Sampson v. Buescher

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit

November 9, 2010
PUBLISH Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

KAREN SAMPSON; NORMAN
FECK; LOUISE SCHILLER; TOM
SORG; WES CORNWELL; BECKY
CORNWELL,

Plaintiffs - Appellants/
Cross-Appellees,
v. Nos. 08-1389 and 08-1415
BERNIE BUESCHER, in his official
capacity as Colorado Secretary of
State,

Defendant - Appellee/
Cross-Appellant.

________________________

CENTER FOR COMPETITIVE
POLITICS; INDEPENDENCE
INSTITUTE; NATIONAL
TAXPAYERS UNION; SAM ADAMS
ALLIANCE; COLORADO COMMON
CAUSE, BRENNAN CENTER FOR
JUSTICE AT NYU SCHOOL OF
LAW,

Amici Curiae.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
(D.C. NO. 1:06-CV-01858-RPM)
Steven M. Simpson (William H. Mellor, with him on the briefs), Institute for
Justice, Arlington, Virginia, for Plaintiffs - Appellants/Cross-Appellees.

Monica M. Marquez, Assistant Solicitor General, (John W. Suthers, Attorney
General, and Maurice G. Knaizer, Deputy Attorney General, with her on the
briefs), Denver, Colorado, for Defendant - Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

Reid Alan Cox and Stephen M. Hoersting, Center for Competitive Politics,
Alexandria, Virginia, filed an amicus curiae brief for Center for Competitive
Politics, Independence Institute, National Taxpayers Union and, Sam Adams
Alliance

J. Lee Gray, Holland & Hart LLP, Greenwood Village, Colorado, filed an amicus
curiae brief for Colorado Common Cause.

Angela Migally, Monica Youn, and Laura MacCleery, Brennan Center for Justice,
New York, New York, filed an amicus curiae brief for Brennan Center for Justice
at NYU School of Law.

Before BRISCOE, Chief Circuit Judge, MCKAY, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.

HARTZ, Circuit Judge.

There is nothing novel about requiring election campaign committees in

this country to file periodic reports, including disclosures of names of

contributors and the amount contributed. Many judicial decisions have

considered whether particular reporting and disclosure requirements can

withstand scrutiny under the First Amendment. The great bulk of those decisions,

however, concern committees that are working for or against candidates for public

office. Reporting requirements are justified as necessary to police whether

anyone is contributing more than allowed to a candidate (the contribution limits

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being justified, in turn, by the need to prevent quid pro quo corruption, and the

appearance of corruption) and to give the electorate useful information

concerning the candidate’s views and those to whom the candidate is likely to be

beholden.

At issue on this appeal is a different type of campaign committee, not one

seeking to elect or defeat a candidate, but one seeking to prevail on a ballot

initiative. A citizen voting on a ballot initiative is not concerned with the merit,

including the corruptibility, of a person running for office, but with the merit of a

proposed law or expenditure, such as a bond issue. As a result, the justifications

for requiring disclosures in a candidate election may not apply, or may not apply

with as much force, to a ballot initiative. Disclosure may facilitate ad hominem

arguments - for whatever they are worth - on the merits of the ballot initiative;

but there is no need for concern that contributors can change a law enacted

through a ballot initiative as they can influence a person elected to office.

Colorado law requires that any group of two or more persons that has

accepted or made contributions or expenditures exceeding $200 to support or

oppose a ballot issue must register as an issue committee and report the names

and addresses of anyone who contributes $20 or more. Plaintiffs are residents of

Parker North, a neighborhood of about 300 homes in an unincorporated part of

Douglas County, Colorado, who opposed the annexation of their neighborhood

into the Town of Parker. Plaintiffs had raised less than $1,000 in monetary and in-

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kind contributions for their cause when supporters of annexation challenged the

failure of the opponents to register as an issue committee.

Plaintiffs contend that Colorado reporting requirements unconstitutionally

burden their First Amendment right to association. We agree that Colorado law,

as applied to Plaintiffs, has violated their constitutional freedom of association..

There is virtually no proper governmental interest in imposing disclosure

requirements on ballot-initiative committees that raise and expend so little money,

and that limited interest cannot justify the burden that those requirements impose

on such a committee.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Colorado Law

The Colorado Constitution defines issue committee as:

any person, other than a natural person, or any group of two or more
persons, including natural persons: (I) [t]hat has a major purpose of
supporting or opposing any ballot issue or ballot question; [and]1 (II)
[t]hat has accepted or made contributions or expenditures in excess
of two hundred dollars to support or oppose any ballot issue or ballot
question.

1
The statutory text uses “or,” not “and.” Colo. Const. art. XXVIII,
§ 2(10)(a)(II). But the Secretary of State has interpreted the provision by
replacing “or” with “and”. See Secretary of State Rules Governing Campaign and
Political Finance 1.7(b) (“A person or group of persons is an issue committee
only if it meets both of the conditions in Article XXVIII, Section 2(10)(a)(I) and
2(10)(a)(II).”); see Aplt. Opening Br. at 10 (stating that both the major purpose
and contribution-or-expenditure requirement must be met to create an issue
committee); Amicus Br. of Brennan Center at 7 (same). But see Aplee. Br. at 9
(quoting the statutory language using or).

