FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
August 10, 2009
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
PUBLISH Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
ROBERT J. MILNE, an individual;
TIMOTHY K. SORROW, individually
and as personal representative on
behalf of his deceased son, Samuel B.
Hall,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
No. 07-4247
USA CYCLING INC., a Colorado
corporation, d/b/a National Off-road
Bicycle Association; CYCLE
CYNDICATE INC., a Colorado
Corporation; ERIC JEAN, an
individual,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Utah
(D.C. No. 2:05-CV-00675-TS)
Steve Russell (Jordan Kendall with him on the briefs) of Eisenberg & Gilchrist,
Salt Lake City, Utah, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Allan L. Larson (Richard A. Vazquez with him on the briefs) of Snow,
Christensen, & Martineau, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Defendants-Appellees.
Before McCONNELL, EBEL, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
EBEL, Circuit Judge.
This diversity jurisdiction case involves Utah state law claims of
negligence, gross negligence, and wrongful death based on a tragic accident that
occurred during a bicycle race called the “Tour of Canyonlands” near Moab,
Utah. During the race, one or more of the racers collided with an SUV and trailer
driving in the opposite direction. One racer was killed, and another was badly
injured. The injured rider and the decedent’s mother—in her own capacity and on
behalf of her son’s estate—filed suit against the race’s organizers and the entities
responsible for promoting and overseeing the race.
The district court granted defendants’ motion to strike plaintiffs’ expert’s
second affidavit, and granted summary judgment for the defendants on all claims.
On appeal, the plaintiffs only challenge the district court’s decision to exclude
their expert’s opinion and to grant summary judgment for the defendants on the
plaintiffs’ claims of gross negligence.
Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we AFFIRM.
I. BACKGROUND 1
1
Because this case comes to us on defendants’ motion for summary
judgment, we construe all facts in plaintiffs’ favor. See Beardsley v. Farmland
Co-Op, Inc., 530 F.3d 1309, 1313 (10th Cir. 2008) (“This court reviews the
(continued...)
-2-
The “Tour of the Canyonlands” (“TOC”) is a cross-country mountain bike
race through the canyons outside Moab, Utah. The race begins on six miles of an
“open course” dirt road, where racers share the road with automobile traffic, and
continues for another nineteen miles on rugged off-road paths. On April 25,
2005, two racers—Samuel B. Hall and Robert J. Milne—were racing the TOC
when they struck a Ford Excursion SUV, and the trailer it was pulling, on the six-
mile open course portion of the race. Mr. Hall died at the scene from severe head
trauma. Mr. Milne was seriously injured, but survived the accident.
Following the accident, Plaintiff-Appellant Timothy Sorrow brought
negligence, gross negligence, and wrongful deaths claims personally and on
behalf of the estate of her deceased son, Mr. Hall, against the people and entities
responsible for organizing the race. Plaintiff-Appellant Robert J. Milne brought
claims of negligence and gross negligence on his own behalf against the same
defendants.
The three Defendants-Appellees were responsible for organizing,
promoting, and overseeing the TOC race on April 25, 2005. U.S.A. Cycling Inc.,
d/b/a the National Off-Road Bicycle Association (“NORBA”), oversaw the race
and drafted the rules governing the race, Cycle Cyndicate organized and promoted
1
(...continued)
district court’s summary judgment decision de novo, viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party . . . .” (quoting Herrera v. Lufkin
Indus., Inc., 474 F.3d 675, 679-80 (10th Cir. 2007)) (ellipses in original).
-3-
the race, and Eric Jean—the president and CEO of Cycle Cyndicate—played a
large role in administering and supervising the race.
A. Open Course Mountain Bike Racing
Although a portion of this race took place on an open road, the race was
governed exclusively by the mountain bike racing rules developed by NORBA.
These rules differ significantly from road racing rules. For example, road racers
must obey a “center-line rule,” and may be disqualified if they cross over the line
painted in the middle of the road. Mountain bike racers, on the other hand, will
not be disqualified for crossing the center-line. This distinction is based at least
in part on the fact that, unlike the roads used for road racing, open-course
mountain bike races often take place on dirt roads that do not have a clearly
marked center line. Thus, a center-line rule would be difficult, if not impossible,
to enforce.
Despite the fact that a mountain bike racer may not be disqualified for
crossing the center line, there was evidence that the race organizers told the racers
to obey a center-line rule. Even where no center-line rule is in effect, however,
racers are expected to be aware of their surroundings, and to veer right if they see
oncoming traffic.
Open-course bicycle races are apparently not uncommon in the mountain
bike racing world and are especially common in Utah. Mr. Milne testified that
-4-
about 25% of the mountain bike races he participated in were “open course”
races. The TOC itself has taken place in part on an open course since at least
1998.
Automobile-bicycle accidents are very uncommon at TOC. Mr. Jean stated
that throughout the more than ten-year history of the race, with races in many of
those years having nearly 500 participants, he is aware of only one accident
involving a bicyclist and an automobile—the accident that led to this case.
