Fischer & Mandell LLP v. Citibank, N.A.

10-2155
Fischer & Mandell LLP v. Citibank, N.A.

10-2155-cv
Fischer & Mandell LLP
v. Citibank, N . A .

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

August Term 2010

Submitted: January 12, 2011 Decided: February 3, 2011

Docket No. 10-2155-cv

FISCHER & MANDELL LLP,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

CITIBANK, N .A.,

Defendant-Appellee.

Before : POOLER, WESLEY, and CHIN, Circuit Judges.

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District

Court for the Southern District of New York (Sullivan, J.)

dismissing plaintiff-appellant's claims against defendant-

appellee bank for breach of contract and negligence. Plaintiff-

appellant contended that the bank was responsible for the loss of

funds when the bank executed wire transfers against insufficient

funds. The district court rejected the claims and granted

summary judgment to the bank.

AFFIRMED.
 BARRY R. FISCHER, The Barry Fischer Law
Firm LLC, New York, NY, for
Plaintiff-Appellant.

BARRY J. GLICKMAN, Zeichner Ellman &
Krause LLP, New York, NY, for
Defendant-Appellee .

CHIN, Circuit Judge:

In January 2009, pro se plaintiff-appellant Fischer &

Mandell LLP (llF&M"), law firm, deposited a check for $225,351
a

into its account at defendant-appellee Citibank, N.A.

.
("Citibank") The funds were made "available" before the check

cleared, and F&M wired most of the funds elsewhere. The check,

however, turned out to be counterfeit and was dishonored.

Citibank debited the account the amount of the check plus a $10

returned check fee.

F&M brought this action below for breach of contract

and negligence, contending that it relied on Citibank's advice

that the funds were "availableu and that Citibank was responsible

for the losses. In a thorough and carefully considered decision,

the district court (Sullivan, J.) granted summary judgment to

Citibank dismissing the claims. We affirm.
 STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Facts

In January 2009, F&M1 received from a new client what

appeared to be an official Wachovia Bank check for $225,351 (the

"Checkl1). The Check was made payable to F&M, and F&M was advised

that it represented partial payment of a debt owed by another

entity to the client. On Thursday, January 15, 2009, F&M

deposited the Check into its attorney trust account at Citibank.

The client requested a wire transfer of a portion of

the funds. On Monday, January 19, 2009, a bank holiday, F&M

accessed its trust account through the Citibank website. The

website showed that funds in excess of the amount of the Check

were "available." As instructed by its client, F&M then

requested a wire transfer of $182,780 to an account in South

Korea. Citibank executed the transfer the next day.

The client thereafter requested a second wire transfer.

On Wednesday, January 21, 2009, F&M again accessed its trust

account online and saw an "availableN balance of $61,232. F&M

then requested transfer of $27,895 to an account in Canada.

Because Citibank did not have a direct relationship with the

- -

1
F&M is now known as the Barry Fischer Law Firm LLC.
Canadian bank, it sent a payment order to an intermediary bank,

, at
Bank of America, N.A. (llBoA1l) 9:37 a.m. the same day.2

That afternoon, the Federal Reserve Bank returned the

Check as dishonored and unpaid. A Citibank representative

telephoned F&M to advise that the Check was counterfeit and had

been dishonored. Citibank charged back to the trust account the

amount of the Check and a $10 returned check fee, resulting in an

overdraft. Citibank then debited an amount necessary to satisfy

the overdraft from a money market account F&M maintained at

Citibank .

The same afternoon, at approximately 3:30 p.m., F&M

asked Citibank to cancel and recall the two wire transfers.

Citibank did not, however, seek to cancel the wire transfers

until shortly after 6 a.m. the next morning. On January 27 and

28, 2009, Citibank learned that the transfers could not be

cancelled because the funds had already been withdrawn.