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Colo. Const. art. XXVIII, § 2(10)(a)(I)-(II). All monetary contributions received

by an issue committee must be deposited in a separate account in the committee’s

name; no contribution or expenditure exceeding $100 may be in cash. Id. § 3(9),

(10). The Colorado Fair Campaign Practices Act (the Campaign Act) requires an

issue committee to register with the appropriate officer (usually the Secretary of

State or County Clerk) before accepting contributions. See Colo. Rev. Stat.

§ 1-45-108(3). The statement of registration must include the name of the issue

committee; the name of a registered agent; the committee’s address and telephone

number; the identities of all affiliated candidates and committees; and the

“purpose or nature of interest” of the committee. Id.

Issue committees also must report all contributions and expenditures,

including the name and address of any person who contributes $20 or more, and

the occupation and employer of any person who contributes $100 or more. See id.

§ 1-45-108(1)(a)(I)-(II). Reports required to be filed with the county clerk (such

as the reports in this case, see id. § 1-45-109(1)) must be filed 21 days before the

election, on the Friday before the election, and 30 days after the election; and

annually in off-election years. See id. § 1-45-108(2)(a)(II). They must include

the committee’s fund balance at the beginning of the reporting period, the total

amounts of contributions and expenditures during the reporting period, and the

name and address of the financial institution used by the committee. See id.

§ 1-45-108(2)(b).

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 The reports are public records and are made available on the Secretary of

State’s website. See id. § 1-45-109(4)–(5). Failure to comply with the

registration and reporting requirements can result in civil penalties “of fifty

dollars per day for each day that a statement or other information required to be

filed [by the Constitution or the Campaign Act] is not filed by the close of

business on the day due,” Colo. Const. art. XXVIII, § 10(2)(a), although the

Secretary or an administrative law judge (ALJ) can set aside or reduce a penalty

upon a showing of good cause. See id. § 10(2)(b), (c).

The Campaign Act directs the Secretary of State to “promulgate such rules

. . . as may be necessary to enforce and administer any provision of [the Act].”

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1-45-111.5. The rules are 19 pages long. Among other things,

the rules require that each contribution or expenditure of $20 or more be listed

separately, see 8 CCR 1505-6 §§ 4.1, 4.4, and that any change in the information

disclosed in the registration form be reported within five days, see id. § 3.1. The

Secretary also publishes the Colorado Campaign and Political Finance Manual,

which has 41 pages of text and another 51 pages of appendices that reproduce the

applicable constitutional, statutory, and regulatory provisions. The Secretary’s

website acknowledges that “[t]he laws and rules governing campaign finances are

complex.” Aplt. App., Vol. II at 750. The Manual states that it “provides

guidelines and helpful tips for proper compliance with the law.” Id. at 585. But

it is to be used “for reference and training purposes only and should not be used

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as a substitute for legal advice.” Id. (full capitalization omitted). Indeed, if the

Secretary cannot answer a question, he recommends retaining an attorney. See id.

at 763, 765 (deposition of Christi Heppard, head of the campaign-finance

department of Secretary’s office).

Private citizens can enforce these provisions by filing with the Secretary of

State a written complaint alleging a violation of the registration or reporting

requirements. See Colo. Const. art. XXVIII, § 9(2)(a). Within three days of

filing, the Secretary must refer the complaint to an ALJ who “shall hold a hearing

within fifteen days of the referral of the complaint, and shall render a decision

within fifteen days of the hearing.” Id. If the ALJ determines that a violation

occurred, the judge’s decision “shall include any appropriate order, sanction, or

relief authorized” under Article XXVIII of the state constitution. Id. Further, a

party in such a proceeding may be entitled to recover its attorney fees from an

opposing attorney or party who brought or defended an action without

“substantial justification.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1-45-111.5(2). The ALJ’s decision

“shall be final and subject to review by the [Colorado] court of appeals.” Colo.

Const. art. XXVIII, § 9(2)(a). The Secretary can enforce the decision; but if the

Secretary does not file an enforcement action within 30 days of the decision, the

private complainant may institute a private action for enforcement. See id. “The

prevailing party in a private enforcement action shall be entitled to reasonable

attorneys fees and costs.” Id.

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 B. The Parker North Annexation

In 2005, Parker North resident David Hopkins began to gather signatures

for a petition seeking the annexation of Parker North into the Town of Parker,

Colorado. He submitted the petition with the necessary signatures to the Parker

Town Council at a meeting on February 21, 2006. After the meeting Plaintiff

Norman Feck wrote a letter to Parker’s mayor and council opposing annexation

and distributed a copy of his letter to every household in Parker North. Plaintiffs

Karen Sampson and Tom Sorg later met with Feck and several other neighbors,

and joined Feck’s efforts. Sorg discovered that residents could remove their

signatures from Hopkins’s annexation petition and encouraged neighbors to do so.

He also started an e-mail discussion group for all Parker North residents to debate

annexation. Several Plaintiffs walked the neighborhood to discuss annexation

with residents, wrote letters, and developed flyers that they distributed. Plaintiff

Wes Cornwell owned a printing shop and printed “No Annexation” signs which

he sold to Parker North residents at cost. On March 23 the Parker Town Council

declared Hopkins’s petition invalid because a sufficient number of residents of

Parker North had withdrawn their signatures.

