PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
PETER GLASSMAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ARLINGTON COUNTY, VIRGINIA;
1210 NORTH HIGHLAND STREET -
CLARENDON LIMITED PARTNERSHIP;
THE VIEWS AT CLARENDON No. 10-1496
CORPORATION, INCORPORATED;
VIRGINIA HOUSING DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY; BOARD OF
SUPERVISORS OF ARLINGTON
COUNTY, VIRGINIA; FIRST BAPTIST
CHURCH OF CLARENDON,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.
Claude M. Hilton, Senior District Judge.
(1:09-cv-01249-CMH-TRJ)
Argued: September 22, 2010
Decided: December 23, 2010
Before NIEMEYER and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges,
and Robert J. CONRAD, Jr., Chief United States District
Judge for the Western District of North Carolina,
sitting by designation.
2 GLASSMAN v. ARLINGTON COUNTY
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Niemeyer wrote the
opinion, in which Judge Duncan and Judge Conrad joined.
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Andrew S. Oldham, KELLOGG, HUBER, HAN-
SEN, TODD, EVANS & FIGEL, PLLC, Washington, D.C.,
for Appellant. James Patrick Taves, GREEHAN, TAVES,
PANDAK & STONER, PLLC, Chantilly, Virginia; Raighne
Coleman Delaney, BEAN, KINNEY & KORMAN, PC,
Arlington, Virginia, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Stephen G.
Cochran, ROEDER, COCHRAN, PARROTT, CHANDLER
& KINSEL PLLC, McLean, Virginia; Joseph S. Hall, KEL-
LOGG, HUBER, HANSEN, TODD, EVANS & FIGEL,
PLLC, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. T. David Stoner,
GREEHAN, TAVES, PANDAK & STONER, PLLC, Chan-
tilly, Virginia; Stephen A. MacIsaac, County Attorney, Carol
W. McCoskrie, Assistant County Attorney, ARLINGTON
COUNTY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Arlington, Virginia, for
Appellees Arlington County, Virginia, and Board of Supervi-
sors of Arlington County. H. Robert Showers, Timothy Paul
Bosson, SIMMS SHOWERS, LLP, Leesburg, Virginia, for
Appellee First Baptist Church of Clarendon. Robert M. Tyler,
Jeffrey D. McMahan, Jr., MCGUIREWOODS LLP, Rich-
mond, Virginia, for Appellee Virginia Housing Development
Authority.
OPINION
NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:
In 2004, the First Baptist Church of Clarendon, in Arling-
ton County, Virginia, proposed—and Arlington County
approved—a plan to develop a parcel of land that the Church
owned and on which the church building was located. Under
GLASSMAN v. ARLINGTON COUNTY 3
the plan, the existing church building would be razed, and in
its place a 10-story building would be erected, which would
include a new church building and church facilities on the
first two floors, and apartments on the upper eight floors, to
include affordable units for low and moderate income people
as well as market-rate units.
In furtherance of the plan, the Church conveyed the prop-
erty to a private development corporation, and the develop-
ment corporation thereafter created a two-unit condominium
on the property, one for the Church and one for the apart-
ments. The Church financed the construction of its portion of
the building, and Arlington County and the federal govern-
ment provided loans to finance construction of the apart-
ments.
Peter Glassman, a taxpayer in Arlington County, who lives
less than one block from the property, commenced this action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Arlington County, the Com-
monwealth of Virginia, the First Baptist Church, and the
developer, alleging that Arlington County’s involvement in
the development violates the Establishment Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, as well as its counterpart in the Virginia Consti-
tution. He seeks to enjoin completion of the project, which
has already commenced, and to order rescission of the loan
and restitution to Arlington County of all monies advanced by
the County. In his complaint, Glassman alleges that the Coun-
ty’s announced purpose of providing affordable housing in
Arlington "has been used to mask what is really a subsidy
from the County to support the building of the [new] Church,
at the expense of the affordable housing cause." This is evi-
denced, he alleges, by the County’s approval of above-market
payments for the housing portion of the project, by the pres-
ence of both Church and County members on the developer’s
board, and by the physical layout of the building in which
"[t]he housing units will share with the Church a common
foundation, common elevator, and other common infrastruc-
ture." Glassman also alleges that the funding arrangement,
4 GLASSMAN v. ARLINGTON COUNTY
administration, and building layout create an unconstitutional,
excessive entanglement of the Church and the County.