Perhaps because of the low frequency of vehicular accidents, NORBA has no
rules dictating that race organizers must regulate traffic on open-course trails to
avoid automobile-bicycle collisions. There was some evidence that, despite the
fact that NORBA has no such requirement, Mr. Jean requested permission to close
the road to traffic on the day of the race. Whether or not he made those efforts, it
is clear that the permit obtained for the race stated that the race could not stop
traffic for more than 15 minutes at a time. 2
B. The Racers
Both Mr. Hall and Mr. Milne were classified as “expert” racers, and had
extensive mountain bike racing experience. They had raced the TOC before, and
2
The race organizers obtained a permit from the Bureau of Land
Management (“BLM”) for the race. However, the record indicates that there was
a conflict at the time between the BLM and some of the County governments
regarding who had control over the roads in the area. This court expresses no
opinion on that conflict.
-5-
were familiar with the course. Before each of these races, they knowingly signed
liability release forms, which provided that the parties had waived all claims
against the race organizers, including claims premised on the organizers’
negligence. The releases also specifically mentioned that racers were assuming
the risk of collision with vehicles. Those warnings, in combination with the race
organizers’ pre-race announcements that the first six miles would be on an open
course shared with other vehicles, make it clear that Mr. Hall and Mr. Milne knew
they could encounter vehicles during their race.
C. Safety Precautions Taken by the Race Organizers
The race organizers took a number of safety precautions both before and
during the race. For example, the race organizers posted a sign warning people in
the area of the upcoming race, although that sign had been knocked down at least
once during the week the leading up to the race.
On the day of the race, the organizers posted, about a mile and half from
the starting line, some attendants whose job it was to warn drivers that a race was
taking place, that they might encounter some temporary road closures, and that
they would be sharing the road with hundreds of cyclists. Some race organizers
also testified that they approached people camped in the area to warn them that a
race would be taking place that day. Mr. Konitshek, the driver of the SUV
involved in the accident, testified that no one ever came to his campground to
-6-
warn of the race that morning, despite the fact that his campground was clearly
visible from the road. However, the other members of his party testified that the
race organizers warned them about the race as they drove away from their
campground.
The race organizers also arranged for 25 “course marshals” to help
supervise the race. Some of those marshals were posted near intersections or
sharp turns in order to mitigate some of the risks associated with the automobile
traffic the racers might encounter. However, no one was assigned to the area
right near the accident site, which was relatively straight and wide. Further, even
though some course marshals had been assigned to areas between the starting line
and the place of the accident, some witnesses testified that they did not notice
anyone directing traffic in that area. In addition to the course marshals, Mr. Jean
had a few people available to administer first aid to injured riders. Mr. Jean
himself also carried a backpack with some medical equipment.
Finally, the race organizers made significant efforts to inform the racers
that they might encounter vehicles during the race. In order to ride, race
participants had to sign a liability release waiver that specifically mentioned the
potential for vehicular accidents. Further, before the race began, the race
organizers announced that the TOC was an open course race, and that racers
might encounter automobile traffic.
-7-
D. The Accident
Mr. Konitshek was driving a 2001 Ford Excursion with a 30-foot trailer
about five miles from the starting line when he noticed that a group of bikers
were approaching his car from the opposite direction. The bikers were spread out
too wide for their lane of travel. That portion of the road was relatively wide,
open, and fast. The visibility there was also relatively good. Although the view
was partially blocked by some rocks, Mr. Konitshek’s SUV and trailer were
visible to racers from at least 150 feet away. Mr. Konitshek testified that, when
he saw the oncoming bikers, he veered as far right in his lane of travel as
possible, and remained on the right side of the road the entire time. 3 He was
going about 5 miles per hour when one of the bikers hit his left sideview mirror,
causing it to bang into his window and shatter.
Casey Byrd, a rider who was just behind Mr. Hall and Mr. Milne when the
accident occurred, testified that right before the accident, Mr. Hall had attempted
to pass both himself and Mr. Milne. Mr. Byrd was immediately behind Mr.
3
There was conflicting evidence on whether Mr. Konitshek or the racers
had crossed the center line of the road. Mr. Konitshek was adamant that he had
remained on his side. However, one of the riders witnessing the accident testified
that the riders remained on their side of the road, although he then recanted his
testimony to some extent, stating that it was hard to tell whether the riders and/or
the truck had remained on their respective sides of the road. Another rider
testified at his deposition that he was certain that Mr. Konitshek’s SUV extended
beyond the center line. Still another testified that the SUV certainly remained on
its side of the road the entire time. For purposes of this appeal, we will assume
the facts most favorable to Plaintiffs’ argument.
-8-
Milne, so Mr. Hall passed him first. Mr. Byrd testified that Mr. Hall passed very
closely and, because of his proximity and his speed—Mr. Hall was riding about
25 miles per hour at that time—Mr. Casey could feel the wind coming off him as
he passed. Then, as Mr. Hall began to pass Mr. Milne, their handlebars locked
together, causing them to veer left and strike Mr. Konitshek’s camper. It is not
entirely clear what happened next, but at least one racer testified that he saw the
trailer run over Mr. Hall.
E. The District Court’s Decision
The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on all
claims. On the plaintiff’s gross negligence claims, the court determined that the
undisputed facts showed that defendants had taken a number of steps to protect
the racers’ safety, and even if those steps were taken negligently, they were not
grossly negligent. The district court also struck plaintiffs’ expert’s second
affidavit, finding that plaintiffs’ witness was not qualified to testify as an expert
on mountain bike races. This appeal, challenging the district court’s grant of
summary judgment on plaintiffs’ gross negligence claims and the court’s decision
to strike plaintiffs’ expert, timely followed.
