FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
April 21, 2009
PUBLISH Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
GINGER MARTINEZ, individually
and as Personal Representative of the
Estate of Kenneth Wayne Ginn,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 08-6042
DeWAYNE BEGGS, as Sheriff of
Cleveland County; DAVID EPPS,
KEVIN BRANDON; CLEVELAND
COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS; TOMMY
EDWARDS; GILBERT KIRKLAND,
Defendants-Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
(D.C. No. 5:CV-07-132-F)
T. David Hasbrook of Hasbrook & Hasbrook, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for
Plaintiff-Appellant.
David W. Lee (with Ambre C. Gooch on the brief), of Lee & Gooch, P.C.,
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendants-Appellees.
Before KELLY, BRISCOE, and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges.
BRISCOE, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff-Appellant Ginger Martinez, individually and on behalf of the
estate of her father, Kenneth Wayne Ginn, filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against
the Board of County Commissioners of Cleveland County Oklahoma, Sheriff
DeWayne Beggs, and Deputies Kevin Brandon, Tommy Edwards, David Epps,
and Gilbert Kirkland alleging violations of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution for deliberate indifference to Ginn’s serious medical
needs after Ginn died while in police custody.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on
qualified immunity grounds after concluding that Martinez had failed to show a
genuine issue of material fact with respect to the subjective component of
deliberate indifference, and, thus, had failed to show a constitutional violation.
Martinez appeals. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and
affirm.
I
Ginn died on the evening of May 2, 2006, in the Cleveland County
Detention Center (the “detention center”) in Noble, Oklahoma, a few hours after
his arrest for public intoxication. An autopsy conducted after his death revealed
that Ginn had a blood alcohol level of 0.32%. According to the medical
examiner’s report, the cause of death was heart attack, and alcohol may have been
a contributing factor.
2
At 5:16 p.m. on the day of Ginn’s death, the police received a call reporting
a fight in progress. The fight was outside the home of Teresa Carlson. Three
officers responded to the call within a few minutes of one another—defendants
Kirkland and Edwards, and Barbara McSwain, who is not a defendant in this case.
Kirkland arrived first and noticed Ginn sitting on the ground in a section of
unfinished porch, between two porch runners approximately two feet off the
ground. 1 Kirkland did not see how Ginn came to be on the ground, so he asked
Ginn if he was alright and if he needed any medical assistance. Ginn said that he
was alright and did not need medical assistance. When asked if he had been
drinking, Ginn said, “yes.” Aplt. App., Vol. I, at 92 ¶ 5 (Aff. of Kirkland, Doc.
49-2). Kirkland noticed that Ginn’s speech was slurred, his eyes were bloodshot,
and he smelled of alcohol.
Carlson was standing nearby, and she told Kirkland that Ginn was a
neighbor who visited often. She also reported that Ginn had fallen and that he
had appeared to be knocked out for a short time. She stated that “Ginn had drunk
an entire bottle of whiskey,” “Ginn seemed to be hallucinating and seeing people
trying to get him,” and “that [Carlson] thought Ginn needed to go to the doctor.”
1
The district court interpreted “porch runners” to be floor joists and
concluded that “Mr. Ginn’s presence in that position would be reliable evidence
from which it could fairly have been inferred by the officers at the scene that Mr.
Ginn was intoxicated to the point of not being able to move about without some
risk of mishap.” Aplt. App., Vol. II, at 465 n.2 (Order at 3 n.2).
3
Id., Vol. II, at 255-56 ¶ 13 (Aff. of Carlson, Doc. 59-5). Additionally, Carlson
told Kirkland that Ginn tried to fight her daughter. Carlson told Kirkland that she
did not want to press charges; she only wanted Ginn off of her property.
Edwards arrived next, and Kirkland told him what had happened, including
that Ginn had drunk a lot of alcohol. Edwards approached Ginn, who was still in
the unfinished porch area, and told him that the police would have to take him
home. Ginn responded by asking Edwards if he wanted to fight and threatening
to “kick his ass.” Id., Vol. I, at 101 ¶ 5 (Aff. of Edwards, Doc. 49-4). According
to Carlson, one of the officers asked Ginn if he wanted to go to the hospital and
Carlson believes Ginn did not respond. When Carlson told the officer to call the
paramedics, she was told to “shut up and go inside.” 2 Id., Vol. II, at 256 ¶ 16.