The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss
the complaint, concluding, in a thorough 24-page opinion,
that the facts alleged in the complaint did not state a plausible
claim upon which relief could be granted for a violation of the
Establishment Clause. Having found no violation of the U.S.
Constitution, the court also found no violation of the Virginia
Constitution, which has been construed in "parallel" to the
U.S. Constitution.
For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
I
Because we are reviewing the district court’s order dismiss-
ing Glassman’s complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 12(b)(6) and therefore are evaluating the complaint only
for legal sufficiency, we take as true the facts alleged in the
complaint in determining whether they support a plausible
claim for relief. See Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186,
192-93 (4th Cir. 2009).
Summarizing his complaint, Glassman states that he "has a
substantial grievance concerning the County and State’s
financing of a Baptist Church building less than one block
from his home." He alleges that (1) the nature of the relation-
ship between and among the First Baptist Church, the devel-
oper, and the County in the development of this project; (2)
the nature of the funding; and (3) the planned structure of the
completed project support his claim that Arlington County has
violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment
and its counterpart in the Virginia Constitution.
The complaint then recites the transaction in some detail.
In the 2003-04 period, the First Baptist Church decided to
develop the property on which its church building was then
GLASSMAN v. ARLINGTON COUNTY 5
located in order to rebuild the church building and to con-
struct affordable housing. By including affordable housing in
the plan for the project, the Church intended to take advantage
of funding from Arlington County’s "Affordable Housing
Investment Fund"; funding by the Virginia Housing Develop-
ment Authority; and tax credits from the federal government
for low-income housing.
The plan called for razing the existing church building and
constructing a new building, including a new sanctuary and
church facilities, 70 affordable housing apartments, 46
market-rate apartments, and a parking garage for the apart-
ment tenants. To implement the plan, the Church created a
nonprofit corporation to serve as the developer of the project
—the Views at Clarendon Corporation (the "Developer")—
which had a seven-person board consisting of three members
designated by the Church, one of whom was the president of
the board, three "Affordable Housing Advocates," and one
member appointed by Arlington County. The Developer in
turn created a Virginia limited partnership—1210 North
Highland Street, Clarendon Limited Partnership—to purchase
the property from the Church and administer the funding. In
forming the limited partnership, the Developer made itself the
general partner and the limited partner. The 1210 N. Highland
Partnership then created a two-unit condominium on the prop-
erty, with one unit for the portion of the project to be occu-
pied by the Church and the other for the housing portion of
the project. All funding for the project was paid directly to the
1210 N. Highland Partnership.
The configuration of the physical structure of the building
called for a three-story below-ground tenant parking garage
and a ten-story above-ground building. The first two stories
above ground, which had a footprint larger than the eight-
story tower, were largely dedicated to Church use, including
the sanctuary. The portion of the structure extending beyond
the tower’s footprint was designed to accommodate the
Church’s front entrance and a steeple. The eight-story tower
6 GLASSMAN v. ARLINGTON COUNTY
was dedicated to housing and was comprised of 70 below
market-rate apartments, to be rented as affordable housing for
low and middle income persons, and 46 market-rate apart-
ments. The tower lobby and elevator on the first floor were to
be used in common by both church members and tenants.
The construction of the Church’s portion of the structure,
estimated to cost $5.8 million, was funded mostly by the $5.6
million proceeds of the Church’s sale of the property to 1210
N. Highland Partnership. The construction of the housing por-
tion of the project and parking garage was funded by a $13.1
million loan from Arlington County’s Affordable Housing
Investment Fund, a $14.5 million loan from the Virginia
Housing Development Authority, and an $18.6 million loan
funded by the federal government. The complaint does not
allege that any money from these public sources was paid to
the Church except for the $5.6 million for the purchase of the
property.
The complaint asserts that Arlington County and the Vir-
ginia Housing Development Authority overvalued the apart-
ments in making loans to the project and that this overvaluing
was necessary to make the project work financially. It states
that, as a consequence, the Church benefited, because the via-
bility of the project enabled construction of a new church
building. Based on this indirect benefit, the shared member-
ship on the Developer’s board, and the physical design of the
building, Glassman asserts that the County’s actions involved
it in a constitutionally-prohibited relationship with the
Church.
