Sierra Club v. Kimbell

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
___________

No. 09-1639
___________

Sierra Club; Friends of the Boundary *
Waters Wilderness; Defenders of *
Wildlife; Northeastern Minnesotans *
for Wilderness, *
*
Appellants, *
* Appeal from the United States
v. * District Court for the
* District of Minnesota.
Abigail Kimbell, Chief of the United *
States Forest Service; Tom Vilsack, *
Secretary of Agriculture, *
*
Appellees. *
*
____________________ *
*
Minnesota Forest Industries, Inc.; *
Minnesota Timber Producers *
Association; Lake County; All Terrain *
Vehicle Association of Minnesota; *
Blue Ribbon Coalition, Inc., *
*
Intervenor Defendants/Appellees, *
*
____________________ *
*
The Ruffed Grouse Society, *
*
Amicus on Behalf of Appellee, *
*
Mark Holsten, as Commissioner of The *
Minnesota Department of Natural *
Resources, *
*
Amicus on Behalf of Appellee. *
___________

Submitted: February 9, 2010
Filed: October 18, 2010
___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge,1 COLLOTON and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.
___________

COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.

In July 2004, the United States Forest Service issued a Land and Resource
Management Plan for the Superior National Forest (the “forest plan”). Sierra Club,
Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness, and Northeastern Minnesotans for
Wilderness (collectively, “Sierra Club”) sought judicial review of the forest plan in
the district court. As relevant to this appeal, Sierra Club argued that the Forest
Service’s assessment of the forest plan’s environmental impacts violated the National
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370h. In particular, Sierra
Club claimed that the Forest Service had failed to consider the plan’s effects on the
Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness (“BWCAW”). The district court2
determined that the Forest Service had considered adequately the impacts on the
nearby wilderness area in accordance with NEPA, and therefore granted the agency’s

1
The Honorable James B. Loken stepped down as Chief Judge of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit at the close of business on March 31,
2010. He has been succeeded by the Honorable William Jay Riley.
2
The Honorable Patrick J. Schiltz, United States District Judge for the District
of Minnesota.

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motion for summary judgment. Sierra Club v. Kimbell, 595 F. Supp. 2d 1021 (D.
Minn. 2009). Sierra Club appeals, and we affirm.

I.

The Superior National Forest was created by a proclamation of President
Theodore Roosevelt in 1909 and expanded through a series of subsequent
acquisitions. Today, the forest encompasses over three million acres in northeastern
Minnesota along the United States-Canadian border near Lake Superior. Within the
Superior National Forest lies a 1.1 million acre wilderness area known as the
BWCAW. The BWCAW is one of the nation’s most popular wilderness areas,
attracting nearly 300,000 visitors annually to its many lakes and pristine forested
landscapes.

Federal efforts to protect the BWCAW date back to at least 1926, when 1000
square miles within the Superior National Forest were set aside as a canoe recreation
area. The Wilderness Act of 1964 expanded the protected area and officially
designated the BWCAW as wilderness, thereby restricting authorized uses of the area
to preserve its wilderness character. See 16 U.S.C. § 1133(b). In 1978, the Boundary
Waters Canoe Area Wilderness Act, Pub. L. No. 95-495, 92 Stat. 1649 (1978), gave
the area its current name, set aside additional acreage as wilderness, and further
restricted authorized uses. Id. §§ 3, 4. The BWCAW Act ended all logging within the
wilderness and established stricter limitations on motorized recreational use. Id.
§§ 4(c), (e), (f), 6(a).

The Superior National Forest, which includes the entire BWCAW, is part of the
National Forest System, and is subject to the National Forest Management Act of
1976 (“NFMA”), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1687. As relevant to this appeal, NFMA directs
the Secretary of Agriculture to “develop, maintain, and, as appropriate, revise [forest
plans] for units of the National Forest System.” Id. § 1604(a). A forest plan is a

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“general planning tool” that establishes the “overall management direction for the
forest unit for ten to fifteen years,” and serves as “a programmatic statement of intent”
to guide “future site-specific decisions.” Sierra Club v. Robertson, 28 F.3d 753, 755,
758 (8th Cir. 1994). In developing a forest plan, the Forest Service, which manages
the Forest System, must comply with the Multiple Use-Sustained-Yield Act of 1960,
16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531. This Act requires the Forest Service to account for both
environmental and economic considerations in the plan, see 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g),
including “outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, wildlife and fish, and
wilderness.” Id. § 1604(e)(1).