In April 2006, Hopkins and Patsy Putnam circulated a second petition to

hold an annexation election, this time without language allowing residents to

remove their signatures. Plaintiffs again began efforts to oppose the petition.

About this time Hopkins learned of the campaign finance laws governing issue

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committees and registered the issue committee “Parker Yes” online on May 9,

2006.

To persuade their neighbors to oppose annexation, Plaintiffs purchased and

distributed No Annexation signs, mailed to all residents of Parker North a

postcard summarizing the reasons to oppose annexation, continued to discuss and

debate the issue on the Internet, and on June 16 submitted to the Town Council a

document opposing annexation that was signed by 215 residents. Putnam and

Hopkins engaged in similar efforts to promote their side of the issue. On June 19

the Town Council scheduled a meeting for August 14 to decide whether to hold an

annexation election. At that later meeting, it voted to hold the election on

February 6, 2007. The proposed annexation was defeated 351 to 21.

C. The Campaign-Law Complaint

On July 3, 2006, Putnam, with Hopkins as her attorney, filed a complaint

with the Secretary of State alleging that Plaintiffs had violated the campaign

finance law by failing (1) to register as an issue committee, (2) to establish a

committee bank account with a separate tax identification number, and (3) to

comply with the reporting requirements of Colorado Law. Among the allegations

was that Plaintiffs’ “illegal activities . . . expos[e] all persons who have contacted

or obtained campaign materials from [Plaintiffs] with possible investigation,

scrutinization and sanctions for Campaign Finance violations.” Aplt. App.,

Vol. II at 582.

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 The Secretary referred the complaint to Colorado’s Office of

Administrative Courts. Plaintiffs obtained counsel and on counsel’s advice,

Plaintiff Becky Cornwell registered the issue committee “No Annexation” on

July 16, listing herself as the registered agent. The report, covering

November 27, 2005, to July 13, 2006, showed nonmonetary contributions (signs,

a banner, postcards, and postage) totaling $782.02 from Plaintiffs Sampson, Feck,

and Wes Cornwell. 2

On July 12, Putnam followed her complaint with a subpoena to produce the

following:

[1] All evidence of sales, purchases, gifts or any transfers of
any materials concerning annexation of Parker North into the Town
of Parker, Colorado, including signs, banners or campaign materials,

2
The registration and report may have been premature. In district court
both parties agreed that under then-current law the registration requirement had
arisen by the time the first petition for annexation was presented to the Town
Council. But the district court rejected that interpretation, holding that the
registration and reporting requirements were not triggered until the municipality
published the notice of election, which did not occur until December 24, 2006.
See Sampson v. Coffman, No. 06-cv-01858-RPM, 2008 WL 4305921, at *8 (D.
Colo. Sept. 18, 2008) (unpublished). After that decision the Campaign Act was
amended to state that a municipal-annexation matter does not become a ballot
issue until the first notice of the annexation election is published. See Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 1-45-108(7)(b); id. § 31-12-112(6). Although Plaintiffs’ opening brief on
appeal contends that the district court erred in interpreting the preamendment law,
the amendment has mooted the issue; Plaintiffs do not argue that they could
obtain any relief were we to decide that the district court misinterpreted the
statute before its amendment. See Kansas Judicial Review v. Stout, 562 F.3d
1240, 1246 (10th Cir. 2009) (“Generally, repeal of a challenged statute causes a
case to become moot because it extinguishes the plaintiff’s legally cognizable
interest in the outcome, rendering any remedial action by the court ineffectual.”)

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 showing the item, the amount contributed or expended, the fair
market value of each such item and whether it was sold, gifted or
otherwise transferred, listing the type of transfer.
[2] Names, addresses and telephone numbers for all persons
who are or may be members of [Plaintiffs’] issue committee or
group.
[3] Names, addresses and telephone numbers for all persons
sold, gifted, or transferred signs, banners or any campaign
information.
[4] All evidence concerning amounts contributed and
expended on the issue of annexation of Parker North into the Town
of Parker, Colorado.
[5] All bank account information concerning contributions,
expenditures or campaign materials on the issue of annexation of
Parker North into the Town of Parker, Colorado.
[6] All issue committee registration information concerning
the issue of annexation of Parker North into the Town of Parker,
Colorado.
[7] All reports made or due to any entity, including the
Colorado Secretary of State, concerning the issue committee of
[Plaintiffs] or about the issue of annexation of Parker North into the
Town of Parker, Colorado.
[8] All communications amongst [Plaintiffs] or anyone else
concerning the issue of annexation of Parker North into the Town of
Parker, Colorado.
[9] Examples of information or campaign materials sold,
gifted or transferred to anyone concerning the issue of annexation of
Parker North into the Town of Parker, Colorado.

Id. at 603.