After briefing and argument, the district court, by an order
dated April 12, 2010, granted the defendants’ motion to dis-
miss. After examining all of the relationships between the par-
ties, as well as the funding scheme and the physical structure,
the court held that Glassman had failed to allege facts show-
ing that he was entitled to relief for violation of the Establish-
ment Clause or Virginia’s counterpart. The court found: (1)
GLASSMAN v. ARLINGTON COUNTY 7
"Despite an innuendo plaintiff tries to draw from such allega-
tions, the facts alleged in the Amended Complaint show that
the purpose of the loan was to assist in the development of
affordable housing in Arlington County"; (2) "[t]he Amended
Complaint fails to allege facts from which this Court could
conclude that the County’s aid results in any indoctrination
attributable to the County or even [the First Baptist Church]";
(3) the complaint does not support any argument that the First
Baptist Church "was paid more than fair market value for its
property"; and (4) the County’s actions in approving the proj-
ect and lending money for affordable housing did not create
excessive entanglement, given that "[p]laintiff alleges no facts
that the County is actively engaged in developing [the First
Baptist Church’s] sanctuary or, for that matter, the affordable
housing component of the project," and the County’s loan was
"not for the construction of a new sanctuary or other religious
facilities of [the First Baptist Church]."
Glassman filed this appeal, challenging the district court’s
April 12, 2010 order.
II
Our standard for review of the district court’s order is espe-
cially important in this case because the complaint, which is
33 pages long, is comprised not only of factual allegations,
but also of conclusions, characterizations, opinion, specula-
tion, and argument. For example, it alleges, "This case pre-
sents a remarkable example of a state actor taking unprece-
dented steps to promote, sponsor and fund the demolition,
rebuilding and renovation of a Baptist Church with taxpayer
money." Similarly, it states, "In short, the County’s support of
the Church project is so intertwined with religion that the
County’s affordable housing mantra rings hollow; such an
unprecedented and irresponsible use of affordable housing
dollars suggests that the County, at worst, actually acted with
the purpose of establishing and promoting religion or, at best,
its actions have the perceived and actual effect of advancing
8 GLASSMAN v. ARLINGTON COUNTY
religion." Speculating, the complaint states, "The same Arti-
cles of Incorporation provide for an Initial Board of Trustees
of the Church. Certain of these Church trustees would later
become members of the supposed ‘independent’ nonprofit
Board of the Views Corporation [the developer], which the
Church created ostensibly to build and manage the affordable
housing units separately from the Church." And again, "as-
suming that the government-subsidized loans are ever paid
off, on information and belief the Church will also be the
deFacto [sic] owner of the [Developer’s] residential property,
with access to the perpetual funding mechanism that the prop-
erty provides."
While these statements are not inappropriate, they nonethe-
less cannot be taken as a basis to support a plausible claim.
To determine whether a plausible claim has been asserted, we
consider the factual allegations of the complaint to determine
whether they plausibly show an entitlement to relief. See Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007). To be sure,
Glassman’s complaint does include extensive factual allega-
tions related to the history and the nature of the transaction at
issue.
When reviewing an order dismissing a complaint under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), we determine
whether the complaint contains "sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face." Giacomelli, 588 F.3d at 193 (internal quotation
marks, emphasis, and citations omitted). As we explained,
The plausibility standard requires a plaintiff to dem-
onstrate more than "a sheer possibility that a defen-
dant has acted unlawfully." It requires the plaintiff to
articulate facts, when accepted as true, that "show"
that the plaintiff has stated a claim entitling him to
relief, i.e., the "plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’"
Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Under this standard,
"we need not accept the legal conclusions drawn from the
GLASSMAN v. ARLINGTON COUNTY 9
facts," nor "unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclu-
sions, or arguments." Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298,
302 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). As the Supreme Court has admonished, a complaint
must contain "more than labels and conclusions, and a formu-
laic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Employing these guidelines, we now determine whether the
complaint states a claim for an Establishment Clause violation
that is plausible on its face.
III
In determining whether Arlington County acted in a man-
ner that effectively makes a law "respecting an establishment
of religion," as prohibited by the First Amendment, we focus
on both the purpose of the County’s activity in participating
in the development of the housing project and the effect of its
involvement. The Establishment Clause prohibits state action
with a sectarian legislative purpose or with the primary effect
of advancing religion, including fostering an "excessive gov-
ernment entanglement" with religion. See Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971); see also Agostini v. Felton, 521
U.S. 203, 232 (1997) (stating that "excessive entanglement"
has sometimes been considered independently, and sometimes
as part of the "effects" analysis). But it does not prohibit all
interaction between church and state. To the contrary,
"[i]nteraction between church and state is inevitable, and we
have always tolerated some level of involvement between the
two." Agostini, 521 U.S. at 233 (internal citation omitted).