The Forest Service also must develop a forest plan in compliance with the
procedural requirements of NEPA. Under NEPA, if an agency proposes to undertake
a “major Federal action[] significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment,” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C), the agency must prepare an environmental
impact statement (“EIS”). The Forest Service has therefore promulgated regulations
requiring the preparation of a draft and final EIS in conjunction with a proposed forest
plan. See 36 C.F.R. § 219.10(b) (2000).3 The Forest Service must consider in the EIS
a broad range of reasonable alternatives to help identify the alternative that best
maximizes “net public benefits.” Id. § 219.12(f). The agency also must evaluate the
“physical, biological, economic, and social effects” of those alternatives in compliance
with NEPA procedures. Id. § 219.12(g), (h).

3
Section 219 of Title 36 of the Code of Federal Regulations, which contains the
substantive rules regarding the adoption of forest plans, was substantially revised in
November 2000. See 65 Fed. Reg. 67,514 (Nov. 9, 2009). Yet the regulation allows
for revisions started under the prior rules to be completed under those rules at the
election of the Forest Service. 36 C.F.R. § 219.35(b) (2001). The Forest Service
elected here to continue the revision process under the original regulations
promulgated in 1982. See 47 Fed. Reg. 43,026 (Sept. 30, 1982). Therefore, unless
otherwise indicated, references to Section 219 of Title 36 are to the 1982 rules, as set
forth in the July 1, 2000 edition of the Code of Federal Regulations.

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 The development and implementation of a forest plan generally “involves a
two-stage process.” Robertson, 28 F.3d at 755. Initially, the Forest Service creates
a proposed forest plan and accompanying draft and final EIS to evaluate alternative
management scenarios. See 36 C.F.R. § 219.10(b). After receiving public input, the
Regional Forester either approves or disapproves the proposed plan. Id. § 219.10(b),
(c). If the forest plan is approved, the Forest Service issues a record of decision to
document the rationale for the management approach adopted in the plan. Id.
§ 219.10(c)(1). The process then moves to a second stage in which the forest plan is
implemented and “individual site-specific projects are proposed and assessed.”
Robertson, 28 F.3d at 755. An approved forest plan, for example, might establish
logging goals for the forest as a whole, but before the Forest Service can permit a
specific logging project, the agency must, among other things, ensure that the project
conforms with the forest plan, see 36 C.F.R. § 219.10(e), and conduct site-specific
environmental analysis pursuant to NEPA. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.14, 1508.9(b); see
also Ohio Forestry Ass’n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 729-30 (1998).

This case focuses on a dispute involving the first stage of the forest planning
process for the Superior National Forest. Pursuant to NFMA’s requirement that a
forest plan be revised “at least every fifteen years,” see 16 U.S.C. § 1604(f)(5)(A), the
Forest Service announced in 1997 its intention to revise the plan for the Superior
National Forest that had been in effect since 1986. After a period of study and
analysis, the Forest Service issued a draft EIS in 2003. The draft EIS discussed and
compared the anticipated environmental impacts of several proposed approaches to
forest management. The Forest Service considered public comments to the draft EIS,
and, in July 2004, issued a final EIS (“FEIS”), a record of decision (“ROD”), and the
revised forest plan.

The FEIS identifies seven alternative approaches for managing the Superior
National Forest. These approaches, labeled A through G, differ in the amount and
location of human activity (including logging and recreation) that they allow, and in

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their goals for plant and animal life in the forest. Alternative B, for example, would
reduce timber harvesting from current levels, restore old growth forest, designate new
wilderness study areas adjacent to the BWCAW, and decrease the number of new
ATV and snowmobile trails. FEIS § 2-14. Similarly, Alternative D emphasizes non-
motorized recreational activities, such as hiking and canoeing, along with the
restoration of old growth forest through a reduction in logging. FEIS § 2-19.
Alternative C, by contrast, allows an increase in timber production relative to the 1986
plan. FEIS § 2-17. Alternative E falls between these options with respect to timber,
emphasizing more harvesting than Alternatives B and D, but less than Alternative C.
FEIS § 2-22. Alternative E also permits the greatest number of new snowmobile and
ATV trails, and designates no new wilderness study areas. FEIS § 2-24.