II. Discussion
A. Federal Law Dictates Summary Judgment Standard
-9-
Before turning to the facts of this case, this court must address whether
Utah’s summary judgment rules preclude this court from upholding the district
court’s grant of summary judgment. Under federal law, a defendant may be
granted summary judgment whenever plaintiffs fail adequately to “support one of
the elements of their claim upon which they ha[ve] the burden of proof.” Jensen
v. Kimble, 1 F.3d 1073, 1079 (10th Cir. 1993).
Utah’s approach to summary judgment is generally parallel to the federal
courts’ approach. See, e.g., Burns v. Cannondale Bicycle Co., 876 P.2d 415, 418-
20 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (affirming summary judgment for defendants because
plaintiff failed to bring evidence supporting one of the elements regarding which
it had the burden of proof). However, Utah has a special rule for summary
judgment in negligence cases that differs significantly from federal law. Under
Utah law, “[s]ummary judgment in negligence cases, including gross negligence
cases, is inappropriate unless the applicable standard of care is fixed by law.”
Pearce v. Utah Athletic Foundation, 179 P.3d 760, 767 (Utah 2008) (emphasis
added) (internal quotation omitted). In other words, Utah courts would prevent
either party to a negligence dispute from obtaining summary judgment where the
standard of care applicable to that dispute has not been “fixed by law.” See Berry
v. Greater Park City Co., 171 P.3d 442, 449 (Utah 2007) (explaining that Utah
courts will not grant summary judgment in a gross negligence case where the
applicable standard of care has not been fixed by law because “[i]dentification of
- 10 -
the proper standard of care is a necessary precondition to assessing the degree to
which conduct deviates, if at all, from the standard of care—the core test in any
claim of gross negligence”); but see RJW Media, Inc. v. CIT Group/Consumer
Finance, Inc., 202 P.3d 291, 296 (Utah Ct. App. 2008) (affirming grant of
summary judgment for defendant in a negligence case where the standard of care
had not been “fixed by law” but the defendant had presented uncontested
evidence of the appropriate standard of care).
In Pearce, 179 P.3d 760, the most recent Utah Supreme Court case to
consider this issue, the plaintiff brought gross negligence claims arising out of
injuries that occurred during a bobsled ride. The Utah court reversed the lower
court’s grant of summary judgment for the defendants, concluding that summary
judgment was inappropriate because the applicable standard of care had not been
“fixed by law.” The court held that the generally applicable “reasonably prudent
person” standard was insufficiently specific to constitute a standard of care “fixed
by law.” Id. at 768 n.2. Rather, for the standard of care in that case to be “fixed
by law,” a statute or judicial precedent must articulate “specific standards for
designing, constructing, and testing a bobsled run for the public or for operating a
public bobsled ride.” Id.; see also Berry, 171 P.3d at 449 (denying motion for
summary judgment in negligence case involving a skiercross course because the
applicable standard of care was not “fixed by law”); Wycalis v. Guardian Title of
Utah, 780 P.2d 821, 825 (Utah. Ct. App. 1989) (stating that “the applicable
- 11 -
standard of care in a given case may be established, as a matter of law, by
legislative enactment or prior judicial decision”). Since no statute or precedent
provided a standard of care for bobsled rides, the Utah court denied the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Pearce, 179 P.3d at 768.
Applying Utah law to this case would probably require that we reverse the
district court’s grant of summary judgment. It is undisputed that no Utah
precedent or legislative enactment specifically establishes the standard of care for
running mixed-course bicycle races. Thus, under Utah law, the standard of care
in this case is not “fixed by law,” and summary judgment would be inappropriate.
Under federal law, on the other hand, a defendant need not establish that
the standard of care specific to the factual context of the case has been “fixed by
law” in order to be granted summary judgment. See Gans v. Mundy, 762 F.2d
338, 342 (3rd Cir. 1985) (holding that defendant moving for summary judgment
in a legal malpractice claim need not present expert testimony establishing a
standard of care even though a plaintiff in that position would need to do so,
because the case law establishing the plaintiff’s duty to provide expert testimony
“cannot fairly be characterized as applying to a defendant’s motion under Rule
56”) (emphasis in original); see also id. at 343 (“[T]he party moving for summary
judgment has the ultimate burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue as to
any material fact. But once the appellees averred facts and alleged that their
conduct was not negligent, a burden of production shifted to the appellant to
- 12 -
proffer evidence that would create a genuine issue of material fact as to the
standard of care.”) (citations omitted); see generally Young v. United Auto.
Workers Labor Employment and Training Corp., 95 F.3d 992, 996 (10th Cir.
1996) (“A party who moves for summary judgment under Rule 56 is not required
to provide evidence negating an opponent’s claim. Rather, the burden is on the
nonmovant, who must present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly
supported motion for summary judgment.”) (citations and quotations omitted).