F&M1s accounts at Citibank were covered by a series of

written agreements (the I1Agreementsu),
the most relevant of which

2 Intermediary banks are a common feature of
international electronic funds transfers, the operations of which
we explained recently in Shipping Corp. of India Ltd. v. Jaldhi
Overseas PTE Ltd., 585 F.3d 58, 60 n.1 (2d Cir. 2009).
were the CitiBusiness Client Manual (the "Manualu), the Citibank

Marketplace Addendum (the "AddendumI1),
and the CitiBusiness User

Agreement (the I1UserAgreement," and collectively the

I1Agreements )
l1 .
B . Prior Proceedings

F&M commenced two lawsuits based on Citibank's actions

with respect to the Check.

On February 2, 2009, F&M brought an action in the

Southern District of New York asserting claims under the

Electronic Fund Transfer Act and the Expedited Funds Availability

Act and state law. The district court (Sullivan, J.) granted

summary judgment to Citibank dismissing the federal claims and

declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state

law claims. See F i s c h e r & Mandell, LLP v. C i t i b a n k , N.A., No. 09

Civ. 1160 (RJS), 2009 WL 1767621 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2009). F&M

did not appeal the judgment.

On July 14, 2009, F&M commenced this action in the

Supreme Court of the State of New York on the state law claims.

The complaint asserted two causes of action: breach of contract

and negligence. The claims were brought under the common law of

New York; the complaint did not cite the Uniform Commercial Code
 .
(the "U.C.C.") Citibank removed the case to the Southern

District of New York based on diversity juri~diction.~

Citibank moved for summary judgment, and the district

court (Sullivan, J.) granted the motion in May 2010. See Fischer

& ,
Mandell, LLP v. Citibank, N.A., No. 09 Civ. 6916 (RJS) 2010 WL

2484205 (S.D.N.Y.May 27, 2010). The district court rejected

Citibanklsassertion that the breach of contract claim was

preempted by Articles 4 and 4-A of the U.C.C. because, as the

district court observed, both of those articles allow certain of

their provisions to be varied by agreement between the parties.

The learned district court considered the Agreements, concluded

that they were clear and unambiguous, and held as a matter of law

that Citibank did not breach its contractual obligations to F&M.

Id. at **4-6.

As for the negligence claim, the district court held

that the claim was preempted by Article 4-A of the U.C.C. Id. at

**7-8. The district court applied Article 4-A, concluded that

3
Citibank is a citizen of Nevada and F&M is a citizen of
New York for diversity purposes. Apparently, the parties were
unaware of their diverse citizenship in the first action, as
there is no reason why they could not have invoked diversity
jurisdiction over the state law claims then.
Citibank acted in conformity with Article 4-A, and held that the

negligence claim failed as a matter of law. Id. at f9.

Final judgment granting Citibankls motion for summary

judgment was entered on May 28, 2010, and this appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

We review an award of summary judgment de novo, drawing

all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. J.

Walter Thompson, U.S.A., Inc. v. First BankAmericano, 518 I?. 3d

128, 136-37 (2d Cir. 2008).

B. The Merits

We discuss the two causes of action - - breach of

contract and negligence - - in turn.

1. Breach of Contract

a. U.C.C. Preemption

A threshold issue is whether Articles 4 and 4-A preempt

F&M1s breach of contract claim, brought under the common law of

New York. If so, the question remains to what extent. The

district court held that the breach of contract claim was not

preempted in this case because both Articles permit parties in a

banking relationship to vary their rights by agreement, to a

certain extent, and the relevant contractual provisions here were

-7-
not inconsistent with the rights created by the U.C.C. We

agree.

Article 4-A I1governsthe procedures, rights, and

liabilities arising out of commercial electronic funds

transfers. Grain Traders, Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 160 F.3d 97,

100 (2d Cir. 1998); accord Ma v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &

Smith, Inc., 597 F.3d 84, 87-88 (2d Cir. 2010) . In Grain

Traders, we held that common law claims arising from electronic

funds transfers are precluded "when such claims would impose

liability inconsistent with the rights and liabilities expressly

created by Article 4-A.M 160 F.3d at 103 (citations omitted).