Thus, the test for determining whether a legislative act with-
stands an Establishment Clause challenge requires (1) that the
act have a secular purpose; (2) that its principal or primary
effect be neither to advance nor to inhibit religion; and (3)
that it not foster excessive government entanglement with
religion. See Lemon, 402 U.S. at 612-13; Ehlers-Renzi v. Con-
10 GLASSMAN v. ARLINGTON COUNTY
nelly Sch. of the Holy Child, Inc., 224 F.3d 283, 288 (4th Cir.
2000).
In this case, Glassman acknowledges that Arlington Coun-
ty’s announced purpose to provide affordable housing in
Arlington County was a secular purpose. But he argues that
this announced purpose was a sham and that the County’s real
purpose was to aid the First Baptist Church in rebuilding its
church. This, he claims, had the primary effect of advancing
the Baptist faith. He also contends that Arlington County
became unconstitutionally entangled in the Baptist religion
through its involvement in the project.
We now examine the complaint under the applicable test to
determine whether the facts alleged support his claim.
A
We ask first whether the County’s activity in this project
had a secular purpose. This first prong of the Lemon test pre-
sents a "fairly low hurdle, which may be cleared by finding
a plausible secular purpose on the face of the regulation."
Ehlers-Renzi, 224 F.3d at 288 (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). But the proffered secular purpose must be
"sincere and not a sham." Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S.
578, 587 (1987).
While Glassman acknowledges that the "County invokes
affordable housing as the stated rationale to support this . . .
project," he nonetheless argues that the County’s true purpose
was to advance the Baptist faith by helping the First Baptist
Church rebuild its church. To argue that the announced pur-
pose was not sincere, he relies on the County manager’s
alleged statement that any approved project would have to
produce sufficient capital to meet the Church’s needs. But this
statement does not necessarily indicate a purpose to advance
the Baptist faith. It is self-evident that the affordable housing
project could not have gone forward if it were not beneficial
GLASSMAN v. ARLINGTON COUNTY 11
to all involved. If the County wished to achieve its secular
purpose of building affordable housing, it would have to sup-
port a proposal that would also meet the needs of the Church,
as well as the other relevant parties to the project. Glassman
has alleged no facts to suggest that County officials intended
to benefit the Church rather than simply attempting to craft a
proposal that was workable for all involved.
In an effort to show otherwise, Glassman points to a series
of e-mails sent by members of the Church discussing the
Church’s construction costs and the use of County loan funds
to meet those costs. These allegations, again, do not support
a claim that the County had a religious purpose because the
e-mails cannot be attributed to any government actor. Indeed,
the only County e-mail mentioned indicates the County’s con-
trary intent, asking that Church members remove the
Church’s costs from spreadsheets before sending them to the
County.
The County’s announced purpose to provide affordable
housing is undoubtedly a legitimate, secular goal, and we con-
clude that the allegations in the complaint do not support the
claim that this secular goal was a sham or that the County had
a purpose to advance religion in deciding to lend money to the
project. Accordingly, we readily conclude, as did the district
court, that the complaint does not set forth a plausible claim
that would support an Establishment Clause violation based
on a purpose to advance religion.
B
The second prong of the Lemon test is directed at whether
the County’s activities have the principal or primary effect of
advancing religion. This prong could be satisfied by a show-
ing that County funds were used to fund the religious activi-
ties of the First Baptist Church. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487
U.S. 589, 614-15 (1988). It could also be satisfied if the
County’s activities in the project amounted to government
12 GLASSMAN v. ARLINGTON COUNTY
indoctrination, or defined program recipients by reference to
religion, or created an excessive entanglement with religion.
See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234.
Glassman devotes a majority of his allegations to this sec-
ond prong of the Lemon test, alleging in the complaint three
broad categories of facts to support his claim: (1) the County
overvalued the affordable housing units with the result that
their funding was actually "a subsidy from the County to sup-
port the building of the church"; (2) the physical layout of the
building, in which the apartment tenants "will share with the
Church a common foundation, common elevator, and other
common infrastructure," creates "a religious overtone,"
because the tenants would "literally pass through the Church’s
property, overlook the Church’s steeple, and be subject daily
to the Church’s message"; and (3) the County has "appointed
a County representative to sit on the Church-dominated board
of the not-for-profit [development corporation] that will over-
see the construction" and thereby "has become excessively
entangled with the Church."