A common feature of each alternative is a commitment to continue to manage
the BWCAW in accordance with the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Plan. The Forest
Service adopted this plan in 1993 along with an EIS specific to the wilderness area.
The 2004 forest plan and accompanying FEIS, therefore, anticipate changes to the
management approach only for those areas of the Superior National Forest outside of
the Boundary Waters. Another common point among the alternatives is their use of
geographic “analysis areas” that extend in and out of the Boundary Waters. For
example, the FEIS frequently employs the Northern Superior Uplands as the area in
which environmental impacts are measured. FEIS § 3.1-24. This vast area, which
includes the BWCAW, is preferred because “[m]any ecosystem processes essential
for sustainability . . . operate at large spatial scales.” FEIS § 3.3.2-2. Each of the
alternatives also identifies a combination of “management areas” that emphasize
different land use objectives, such as timber production or scenic recreation. The
management areas vary in size and location by alternative. FEIS § 2-9.

In the record of decision issued with the FEIS, the Forest Service identified
Alternative E as its choice to guide the management of the Superior National Forest.
According to the agency, Alternative E maximizes the net benefit to the public by

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maintaining the long-term health of the forest while providing the best mix of
sustainable economic, social, and ecological benefits. The revised forest plan
discusses in detail how the forest will be managed under Alternative E, and establishes
a series of objectives, standards, and guidelines to govern future site-specific activities
and to achieve desired forest conditions. Under Alternative E, the forest plan divides
the area of the national forest outside of the BWCAW into three “spatial management
zones.” FEIS § 3.2-60. These zones permit varying levels of resource use. Together
with the management areas, they establish forest-wide land use patterns.

Sierra Club’s present complaint is related to the spatial management zones. In
the revised forest plan, the geographic area designated as Spatial Zone 3 borders the
BWCAW. The management areas in Zone 3 are eligible for the vast majority of
timber harvesting permitted under the plan, FEIS § 3.2-54, and they allow motorized
recreational activities. The Forest Service contends that the purpose of the spatial
zones is simply to ensure well-distributed habitats within the forest. Sierra Club
disagrees, and argues that the intense timber harvesting and other activities permitted
near the BWCAW under Alternative E will have adverse “edge effects” on the
wilderness area that the Forest Service failed to consider in the FEIS. Those alleged
effects include habitat degradation along the wilderness edge, noise pollution,
impairment of water quality, and increased illegal access to the BWCAW by off-road
vehicles. Sierra Club contends that the Forest Service violated NEPA by approving
the revised forest plan without analyzing the plan’s impact on the BWCAW, including
these “edge effects,” and that the district court erred in granting the Forest Service’s
motion for summary judgment.

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 II.

Before reaching the merits of Sierra Club’s NEPA claim, we must consider
whether Sierra Club has standing to challenge the forest plan and FEIS. The
government raised no objection to standing in the district court, but it presses the issue
on appeal, and we must consider a challenge to our jurisdiction at any time in the
proceeding. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); Goos v. ICC, 911 F.2d 1283, 1289 (8th Cir.
1990).

Article III establishes as a constitutional minimum for standing the following
three elements: an injury in fact, meaning the actual or imminent invasion of a
concrete and particularized legal interest; a causal connection between the alleged
injury and the challenged action of defendant; and a likelihood that the injury will be
redressed by a favorable decision of the court. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). The Forest Service contends that because Sierra Club
alleges only the potential for future harm at later stages of the forest planning process,
it fails to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement in this initial phase.