We noted, however, that Article 4-A permits some of its

provisions to be varied by agreement. Id. For example, 5 4-A-

212 permits a receiving bank to vary its duties to the sender of

wire transfers. See N.Y. U.C.C. 5 4-A-212 ( " A receiving bank is

not the agent of the sender or beneficiary of the payment order

it accepts . . . and the bank owes no duty to any party to the

funds transfer except as provided in [Article 4-A] or by express

agreement." (emphasis added)). Accordingly, a common law breach

4 Although Citibank no longer argues, as it did below,
that the breach of contract claim is preempted, F&M continues to
suggest that the Agreements are inconsistent with the U.C.C. We
address preemption to resolve this dispute.
of contract claim is not preempted by Article 4-A to the extent

the provisions are not inconsistent with Article 4-A or they fall

within one of the areas where a variance is permitted. See

Centre-Point Merch. Bank Ltd. v. Am. Express Bank Ltd., 913 F.

Supp. 202, 206 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (I1[R]esortingto principles of law

or equity outside of Article 4-A is acceptable, so long as it

does not create rights, duties and liabilities 'inconsistent with

those stated in [Article 4-A]. ' I 1 (quoting N.Y. U.C.C. § 4-A-102

cmt.) ) ; Sheerbonnet, Ltd. v. Am. Express Bank, Ltd. , 951 F. Supp.

403, 414 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (denying motion to dismiss common law

tort and equity claims where they did "not conflict with any of

Article 4-A's provisions"); see also Ma v. Merrill Lynch, 597

F.3d at 89 (observing that "[nlot all common law claims are per

se inconsistent with [the Article 4-A] regime").

Article 4 governs bank deposits and collections.

Neither the New York Court of Appeals nor our Court has directly

considered whether or to what extent Article 4 preempts common

law actions. The New York Court of Appeals has observed,

however, that the New York U.C.C. "has the objective of promoting

certainty and predictability in commercial transactions." Putnam

Rolling Ladder Co. v. Mfrs. Hanover Trust Co., 74 N.Y.2d 340, 349

(1989) (noting as well that "the UCC not only guides commercial

-9-
behavior but also increases certainty in the marketplace and

efficiency in dispute resolution"). Article 4 itself recognizes

that "[tlhe tremendous number of checks handled by banks and the

country-wide nature of the collection process require uniformity

in the law of bank collection^.^ N.Y. U.C.C. § 4-101 cmt. We

therefore hold - - as we did with Article 4A - - that Article 4

precludes common law claims that would impose liability

inconsistent with the rights and liabilities expressly created by

Article 4 . 5

Our holding gives effect to the terms of § 4-103(1),

which provide that Iftheprovisions of [Article 4 may be varied
1

by agreement except that no agreement can disclaim a bank's

responsibility for its own lack of good faith or failure to

5 Under New York law, we are permitted to certify to the
New York Court of Appeals "determinative questions of New York
law [that] are involved in a case pending before [us] for which
no controlling precedent of the Court of Appeals exists." N.Y.
Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 22, § 500.27(a); see also 2d Cir. R.
27.2(a) ("If state law permits, the court may certify a question
of state law to that state's highest court.I1). We resort to
certification llsparingly, however, Highland Capital Mgmt . LP v.
"
Schneider, 460 F.3d 308, 316 (2d Cir. 2006), and recognize that
certification is "not proper where the question does not present
a complex issue, there is no split of authority and sufficient
precedents exist for us to make a determination," Tinelli v.
Redl, 199 F.3d 603, 606 n.5 (2d Cir. 1999) (quotation marks and
brackets omitted). In the present case, we see no need to
certify the Article 4 preemption question as the question before
us falls well within the Tinelli guidelines.
exercise ordinary care." Id. § 4-103(1). This section would be

rendered meaningless if common law claims could impose liability

inconsistent with the rights and liabilities expressly created by

Article 4. See Sunshine v. Bankers Trust Co., 32 N.Y.2d 404, 410

(1974) (finding a purported agreement to extend a bank's time to

charge back a depositor's account invalid because the bank "[was]

attempting to disclaim its own responsibility for ordinary caren

in violation of N.Y. U.C.C. § 4-103).