On the contrary, federal courts will sometimes grant summary judgment to
defendants on negligence claims precisely because of the plaintiff’s failure to
present evidence establishing a standard of care as part of its burden of proof on
an element of plaintiff’s case. See, e.g., Briggs v. Washington Metro. Area
Transit Auth., 481 F.3d 839, 841 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (affirming grant of summary
judgment for defendants on a negligence claim where plaintiff, who under state
law had the burden to provide expert testimony on the standard of care, failed to
“offer creditable evidence sufficient to establish a controlling standard of care”);
Keller v. Albright, 1 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1281-82 (D. Utah 1997) (granting
defendant’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s legal malpractice claim
asserted under Utah law because the plaintiff failed to provide expert testimony
regarding the standard of care, and the case did not involve circumstances “within
the common knowledge and experience of lay jurors”) (citation and quotation
omitted), aff’d, No. 97-4205, 1998 WL 163363 (10th Cir. Apr. 8, 1998)
- 13 -
(unpublished) (affirming “for substantially those reasons set out in the district
court’s [opinion]”). Thus, even when Utah substantive law was involved, the
federal district court of Utah and the Tenth Circuit have held that the federal
courts may grant a defendant summary judgment on a negligence claim even if
the parameters of the standard of care in the relevant industry have not been
previously established by precedent or statute. 4 See also Noel v. Martin, No. 00-
1532, 21 F. App’x 828, 836 *7 (10th Cir. Oct. 19, 2001) (unpublished) (upholding
summary judgment for defendants in a legal malpractice case where the district
court properly dismissed plaintiff’s only expert on the issue of the standard of
care).
In Foster v. Alliedsignal, Inc., 293 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2002), this court
addressed a closely analogous set of facts involving a conflict between federal
and state law standards for granting summary judgment. Foster involved a
retaliatory discharge case brought pursuant to Kansas law. Id. at 1190-91. Under
Kansas law, a plaintiff can prevail at trial if she establishes her case with “clear
and convincing evidence.” Id. at 1194 (internal quotation omitted). However,
Kansas law provides that “a plaintiff in a retaliation case . . . . can successfully
oppose a motion for summary judgment by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id.
at 1194 (internal quotation and citation omitted). In Foster, this court rejected the
4
Admittedly, there is no indication in Keller v. Albright, 1 F. Supp. 2d
1279, that the plaintiff there argued that the Utah standard for granting summary
judgment in a negligence claim should apply.
- 14 -
plaintiff’s efforts to have that lower evidentiary standard apply at the summary
judgment stage in federal court. Id. at 1194-95. Instead, this court held that the
Supreme Court’s opinion in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242
(1986), required that courts “view the evidence through the prism of the
substantive evidentiary burden.” Id. at 254; see also Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee
Corp., 769 F.2d 1451, 1454-55 (10th Cir. 1985) (stating, in the context of a
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, that “the question of the
sufficiency of the evidence needed to go to the jury in a diversity case is a matter
of federal law”); Bank of Cali., N.A. v. Opie, 663 F.2d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1981)
(“[F]ederal law alone governs whether evidence is sufficient to raise a question
for the trier-of-fact.”). Applying that standard to the case before it, this court in
Foster held that, at summary judgment, the plaintiff “must set forth evidence of a
clear and convincing nature that, if believed by the ultimate factfinder, would
establish that plaintiff was more likely than not the victim of illegal retaliation by
her employer.” Foster, 293 F.3d at 1195. See also Conrad v. Bd. of Johnson
County Comm’rs, 237 F. Supp. 2d 1204, 1266-67 (D. Kan. 2002) (holding that,
for state law retaliatory discharge claims, the “clear and convincing standard is
applied at the summary judgment stage—at least when the claim is brought in a
federal court sitting in diversity”). Thus, although the state law dictated that a
plaintiff alleging retaliatory discharge could avoid summary judgment under a
preponderance of the evidence standard, federal law required that the substantive
- 15 -
standard applied at trial (i.e., clear and convincing evidence) governs summary
judgment determinations. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); McEwen v.
Delta Air Lines, Inc., 919 F.2d 58, 60 (7th Cir. 1990) (“Federal courts may grant
summary judgment under Rule 56 on concluding that no reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the party opposing the motion, even if the state would require
the judge to submit an identical case to the jury.”); 10A Charles Alan Wright,
Arthur R. Miller, and Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2712 (3d
ed. 1998) (“[I]n diversity-of-citizenship actions questions relating to the
availability of summary judgment, such as whether there is a disputed issue of
fact that is sufficient to defeat the motion, are procedural and therefore governed
by Rule 56, rather than by state law.”).
The circumstances of this case are very similar to what we addressed in
Foster. Like the evidentiary rule in Foster, Utah’s rule foreclosing summary
judgment in cases where the standard of care has not been fixed by law applies
exclusively at summary judgment. This is clear because Utah law provides that,
at trial, the plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating the appropriate standard of
care. See Webb v. Univ. of Utah, 125 P.3d 906, 909 (Utah 2005) (“To establish a
claim of negligence, the plaintiff must establish . . . that the defendant owed the
plaintiff a duty [and] that the defendant breached that duty . . . .”) (citations and
quotations omitted); Sohm v. Dixie Eye Ctr., 166 P.3d 614, 619 (Utah Ct. App.
2007) (“To sustain a medical malpractice action, a plaintiff must demonstrate . . .
- 16 -
the standard of care by which the [physician’s] conduct is to be measured . . . .”
