general matter, this court has held that deference to a state court
decision on the merits of a federal claim is appropriate even when the state court does not
expressly articulate a rationale for its decision.
[W]e must uphold the state court’s summary decision unless our independent
review of the record and pertinent federal law persuades us that its result
contravenes or unreasonably applies clearly established federal law, or is based
on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented. This “independent review” should be distinguished from a full de
novo review of the petitioner’s claims. Our review is in fact deferential
because we cannot grant relief unless the state court’s result is legally or
factually unreasonable.
Aycox v. Lytle, 196 F.3d 1174, 1178 (10th Cir. 1999). Also, a state court adjudicates the
merits of a federal claim for purposes of AEDPA deference even if it decides the claim
without citing the controlling Supreme Court precedent. Harris v. Poppell, 411 F.3d 1189,
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1195 (10th Cir. 2005).
B
Sandoval asserts that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial, raising
several allegations of deficient performance by his lawyer. He argues that counsel failed to
conduct a reasonable investigation, failed to interview several potentially helpful witnesses,
and failed to consult and adequately prepare the psychologist, Dr. Sandeen, who did testify.
Sandoval contends that he is entitled to relief under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984), and that the state court’s denial of his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was
contrary to or an unreasonable application of that well-established precedent.
Under Strickland, Mr. Sandoval must show that counsel’s performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness as measured against prevailing professional norms, and
he must show that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been
different but for counsel’s inadequate performance. 466 U.S. at 688, 694. Establishing a
reasonable probability of a different outcome requires something less than a showing “that
counsel’s deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome in the case.” Id. at 693.
Instead, a reasonable probability “is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.” Id. at 694.
Sandoval’s first allegation is that counsel failed to conduct an adequate investigation.
That the duty to provide effective assistance includes the duty to conduct an investigation
that is reasonable under the circumstances of the case is clearly established law, being the
specific claim raised in Strickland itself. As for the circumstances of this case, Sandoval
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contends that his attorney “performed virtually no independent defense investigation of the
charges in this case and did not prepare adequately to present Mr. Sandoval’s only potential,
meritorious defense.” Applicant-Appellant’s Brief in Chief at 19. Sandoval goes on to say
that counsel apparently “did little more than review the discovery provided by the
prosecution and then appear in court at Mr. Sandoval’s side.” Id.
More specifically, Sandoval alleges that counsel failed to investigate and present
evidence of his fear of Parra and Bruhn based on their previous threats against his family;
failed to conduct any pretrial interviews with the prosecution witnesses; did not review Mr.
Parra’s medical records before the trial; and did not even interview defense witnesses until
the night before their testimony. We note, however, that several defense witnesses testified
that Parra had been armed and threatening Sandoval’s son. Probably the impact of this
evidence was undercut by the fact that none of the witnesses, not even Sandoval himself, told
the police immediately after the incident that Parra had been armed.5 The state court’s
conclusion that more, essentially cumulative, evidence on this point would not likely have
affected the outcome easily passes muster under AEDPA’s standard; the conclusion is not
unreasonable under the circumstances.
For reasons discussed further below, we do not think that the medical evidence
pertaining to Parra had the potential to affect the outcome of the trial as Sandoval claims.
5
Also, the fact that Sandoval’s son yelled out to him, “No, Dad, no,” or “No, Dad,
don’t shoot” (the record includes references to both versions), may have weighed in the
minds of the jurors as evidence that the victim was not directly threatening Sandoval’s
son at the time Sandoval began shooting.
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Most importantly as to this point, the assertion that the nature of the wound to Parra’s hand
could support an inference that he was gripping something hard at the time his hand was hit,
even if accepted, falls far short of proving that the object may have been a pistol. It is mere
conjecture that this evidence would have had persuasive force in supporting the claim that
the victim was armed. Because the jury evidently disbelieved four or more witnesses who
testified that Parra had been armed (perhaps because, as just noted, none of the witnesses so
stated during the initial investigation), counsel’s failure to investigate Parra’s medical records
and his resulting inability to use this evidence seems highly unlikely to have had any effect
on the jury’s findings.