Here, as discussed below, however, the Agreements did

not create rights or obligations inconsistent with those created

by Articles 4 and 4-A. Accordingly, we hold that the district

court correctly held that the common law breach of contract claim

was not preempted and that it correctly looked to the Agreements

to decide the rights and liabilities of the parties.

b. A n a l y s i s of the C l a i m

Under New York law, a breach of contract claim requires

proof of (1) an agreement, (2) adequate performance by the

plaintiff, (3) breach by the defendant, and (4) damages. First

Investors Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 152 F.3d 162, 168 (2d

Cir. 1998); Harsco Corp. v. Segui, 91 F.3d 337, 348 (2d Cir.

1996). Summary judgment is appropriate if the terms of the
contract are unambiguous. T o p p s Co. v. C a d b u r y S t a n i S . A. I . C. ,

526 F.3d 63, 68 (2d Cir. 2008).

The parties dispute only the third element, and the

principal point of contention is the meaning of the term

uavailable.n The thrust of F&M1s argument is that when

Citibankls website ~gratuitouslyndeclared the funds to be

"available" before they had been collected, it implicitly

represented that the Check had cleared, thereby misleading F&M

into believing that funds were "available for withdrawal as a

matter of right" for both wire transfers. Citibank argues that

uavailablell
meant only that the account balance could be

withdrawn from the account and not that the balance represented

collected funds.

The district court correctly rejected F&M1s

interpretation and accepted Citibankls. The Agreements clearly

show that while Citibank gave its customers the ability to make

use of check proceeds provisionally, that is, before checks

cleared, that right was subject to a charge back if a check was

r e t ~ r n e d . ~ hold, in the circumstances here, that "availableu
We

6 F&M agreed to be bound "by all of the rules,
regulations, charges and fees in the Citibank Client Manual and
Schedule of Fees and Charges and any other account agreements it
receives and any modification (s) or amendment (s) of the same.I'
meant only that account balances were "a~ailable~~ use on a
for

provisional basis, subject to a charge back if a check was

returned, and not that the account balance represented collected

funds .

The key provision is contained in the Addendum, which

provides clear guidance as to the processing of checks:

This process
When D o e s a C h e c k C l e a r ? :
begins when you deposit a check to your
account and is not completed until the bank
on which the check is drawn either honors or
returns it to Citibank unpaid. Checks may be
returned because of insufficient funds,
missing signatures, stop payment orders, etc.

The schedules in this addendum show when the
majority of your check deposits will be made
available to you. The schedules are based on
the amount of time generally required for
checks to clear and on federal and state
regulations.

Please note that a check you deposit may be
returned unpaid after we have made the funds
available to you. If this happens, the
amount of the returned check will be deducted
from your account balance.

(Emphasis added). The last-quoted paragraph plainly provides

that funds will be made "availableu on a provisional basis,

subject to a charge back if a check is returned.

Under the Manual, Citibank was entitled to set-off an overdraft
against other accounts of the customer, including, for example, a
money market account.
 The unsurprising notion that customers are responsible

for returned checks is reinforced by the Manual, which

unambiguously provides:

Returned Checks: If you deposit a check that
is returned to us unpaid, we will deduct the
amount of the returned check from your
account balance and return the check to you.
There will also be a service charge.

F&M makes two principal arguments to support its

assertion that "available" is synonymous with llcollected.ll

First, it points to certain clauses in the Agreements that

purportedly provide that only collected funds can constitute

available funds. Second, it argues that the district court

erroneously ignored controlling provisions of the U.C.C. Both

arguments fail.

First, F&M makes much of a provision in the Manual, in

a section listing exceptions to Citibankls "Standard Funds

Availability Policy,I1that reserves to Citibank the right to

"require that any check you present for deposit be sent out for

colle~tion.~
When this exception is invoked, Citibank will

accept a check only on a ucollection basis," that is, the funds

are not made available until after payment is received from the

bank on which the check is drawn. But this exception to

Citibank's general policy of making funds provisionally available
was not invoked here, and thus it is not relevant. F&M also

relies on other references in the Citibank documents to

"sufficient" funds and "availableu funds, but these references

likewise do not stand for the proposition that Citibankls advice

that funds were llsufficientll "available" meant that they had
or

been ucollectedu or "finally settled.u7

Second, F&M1s argument that the district court

erroneously ignored provisions of the U.C.C. also fails, for the

controlling agreements do not create rights and liabilities

inconsistent with those under the U.C.C. F&M notes, for example,

that § 4-213(4) provides that:

credit given by a bank for an item in an
account with its customer becomes available
for withdrawal as of right (a) in any case
where the bank has received a provisional
settlement for the item, - - when such
settlement becomes final and the bank has had
a reasonable time to learn that the
settlement is final.