Plaintiffs objected to producing the information. But in a written ruling on

August 30, the ALJ refused to quash the subpoena except (1) he limited paragraph

[2] to include only the names and addresses of all committee members and the

identities of all other persons or organizations “that have participated with

[Plaintiffs] in opposing the annexation in question in any significant way”; (2) he

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quashed the request for materials described in paragraph [3]; (3) he said that

[Plaintiffs] need not produce material described in paragraphs [4], [5], [6], and

[7] that was available on the Secretary of State’s website; and (4) he limited the

production of materials described in paragraph [8] to “all communications

amongst [Plaintiffs] and any member of the issue committee [and] . . . persons

who have opposed the annexation in a significant way.” Id., Vol. IV at 1418–19.

In the meantime, on July 21, Putnam, through her lawyer Hopkins, sent

Plaintiffs a letter with a “non-negotiable offer of settlement.” Id., Vol. II at 608.

Under the “Stipulation and Guilty Plea” enclosed with the letter, Plaintiffs would

admit all charges against them and would either abandon their organized

opposition to the annexation (including removing all signs and campaign

material) or follow all laws governing issue committees. The letter gave

Plaintiffs four days to respond.

Plaintiffs did not sign the agreement and a hearing was held before the ALJ

on September 20. All Plaintiffs took off from work to attend. After several hours

of testimony by Putnam, the parties reached a settlement. It stipulated (1) that

assuming, for purposes of the stipulation, that there was a ballot issue on or

before June 2, 2006, Plaintiffs met the state constitutional definition of an issue

committee on that date, and (2) that no fines, attorney fees, or other sanction

would be imposed against any party or the attorneys.

D. Plaintiffs’ Lawsuit

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 On September 19, 2006, the day before entering into the stipulation in the

administrative proceeding, Plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the

United States District Court for the District of Colorado. Their three-count

complaint alleged that the Colorado law regulating ballot-issue committees

violated the First Amendment because (1) the private-enforcement provision

unconstitutionally chills free speech; (2) the registration and disclosure

requirements unconstitutionally burden the constitutional rights to free speech and

association; and (3) the disclosure requirements violate the right to anonymous

speech and association. Plaintiffs requested (1) a declaration that the private-

enforcement provision is facially unconstitutional; (2) a declaration that the

registration and disclosure requirements are unconstitutional, facially, and as

applied; and (3) a preliminary and permanent injunction against the Secretary,

prohibiting enforcement. Plaintiffs also requested attorney fees and costs.

On September 18, 2008, the district court issued its decision on the parties’

cross motions for summary judgment. See Sampson v. Coffman,

No. 06-cv-01858-RPM, 2008 WL 4305921 (D. Colo. Sept. 18, 2008)

(unpublished). Contrary to the parties’ contentions that the challenged campaign

finance laws became applicable when the petition for annexation received its first

signature, the court concluded that the challenged campaign finance laws did not

apply to Plaintiffs until the Town first published notice of the annexation election

on December 14, 2006. See id. at *21. It upheld the constitutionality of the

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challenged provisions as applied to Plaintiffs after that date, although it stated

that application of the law to Plaintiffs’ activities before that date would have

been unconstitutional. It declined to rule on Plaintiffs’ challenge to the private-

enforcement process because the administrative proceedings had terminated in a

settlement. It did, however, award attorney fees to Plaintiffs under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1988.

On appeal Plaintiffs raise the arguments that they presented to the district

court. We agree with their as-applied First Amendment argument, holding that

the Colorado registration and reporting requirements have unconstitutionally

burdened their First Amendment right of association. Because of that ruling, we

need not address their other contentions. The Secretary has cross-appealed,

arguing that the attorney-fee award was improper because Plaintiffs failed to

obtain any of the judicial relief requested in their complaint. But that argument is

mooted by our disposition of Plaintiffs’ appeal, so we affirm the attorney-fee

award.

II. DISCUSSION

It is unlikely that the Colorado voters who approved the disclosure

requirements of Article XXVIII of the state’s Constitution were thinking of the

No Annexation committee. The language of the Article’s preamble relevant to

ballot-issue campaigns explains its purpose as follows:

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 The people of the state of Colorado hereby find and declare . . . that
large campaign contributions made to influence election outcomes
allow wealthy individuals, corporations, and special interest groups
to exercise a disproportionate level of influence over the political
process; . . . that political contributions from corporate treasuries are
not an indication of popular support for the corporation’s political
ideas and can unfairly influence the outcome of Colorado elections;
and that the interests of the public are best served by . . . providing
for full and timely disclosure of campaign contributions, independent
expenditures, and funding of electioneering communications, and
strong enforcement of campaign finance requirements.

Colo. Const. art. XXVIII, § 1 (emphasis added). It would take a mighty effort to

characterize the No Annexation committee’s expenditure of $782.02 for signs, a

banner, postcards, and postage as an exercise of a “disproportionate level of

influence over the political process” by a wealthy group that could “unfairly

influence the outcome” of an election. Id. The disconnect between the avowed

purpose of the constitutional disclosure requirements and their effect in this case

should in itself provoke doubt about whether the burden on the First Amendment

associational rights of the members of the No Annexation committee could be

justified. And, as we shall proceed to explain, an examination of First

Amendment doctrine confirms that doubt.