McSwain was the last officer to arrive. Ginn had not moved from the
unfinished porch area. McSwain informed Kirkland and Edwards that she knew
Ginn personally and that Ginn was an alcoholic. McSwain tried to convince Ginn
to go home or to let the officers take him home. McSwain could tell from Ginn’s
reaction that he recognized her. Ginn replied that he did not want to go home and
again threatened to fight the officers. The officers then informed Ginn that if he
2
Carlson’s affidavit does not identify the speaker of these words.
However, because it is more favorable to Martinez, we assume that one of the
officers, and not Ginn, told Carlson to “shut up and go inside.” See Aplt. App.,
Vol. II, at 256 ¶ 16 (“I then told the deputy he should call the paramedics. I was
told to ‘shut up and go inside.’”).
4
did not leave Carlson’s property, they would have no choice but to arrest him for
public intoxication. Ginn refused to leave.
Edwards arrested Ginn for public intoxication. Ginn was generally
uncooperative during the arrest and would not get up from the ground. According
to Edwards, when Edwards reached down to help Ginn up, Ginn took a swing at
Edwards and said “don’t touch me.” Id., Vol. I, at 102 ¶ 7. After Ginn was
handcuffed near the porch area, “Ginn was unsteady on his feet, but he walked
entirely on his own two feet and [Edwards and Kirkland] did not carry him.” Id.
¶ 8. According to Carlson and her daughter, Misty Fisher, the officers picked
Ginn up and dragged him to the patrol car. The arrest affidavit, signed by
Edwards, reported that Ginn “was unable to stand.” Id., Vol. II, at 253. Kirkland
transported Ginn to the detention center.
Before the officers left, Carlson saw Ginn slumped over in the back seat of
the patrol car, and she worried that he had passed out. Kirkland stated that Ginn
was awake for the beginning of the ride, sitting upright and complaining about the
handcuffs being too tight. Kirkland suggested that Ginn lie down to relieve the
pressure on his wrists, and Ginn did as suggested. Kirkland thought Ginn “had
passed out, like most of your drunks do,” id., Vol. II, at 231:15-16 (Dep. of
Kirkland, Doc. 59-2), but Ginn was awake when they arrived at the detention
center. The drive took approximately fifteen to twenty minutes.
The officers did not administer a breath analyzer test or blood alcohol test
5
to Ginn. According to McSwain, such tests are only administered to suspects
arrested for drunk driving offenses, and not to suspects arrested for public
intoxication. The rationale for administering a breath analyzer test for drunk
driving and not for public intoxication is that Oklahoma law does not require
evidence of a person’s blood/alcohol concentration to establish public
intoxication.
At approximately 6:30 p.m., 3 Kirkland and Ginn arrived at the detention
center. Brandon helped remove Ginn from the car and helped him to a receiving
cell. Video surveillance from the detention center shows Brandon and Epps
escorting Ginn down a hallway toward the receiving cell. Ginn could not walk in
a straight line and the officers kept him from veering into the hallway walls. The
officers helped to support Ginn’s weight, but they did not completely carry him.
The detention center manual provides:
Any inmate who is charged with being under the
influence of alcohol or drugs or who has alcohol on his
breath at the time of booking should be considered as a
possible alcoholic. Inmates requiring detoxification or
booked on drug charges will be placed in a holding cell
for 4 to 6 hours or until sober and observed a minimum
of every 30 minutes. . . .
3
Brandon’s affidavit states the time as 7:25 p.m. The Oklahoma State
Bureau of Investigation report states that Ginn arrived at the detention center
around 6:30 p.m. For purposes of this appeal from the grant of summary
judgment, we assume Ginn arrived at 6:30 p.m. since that time is more favorable
to Martinez.
6
The booking deputy will ask the arresting officer about
blood alcohol level of the inmate which would mean
referral elsewhere based on a high blood alcohol level.
If the blood alcohol level is .30 or more the inmate will
not be accepted. If the inmate is unconscious, he will
not be accepted. . . .
If an inmate is booked into the facility under borderline
conditions the shift Supervisor will ensure that the
inmate is checked at least every fifteen minutes.
Id., Vol. II, at 349 (Manual, Doc. 59-14). According to Brandon,
it is not uncommon for an intoxicated person to be taken
directly to receiving, before being formally processed
into the [detention center]. This occurs when the
intoxicated person is unable, due to his/her intoxication,
to answer routine questions asked during processing.
So, the intoxicated person is placed in a receiving cell
for up to four hours to allow him/her to sober up enough
to answer routine processing questions, such as personal
history, family contact numbers, and medical
information.