7
For example, the User Agreement instructs customers to
give online instructions to make transfers or payments "only when
a sufficient balance is, or will be, available in that account at
the time of withdrawal.I1 It also explains that I1Citibankwill
not act on your CitiBusiness Online withdrawal instructions if
sufficient funds are not available." Again, however,
usufficientn does not mean llcollected.ll Citibank permitted
As
its customers to make use of funds on a provisional basis, as
long as there was a "sufficient" balance of uavailable" funds, a
customer could make use of them, subject to a charge back for
returned checks.
N.Y. U.C.C. § 4-213(4) (emphasis added). F & M argues that because

§ 4-213(4) provides that funds are "available for withdrawal as

of right" only when a "settlement becomes final," Citibank erred

when it advised F & M that the funds were "available11
before

settlement of the Check became final. The obvious flaw with this

argument is that Citibank did not advise F & M that the funds were

"available for withdrawal as of right." Rather, Citibank advised

only that the funds were llavailable,ll
without representing that

the Check had cleared or that the funds had been collected or

that settlement had become final. "AvailableM is different from

"available as of right.

In fact, the U.C.C. expressly recognizes that a bank

may permit a customer to use funds provisionally, subject to a

charge back in the event of dishonor, as § 4-212(1) provides:

If a collecting bank has made provisional
settlement with its customer for an item and
itself fails by reason of dishonor . . . to
receive a settlement for the item which is or
becomes final, the bank may revoke the
settlement given by it, charge back the
amount of any credit given for the item to
its customerlsaccount or obtain refund from
its customer.

N.Y. U.C.C. § 4-212(1).8 By permitting its customers access to

8 See also, e.g., Call v. Ellenville Nat'l Bank, 5 A.D.3d
521, 524 (2d Dep't 2004) (llAccordingly,when final settlement was
funds on a provisional basis, subject to the right of a charge-

back and refund, Citibank was merely following a practice that is

common in the banking i n d ~ s t r y . ~

Accordingly, we affirm the district courtls dismissal

of F&M1s breach of contract claim.

2. Negligence

a. U. C. C. Preemption

The district court correctly held that Article 4-A

preempted any common law claims inconsistent with its provisions.

As we held in Grain Traders, there is "no claim for negligence

unless [the] conduct complained of was not in conformity with

not made on the check by the payor bank due to discovery of the
counterfeit, the defendant bank was entitled to revoke the
provisional settlement made on the check and charge back [the
depositorls] account or obtain a refund from [the depositor] for
the funds drawn on the check.It) Chase v. Morgan Guarantee Trust
;
Co., 590 F. Supp. 1137, 1138 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (I1 f the
[I]
collecting bank has credited a customer's account for an item and
even allowed the customer to make a provisional withdrawal, but
fails to receive a final settlement for that item, it may charge
back the customer1 account.11)
s .
9 "Under current bank practice, in a major portion of
cases banks make provisional settlement for items when they are
first received and then await subsequent determination of whether
the item will be finally paid. . . . [Iln those cases where the
item being collected is not finally paid . . . , provision is
made for the reversal of the provisional settlements, charge-back
of provisional credits and the right to obtain refund." N.Y.
U.C.C. § 4-212 cmt. 1.
Article 4-A.I1 160 F.3d at 103; see N.Y. U.C.C. § 4-A-102 Cmt.

(Article 4-A is designed to be the llexclusive
means of

determining the rights, duties and liabilities of the affected

parties in any situation covered by particular provisions of the

.
Article1!)

b. Analysis of the C l a i m

In its second claim, F&M argued that Citibank failed to

exercise reasonable care because it waited some fifteen hours to

try to cancel the two wire transactions after it was asked to do

so. F&M contends that it asked Citibank at approximately 3:30

p.m. on January 21 to recall the two wire transactions, and that

Citibank made no effort to do so until 6:11 a.m. the next day,

January 22. F&M contends that, at a minimum, genuine issues of

material fact existed as to whether Citibank acted reasonably by

not trying sooner. The district court rejected the argument. We

agree.