A. The Right to Associate and Disclosure Requirements

Without question, Colorado election laws place burdens on the right to

associate to support or oppose ballot issues. The Colorado Constitution restricts

the meaning of issue committee to “any person, other than a natural person, or any

group of two or more persons, including natural persons.” Id. § 2(10)(a). In

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other words, a single natural person is not subject to the disclosure or reporting

requirements imposed on ballot-issue organizations such as the No Annexation

committee. (Individuals who expend more than $1000 on electioneering

communications within a year or make an independent expenditure exceeding

$1000 to support or oppose a candidate are required to make disclosures, see id.

§§ 5(1), 6(1); but those requirements do not apply to expenditures for ballot

issues, see id. § 2(7) (defining electioneering communication).) In Citizens

Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S.

290, 296 (1981), the Supreme Court held that a city ordinance burdened freedom

of association because an affluent person was subject to no limits on spending to

support a ballot measure, but contributions made in concert with others were so

restricted. The Court said: “There are, of course, some activities, legal if engaged

in by one, yet illegal if performed in concert with others, but political expression

is not one of them.” Id.

Reporting and disclosure requirements, just as the limits on contributions in

City of Berkeley, can infringe on the right of association. See Buckley v. Valeo,

424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976). As stated by Justice Brennan for a plurality in Federal

Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 254

(1986), “Detailed record-keeping and disclosure obligations, along with the duty

to appoint a treasurer and custodian of records, impose administrative costs that

many small entities may be unable to bear.” See Citizens United v. Fed. Election

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Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 897–98 (2010) (because of the burdens imposed on

PACs, contributing through a PAC is an inadequate substitute for direct

contributions by the corporation itself); Colo. Right To Life Comm., Inc. v.

Coffman, 498 F.3d 1137, 1145 n.6 (10th Cir. 2007) (Colorado constitutional

provision “requiring corporations to make independent expenditures only through

segregated funds . . . burdens corporate freedom of expression”).

Nevertheless, not all burdens on freedom of association are

unconstitutional. In particular, “disclosure requirements in the electoral context”

may be upheld if they survive “‘exacting scrutiny.’” Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811,

2818 (2010). “That standard requires a substantial relation between the

disclosure requirement and a sufficiently important governmental interest. To

withstand this scrutiny, the strength of the governmental interest must reflect the

seriousness of the actual burden on First Amendment rights.” Id. (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted). “In determining whether these [governmental]

interests are sufficient to justify the requirements we must look to the extent of

the burden that they place on individual rights.” Valeo, 424 U.S. at 68.

When analyzing the governmental interest in disclosure requirements, it is

essential to keep in mind that our concern is with ballot issues, not candidates.

The legitimate reasons for regulating candidate campaigns apply only partially (or

perhaps not at all) to ballot-issue campaigns. For example, the Supreme Court

has upheld limits on contributions to candidates on the ground that the limits are

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necessary to avoid the risk or appearance of quid pro quo corruption—the

exchange of a contribution for political favor. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at

901–02; Valeo, 424 U.S. at 45–48 (limits on independent expenditures are

unconstitutional because “[t]he absence of prearrangement and coordination of an

expenditure with the candidate or his agent not only undermines the value of the

expenditure to the candidate, but also alleviates the danger that expenditures will

be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate”).

Limits on contributions to ballot-issue committees, in contrast, are

unconstitutional because of the absence of any risk of quid pro quo corruption.

See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 352 n.15 (1995); City of

Berkeley, 454 U.S. at 296–300; First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.

765, 790 (1978) (“The risk of corruption perceived in cases involving candidate

elections . . . simply is not present in a popular vote on a public issue.”); cf. Elam

Constr. v. Reg’l Transp. Dist., 129 F.3d 1343 (10th Cir. 1997) (invalidating

resolution of transportation-district governing body that district would not enter

into contracts with companies that have contributed more than $100 to

referendum campaigns). 3

3
The amicus brief of the Brennan Center for Justice makes interesting
arguments that corruption concerns can arise in ballot-issue campaigns that are
associated with candidate elections. But we need not address the arguments
because they are irrelevant to our disposition of this case and were not raised by
any party to the appeal. See Harris v. Owens, 264 F.3d 1282, 1288 n.3 (10th Cir.
2001) (court does not ordinarily address issues raised only by amici).

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 As for disclosure requirements specifically, the Supreme Court has

recognized three proper justifications for reporting and disclosing campaign

finances. The first is that reporting and disclosure requirements “are an essential

means of gathering the data necessary to detect violations of . . . contribution

limitations.” Valeo, 424 U.S. at 68. The second is that publicizing large

contributions and expenditures can “deter actual corruption and avoid the

appearance of corruption” and can facilitate detection of post-election favoritism.

Id. at 67. The third justification is an informational interest. Disclosure of

contributions and expenditures:

allows voters to place each candidate in the political spectrum more
precisely than is often possible solely on the basis of party labels and
campaign speeches. The sources of the candidate’s financial support
also alert the voter to the interests to which a candidate is most likely
to be responsive and thus facilitates predictions of future
performance in office.