C
Mr. Sandoval contends that his trial counsel’s failure to timely identify Dr. Sandeen
as an expert witness resulted in the trial judge’s limiting her testimony to general comments
about post-traumatic stress disorder and excluding any testimony from her about her
examination and treatment of Mr. Sandoval and her opinions regarding Mr. Sandoval. The
state does not dispute the factual basis for this claim. We have no hesitation in saying that
the trial lawyer’s performance on this specific task fell below the standard of objective
reasonableness. The issue, then, is whether this deficiency in counsel’s performance caused
prejudice to Sandoval’s defense.
First, we must consider Sandoval’s proffer as to the testimony Dr. Sandeen might
have given had counsel properly given notice that she would be testifying as an expert. In
support of his petition for habeas relief (both in state court and in the federal district court)
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Sandoval offered a letter from Dr. Sandeen that briefly set out her views. Aplt. App. 134-45.
We note as a preliminary matter that the state did not object to the form of this proffer or at
least does not do so on appeal.
In her letter, Dr. Sandeen said that she first met Mr. Sandoval shortly after the incident
and had known him for several years as a psychotherapy patient. (Dr. Sandeen’s letter is
dated about four years after the incident.) Dr. Sandeen refers to Mr. Sandoval’s “severe[,]
combat-related Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder” in the letter. Dr. Sandeen states that she
believes, based on Sandoval’s account of the incident, that he really did feel that he and his
family were threatened and that he shot Parra for that reason. Then Dr. Sandeen says that
“much has been made in this case of the fact that the young man was also shot in the back.”
She responds to this by opining that
Mr. Sandoval, when faced with the extreme stress of being threatened as well
as the visual and olfactory cues of handling and smelling a weapon being fired,
had a flashback to his Vietnam combat experiences. At that point, he was no
longer in contact with reality and did fire upon the young man’s back, seeing
him as an enemy combatant.
Dr. Sandeen’s letter makes no reference to Mr. Sandoval’s own testimony at trial.
In addressing the issue, we must first determine if the state court ruled on this claim.
We conclude that it did. The order issued by the trial judge on his later consideration of
Sandoval’s second state petition for collateral relief (in which he was represented by counsel)
was, as previously noted, quite terse. The order does not specifically mention Dr. Sandeen
or even expert testimony. But it does refer to the factual assertions in the petition and
accompanying affidavits generally. As to those factual matters, the judge said they were
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“inconsistent with evidence introduced at trial” and either “not necessarily probative of the
defense theories advanced” or “merely cumulative” to evidence produced at trial. In another
part of the order the judge referred to criticism of Sandoval’s previous attorneys, a rather
obvious reference to the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. There again the state
judge referred to “inconsistent theories of defense or justifications” for Sandoval’s acts.
We conclude that the state judge decided this aspect of Sandoval’s ineffective
assistance claim on the merits. We note that Sandoval has not contended otherwise.
Although the state court’s conclusions were stated starkly, they are not impervious to
analysis. “[W]e owe deference to the state court’s result, even if its reasoning is not
expressly stated.” Aycox v. Lytle, 196 F.3d 1174, 1178 (10th Cir. 1999) (emphasis in
original). We therefore will examine the state court’s conclusions with the deference
required under AEDPA.
On this point we cannot improve on the sound reasoning of the federal magistrate
judge who painstakingly examined the issue. That analysis focused on the discrepancies
between Dr. Sandeen’s opinion and Mr. Sandoval’s own description of the incident in his
trial testimony. As the magistrate judge pointed out, Mr. Sandoval did not testify that he
experienced a “flashback” to Vietnam before he began shooting at Mr. Parra. Nor did he
testify that the flashback began before he started shooting at Parra’s car. He testified that he
believed that Parra and his companion meant to do him and his family harm and that he fired
on Parra for that reason. He had fired at least three times before he began shooting at the car.
He testified that the “flashback” to Vietnam did not begin until he had begun firing at the
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automobile, which he did hoping to prevent Parra and his companion from leaving the scene
and disposing of the weapon Parra had brandished. At that point, he testified, the flashback
began and he emptied the rifle’s clip. As far as our record reveals, Mr. Sandoval never
testified that he perceived Parra to be an enemy soldier in Vietnam.
As the magistrate judge concluded, the discrepancies between Sandoval’s account and
Dr. Sandeen’s account held the potential to confuse and distract the jury about Sandoval’s
decisions, his state of mind, and his actions as he was shooting. Because of the
discrepancies, there is not a reasonable probability that Dr. Sandeen’s testimony would have
led to a different verdict. The state court’s conclusion that Sandoval’s defense was not
prejudiced by the limitation of Dr. Sandeen’s testimony is a reasonable one.