Under Article 4-A, a Ifpaymentorder" is an instruction

by a "sender" to a "receiving bankn to pay (or to cause another

bank to pay) a sum of money (under certain conditions not

relevant here) . N.Y. U.C.C. § 4-A-103(1)(a). [A] communication

by the sender canceling or amending a payment order is effective

. . . if notice of the communication is received at a time and in
- 18-
a manner affording the receiving bank a reasonable opportunity to

act on the communication before the bank accepts the payment

order." I d . S 4-A-211(2). The "receiving bank . . . accepts a

payment order when it executes the order." I d . § 4-A-209(1). "A

payment order is 'executed1by the receiving bank when it issues

a payment order intended to carry out the payment order received

by the bank. Id. § 4-A-301(1).

Here, F&M was the "senderu because it was "the person

giving the instruction to the receiving bank," i d . § 4-A-

103 (1)(e), that is, the instruction to recall, and Citibank was

the "receiving bankH because it was "the bank to which the

sender1 instruction [was] addressed," i d .
s § 4-A-103(d). F&M1s

instruction to recall the wire transfers, however, came too late,

as the documentary evidence shows that Citibank had already

executed both payment requests. Citibank executed the payment

order for the first wire transfer at 7:51 a.m. on January 20 and

for the second wire transfer at 9:37 a.m. on January 21, both

well before F&M made its request to cancel at 3:30 p.m. on

January 21. Hence, F&M1s cancellation order was not effective,

as it did not give Citibank "a reasonable opportunity to act on

the communication before [it] accept [edl [i.e. , executed] the

payment order. Id. § 4-A-211(2) see Aleo I n t '1, L t d . v.
;

-19-
Citibank, N.A., 160 Misc. 2d 950, 952 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1994)

(order to cancel wire transfer was ineffective where it was given

five hours after receiving bank had already accepted payment

order) .

F&M argues that the district court misapplied Article

4-A because Citibank was not the "receiving banku but the

"sending bank." This argument fails. While it may be that

Citibank sent F&M1s cancellation orders by forwarding the

requests to the Korean bank and BOA, it was not the "senderll

within the meaning of § 4-A-211(2). In the circumstances here,

the sender is the person who llwant[s]to withdraw . . . the

[payment] order because [he] has had a change of mind about the

transaction or because the payment order was erroneously issued

or for any other reason." N.Y. U.C.C. § 4-A-211 cmt. 1. F&M was

the party that "had a change of mind about the t r a n ~ a c t i o n , ~ ~
and

it addressed its instruction to Citibank, making Citibank the

"receiving bank. " Id. § 4-A-103(d).

F&M also argues that issues of fact existed as to

whether the cancellation orders would have been effective if

Citibank had acted more quickly, and challenges the documents

showing that the payment orders were executed before the recall

request was made. F&M does so, however, in a wholly conclusory

-20-
manner, and it is unable to point to any concrete evidence to

contradict Citibankls documents showing that it executed the

payment orders before the request to cancel was made. FDIC v.

Great Am. Ins. Co., 607 F.3d 288, 292 (2d Cir. 2010) (party

opposing summary judgment cannot rely on Hconclusory allegations

or unsubstantiated speculation").

F&M cites documents showing that Citibank did not act

on the recall request until 6:11 a.m. on January 22, but even

assuming fifteen hours was too long, that delay was not the cause

of F&M1s injury. F&M also points to its monthly account

statement, which showed that the second transfer was not debited

to the account until January 22; the fact that the account was

not debited until January 22, however, does not undermine the

documentary evidence showing that the second payment order was

executed the day before. Again, as the district court properly

found, the critical question in terms of timing is when Citibank

executed the wire transfer requests, as set forth in § 4-A-

209 (1).

We have considered F&M1s remaining arguments and

conclude that they lack merit.
 CONCLUSION

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED, with

costs.