As to Glassman’s first point, there are no factual allegations
supporting the conclusion that the County overvalued the
affordable housing to provide a subsidy for the Church. More
relevant would be the allegation that the County overvalued
the payment to be made to the Church for its property—the
$5.6 million purchase amount. But the allegations of the com-
plaint do not support a claim that $5.6 million constituted an
overpayment. Although the complaint does allege that the
Church property, as previously zoned, was worth only $1.1
million, it acknowledges that the property was rezoned for the
project,* and as rezoned was worth $10.5 million. In addition,
the complaint alleges that the County manager determined
that the value of the air rights on the property, as was needed
to construct the apartment tower over the Church, was $5.8
*Earlier litigation challenged the legality of the rezoning, but those
efforts were ultimately unsuccessful.
GLASSMAN v. ARLINGTON COUNTY 13
million. Accordingly, the County’s $5.6 million payment for
the property to 1210 N. Highland Partnership can hardly be
argued to be an overvaluation. Moreover, the complaint
includes no other factual allegation that the Church received
any funds from the County or the State, other than the $5.6
million representing the property’s purchase price. Rather, the
complaint reaffirms that this was the sum total paid to the
Church when it alleges that the amount that the Church
received from the County for the purchase of the land was
"coincidentally" the amount estimated by the Church to be
necessary to construct the Church’s portion of the project.
The complaint does devote numerous paragraphs to
explaining how the costs for the project increased over the
years to a point where they exceeded the fair market value of
the apartments. But these allegations have little relevance to
a suggestion that the County subsidized the Church. They can
only be taken to mean that the County was willing to pay
more than it had initially estimated in order to have affordable
housing in this densely populated portion of Arlington
County.
Glassman also argues that the physical layout of the Church
placed the tenants in close proximity to the Church so as to
create a "religious overtone." This proximity of secular ten-
ants to church property, however, cannot justify an argument
that the tenants would be subject to religious indoctrination.
The only areas of the building shared by Church members and
the tenants were the lobby and the elevator, and these, by their
nature, are not places where religious indoctrination would
occur. Glassman’s allegation that "requiring" the tenants to
see the Church’s steeple somehow violates the Establishment
Clause is no more forceful than an argument that his viewing
the Church’s steeple from his own home, within a block of the
Church, led to unconstitutional indoctrination.
Finally, Glassman contends that the County has become
excessively entangled with the Church because the Church
14 GLASSMAN v. ARLINGTON COUNTY
appointed three members of the development corporation’s
board. He insinuates that this arrangement could allow the
Church to exert unconstitutional control over the Developer.
But he includes no allegation to suggest that the Church in
any way controls the board members or directs their activities
as board members of a secular non-profit corporation. It is
well established that a non-profit organization does not
become sectarian merely because its directors are members of
a religious organization. See Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S.
291, 298 (1899) ("Whether the individuals who compose the
corporation under its charter happen to be all Roman Catho-
lics, or all Methodists, or Presbyterians, or Unitarians, or
members of any other religious organization, or of no organi-
zation at all, is of not the slightest consequence with reference
to the law of its incorporation, nor can the individual beliefs
upon religious matters of the various incorporators be
inquired into"). Likewise, the County’s appointment of a
board member can hardly be considered an action establishing
religion, especially when the person is a board member of a
secular corporation dedicated to construction of an affordable
housing project funded by the County. Such participation by
the County can only be characterized as a necessary involve-
ment to monitor funding of a secular project.
Glassman also contends, whether as part of the effects test
or a separate third prong of the Establishment Clause test, that
the project will result in excessive entanglement because the
administrative cooperation between the County and the
Developer will require pervasive government monitoring to
protect against indoctrination. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 233.
But he points to no factual allegations other than the inevita-
ble interaction required to monitor funds. See id. at 233-34. In
a project like this one, the County would, of course, be
required to monitor the use and administration of its funds to
prevent misappropriation. Such monitoring, however, does
not support a claim of excessive entanglement. See Bowen,
487 U.S. at 615-17. Similarly, the County’s assistance in
overcoming obstacles in respect to funding and even zoning
GLASSMAN v. ARLINGTON COUNTY 15
would not constitute excessive entanglement. See Agostini,
521 U.S. at 233-34.
In short, the complaint does not allege facts to support
Glassman’s contention that Arlington County’s participation
in this joint venture has the effect of advancing religion or
excessively entangles the County and the Church. All of the
complaint’s factual allegations are completely consistent with
the legitimate joint effort of the Church and the County to
bring about the development of a real estate project, in which
the Church funds construction of the portions to be used for
sectarian purposes and the County funds construction of the
portions to be used for the secular purpose of providing
affordable housing. We hold that this type of interaction
among the County, the Developer, and the Church for devel-
opment of this real estate project does not result in the estab-
lishment of religion.