The Forest Service relies heavily on our decision in Sierra Club v. Robertson,
28 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1994). Robertson held that the plaintiffs in that case lacked
standing to challenge a forest plan for the Ouachita National Forest, because further
agency action was necessary before the Forest Service could take steps that would
cause injury. Id. at 758. The plaintiffs in Robertson limited their allegation of injury
to a claim that the amount and method of timber harvesting permitted by the forest
plan caused environmental or aesthetic harm. Because NEPA required an additional
stage of site-specific analysis before any timber could actually be cleared, this court
determined that the asserted injury was not sufficiently imminent at the initial forest
planning stage to create an injury in fact. Id. at 758-60. This view has been criticized
by the Seventh Circuit, see Sierra Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606, 612-13 (7th Cir.

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1995), but endorsed by the Eleventh Circuit in the closely related context of ripeness.
See Wilderness Soc’y v. Alcock, 83 F.3d 386, 389-91 (11th Cir. 1996).

Sierra Club argues in reply that Robertson is not controlling here, because that
case involved only a NFMA claim, not a NEPA claim. This is incorrect. The opinion
of this court in Robertson expressly states that the plaintiffs alleged violations of both
“NFMA and NEPA.” 28 F.3d at 757 (emphasis added). The district court’s published
opinion in Robertson also makes clear that the plaintiffs’ complaint raised claims
under NFMA and NEPA, and the district court specifically analyzed a series of NEPA
claims. See Sierra Club v. Robertson, 810 F. Supp. 1021, 1024, 1029-30 (W.D. Ark.
1992).

Sierra Club also cites Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 446 F.3d
808 (8th Cir. 2006), to support its standing to bring this NEPA challenge. The court
in Army Corps concluded that the plaintiffs had standing under NEPA to dispute an
agency’s environmental assessment of a levee construction project, even though
further agency action was required before injury would occur. Id. at 816. Army
Corps, however, made no mention of Robertson, and of course could not overrule a
prior panel decision. Army Corps is consistent with the established rule that a
defendant’s action need not be the “very last step in the chain of causation” to cause
cognizable injury, Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 169 (1997), but Robertson is more
directly on point with respect to whether a forest plan causes an injury in fact.

To the extent the plaintiffs here rely on the forest plan’s authorization of
additional timber harvesting and the FEIS’s alleged failure to analyze the specific
impacts of that harvesting, Robertson poses a formidable hurdle. We conclude,
however, that the plaintiffs have standing based on other aspects of the agency’s
action. The plaintiffs here, unlike those in Robertson, claim injuries that occur with
the adoption of the forest plan, not merely harms that arise at some future time after
further analysis and action by the agency. Specifically, Sierra Club argues that the

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plan itself, with its endorsement of Alternative E, represents a final agency decision
to reject features in other alternatives, such as the designation of new wilderness study
areas adjacent to the BWCAW, and a decrease in motorized recreational activity near
the wilderness. Had the Forest Service properly evaluated the impacts of its decision
on the wilderness area, Sierra Club contends, the agency perhaps would have chosen
to manage the forest pursuant to a different alternative that would not interfere with
the plaintiffs’ enjoyment of the forest near the BWCAW.

Standing can be based on harms to recreational or even aesthetic interests, see
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-36 (1972), and organizations like Sierra
Club “can assert the standing of their members.” Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129
S. Ct. 1142, 1149 (2009); see also Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432
U.S. 333, 343 (1977). Here, the plaintiff organizations submitted affidavits from
several individual members asserting imminent harms from the agency’s action. One
member and frequent visitor to the Superior National Forest claimed that the agency’s
selection of Alternative E, which resulted in the designation of no new wilderness
study areas, immediately diminished her opportunities for non-motorized recreation
near the BWCAW. Another member described a similarly imminent interest in
“increasing opportunities for non-motorized recreation” in areas adjacent to the
wilderness area that was harmed by the selection of Alternative E.

While alternatives rejected by the Forest Service would create wilderness study
areas or additional non-motorized recreational opportunities near the BWCAW,
Alternative E is a final agency decision to eliminate those options. Alternatives B and
D, for example, both call for twelve areas that border the BWCAW, comprising
thousands of acres, to be designated as wilderness study areas, in which road
development and motorized recreation would not be allowed. FEIS § 3.7-9. The
FEIS states that these areas “could provide a more immediate wilderness experience,”
including opportunities for non-motorized recreation in a pristine setting. FEIS § 3.7-
11. Alternative E allows motorized activities in many of these areas. FEIS § 3.7-9.