(quoting Jensen v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 82 P.3d 1076, 1095-96 (Utah 2003))
(alteration in original)); see also Model Utah Jury Instructions, Second Edition,
CV301B (2009), http://www.utcourts.gov/resources/muji/ (stating that “to
establish medical malpractice” a plaintiff “has the burden of proving,” inter alia,
“what the standard of care is”); id. at CV302 (putting the same burden of proof on
a plaintiff attempting to prove nursing negligence). By allowing the plaintiff to
avoid summary judgment in cases where the standard of care has not been fixed
by law, Utah has created a rule very similar to Kansas’s rule allowing plaintiffs to
avoid summary judgment under a lesser standard of proof than they would carry
at trial. We are, therefore, bound to treat Utah’s unique summary judgment rule
in the same way that we treated the rule in Foster, and conclude that, although we
will look to Utah law to determine what elements the plaintiffs must prove at trial
to prevail on their claims, see Oja v. Howmedica, Inc., 111 F.3d 782, 792 (10th
Cir. 1997) (stating that “in a diversity action we examine the evidence in terms of
the underlying burden of proof as dictated by state law”), we will look
exclusively to federal law to determine whether plaintiffs have provided enough
evidence on each of those elements to withstand summary judgment. 5 As we
5
Even if the defendants have some burden to establish that the race was run
in accordance with the standard of care in order to be granted summary judgment,
they have met that burden controlling. The defendants put on evidence from a
number of experienced biking participants that this race was carefully run in
(continued...)
- 17 -
discuss in the following section, this approach leads us to concur with the district
court’s decision granting summary judgment for the defendants.
B. Plaintiffs Failed to Provide Evidence of Gross Negligence
1. Standard of Review
5
(...continued)
accordance with the standard of care they have come to expect in mountain-bike
races. Once the testimony of plaintiffs’ expert Sean Collinsworth is excluded, as
we hold later was appropriate, plaintiffs put on no conflicting evidence from any
witness qualified to articulate a proper standard of care for a mountain bike race.
Further, under Utah law, it would probably be unnecessary for defendants to
present expert testimony to establish compliance with the standard of care in this
case. Compare Collins v. Utah State Dev. Ctr., 992 P.2d 492, 494-95 (Utah Ct.
App. 1999) (holding that expert testimony was not necessary in case involving
claim that a center working with the developmentally disabled was negligent for
allowing a resident to ride a swing without any safety devices designed to ensure
that she would not fall off), and Schreiter v. Wasatch Manor, Inc., 871 P.2d 570,
574-75 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (holding that expert testimony was not necessary in
a case involving allegations that a senior living center was negligent for failing to
install a fire sprinkler system), with Macintosh v. Staker Paving and Const. Co.,
2009 WL 953712, *1 (Utah Ct. App. Apr. 9, 2009) (unpublished) (holding that
expert testimony was needed to establish the standard of care in a case involving
traffic control at a construction site because of the complex rules governing
traffic control in that context); see generally Preston & Chambers, P.C. v. Koller,
943 P.2d 260, 263 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (“Expert testimony is required where the
average person has little understanding of the duties owed by particular trades or
professions, as in cases involving medical doctors, architects, and engineers.”)
(citations and quotations omitted). In any event, plaintiffs have cited no law
establishing that Utah would require an expert in this case, and have not
addressed this question in their briefs, so this issue is not before us on appeal.
Thus, even if the defendants have the burden at summary judgment to establish
that there is no genuine dispute of fact that their conduct satisfied the applicable
standard of care, we hold that on this summary judgment record, defendants
satisfied that burden.
- 18 -
“This court reviews the district court’s summary judgment decision de
novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party
. . . .” Beardsley v. Farmland Co-Op, Inc., 530 F.3d 1309, 1313 (10th Cir. 2008)
(quoting Herrera v. Lufkin Indus., Inc., 474 F.3d 675, 679-80 (10th Cir. 2007))
(ellipses in original). “Summary judgment is appropriate if the record evidence
shows there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Praseuth v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 406
F.3d 1245, 1255 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). This court will
grant summary judgment for a defendant if the plaintiff fails adequately “to
support one of the elements of their claim upon which they ha[ve] the burden of
proof.” Jensen, 1 F.3d at 1079. A plaintiff “cannot avoid summary judgment
merely by presenting a scintilla of evidence to support her claim; she must proffer
facts such that a reasonable jury could find in her favor.” Turner v. Public Serv.
Co. of Colo., 563 F.3d 1136, 1142 (10th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
2. Analysis
The parties agree that, under Utah law, the liability releases signed by Mr.
Milne and Mr. Hall preclude the plaintiffs from bringing ordinary negligence
claims against the defendants. See Pearce, 179 P.3d at 765 (stating that “people
may contract away their rights to recover in tort for damages caused by the
ordinary negligence of others”); see also id. at 766 (holding that “recreational
- 19 -
activities do not constitute a public interest and that, therefore, preinjury releases
for recreational activities cannot be invalidated under the public interest
exception”). However, the plaintiffs argue—and, on appeal, the defendants do
not contest—that, under Utah law, a liability release will not prevent a plaintiff
from bringing claims of gross negligence. Cf. Hawkins ex rel. Hawkins v. Peart,
37 P.3d 1062, 1065 (Utah 2001) (stating in dicta that a liability release “is always
invalid if it applies to harm wilfully inflicted or caused by gross or wanton
negligence”) (quoting 6A Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts, § 1472, at
596-97 (1962)). Thus, the only merits issue raised on appeal is whether plaintiffs
have offered enough evidence in support of their claims of gross negligence to
withstand a motion for summary judgment. 6
Under Utah law, “[g]ross negligence is the failure to observe even slight
care; it is carelessness or recklessness to a degree that shows utter indifference to
the consequences that may result.” Moon Lake Elec. Ass’n, Inc. v. Ultrasystems
W. Constructors, Inc., 767 P.2d 125, 129 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (quoting Atkin
Wright & Miles v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 709 P.2d 330, 335 (Utah
1985)) (emphasis added); see also Pearce, 179 P.3d at 767 (same). Thus, “the
6
Aside from her negligence and gross negligence claims, Plaintiff Sorrow
also brought wrongful death claims relating to Mr. Hall’s death. However, the
appellants have not adequately addressed those claims on appeal, so they will be
deemed to have been waived. See United States v. Abdenbi, 361 F.3d 1282, 1289
(10th Cir. 2004) (“The failure to raise an issue in an opening brief waives that
issue.”).