D
Sandoval claims that his Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights were
infringed by the admission in evidence of the preliminary hearing testimony of Mr. Parra.
The state points out that in the federal district court Mr. Sandoval based an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim on the same facts and did not directly contend that he had
suffered a Confrontation Clause violation. Sandoval had alleged in his federal habeas
petition that counsel had performed inadequately in stipulating to the reasonableness of the
state’s efforts to locate Parra and serve him with a trial subpoena, a stipulation that led to the
decision to admit his prior testimony. Although Sandoval’s brief focuses on the argument
that his right of confrontation was infringed, it also includes assertions that point toward an
ineffective assistance claim on these facts. Out of an abundance of caution, we will review
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the claim both as a direct claim of violation of the constitutional right of confrontation and
as another basis for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
On appeal, Mr. Sandoval cites the fundamental importance of the right of
confrontation and the interests it safeguards. But it is well established that prior testimony
may be used against an accused in a criminal trial where the accused had the opportunity to
cross-examine the witness at the earlier proceeding and the state has shown that the witness
was unavailable for trial. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004) (“Testimonial
statements of witnesses absent from trial have been admitted only where the declarant is
unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine.”).
On direct appeal, the New Mexico Court of Appeals held that the trial judge had not
abused his discretion in admitting the testimony because Sandoval’s counsel had stipulated
to the reasonableness of the state’s efforts to serve Parra, the only predicate for admission of
the testimony that had been challenged. Although the state court did not mention the
doctrine of invited error, its holding seems clearly to be an application of that principle. The
Confrontation Clause claim was thus waived (not forfeited6) in the state court. We do not
“consider issues that have been defaulted in state court on an independent and adequate state
procedural ground, unless the petitioner can demonstrate cause and prejudice or a
fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Hickman v. Spears, 160 F.3d 1269, 1271 (10th Cir.
6
See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (“Waiver is different from
forfeiture. Whereas forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right, waiver
is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.”) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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1998). Here, Sandoval does not address the procedural bar directly and has not presented
any argument – except ineffective assistance of counsel – addressing the cause and prejudice
requirements to overcome the effect of waiver. See Brown v. Sirmons, 515 F.3d 1072, 1092-
93 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, __ U.S. __ (2008).7 Thus, taken on its face as a claim of denial
of the right of confrontation, this claim cannot even be considered because it was waived in
state court. We turn, then, to consider whether the waiver – trial counsel’s stipulation that
the state’s effort to locate Parra was diligent – was itself an instance of ineffective assistance
of counsel that could be the basis for federal habeas relief.
Taken as a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Sandoval’s allegations about the
admission at trial of Parra’s previous testimony from the preliminary hearing has two main
branches – the first contending that the cross-examination of Parra at the preliminary hearing
was lacking, and the second challenging whether Mr. Parra was truly unavailable for the trial.
As to the adequacy of the cross-examination, Sandoval’s criticism is mostly speculative.
Because of the problems that later developed with the performance of his first attorney, he
suggests that the attorney may have been under the influence of controlled substances at the
time of the preliminary hearing. But no evidence is cited to support this suggestion.
Sandoval also makes two more specific contentions about the extent of the first
attorney’s cross-examination of Parra at the preliminary hearing. The first assertion is that
Parra was not confronted about the presence of alcohol in his blood when he was treated at
7
Another exception to the exhaustion requirement is recognized for a fundamental
miscarriage of justice, see id., but Sandoval does not invoke this exception.
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the emergency room immediately after the incident.8 The attorney had failed to obtain the
medical records before the hearing and was unaware of this medical finding. The second
assertion is that the cross-examination at the preliminary hearing did not confront Mr. Parra
with evidence that he had threatened the Sandoval family repeatedly prior to the incident.