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Alternative D would surround the BWCAW with “Semi-primitive” management
areas, thereby permitting few visitors, minimal roads, and, in many cases, no
motorized vehicles, in order to preserve the natural conditions of the forest. FEIS
§§ 3.8-5, 3.8-26. Alternative D also would result in the closure of “[s]ome existing
motorized trails” near the BWCAW, FEIS § 3.8-49, and prohibit all cross-country
snowmobile travel in the forest. FEIS § 3.8-56. This feature would have the
immediate effect of allowing non-motorized recreationists to travel without
encountering disruptions like noise pollution and wildlife habitat destruction. FEIS
§ 3.8-58. Alternative E, by contrast, allows for up to 130 miles of additional
snowmobile trails, and surrounds the BWCAW with “Roaded Natural” areas, in which
motorized vehicle use and high visitor interaction are authorized. FEIS §§ 3.8-5, 3.8-
11, 3.8-27.

Given the immediate, concrete consequences for the recreational interests of
specific visitors to the Superior National Forest that result from the selection of
Alternative E over other alternatives rejected in the FEIS, we conclude that the
plaintiffs have shown the injury in fact necessary for standing. Unlike the plaintiffs
in Robertson, Sierra Club alleges more than future harms from the amount, location,
and method of timber harvesting permitted under Alternative E. Sierra Club also
claims that its members are imminently injured by Alternative E’s failure to designate
additional wilderness, to close more forest roads, and to decrease motorized vehicle
use near the BWCAW. These harms are incurred by plaintiffs who seek a more
primitive forest experience, without regard to any future site-specific analysis or
further study. The Supreme Court, while not deciding whether this sort of injury is
sufficient to establish standing or ripeness, has recognized that such allegations of
harm present “significantly different” issues than a claim based on future logging or
clearcutting alone. See Ohio Forestry Ass’n, 523 U.S. at 738-39. We conclude that
Sierra Club has alleged the “invasion of a legally protected interest” that is both
“concrete and particularized” and “imminent.” Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560
(internal quotation omitted). The causation and redressability elements of standing

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are not disputed by the Forest Service, and we see no reason to conclude they are not
satisfied in this case. See id. at 572 n.7.

III.

We now turn to the merits of Sierra Club’s NEPA claim. Sierra Club contends
that its members were harmed when the Forest Service selected Alternative E over
other management options. Sierra Club argues that this selection was the direct result
of the agency’s inadequate consideration of the effects of the various alternatives on
the BWCAW, and that this inadequate consideration constituted a violation of NEPA.
We must determine, therefore, whether the district court correctly granted summary
judgment to the Forest Service on the ground that the agency complied with NEPA
by evaluating adequately the impacts of the different management scenarios on the
BWCAW. We review the district court’s summary judgment decision de novo,
applying the same standards that the district court employed. Friends of the Boundary
Waters Wilderness v. Dombeck, 164 F.3d 1115, 1121 (8th Cir. 1999).

Although NEPA does not provide a private right of action, the Administrative
Procedure Act (“APA”) permits judicial review of agency action in this context. See
Cent. S.D. Coop. Grazing Dist. v. Sec’y of the USDA, 266 F.3d 889, 894 (8th Cir.
2001). Under the APA, a reviewing court will not set aside agency action unless it is
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).

NEPA does not establish rules governing the substantive content of forest plans.
Instead, NEPA’s mandate “is essentially procedural.” Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978). The statute’s
purpose is to “insure a fully informed and well-considered decision, not necessarily
a decision the judges of [this court] would have reached had they been members of the
decisionmaking unit of the agency.” Id. NEPA does not prevent agencies from taking

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environmentally harmful action, for as long as “the adverse environmental effects of
the proposed action are adequately identified and evaluated, the agency is not
constrained by NEPA from deciding that other values outweigh the environmental
costs.” Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989). The
statute requires “only that the agency take a ‘hard look’ at the environmental
consequences before taking a major action.” Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983).