Id. 4

The first and second grounds do not support reporting and disclosure

requirements for ballot-issue committees. The first—facilitating the detection of

violations of contribution limitations—is mooted by the prohibition on

4
The Secretary of State’s appellate brief also cites to United States v.
Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954), which rejected a First Amendment challenge
to disclosure requirements for Congressional lobbyists. In McIntyre the Supreme
Court distinguished Harriss on the ground that “[t]he activities of lobbyists who
have direct access to elected representatives, if undisclosed, may well present the
appearance of corruption.” 514 U.S. at 356 n.20. In our view, Harriss teaches
little about disclosure requirements in ballot-issue campaigns to influence public
opinion.

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contribution limitations in the ballot-issue context. And the second—deterring

corruption and its appearance—is irrelevant because, as our prior discussion has

pointed out, quid pro quo corruption cannot arise in a ballot-issue campaign. See

Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc. (ACLF), 525 U.S. 182, 203–04

(1999); McIntyre v. Ohio Election Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 352 n.15; City of

Berkeley, 454 U.S. at 296–97; Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 790.

Thus, the reporting and disclosure requirements for Colorado issue

committees (at least those committees addressing ballot issues) must be justified

on the third ground—the informational interest. We must therefore analyze the

public interest in knowing who is spending and receiving money to support or

oppose a ballot issue. It is not obvious that there is such a public interest.

Candidate elections are, by definition, ad hominem affairs. The voter must

evaluate a human being, deciding what the candidate’s personal beliefs are and

what influences are likely to be brought to bear when he or she must decide on

the advisability of future governmental action. The identities of those with strong

financial ties to the candidate are important data in that evaluation. In contrast,

when a ballot issue is before the voter, the choice is whether to approve or

disapprove of discrete governmental action, such as annexing territory, floating a

bond, or amending a statute. No human being is being evaluated. When many

complain about the deterioration of public discourse—in particular, the inability

or unwillingness of citizens to listen to proposals made by particular people or by

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members of particular groups—one could wonder about the utility of ad hominem

arguments in evaluating ballot issues. Nondisclosure could require the debate to

actually be about the merits of the proposition on the ballot. Indeed, the Supreme

Court has recognized that “[a]nonymity . . . provides a way for a writer who may

be personally unpopular to ensure that readers will not prejudge her message

simply because they do not like its proponent.” McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 342.

The Supreme Court has sent a mixed message regarding the value of

financial disclosure in a ballot-issue campaign. Perhaps its view can be

summarized as “such disclosure has some value, but not that much.” Although

the Court has never rejected a First Amendment challenge to a financial-

disclosure requirement in the ballot-issue context, on three occasions it has

spoken favorably of such requirements.

First, in Bellotti the Court invalidated a Massachusetts statute prohibiting

corporate expenditures in ballot-issue campaigns. 435 U.S. at 767. As previously

noted, the Court stated that the risk of quid pro quo corruption is not present in

such campaigns, id. at 790, and it observed that the voters “are entrusted with the

responsibility for judging and evaluating the relative merits of conflicting

arguments.” Id. at 791. But it went on to say that the people “may consider, in

making their judgment, the source and credibility of the advocate,” id. at 791–92,

and appended a footnote saying that “[i]dentification of the source of advertising

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may be required as a means of disclosure, so that people will be able to evaluate

the arguments to which they are being subjected,” id. at 792 n.32.

Second, in City of Berkeley the Court similarly invalidated a municipal

ordinance setting a cap on contributions to committees supporting or opposing

ballot measures. See 454 U.S. at 291–94. In response to the City’s argument that

the contribution cap was necessary to identify those supporting or opposing a

ballot measure, the Court said that the cap was not necessary because another

provision in the ordinance required disclosure. The Court wrote, “The integrity

of the political system will be adequately protected if contributors are identified

in a public filing revealing the amounts contributed; if it is thought wise,

legislation can outlaw anonymous contributions.” Id. at 299–300.

More recently, in ACLF the Court expressed approval for disclosure

requirements when it struck several provisions in a Colorado statute regulating

the circulation of petitions to place initiatives on the ballot. 525 U.S. at 202–03.

One issue before the Court was a statutory requirement to disclose the names of

paid circulators and the amounts paid to each circulator. The Court, without

distinguishing between candidate and ballot-issue campaigns, wrote:

We explained in Buckley that disclosure provides the electorate with
information as to where political campaign money comes from and
how it is spent, thereby aiding electors in evaluating those who seek
their vote. We further observed that disclosure requirements deter
actual corruption and avoid the appearance of corruption by exposing
large contributions and expenditures to the light of publicity. . . .
[T]he State and supporting amici stress the importance of disclosure

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 as a control or check on domination of the initiative process by
affluent special interest groups. . . . Disclosure of the names of
initiative sponsors, and of the amounts they have spent gathering
support for their initiatives, responds to that substantial state
interest. . . . Through the disclosure requirements that remain in
place, voters are informed of the source and amount of money spent
by proponents to get a measure on the ballot; in other words, voters
will be told who has proposed a measure, and who has provided
funds for its circulation.
Id. (citations, brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). The Court also

wrote: “To inform the public ‘where [the] money comes from,’ Buckley, 424 U.S.

at 66 (internal quotation marks omitted), we reiterate, the State legitimately

requires sponsors of ballot initiatives to disclose who pays petition circulators,

and how much.” Id. at 205. The disclosure requirements referred to in these

passages, however, were not challenged in the case before the Court. The

disclosure requirements that were challenged—the disclosure of the names of paid

circulators and the amounts paid to each—were stricken because they could not

be justified by the benefit they might add to the unchallenged disclosure

requirements. See id. at 202–03.