Id., Vol. I, at 114 ¶ 5.
After Brandon and Epps took Ginn to the cell, Ginn complied with a
request to kneel down so his handcuffs could be removed. Brandon, Epps, and
Kirkland last saw Ginn alive and resting his head on his arms on his cell bench.
That evening, both Brandon and Epps were responsible for conducting sight
checks of all people housed on the first floor of the detention center, including
Ginn. However, no one logged in a sight check of Ginn that evening.
At approximately 9:35 p.m., about three hours after Ginn first arrived at the
detention center, Brandon returned to the receiving cell and found Ginn dead,
7
with his body in a kneeling position. Brandon called for back-up, checked vital
signs, and attempted life saving procedures, including trying to use an automatic
defibrillator. Fire department officials arrived and determined that Ginn was
dead.
The medical examiner, Chai Choi, M.D., answered interrogatories on behalf
of defendants stating that Ginn’s cause of death was “[s]udden heart attack due to
coronary artery disease” and that “the death was caused by heart attac[k] rather
than acute alcohol intoxication.” Id., Vol. I, at 134 (Doc. 49-14). However, the
examiner also stated that “I felt that the acute ethanol intoxication would be a
participating factor to his death.” Id. at 135. When asked if Ginn would have had
the heart attack if there were no alcohol in his system, Choi stated, “I do not have
an opinion (whether [Ginn] would have experienced the same heart attack without
acute ethanol intoxication).” Id.
Plaintiff’s expert, Kenneth Desser, M.D., opined that Ginn “died as a result
of severe ischemic heart disease, 4 compounded by a toxic blood alcohol level and
ventricular hypertrophy.” 5 Id., Vol. II, at 388 (Aff. of Desser, Doc. 59-17).
Desser stated that “Ginn should have been transported to a medical facility after
4
Severe ischemic heart disease is a “deficiency of blood supply due to
obstruction of the circulation to [the heart.]” Taber’s Cyclopedic Medical
Dictionary 947 (Clayton L. Thomas, ed., 16th ed. 1989).
5
Ventricular hypertrophy is the “[i]ncreased size and muscular content of
the myocardium of the ventricles,” or lower chambers in the heart. Taber’s, supra
note 4, at 870.
8
he was taken into custody by law enforcement officers.” 6 Id. If Ginn were taken
to a medical facility, Desser states “to a reasonable degree of medical certainty”
that the following would have occurred: the medical facility would have measured
Ginn’s blood alcohol level, that level would have exceeded 300 mg/dl, “which is
associated with coma and depressed vital signs”; Ginn would have been kept in
the facility for observation; while under observation Ginn would have
“experienced an acute coronary syndrome and ventricular arrhythmia”; Ginn’s
cardiac experiences would have been reversed with medical supervision and
treatment; after treatment, Ginn would have had either coronary bypass surgery or
percutaneous coronary intervention 7; Ginn would have also been treated with “a
beta blocker, aspirin, heparin, possibly nitroglycerin, oxygen and a statin”; and
that, therefore, “this was a preventable death.” Id.
II
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,
6
Desser gives no support for why officers “should have” transported Ginn
to a hospital. For example, Desser does not list any observable symptoms Ginn
would have displayed due to his intoxication that should have alerted officers to a
substantial risk of serious harm.
7
A percutaneous coronary intervention can be any of a variety of
procedures used to alter the structure of the blood vessels that supply blood to the
heart muscle, such as the insertion of a stent. See Taber’s, supra note 4, at 101
(defining “angioplasty”), 416 (defining “coronary”), 932 (defining
“intervention”), 1356 (defining “percutaneous”).
9
applying the same legal standard used by the district court. Reeves v. Churchich,
484 F.3d 1244, 1250 (10th Cir. 2007). Summary judgment should be granted “if
the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
“[W]e review summary judgment orders deciding qualified immunity
questions differently from other summary judgment decisions.” Medina v. Cram,
252 F.3d 1124, 1128 (10th Cir. 2001). When a defendant asserts qualified
immunity at summary judgment, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that: (1)
the defendant violated a constitutional right and (2) the constitutional right was
clearly established. Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815-16 (2009) (citing
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). In Pearson, the Supreme Court held
that the court has discretion to determine “which of the two prongs of the
qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances
in the particular case at hand.” Id. at 818. In this case, because defendants did
not violate Ginn’s constitutional rights, we need not address whether those rights
were clearly established.