The EIS is the primary procedural vehicle through which NEPA seeks to ensure
that an agency engages in this “hard look” review of environmental consequences.
See 42 U.S.C. § 4332. This “detailed statement,” id. § 4332(2)(C), from which a court
can assess whether the agency has made “a good faith effort to consider the values
NEPA seeks to protect,” must not “merely catalog environmental facts, but also
explain fully its course of inquiry, analysis and reasoning.” Minn. Pub. Interest
Research Grp. v. Butz, 541 F.2d 1292, 1299 (8th Cir. 1976). The role of the courts
in this process “is simply to ensure that the agency has adequately considered and
disclosed the environmental impact of its actions and that its decision is not arbitrary
or capricious.” Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., 462 U.S. at 97-98. Whether an agency
adequately considered the environmental consequences of its actions is “evidenced
through the EIS’s form, content, and preparation” and in the agency’s “actual balance”
of environmental costs and benefits. Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness, 164
F.3d at 1128 (internal quotation omitted).

We examine the agency’s FEIS to determine whether the Forest Service took
a “hard look” at the environmental consequences of the July 2004 forest plan. As an
initial matter, the question arises whether NEPA even required the agency to consider
impacts on the BWCAW, given that the revised plan changes the management
approach only for areas of the Superior National Forest outside of the BWCAW.
Sierra Club argues that the need for this evaluation flows logically from the text of
NEPA and the Council on Environmental Quality’s (“CEQ”) implementing

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regulations. Sierra Club first points out that NEPA obligates an agency to analyze
whether its action “significantly” impacts the environment. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332(2)(C). Citing the CEQ regulations, Sierra Club notes that to evaluate whether
an action “significantly” affects the environment requires consideration of that
action’s “intensity.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27. This, in turn, requires the agency to
consider the “[u]nique characteristics of the geographic area such as proximity to . . .
ecologically critical areas.” Id. § 1508.27(b)(3). The BWCAW is indeed a unique
geographic area, but Sierra Club’s argument overlooks the fact that the cited statutory
text and regulations establish the criteria for determining the threshold question
whether an EIS is required at all. They do not necessarily address the content of the
impact statement. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332; Heartwood, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 380
F.3d 428, 431-34 (8th Cir. 2004) (“If an agency takes a ‘hard look’ and determines
that the proposed action has no ‘significant’ environmental impact, an EIS is
unnecessary.”).

The Forest Service was required, however, to consider the impacts of the
alternative management scenarios on the BWCAW for another reason. NEPA made
it our “national policy . . . to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage
to the environment and . . . to enrich the understanding of the ecological systems and
natural resources important to the Nation.” 42 U.S.C. § 4321. Like the Fourth
Circuit, we believe this policy “is surely implicated when the environment that may
be damaged is one that Congress has specially designated for federal protection.”
Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Dep’t of the Navy, 422 F.3d 174, 186-87 (4th Cir. 2005).
Congress expressly recognized the need to “protect[] the special qualities of the
[BWCAW] as a natural forest-lakeland wilderness ecosystem of major esthetic,
cultural, scientific, recreational and educational value to the Nation.” BWCAW Act
§ 1, Pub. L. 95-495, 92 Stat. 1649 (1978). The guiding policy of NEPA thus requires
that the Forest Service’s assessment in this case include an evaluation of how the
alternatives proposed in the FEIS “will affect the unique biological features of this
congressionally protected area.” Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 422 F.3d at 187.

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 The Forest Service appears to concede as much, because its argument on appeal
is not that consideration of impacts on the BWCAW was unnecessary, but that NEPA
does not require the evaluation of those impacts to be discussed in a separate section
of the FEIS, as Sierra Club suggests. We agree with the Forest Service that nothing
in either NEPA or its implementing regulations prevents the Forest Service from
integrating consideration of the BWCAW into its analysis of the revised plan’s effects
on other resources within the Superior National Forest.