Thus, in all three cases the statements by the Supreme Court supporting

disclosures in ballot-issue campaigns were dicta. The Court has never upheld a

disclosure provision for ballot-issue campaigns that has been presented to it for

review. Of course, this court takes Supreme Court dictum very seriously. United

States v. Serawop, 505 F.3d 1112, 1122 (10th Cir. 2007) (“we are bound by

Supreme Court dicta almost as firmly as by the Court’s outright holdings”

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(internal quotation marks omitted)). But the absence of the precise and careful

analysis necessary to resolve a particular issue fully presented to the Court makes

it difficult for us to assess the weight that should be granted the public interest in

disclosure when balancing it against the burden on the First Amendment right of

association imposed by a particular statute in a particular circumstance. The

difficulty is especially great when the Court has also suggested the limits of the

public interest in disclosure in the ballot-issue context. In McIntyre the Court

meticulously distinguished its precedents affirming disclosure requirements in

candidate elections as it overturned a fine for distributing anonymous pamphlets

opposing a school tax levy. See 514 U.S. at 353–56. And it quoted the following

passage from a New York court that struck down a similar statute:

Of course, the identity of the source is helpful in evaluating ideas.
But the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market. Don’t underestimate the
common man. People are intelligent enough to evaluate the source
of an anonymous writing. They can see it is anonymous. They know
it is anonymous. They can evaluate its anonymity along with its
message, as long as they are permitted, as they must be, to read that
message. And then, once they have done so, it is for them to decide
what is responsible, what is valuable, and what is truth.

Id. at 348 n.11 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Bellotti, 435

U.S. at 777 (“The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for

informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether

corporation, association, union, or individual.”)

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 We also find it significant that in the recent decision in Doe v. Reed, 130 S.

Ct. 2811, the Court affirmed a state law requiring disclosure of referendum

petitions without reliance on the State’s asserted interest in providing information

to the electorate about who supports the petition. See id. at 2819. Rather, the

court relied on the utility of disclosure in preserving the integrity of the electoral

process. See id. at 2819–21. The concurring opinion of Justice Alito pointed out

the “breathtaking” implications of the State’s contention

that publicly disclosing the names and addresses of referendum
signatories provides the voting public with ‘insight into whether
support for holding a vote comes predominantly from particular
interest groups, political or religious organizations, or other group[s]
of citizens,’ and thus allows voters to draw inferences about whether
they should support or oppose the referendum.

Id. at 2824 (quoting Brief for Respondent Washington Families Standing Together

58). He continued:

Were we to accept respondents’ asserted informational interest, the
State would be free to require petition signers to disclose all kinds of
demographic information, including the signer’s race, religion,
political affiliation, sexual orientation, ethnic background, and
interest-group memberships. Requiring such disclosures, however,
runs headfirst into a half-century of our case law, which firmly
establishes that individuals have a right to privacy of belief and
association.

Id.

To be sure, typical financial-disclosure laws are not nearly as sweeping as

the types of requirements hypothesized by Justice Alito. They require disclosure

of only name and address, and sometimes employment. But by the same token,

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they reveal only one dimension of the support for a ballot measure. Their purpose

is not to inform the electorate about all who believe that a particular result is in

the public interest; volunteers who devote many hours to grassroots work need not

be identified. Rather, their only purpose is to identify those who (presumably)

have a financial interest in the outcome of the election. See Canyon Ferry Baptist

Church v. Unsworth, 556 F.3d 1021, 1033 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he relevant

informational goal is to inform voters as to who backs or opposes a given

initiative financially, so that the voters will have a pretty good idea of who stands

to benefit from the legislation.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). This limited

purpose must be kept in mind when evaluating the constitutionality of a particular

financial-disclosure requirement.

Accordingly, while assuming that there is a legitimate public interest in

financial disclosure from campaign organizations, we also recognize that this

interest is significantly attenuated when the organization is concerned with only a

single ballot issue and when the contributions and expenditures are slight. We

now proceed to weigh that interest against the First Amendment right of

association in the context of this case.

B. Application to this Case

In our view, the burden on Plaintiffs’ right to association imposed by

Colorado’s registration and reporting requirements cannot be justified by a public

interest in disclosure. The burdens are substantial. The average citizen cannot be

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expected to master on his or her own the many campaign financial-disclosure

requirements set forth in Colorado’s constitution, the Campaign Act, and the

Secretary of State’s Rules Concerning Campaign and Political Finance. Even if

those rules that apply to issue committees may be few, one would have to sift

through them all to determine which apply. As the Supreme Court recently

observed in rejecting a proposed intricate interpretation of the term electioneering

communication in 2 U.S.C. § 441b: “Prolix laws chill speech for the same reason

that vague laws chill speech: People of common intelligence must necessarily

guess at the law’s meaning and differ as to its application.” Citizens United, 130