The probative value of the evidence of alcohol in Parra’s blood is unclear. The
medical report in our record does not quantify the finding but merely notes that the ETOH
(alcohol) level was “elevated.” On this thin basis, we cannot say that Sandoval’s defense
was prejudiced by the failure to discover and use this evidence. The critical issue at trial was
whether Sandoval’s admitted acts were lawful as a response to an immediate threat to his
son, which seems to have been substantially a matter of whether the jurors believed the four
defense witnesses who said that Parra was brandishing a firearm or the testimony of Parra
and his companion who said that he was not. The additional factor that Parra had some
unknown amount of alcohol in his system at the time, while of some relevance to that issue,
does not appear to have had the potential to substantially affect the jury’s decision. As far
as the evidence reveals, Parra may have had enough to drink the night before that some traces
of alcohol were still detectable.
Sandoval also contends that the failure of his first attorney to confront Parra on cross-
examination about his past threats to the Sandoval family constituted ineffective assistance.
Sandoval and other family members testified at trial that they felt threatened. The state
8
This argument is related to the argument discussed in part IV-E, infra, that the
prosecution withheld evidence. The medical report revealing that Parra had alcohol in his
blood was not produced until trial.
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court’s conclusion that further testimony would have been merely cumulative and so that
Sandoval had failed to show prejudice was not unreasonable.
Therefore, Sandoval fails to show that the attorney’s performance at the preliminary
hearing fell below the objective standard of reasonableness, with the possible exception of
the failure to obtain the record of Parra’s emergency room treatment prior to the hearing.
Even if we were to assume that this was an instance of substandard performance, we see no
possibility, much less a reasonable probability, that the outcome of the proceeding would
have been different.
As to the decision by Sandoval’s second lawyer to stipulate to the reasonableness of
the state’s efforts to locate and serve Mr. Parra, we cannot say that the decision fell below
professional standards because, as far as our record reveals, the state’s efforts would have
passed a challenge for reasonableness if the challenge had been made. A witness was
prepared to testify about the efforts made to locate Mr. Parra, but we have no basis for
assessing the strength of that potential testimony.
We note that Mr. Sandoval’s argument about Parra’s unavailability relies on two facts.
First, it apparently came out at trial in discussion of the state’s efforts that Parra’s father
knew where Parra was but had refused to reveal his location to the prosecution. This is
troubling, but Mr. Sandoval does not say specifically what he contends his trial attorney
should have done in response to this situation. There may have been tools available to the
prosecution to convince Parra’s father to cooperate, but Mr. Sandoval offers no suggestions
and no legal authorities to support his argument. The second fact Sandoval relies upon is that
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during voir dire a prospective juror indicated that he or she had rented an apartment to Mr.
Parra in the recent past. But we do not know if the juror had actually seen Mr. Parra in the
intervening weeks or months, or whether anyone followed up on this information.
These two facts are, we conclude, insufficient to establish that counsel could have had
the prior testimony excluded had he tried to do so. That is to say, Sandoval casts some doubt
on the question whether Mr. Parra was truly unavailable, in the legal sense, but his evidence
is not sufficient for us to conclude that the state’s efforts to locate him were not reasonable.
Thus, we cannot conclude that counsel rendered ineffective assistance in stipulating to the
reasonableness of the state’s efforts to locate Parra.
Even if we were to assume, for purposes of argument, that it was a breach of the duty
of reasonable competence to enter into the stipulation that opened the door to the admission
of Parra’s preliminary hearing testimony, we would find that Sandoval has failed to show
prejudice sufficient to prevail under the Strickland standard. We have already discussed our
conclusion that Sandoval has failed to show that the cross-examination of Parra by
Sandoval’s first attorney at the preliminary hearing was ineffective. Sandoval apparently
would have us presume that a reasonably effective attorney cross-examining Parra at trial
would have brought out testimony about Parra’s past threats and the presence of alcohol in
his body at the time of the incident. We are not persuaded that there is a reasonable
probability that this would have affected the outcome.
Sandoval has not established that the state court’s decision rejecting his Strickland
claim was contrary to or an unreasonable application of that Supreme Court precedent.
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E
Sandoval argues that the prosecution’s failure to produce Parra’s medical records
before trial violated his Fifth Amendment due process right to a trial free from prosecutorial
misconduct, specifically the withholding of evidence that would have aided his defense. He
contends that the medical report on Parra’s treatment at the emergency room immediately
after the incident, which was not produced until the day of trial, was exculpatory evidence
that the prosecution had a duty to disclose before trial so that trial counsel could have been
prepared to utilize it. Sandoval asserts that the report showed that Parra had suffered a
wound to his hand but not an exit wound corresponding to that wound. This evidence, he
argues, would have supported his testimony that Parra had been armed, because the absence
of an exit wound could be explained as the result of Parra holding something hard, like a
pistol.