The parties do seem to disagree about the level of detail required for the
analysis of environmental impact. The district court concluded that the FEIS need
contain only a general level of analysis, given that this case involves a revised forest
plan that is programmatic in its approach. 595 F. Supp. 2d at 1030. To the extent that
the impacts discussed in the plan depend on future, site-specific activity, we agree.
The “hard look” required of the Forest Service is “necessarily contextual,” Nat’l
Audobon Soc’y, 422 F.3d at 187, and the degree of detail that NEPA requires in an
EIS “depends upon the nature and scope of the proposed action.” California v. Block,
690 F.2d 753, 761 (9th Cir. 1982). At this programmatic planning stage, the EIS
“must provide sufficient detail to foster informed decision-making,” but “site-specific
impacts need not be fully evaluated” until the decision to undertake a site-specific
project has been made. Friends of Yosemite Valley v. Norton, 348 F.3d 789, 800 (9th
Cir. 2003) (internal quotations omitted). For those more immediate impacts not
subject to further evaluation, such as the designation of areas for wilderness study, or
the prohibition of motorized recreational activities in certain forest zones, more
detailed analysis is appropriate.

Our examination of the FEIS convinces us that the Forest Service took an
appropriately “hard look”at the environmental consequences of the revised forest plan
on the BWCAW. This is evident in three ways. First, as the district court correctly
noted, the FEIS communicates a “clear intention” by the Forest Service to manage the
Superior National Forest “in a way that is neutral with respect to the BWCAW.” 595

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F. Supp. 2d at 1029. The FEIS expressly states that the revised forest plan, under all
of the management approaches considered, will “carry forward the 1993 Forest Plan”
for the BWCAW and its accompanying EIS. FEIS § 1-28. The statement repeatedly
confirms that “[n]o decisions were made that affect[] current management of the
BWCAW.” FEIS § 1-32. These pronouncements indicate that the Forest Service
considered the BWCAW in its analysis, and set forth in the FEIS a policy that
proposed changes have only a minimal, neutral impact on the wilderness area, such
that new management direction for that area is unnecessary.

Second, the Forest Service’s “hard look” is evidenced by the agency’s analysis
of several specific impacts to the BWCAW. The FEIS expressly considers the effect
of the various management alternatives on wildlife habitats and plant species within
the wilderness area. Regarding plant species, the FEIS concludes that “pine
replacement in the BWCAW in stands of all ages would remain the same under all
alternatives.” FEIS § 3.3.4-37. For wildlife habitats, the conclusions from the
agency’s programmatic analysis are comparable. The FEIS states that “[t]he quality,
quantity, and distribution of lynx foraging and . . . habitat . . . in the BWCAW is not
significantly influenced by the proposed actions of the Revised Plans.” FEIS § 3.3.4-
8. Likewise, the FEIS anticipates that “the potential impact to wolves within the
BWCAW would not vary by alternative.” FEIS § 3.3.4-23. The same conclusion is
reached for deer, § 3.3.6-29, bald eagles, § 3.3.4-37, and ruffed grouse, § 3.3.6-37.
These statements demonstrate the consideration of impacts within the BWCAW, and
they reflect neutrality towards the BWCAW. Given the substantially different land
use patterns contemplated by the alternatives in the FEIS, these statements could not
plausibly imply neutrality among the alternatives without also suggesting neutrality
towards the wilderness.

Along with these “no impact” conclusions, the analysis in the FEIS recognizes
that certain proposed actions could negatively affect the BWCAW. Most
significantly, the FEIS considers potential “edge effects” about which Sierra Club is

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concerned. The FEIS acknowledges that under the management approach adopted by
the Forest Service, timber harvesting adjacent to the BWCAW in Spatial Zone 3 will
likely result in “less connectivity of habitats between those found in the BWCAW”
and other parts of the forest. FEIS § 3.2-60. Consequently, the FEIS instructs that
“site specific analysis could consider the issue of connectivity, and through thoughtful
management, could mitigate the impacts to connectivity in Zone 3.” FEIS § 3.2-61.
This identification of general issues for further analysis at the site-specific stage of
forest planning is consistent with the “hard look” required of the Forest Service in this
programmatic context. The FEIS also recognizes that certain species are vulnerable
to the habitat disturbances that may occur under Alternative E. For instance, because
“[a]reas adjacent to the wilderness in Spatial Zone 3 would be harvested and
fragmented to a higher degree,” this could create “gaps in habitat that increase risk”
to the Northern Goshawk. FEIS § 3.3.6-11. Similar risks are identified for the Boreal
Owl. FEIS § 3.3.5-19.