S. Ct. at 889 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). The Secretary of

State’s website acknowledged that the State’s campaign finance laws and rules

“are complex,” Aplt. App., Vol. II at 750, and the official who oversaw the

Secretary of State’s campaign finance department testified that she advises those

with difficult questions to retain an attorney. And even attorneys are not error-

free. Recall that the complaint filed by attorney Hawkins with the Secretary of

State incorrectly alleged that persons who had obtained campaign materials from

Plaintiffs could be subject to sanctions under Colorado law. Moreover, failure to

comply with the rules can be expensive; failure to meet a recording deadline can

cost $50 a day, see Colo. Const. art. XXVIII, § 10(2)(a). As Plaintiff Becky

Cornwell stated in her affidavit:

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 I found the [campaign] laws difficult to understand and I constantly
worried about being sued for even the smallest error. Particular
points—like non-monetary contributions—were counterintuitive; the
forms were hard to follow; the website was often slow and had
technical glitches; and getting questions answered often took several
days and sometimes did not yield correct answers or even any answer
at all.

Aplt. App., Vol II t 490.

It is no surprise that Plaintiffs felt the need to hire counsel upon receiving

the complaint against them filed with the Secretary of State. One would expect,

as was the case here, 5 that an attorney’s fee would be comparable to, if not

exceed, the $782.02 that had been contributed by that time to the anti-annexation

effort. This is a substantial burden. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 889 (“The

First Amendment does not permit laws that force speakers to retain a campaign

finance attorney, conduct demographic marketing research, or seek declaratory

rulings before discussing the most salient political issues of our day.”). And

added to that burden was the burden on Plaintiffs of time, energy, and money to

review the law themselves and to take off work to attend the hearing on the

complaint against them.

5
The record contains the No Annexation disclosure reports from
November 27, 2005, through October 27, 2007. In addition to the $782.02 in in-
kind contributions reported on July 13, 2006, the committee received an
additional in-kind contribution of $31.53 in October 2006. The cash contributions
(made between September 2006 and April 2007) totaled $1,426, of which
$1,178.82 went for attorney fees and $247.18 remained in the committee bank
account. See Aplt. App., Vol. I at 332–63.

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 On the other side of the scale, the public interest in disclosure is minimal.

We agree with the Ninth Circuit that “[a]s a matter of common sense, the value of

this financial information to the voters declines drastically as the value of the

expenditure or contribution sinks to a negligible level.” Canyon Ferry Baptist

Church, 556 F.3d at 1033. Canyon Ferry considered a Montana statute requiring

“political committees” to disclose expenditures and contributions. The term

political committee encompassed any organization of two or more individuals

who made contributions or expenditures with respect to a ballot issue. The court

held the statute unconstitutional as applied to a one-time in-kind de minimis

expenditure. See id. at 1031.

The expenditures in this case are more substantial than those in Canyon

Ferry. But they are sufficiently small that they say little about the contributors’

views of their financial interest in the annexation issue. One can question the

value to the electorate of knowing that the contributors to Plaintiffs’ committee

might think that they will financially benefit from defeat of the annexation by

more than the amount of their contributions. It is worth repeating the pertinent

portions of §1 of the Colorado constitutional amendment governing campaign

finances:

The people of the state of Colorado hereby find and declare . . . that
large campaign contributions made to influence election outcomes
allow wealthy individuals, corporations, and special interest groups
to exercise a disproportionate level of influence over the political
process . . . that political contributions from corporate treasuries are

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 not an indication of popular support for the corporation’s political
ideas and can unfairly influence the outcome of Colorado elections;
and that the interests of the public are best served by . . . providing
for full and timely disclosure of campaign contributions, independent
expenditures, and funding of electioneering communications, and
strong enforcement of campaign finance requirements.

Colo. Const. art. XXVIII, § 1 (emphasis added). Those expressed purposes have

little to do with a group of individuals who have together spent less than $1,000

on a campaign (not including $1,179 for attorney fees); and the appellate briefs

opposing Plaintiffs’ position make no effort to explain the public interest in

disclosure in this particular case

As stated above, campaign-disclosure statutes must survive exacting

scrutiny. There must be a “substantial relation” between the requirement and a

governmental interest that is sufficiently important to justify the burden on the

freedom of association. See Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. at 2818; Valeo, 424 U.S. at

64. Here, the financial burden of state regulation on Plaintiffs’ freedom of

association approaches or exceeds the value of their financial contributions to

their political effort; and the governmental interest in imposing those regulations

is minimal, if not nonexistent, in light of the small size of the contributions. We

therefore hold that it was unconstitutional to impose that burden on Plaintiffs.

We do not attempt to draw a bright line below which a ballot-issue committee

cannot be required to report contributions and expenditures. The case before us is

quite unlike ones involving the expenditure of tens of millions of dollars on ballot

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issues presenting “complex policy proposals.” Cal. Pro-Life Council, Inc. v.

Getman, 328 F.3d 1088, 1105 (9th Cir. 2003). We say only that Plaintiffs’

contributions and expenditures are well below the line.

III. CONCLUSION

We REVERSE and REMAND for entry of judgment in favor of Plaintiffs.

We AFFIRM the award of attorney fees to Plaintiffs. We DENY as moot

Plaintiffs’ motion to supplement the record.

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