Thus, we agree with the district court that the complaint
fails to allege a plausible claim for an Establishment Clause
violation.
IV
The disposition of Glassman’s claim for violation of the
Virginia Constitution follows our disposition of his claims for
violation of the U.S. Constitution because the protections
under the Virginia Constitution are "parallel" to those of the
U.S. Constitution. See College Bldg. Auth. v. Lynn, 538
S.E.2d 682, 691 (Va. 2000); Va. Const. art. I, § 16. Thus, as
Glassman’s claim under the U.S. Constitution fails, so too
does his claim under the Virginia Constitution.
In arguing to the contrary, Glassman cites a Virginia Attor-
ney General’s opinion and a Virginia Supreme Court case to
argue that Virginia’s Establishment Clause provides greater
protection than is provided under the U.S. Constitution. See
1994 Va. Op. Att’y Gen. 21, 1994 WL 58403; Almond v. Day,
16 GLASSMAN v. ARLINGTON COUNTY
89 S.E.2d 851 (Va. 1955). But both of these sources deal with
Article 8, § 10 (formerly § 141), of the Virginia Constitution,
a provision that previously prohibited appropriations to pri-
vate schools and now prohibits appropriations to sectarian
schools. Because these sources deal with an entirely separate
constitutional provision, they have no relevance here.
Glassman points to other cases that observe that no State
protects religious freedom more fully than does Virginia, but
these cases do not advance his argument, because none of
them states that the Virginia Constitution provides more pro-
tection than the U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., Reid v. Gholson,
327 S.E.2d 107 (Va. 1985); Jones v. Commonwealth, 38
S.E.2d 444 (Va. 1946).
V
Finally, we conclude that the district court properly dis-
missed Glassman’s remaining claims for civil conspiracy and
unjust enrichment.
"To establish a civil conspiracy claim under [42 U.S.C.]
§ 1983, [a plaintiff] must present evidence that the [defen-
dants] acted jointly in concert and that some overt act was
done in furtherance of the conspiracy which resulted in [the]
deprivation of a constitutional right." Hinkle v. City of Clarks-
burg, 81 F.3d 416, 421 (4th Cir. 1996). Because we hold that
the defendants’ actions in this case did not result in the "depri-
vation of a constitutional right," we conclude that Glassman’s
civil conspiracy claim was properly dismissed.
The district court dismissed Glassman’s unjust enrichment
claim based on Glassman’s failure properly to plead that he
had "conferred some benefit on the defendant" or that "any
party ha[d] been unjustly enriched at his monetary expense."
Glassman v. Arlington County, No. 01:09-cv-1249, 2010 WL
1488515, at *11 (E.D. Va. Apr. 12, 2010). On appeal, Glass-
GLASSMAN v. ARLINGTON COUNTY 17
man has not challenged the grounds for this ruling and there-
fore has waived this issue.
VI
Taking the well-pleaded facts of the complaint, we are
presented with an arrangement under which Arlington County
participated with the First Baptist Church of Clarendon to
develop real property for the mutual benefit of the County and
the Church. We can find no factual allegations that support a
claim that the County sought to advance the First Baptist
Church’s faith, to spread the message of the First Baptist
Church, or to become entangled in its religious affairs. Rather,
the County’s only interest was to accomplish the secular end
of having affordable housing constructed in a highly urban
area of Arlington County. To the extent that the Church and
the County pursued their own goals through a secular corpo-
ration, they surely have interacted and will continue to inter-
act with each other. We have observed, however, "[k]eeping
religion and State distinct, while at the same time protecting
the freedom of the people to act fully in both arenas, requires
the State to recognize and even interact with religion." Ehlers-
Renzi, 224 F.3d at 292. The interaction presented in this case
does not support a plausible claim that the County acted so as
to make a law establishing religion.
The judgment of the district court is accordingly affirmed.
AFFIRMED