- 20 -
task confronting a plaintiff who claims injury due to a defendant’s gross
negligence is markedly greater than that of a plaintiff who traces his injury to
ordinary negligence. Gross negligence requires proof of conduct substantially
more distant from the appropriate standard of care than does ordinary
negligence.” Berry, 171 P.3d at 449.
“Whether an actor’s conduct constitutes negligence is generally a factual
question left to a jury. The question should only be answered by the court in rare
cases where the evidence is susceptible to only one possible inference.” Roberts
v. Printup, 422 F.3d 1211, 1218 (10th Cir. 2005) (citations and quotations
omitted). However, appeals courts have affirmed grants of summary judgment on
gross negligence claims where the undisputed evidence showed that the
defendants took precautionary measures and did not ignore known and obvious
risks. Cf. Milligan v. Big Valley Corp., 754 P.2d 1063, 1069 (Wyo. 1988)
(affirming summary judgment for defendants on “willful and wanton misconduct”
claim, holding that the defendants “did not act in utter disregard of” plaintiffs’
safety in organizing a ski race where the race organizers had taken a number of
safety precautions, plaintiffs presented no evidence that there was a preexisting
requirement to take additional precautions, and the racers had been notified in
advance of the dangers of the race); Santho v. Boy Scouts of Am., 857 N.E.2d
1255, 1262-63 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006) (affirming directed verdict on claim of
recklessness arising from an ice skating race in part because race organizers took
- 21 -
some safety precautions and there was no evidence that organizer had knowingly
disregarded any specific dangers or contravened any industry standards).
In this case, the plaintiffs have fallen short of producing evidence upon
which a jury could conclude that the defendants failed to exercise “even slight
care” in organizing and administering this race. Moon Lake Elec. Ass’n, Inc.,
767 P.2d at 129.
Mountain bike racing is an inherently dangerous sport, so the defendants
cannot be considered grossly negligent merely because they organized a race that
placed the racers at risk of injury and even death. Rather, the court must look at
the specific steps the defendants took to ensure the racers’ safety in order to
determine whether a jury could decide that they were grossly negligent.
As discussed above, the undisputed evidence shows that the race organizers
took a number of steps to warn of, and protect against, the risk of an automobile
accident during the race. The race organizers posted a sign warning people in the
area of the upcoming race, posted attendants near the starting line to warn drivers
about the race taking place that day, and approached people camped in the area
to warn them that the road would be clogged with bikers that morning.
The race organizers also provided 25 course marshals, some of which were
assigned to areas like intersections and sharp turns specifically because of the
unique risks of automobile traffic in those areas. No one was assigned to the area
right near the accident, but that choice was not grossly negligent in light of the
- 22 -
fact that the stretch of road where the accident occurred was relatively straight
and wide. The race organizers also had some first aid personnel standing by, in
addition to Mr. Jean, who carried a backpack with some medical supplies.
Finally, the racers were warned—both in writing and verbally—that they
might encounter traffic during the race. The racers’ decision to compete on a
course that they knew they would be sharing with automobiles strongly undercuts
their ability to claim after the fact that it was grossly negligent for the race
organizers to conduct an open course race. Cf. Walton v. Oz Bicycle Club of
Wichita, No. 90-1597-K, 1991 WL 257088, *4 (D. Kan. Nov. 22, 1991) (granting
defendants summary judgment on negligence claim arising from plaintiff striking
an automobile during a bicycle race organized by the defendants in part because
“the fact that the course was open to normal traffic was explicitly made known to
the participants”).
Mr. Konitshek claimed that the organizers’ efforts to warn people in the
area of the upcoming race were ineffective, because he did not know about the
race until moments before the accident. Mr. Konitshek’s complaints about the
sufficiency of the race organizers’ warnings do not rise to the level of creating a
material issue of fact with regard to gross negligence for two reasons. First, even
if the race organizers’ warnings were imperfect, that does not negate the fact that
they made rather substantial efforts to warn people, and their failure to reach
every person in the area is insufficient to show gross negligence. Second,
- 23 -
although Mr. Konitshek testified that he would have changed his plans if he had
known about the race in advance, the plaintiffs presented no reason for this court
to think that most drivers would change their plans to avoid a bicycle race on a 6-
mile stretch of open road.