Under the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause, “pretrial detainees
are . . . entitled to the degree of protection against denial of medical attention
which applies to convicted inmates” under the Eighth Amendment. Garcia v. Salt
Lake County, 768 F.2d 303, 307 (10th Cir. 1985). A claim for inadequate
10
medical attention will be successful if the plaintiff shows “‘deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs.’” Estate of Hocker v. Walsh, 22 F.3d 995,
998 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). The
Supreme Court cautioned that “an inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical
care” does not rise to a constitutional violation. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06.
A. Objective Component
The test for deliberate indifference is both objective and subjective.
Callahan v. Poppell, 471 F.3d 1155, 1159 (10th Cir. 2006). The objective
component of the test is met if the “harm suffered rises to a level ‘sufficiently
serious’ to be cognizable under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause” of the
Eighth Amendment. Mata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745, 752-53 (10th Cir. 2005)
(quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). In Mata, we explained
that it is the harm claimed by the prisoner that must be sufficiently serious to
satisfy the objective component, and not solely “the symptoms presented at the
time the prison employee has contact with the prisoner.” 427 F.3d at 753.
As to the objective component of the test for deliberate indifference,
Martinez simply contends, “Obviously, death satisfies this requirement.” Aplt.
Br. at 16. Martinez does not claim that intoxication alone is a sufficiently serious
harm. We agree with Martinez and the district court that “the ultimate harm to
Mr. Ginn, that is, his heart attack and death, w[as], without doubt, sufficiently
serious to meet the objective component” necessary to implicate the Fourteenth
11
Amendment. Aplt. App., Vol. II, at 478 (Order at 16).
B. Subjective Component
Having determined that the selected harm is sufficiently serious to meet the
objective component, we “can turn to causation and the subjective prong.” Mata,
427 F.3d at 753. “To prevail on the subjective component, the prisoner must
show that the defendants knew he faced a substantial risk of harm and disregarded
that risk, by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Callahan, 471 F.3d at
1159 (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A] prison official cannot be found
liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of
confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to
inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he
must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Unlike the objective
component, the symptoms displayed by the prisoner are relevant to the subjective
component of deliberate indifference. The question is: “were the symptoms such
that a prison employee knew the risk to the prisoner and chose (recklessly) to
disregard it?” Mata, 427 F.3d at 753.
The factfinder may conclude that a prison official subjectively knew of the
substantial risk of harm by circumstantial evidence or “from the very fact that the
risk was obvious.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. However, the Supreme Court has
cautioned that an obvious risk cannot conclusively establish an inference that the
12
official subjectively knew of the substantial risk of harm, because “a prison
official may show that the obvious escaped him.” Id. at 843 n.8.
Finally, the subjective component requires the prison official to disregard
the risk of harm claimed by the prisoner. 8 Our decision in Estate of Hocker v.
Walsh, 22 F.3d 995 (10th Cir. 1994) is instructive. In Hocker, Hocker was placed
in a detention center while intoxicated and at times incoherent or “would not
wake up.” 22 F.3d at 997. Two days later, she was discovered dead in her cell,
having hung herself from the upper bunk. Id. Plaintiffs argued that the detention
center’s policy of admitting intoxicated and unconscious individuals showed
deliberate indifference, but that argument was “flawed.” Id. at 998. Instead, we
concluded that the plaintiffs were required to show that defendants were
deliberately indifferent to the specific risk of suicide, and not merely to the risk
8
Martinez seems to argue that deliberate indifference does not require any
connection between the subjective disregard of a risk of serious harm and the
objective harm actually claimed. She states that “[a] general awareness of the
potential for harm is enough.” Aplt. Br. at 26. Martinez cites to Farmer, 511
U.S. at 825, and Winton v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Tulsa County, 88 F. Supp. 2d 1247
(N.D. Okla. 2000) (interpreting Farmer) for support. However, Farmer and
Winton are both prisoner assault cases, and the holding in these cases is that the
officers need not identify the specific assailant, but need only recognize the
substantial risk of the claimed harm—assault. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843;
Winton, 88 F. Supp. 2d at 1265. As regards the relationship between the
disregard of a substantial risk of serious harm and the objective harm claimed,
prisoner assault cases like the case at bar still require the officers’ subjective
disregard of a risk of serious harm, whether the harm is assault, or a heart attack
and death. Here, Martinez has not presented evidence to create an issue of
material fact regarding the defendants’ subjective disregard of Ginn’s risk of
heart attack or death.