The state contends that this issue was not raised in Sandoval’s direct appeal and was
rejected by the state habeas court for that reason, citing the state court’s statement that all of
the issues raised in the state collateral proceeding “were available to Petitioner prior to direct
appeal . . . .” But the state’s brief truncates the quote in a troubling way: The state court
went on to say that the issues not only were available on direct appeal but “in fact were
presented . . . .” However, review of the appellate court’s opinion on direct appeal yields no
indication that this issue was in fact raised.
Under the circumstances, we will not decide this murky issue of procedural bar
because the claim is easily defeated on the merits. A claim of suppression of material,
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favorable evidence presents a mixed question of law and fact which we review de novo. See
Snow v. Sirmons, 474 F.3d 693, 711 (10th Cir. 2007).
Sandoval invokes the now-familiar rule of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963),
and its progeny, including Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). Brady held that due
process requires the prosecution to produce on request evidence favorable to the accused that
is material either to guilt or to punishment. Giglio held that the Brady rule encompasses
evidence that is favorable to the accused by tending to impeach a prosecution witness.
We are not convinced that the evidence in question was either material or exculpatory.
Sandoval does not show that, had the medical report been produced in ample time before
trial, admissible evidence could have been adduced that would have supported his preferred
explanation for the absence of an exit wound. No attempt is made to show what other
explanations might exist to explain the medical report, and of course we thus have no basis
to assess what the most likely explanation might be, or even if it is possible to gauge the
likelihood of any explanation. Without some evidence to support it, Sandoval’s assertion
seems merely speculative. We acknowledge that a primary component of Sandoval’s
argument is that there was no opportunity at trial to gather any such evidence, but Sandoval
had the burden in this proceeding to show that his theory was more than speculation.
Because he has failed to do so, we cannot find that the medical report constituted material,
exculpatory evidence, and so must conclude that no Brady violation has been established.
F
Finally, Sandoval contends that the federal district court should have held an
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evidentiary hearing before deciding the issues raised in his petition. Because Sandoval’s
petition is governed by AEDPA, he can obtain an evidentiary hearing in federal court by (1)
showing he was diligent in developing the factual basis for his claim in state court, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(e)(2) (2000); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 429–31 (2000), and (2) asserting a
factual basis that, if true, would entitle him to habeas relief, Schriro v. Landrigan, __ U.S.
__, 127 S. Ct. 1933, 1940 (2007); Mayes v. Gibson, 210 F.3d 1284, 1287 (10th Cir. 2000).
This means he must show that, taking his allegations as true, he would prevail on his claim.
Consistent with this standard, “an evidentiary hearing is unnecessary if the claim can be
resolved on the record.” Anderson v. Att’y Gen. of Kan., 425 F.3d 853, 859 (10th Cir. 2005);
see also Schriro, 127 S. Ct. at 1940 (“[I]f the record refutes the applicant’s factual allegations
or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary
hearing.”).
Sandoval has not shown that an evidentiary hearing would have aided his cause. We
will assume that Sandoval was diligent in developing the factual basis for his claim of
ineffective assistance in state court. The state does not contend otherwise, and it appears that
the evidence submitted to the federal district court had earlier been submitted to the state
court on collateral review. The dispositive point, we think, is that the district court did not
discount Sandoval’s evidence but held that the evidence was insufficient to show that he was
entitled to habeas relief on his claims. We have found no error in that conclusion. Because
the district court took that approach, as we have on appeal, the contention that an evidentiary
hearing would have helped Sandoval’s case is without merit.
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Although Sandoval, in his brief, asserts that the federal magistrate judge “repeatedly
acknowledged in his findings of fact that there were factual disputes presented by the
parties,” we disagree with that characterization. We have studied the portions of the
magistrate judge’s report to which Sandoval refers, and we find nothing to support his
statement. Most significantly, we find nothing in the magistrate judge’s report to suggest that
he discounted or disregarded any of the evidence Sandoval presented by affidavit and
otherwise.
Instead, both this court and the district court have credited the evidence presented but
found that evidence insufficient to show that Sandoval’s federal rights were violated. An
evidentiary hearing was not required under these circumstances.
Conclusion
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
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