Utah requires a very high level of disregard for safety in order to constitute
gross negligence. See Pearce, 179 P.3d at 767; Atkin Wright & Miles, 709 P.2d
at 335; Moon Lake Elec. Ass’n, Inc., 767 P.2d at 129. The undisputed steps that
defendants took to enhance the safety of the TOC would prevent any reasonable
juror from finding gross negligence under Utah substantive law. Many of the
precautions discussed above were specifically designed to prevent accidents with
automobiles. Further, there was no evidence that automobile accidents posed a
particularly serious risk in this case. On the contrary, the race had been
conducted on an open course for over a decade, and this is the first instance of an
accident involving a racer and a vehicle. Thus, the organizers’ failure to shut
down the road, mark and enforce a center line on the road, more closely monitor
vehicular traffic, or more thoroughly warn other area drivers of the upcoming race
cannot, as a matter of law, amount to gross negligence in light of the other safety
steps taken by the organizers of this race. Cf. Holzer v. Dakota Speedway, Inc.,
610 N.W.2d 787, 793-94 (S.D. 2000) (affirming summary judgment for
defendants on reckless conduct claim relating to harm caused to a pit crew
member during an automobile race in part because the allegedly reckless conduct
- 24 -
that led to the harm in that case had been present during races for three years
prior to this accident, and had never before caused anyone any harm).
An examination of cases in other jurisdictions shows that courts have been
reluctant to find that race organizers have been grossly negligent for failing to
take every precaution that 20/20 hindsight might counsel. See Milligan, 754 P.2d
at 1069 (affirming summary judgment for defendants on “willful and wanton
misconduct” claim arising out of a ski race where the race organizers had taken a
number of safety precautions, plaintiffs presented no evidence that there was a
preexisting requirement to take additional precautions, and the racers had been
notified in advance of the dangers of the race); Santho, 857 N.E.2d at 1262-63
(affirming directed verdict on claim of recklessness arising from an ice skating
race in part because race organizers took some safety precautions and there was
no evidence that organizer had knowingly disregarded any specific dangers or
contravened any industry standards); Holzer, 610 N.W.2d at 793-94 (affirming
summary judgment for defendants on reckless conduct claim relating to harm
caused to a pit crew member during an automobile race in part because plaintiff
failed to show that, at the time of the accident, the defendants “knew or had
reason to know of an unreasonable risk of harm” to the defendant); Walton, 1991
WL 257088 at *4 (granting defendants summary judgment on negligence claim
arising from plaintiff striking an automobile during a bicycle race organized by
- 25 -
the defendants in part because “the fact that the course was open to normal traffic
was explicitly made known to the participants”).
We therefore agree with the district court’s determination that the plaintiffs
in this case have failed to provide evidence upon which a reasonable jury could
conclude that the race organizers were grossly negligent. 7 See Turner, 563 F.3d
at 1142 (stating that, to avoid summary judgment, a plaintiff “must proffer facts
such that a reasonable jury could find in her favor”).
C. District Court did not Abuse its Discretion by Excluding Plaintiffs’
Expert
1. Standard of Review
“Like other evidentiary rulings, [the court] review[s] a district court’s
decision to exclude evidence at the summary judgment stage for abuse of
discretion.” Sports Racing Serv., Inc. v. Sports Car Club of Am., Inc., 131 F.3d
874, 894 (10th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). “[A] district court abuses its
discretion when it renders an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly
unreasonable judgment.” Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Farm Credit Bank of Wichita,
226 F.3d 1138, 1163 (10th Cir. 2000) (citations and quotations omitted).
7
Because we decide this case on the grounds that plaintiffs have failed to
present evidence of gross negligence, we do not reach the defendants’ separate
argument that, even if they were grossly negligent, their negligence could not
have proximately caused the harms complained of in this case.
- 26 -
When testing the admissibility of expert testimony, courts must first
determine whether an expert is “qualified by ‘knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education’ to render an opinion.” Ralston v. Smith & Nephew
Richards, Inc., 275 F.3d 965, 969 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702).
Second, if the court determines that a witness is qualified, it must then “determine
whether her opinions [a]re ‘reliable.’” Id.
The district court struck the second affidavit of plaintiffs’ expert Sean
Collinsworth, concluding that he was “not sufficiently qualified to render expert
testimony on the applicable standards of care for mountain bike racing,
particularly regarding the TOC[, and] that any such testimony would be
speculative and not sufficiently reliable . . . .” (Appx. at 9.)
2. Analysis
Plaintiffs rely heavily on their expert’s testimony to support their claim that
the race organizers were grossly negligent. However, plaintiffs’ expert, Sean
Collinsworth, admittedly had no experience in organizing, supervising, or
studying mountain bike races and, therefore, was not qualified to offer expert
testimony on the standard of care for mountain bike races. At his deposition, Mr.
Collinsworth was asked, “As a matter of fact—just so we’re clear, you’re not an
expert on mountain bike racing . . . Is that a fair statement?” (Appx. at 641.) He
answered, “Yes, it is.” (Id.) Nor was he even an experienced mountain bike
- 27 -
rider. He had only participated in one or two mountain bike races, and those were
more than 15 years ago. He had never published any articles about bicycle racing
of any sort, let alone mountain bike racing. He testified that, as a police officer,
he investigated hundreds of vehicle-bicycle collisions, but there was no indication
that any of those took place on a dirt road or in the course of a race.