13
of intoxication. Id. at 1000. In the case before us, the defendants must
subjectively disregard the risk of Ginn’s claimed harm—death and heart
attack—and not merely the risks of intoxication.
1. Individual County Defendants
Martinez contends that the district court erred in concluding that there was
no issue of material fact regarding the subjective component of deliberate
indifference as to each of the individual county defendants.
Martinez argues that a jury could find that Kirkland and Edwards, the
arresting officers, subjectively knew that Ginn faced a substantial risk of serious
harm. The arresting officers knew that Ginn consumed an entire bottle of
whiskey, he could not walk without help, he may have been unconscious for a
short time, he was talking as if he were hallucinating, and Carlson thought he
needed medical care. Carlson told the arresting officers that she thought Ginn
needed medical care, and they told her to “shut up and go inside.”
Martinez additionally argues that a jury could find that the custodial
officers, Brandon and Epps, subjectively knew that Ginn faced a substantial risk
of serious harm. The custodial officers knew that Ginn was drunk, too incoherent
to be booked into jail, had difficulty walking, had not been medically screened,
and was left alone in the receiving cell. Policies required the custodial officers to
visually check on Ginn, yet the officers failed to log in any sight checks for Ginn
between his arrival at 6:30 p.m., and when he was found dead at 9:35 p.m.
14
However, the sufficiently serious objective harm that Ginn faced was heart
attack and death, and not acute intoxication. We agree with the district court’s
determination that there was “no evidence in the record of any symptoms or signs
indicating that Mr. Ginn would suffer from a heart attack.” Aplt. App., Vol. II, at
479 (Order at 17); see also Aplee. Br. at 32 (“Ginn’s only external appearance
was that he was intoxicated, and voluntarily so.”). Additionally, the district court
noted that officers did not know Ginn’s blood alcohol level, there was no
evidence that Ginn was in pain or distress, and at all times Ginn was conscious
and understood that he was being arrested. The officers subjectively knew that
Ginn was intoxicated, but there is no evidence to show that anyone would have
known that Ginn would face an imminent heart attack or death, much less that the
individual county defendants subjectively knew that Ginn was at risk of heart
attack or death.
Martinez argues that this case is “very similar” to Garcia v. Salt Lake
County, 768 F.2d 303 (10th Cir. 1985). Aplt. Br. at 16. In Garcia, Garcia was
arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol after a traffic accident. 768
F.2d at 305. He was transported to the hospital for back pains, where he ingested
an overdose of barbiturates and escaped from the hospital. Id. Police found him
passed out on the pavement outside the hospital, and a medical doctor, with no
knowledge of the barbiturate overdose, declared him semi-conscious. Id. Garcia,
still semi-conscious or unconscious, was released from the hospital to be jailed
15
around 3:45 p.m., and officers were told to observe him. Id. There was no
physician at the jail “most of the time.” Id. at 308. The jail medic instructed that
Garcia was to be checked every fifteen to twenty minutes. Id. at 305. Instead,
the officers checked Garcia only every thirty minutes. Id. at 305-06. At 8:30
p.m., the medic reexamined Garcia, and he was still unconscious. Id. at 306.
When Garcia was checked at 10:15 p.m., he appeared to be dead. Id. Garcia was
then transferred to the hospital, monitored on life support, and ultimately life
support was discontinued. Id. An expert testified that Garcia would have
survived if he had been transported to the hospital when he was examined and
determined to be still unconscious at 8:30 p.m. Id. The jury found for the
plaintiffs on their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim based on the deliberate indifference of
the county policy of admitting unconscious persons into the jail and the jail’s
medical staffing deficiencies, and we affirmed. Id. at 308.
We agree with defendants that the facts of Garcia are distinguishable.
Although defendants in Garcia were aware that Garcia was unconscious for many
hours, they took no action to attend to his obvious medical needs. By
comparison, Ginn was conscious, on his feet, argumentative, and cognizant that
he was being arrested. Ginn exhibited “characteristics that are common to many
intoxicated individuals.” Aplee. Br. at 36. Whereas the practice of admitting to
the understaffed jail unconscious individuals suspected of intoxication shows a
deliberate indifference to an obvious and substantial risk of serious harm, Ginn
16
was not unconscious and showed no obvious symptoms indicating a risk of
serious harm. Nothing in the record indicates that Ginn exhibited symptoms that
would predict his imminent heart attack or death.