The FEIS evaluates other edge effects, including the impact of designating
additional wilderness study areas adjacent to the BWCAW. Alternatives B and D call
for the designation of twelve wilderness study areas next to the Boundary Waters.
These areas would result in road closures and an accompanying reduction in noise
pollution. The FEIS also recognizes that these designations would “provide slightly
more capacity in the BWCAW,” FEIS § 3.7-11, “help alleviate congestion in the
BWCAW,” FEIS § 3.7-11, and improve the experience of non-motorized
recreationists. FEIS § 3.8-58. The Forest Service acknowledges Sierra Club’s belief
that “additional wilderness areas bordering the BWCAW would help buffer the
Wilderness from adjacent impacts.” FEIS § 1-23. Despite these potential
environmental benefits of Alternatives B and D, the Forest Service ultimately adopted
Alternative E, which calls for no new wilderness areas and instead authorizes
motorized recreation in some of those areas. This action was preceded, however, by
“an extensive [ecological] survey” indicating that the additional wilderness areas
contemplated in other alternatives would not “enhance[] . . . [the] extraordinary

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character [of] the BWCAW.” ROD at 17. In particular, the Forest Service studied the
recreational opportunities available near the BWCAW, and determined that these
areas could best provide a “primitive, backcountry experience” under “less restrictive”
rules than within the BWCAW, consistent with section 18 of the BWCAW Act. ROD
at 18. Although Sierra Club may disagree with the merits of the Forest Service’s
conclusion, the agency’s discussion demonstrates that it made an informed decision,
and NEPA requires nothing more. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. at 351.
And the Forest Service’s undertaking of an “extensive survey” concerning the
wilderness areas satisfies us that the agency conducted the more detailed evaluation
expected of actions that have an imminent impact on the recreational and aesthetic
interests of visitors to the area.

A third demonstration of the agency’s “hard look” is its consideration of the
environmental impacts of the forest plan on “analysis areas” that encompass the
BWCAW. For several environmental indicators within the FEIS, the environmental
impacts are measured for the entire Northern Superior Uplands, a geographical area
that includes the BWCAW. FEIS § 3.1-24. The cumulative impacts on forest
composition, § 3.2-3, spatial patterns, § 3.2-52, threatened species, § 3.3.6-10,
invasive species, § 3.3.7-1, and fire, § 3.5-9, are analyzed for the Northern Superior
Uplands, including the BWCAW. The BWCAW is also expressly included in the
analysis area for most wildlife indicators. FEIS § 3.3.0-4.

The evaluation of impacts to watershed health in the FEIS illustrates how the
agency considered the BWCAW as part of its broader analysis concerning the
Northern Superior Uplands. Given the nature of stream flows, environmental effects
for a watershed area will not stop at the BWCAW’s administrative border. The
analysis areas for several indicators of watershed health, therefore, “include, but do
not differentiate between, watersheds that are inside vs. outside the BWCAW.” FEIS
§ 3.6-41. The FEIS estimates, for example, that the increase in road construction
permitted under some alternatives is likely to diminish watershed health within the

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BWCAW and beyond. FEIS § 3.6-16. The FEIS therefore cautions that “concurrent
actions” should be taken at the site-specific level “to offset expansion of the
transportation system.” FEIS § 3.6-16.

Considered together, the agency’s clear intention to act with neutrality towards
the BWCAW, the evaluation of specific impacts to the wilderness area (including
certain “edge effects”), and the inclusion of the BWCAW within broader
environmental analyses persuade us that the Forest Service took the “hard look”
required of it under NEPA. We thus conclude that the Forest Service did not act
arbitrarily or capriciously in its development of the FEIS.

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district is affirmed.
______________________________

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