Although Mr. Collinsworth had experience organizing and supervising
paved road bike races, the district court reasonably concluded that his experience
was insufficient to qualify him to testify about mountain bike races. The facts of
this case make it clear that the rules and practices that prevail at mountain bike
races—even the on-the-road portion of mountain bike races—are different from
the rules and practices that prevail at traditional road races. Most importantly,
road racers are always required to obey a center-line rule, while mountain bikers
racing on dirt roads will generally cross the center-line when there is no
oncoming traffic, but are expected to veer right if they see any traffic
approaching. Furthermore, the conditions of a road race on paved streets with
clearly marked center lines differ significantly from the conditions of the open-
course portion of the TOC, which took place on a dirt road with no clearly
marked center line. Given the differences between road races and mountain bike
races, we conclude that the district court’s finding that Mr. Collinsworth was
unqualified to offer expert testimony on the standard of care for mountain bike
races was not “arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable.”
- 28 -
Atlantic Richfield Co., 226 F.3d at 1163; cf. Ralston, 275 F.3d at 970-71
(upholding district court’s determination that a board certified orthopaedic
surgeon was not qualified to testify about an orthopaedic device that she had
never worked with or studied); Bertotti v. Charlotte Motor Speedway, Inc., 893 F.
Supp. 565, 569-70 (W.D.N.C. 1995) (striking expert testimony regarding design
of go-kart track where expert had experience in automobile racing, but not go-kart
racing).
Even if Mr. Collinsworth was qualified to offer an expert opinion on the
standard of care for mountain bike races, the district court correctly determined
that his testimony in this case was unreliable. “To determine whether an expert
opinion is admissible, the district court performs a two-step analysis. First, the
court must determine whether the expert is qualified by ‘knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education’ to render an opinion. See Fed. R. Evid. 702.
Second, if the expert is sufficiently qualified, the court must determine whether
the expert’s opinion is reliable . . . .” 103 Investors I, L.P. v. Square D Co., 470
F.3d 985, 990 (10th Cir. 2006). “In reviewing whether an expert’s testimony is
reliable, the trial court must assess the reasoning and methodology underlying the
expert’s opinion.” United States v. Rodriguez-Felix, 450 F.3d 1117, 1123 (10th
Cir. 2006) (citations and quotations omitted). Mr. Collinsworth’s opinions in this
case were not based on a study of other similar races, an analysis of precautionary
measures used in mountain bike races and the risks and benefits of such measures,
- 29 -
or any other empirical or quantitative studies. Instead, he relied almost
exclusively on his experience in paved road racing—experience that the district
court reasonably determined was inapplicable to the context of mountain bike
racing—to form his conclusions about the standard of care that should have been
used in this case. Mr. Collinsworth’s conclusions about the safety precautions
that should have been taken in this case are, therefore, mere speculation, and “[i]t
is axiomatic that an expert, no matter how good his credentials, is not permitted
to speculate.” Goebel v. Denver and Rio Grande Western R.R. Co., 215 F.3d
1083, 1088 (10th Cir. 2000). Without their expert’s testimony, the plaintiffs’
claims fall apart. See Bertotti, 893 F. Supp. at 570 (granting summary judgment
for defendants on plaintiffs’ claim that defendants were grossly negligent in
designing and maintaining a go-kart track where the only evidence plaintiffs
provided in support of their claims of gross negligence was inadmissible expert
testimony). 8
8
The district court’s holding on this matter was limited to Mr.
Collinsworth’s second affidavit because the defendants did not also move to strike
plaintiffs’ expert’s initial report or his deposition testimony. However, the
district court’s ruling clearly indicated that it would not allow this expert to
testify as an expert on any of the issues in this case. Therefore, we do not
consider either of Mr. Collinsworth’s affidavits or his deposition testimony in
deciding the merits of plaintiffs’ claims.
- 30 -
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s decisions to
strike the plaintiff’s expert’s second affidavit and to grant summary judgment for
the defendants.
- 31 -
07-4247, Milne v. USA Cycling Inc.
GORSUCH, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
I join all but Section II.C of Judge Ebel’s fine opinion. That section
concerns the admissibility of testimony by the plaintiffs’ expert, Sean
Collinsworth. The majority upholds the district court’s decision to exclude Mr.
Collinsworth’s testimony on the ground that he wasn’t an expert in the relevant
field. I have my doubts. Mr. Collinsworth may not be a professional mountain
bike racer, but he does have substantial experience in organizing and conducting
traffic control operations for bicycle racing and similar events – and the adequacy
of the defendants’ traffic control operations lie at the heart of this case.
Still, I would affirm the district court’s exclusion of Mr. Collinsworth for a
different reason. The only question in this case is gross negligence – namely,
whether defendants took any precautions against the accident that took place.
See, e.g., Pearce v. Utah Athletic Found., 179 P.3d 760, 767 (Utah 2008) (Gross
negligence is “the failure to observe even slight care; it is carelessness or
recklessness to a degree that shows utter indifference to the consequences that
may result.”) (emphasis added); cf. Berry v. Greater Park City Co., 171 P.3d 442,
449 (Utah 2007) (“Gross negligence requires proof of conduct substantially more
distant from the appropriate standard of care than does ordinary negligence.”).
Mr. Collinsworth’s proffered testimony faults the sufficiency of the defendants’
precautions, but doesn’t dispute that the defendants did exercise some degree of
care, however slight, in preparing for and managing this race. His testimony,
thus, might well have been relevant to a negligence claim, but it doesn’t
illuminate the plaintiffs’ gross negligence claim. And a district court is not
obliged to entertain evidence, expert or otherwise, irrelevant to the claims before
it. See Fed. R. Evid. 402 (“Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.”).
With this minor caveat, I am pleased to join.
-2-