2. Sheriff Beggs and the County
Martinez contends that Beggs and the county should be held liable for
Ginn’s death because: (1) county policies and customs showed a deliberate
indifference to the serious medical needs of intoxicated detainees, and (2) Beggs
failed to adequately train and supervise officers regarding how to handle
intoxicated detainees. 9 Martinez asserts her claims against Beggs “in both his
individual capacity and his official capacity,” Aplt. Br. at 19, but she does not
argue that Beggs should be liable for any actions he took on May 2, 2006. 10
Rather, Martinez contends Beggs should be held liable for the actions of the
officers he trained and supervised. To the extent Martinez brings a claim against
9
Specifically, Martinez argues the following theories of liability in her
brief, all of which amount to a claim against the county regarding police policies
and customs or a failure to train and supervise: (1) the county is liable for any
unconstitutional policies implemented by Beggs; (2) the county is liable for
Beggs’ failure to adequately train the officers; (3) Beggs is liable for his
“personal participation” if he knew or should have known he would cause other
officers to inflict unconstitutional policies, Aplt. Br. at 23; (4) Beggs is liable
under the theory of supervisory liability; (5) Beggs is responsible for the
detention center policies; and (6) the county is liable for a pattern of
unconstitutional behavior.
10
Beggs was not present at Carlson’s house or at the detention center on
May 2, 2006. Therefore, Beggs cannot be liable under a theory that alleges his
direct participation in the events leading up to Ginn’s death.
17
Beggs in his official capacity, it is the same as bringing a suit against the county.
See, e.g., Myers v. Okla. County Bd. of County Comm’rs, 151 F.3d 1313, 1316
n.2 (10th Cir. 1998).
A county or sheriff in his official capacity cannot be held “liable for
constitutional violations when there was no underlying constitutional violation by
any of its officers.” Olsen v. Layton Hills Mall, 312 F.3d 1304, 1317-18 (10th
Cir. 2002) (internal quotations marks and brackets omitted). “[E]ven if,” as
Martinez argues, the “policies, training, and supervision [of the individual county
defendants] were unconstitutional, the [county] cannot be held liable where, as
here, the officers did not commit a constitutional violation.” Trigalet v. City of
Tulsa, 239 F.3d 1150, 1155-56 (10th Cir. 2001); see also City of Los Angeles v.
Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (“If a person has suffered no constitutional
injury at the hands of the individual police officer, the fact that the departmental
regulations might have authorized the use of constitutionally excessive force is
quite beside the point.”).
Likewise, Beggs cannot be held liable in his individual capacity for
implementing county policies or for the actions of county officers under a theory
of supervisory liability, when there was no violation of Ginn’s constitutional
rights. See Fogarty v. Gallegos, 523 F.3d 1147, 1162 (10th Cir. 2008)
(explaining that supervisory liability requires a constitutional deprivation
affirmatively linked to the supervisor’s personal participation).
18
As we have concluded that the individual county defendants (Kirkland,
Edwards, Brandon, and Epps) did not violate Ginn’s constitutional rights, Beggs
and the county cannot be held liable as a matter of law.
3. County Liability for “Systemic Injury”
Martinez finally argues that if no single individual county employee is
found liable, the county may still be liable for a “systemic injury” caused by “the
interactive behavior of several government officials, each of whom may be acting
in good faith.” Aplt. Br. at 27 (citing Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S.
622, 652 (1980)). As evidence of a “systemic injury,” Martinez outlines the same
concerns discussed above regarding lack of officer training and detention center
policies (1) to not administer breath analyzer tests to people arrested for public
intoxication, and (2) to allow intoxicated detainees to sober up in a cell for four to
six hours prior to booking. To the extent this argument pertains to the county’s
customs and policies, it has been addressed above. To the extent this argument
suggests that the county can be liable, even if no individual government actor is
liable, it is precluded by our prior precedent. See, e.g., Olsen, 312 F.3d at 1318
(“We will not hold a municipality liable for constitutional violations when there
was no underlying constitutional violation by any of its officers.” (internal
quotation marks and alterations omitted)).
C. Admissibility of the Detention Center Manual
Finally, we need not reach the defendants’ argument that the detention
19
center manual and its policies are inadmissible as irrelevant and as a possible
source of jury confusion. Even assuming the detention center manual and its
policies are admissible for purposes of this appeal, the evidence does not create a
genuine issue of material fact as to the subjective component of deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs.
We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of
defendants.
20