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Reno Hilton Resorts v. National Labor Relations Board

Court: Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
Date filed: 1999-12-03
Citations: 196 F.3d 1275, 339 U.S. App. D.C. 25
Copy Citations
23 Citing Cases
Combined Opinion
                  United States Court of Appeals

               FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

       Argued October 7, 1999    Decided December 3, 1999 

                           No. 98-1484

                      Reno Hilton Resorts, 
                            Petitioner

                                v.

                 National Labor Relations Board, 
                            Respondent

             International Union, United Plant Guard 
                       Workers of America, 
                            Intervenor

          On Petition for Review and Cross-Application 
               for Enforcement of an Order of the 
                  National Labor Relations Board

     Joseph E. Herman argued the cause and filed the briefs for 
petitioner.

     Steven B. Goldstein, Attorney, National Labor Relations 
Board, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the 
brief were Linda Sher, Associate General Counsel, John D. 
Burgoyne, Acting Deputy Associate General Counsel, and 
David Habenstreit, Supervisory Attorney.

     Scott A. Brooks argued the cause and filed the brief for 
intervenor.

     Before:  Ginsburg, Rogers and Tatel, Circuit Judges.

       Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Rogers.

     Rogers, Circuit Judge:  Reno Hilton Resorts ("Reno Hil-
ton") appeals the decision and order of the National Labor 
Relations Board ("Board") that it had violated ss 8(a)(1) and 
(3) of the National Labor Relations Act ("Act"), 29 U.S.C. 
ss 158(a)(1) and (3), by contracting out the work of its 
recently unionized security service.  See Reno Hilton Re-
sorts, 326 NLRB No. 154, 1998 WL 723981, at *1 (Sept. 30, 
1998).  Reno Hilton contends that the Board misstated and 
misapplied the appropriate legal standard for determining 
whether an employer's discharge of an employee constitutes 
an unfair labor practice, and lacked substantial evidence to 
support its finding of discriminatory intent.  Finding these 
contentions unpersuasive, we deny the petition for review and 
grant the Board's cross-application for enforcement of the 
order.

                                I.

     When Reno Hilton began operating what was formerly a 
Bally's hotel-restaurant-casino complex in 1992, it inherited 
Bally's security staff, the members of which were not repre-
sented by any labor organization.  Shortly thereafter, while 
implementing a cost-savings plan, Reno Hilton considered and 
rejected various proposals to contract out a number of securi-
ty positions, despite a projected annual savings ranging from 
$24,000 to $96,000.

     In June 1993, International Union, United Plant Guard 
Workers of America ("Union") began a campaign to organize 
Reno Hilton's security employees.  After losing an election by 

a vote of 51 to 34, the Union filed unfair labor practice 
charges with the Board.  While those charges were pending,1 
the Union started another campaign in 1995 to organize Reno 
Hilton's security employees, and an election was scheduled 
for September 1995.  Reno Hilton retained a labor consulting 
firm, The Burk Group, to assist it in its opposition to the 
union campaign, as it had done in the first campaign.  Shortly 
before the election, Gary Parillo, an "anti-union" security 
employee, was called into the office of Reno Hilton's director 
of security, Dave Bennett, to meet with a Burk Group official.  
A color-coded chart in the office listed various security de-
partment employees and their position on the Union's orga-
nizing efforts.  The Burk Group official asked Parillo to help 
determine which security employees were pro- or anti-union, 
advising Parillo that if the Union came in, the hotel would 
contract out the security jobs and showing Parillo figures 
purporting to represent the associated cost savings.

     The Union won the election by a vote of 44 to 33 and was 
certified by the Board on October 12, 1995, as the exclusive 
collective-bargaining representative of the full-time and regu-
lar part-time security employees at the Reno Hilton.  Shortly 
before and after the election, Reno Hilton's management 
indicated to rank-and-file employees that the presence of the 
Union would mean that "things would get really rough."  
Within two weeks of the Union's certification, the Hilton 
Hotel's Vice President, Jim Anderson, met with Bennett 
regarding contracting out Reno Hilton's security work.  Ac-
cording to Lee Boekhout, a Reno Hilton security employee, 
Bennett's impression after that meeting was that Reno Hilton 
"may have lost the battle," but it had "won the war," and that 
"they [i.e., the unit security employees] were gone."  Bennett 
reassured Boekhout, however, that his job was protected 
because, Bennett claimed, he was able to save the jobs of the 

__________
     1  After finding in another proceeding that Reno Hilton had 
violated sections 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act, an administrative law 
judge recommended that the 1993 election be set aside.  See Reno 
Hilton, Nos. 32-CA-13618, 32-RC-3777 (Aug. 18, 1994).  The 
Board substantially affirmed the decision of the ALJ.  See Reno 
Hilton Resorts, 320 NLRB 197, 197 n.4, 211 (1995).

ten or eleven employees who supported Reno Hilton's posi-
tion in the election campaign.

     During contract negotiation sessions from November 1995 
to early August 1996, Anderson continually proposed to the 
Union that Reno Hilton would have the right to contract out 
its security work.  The Union presented counter proposals to 
the subcontracting plans, which Reno Hilton rejected.  Ac-
cording to the Union President, Anderson assured the Union 
negotiators that Reno Hilton had no present intention to 
contract out its security work.  Be that as it may, in Febru-
ary 1996, Bennett sent a memorandum to Reno Hilton's 
president advising that his investigation with two potential 
subcontractors of the costs of bringing in an outside security 
service indicated that Reno Hilton could save a considerable 
amount of money.  In April 1996, several high-ranking Hilton 
Corporation and Reno Hilton officials discussed the econom-
ics of contracting out the security work.  During this time the 
administrative assistant to Reno Hilton's director of security, 
and its director of human resources spoke to Boekhout about 
changing the job titles of anti-Union employees to protect 
their jobs from the imminent elimination in the wake of 
contracting out.

     Then, in June 1996, Reno Hilton presented the Union with 
a proposed wage freeze and an unrestricted right to contract 
out.  When the Union rejected the proposal, Reno Hilton 
responded with a proposal for a three-year contract with a 
wage ceiling of $10.43 and a one-year bar on contracting out 
security work.  The Union rejected this proposal as well as a 
third proposal for no wage adjustment and unrestricted rights 
to contract out.  The security employees went on strike.  The 
strike lasted from the end of July 1996 until mid-August 1996, 
at which point Reno Hilton and the Union entered into a 
collective bargaining agreement.  The agreement froze 
wages, prohibited discrimination against employees on the 
basis of union or non-union status, and provided that Reno 
Hilton had the right to "[c]ontract or subcontract any work."

     In October 1996, Reno Hilton conducted a financial impact 
analysis of contracting out that estimated savings of over $1.5 

million over three years.  On November 1, 1996, hotel offi-
cials met with a potential subcontractor, American Protective 
Services, to discuss cost and quality issues.  The same day, 
Anderson wrote to the Union President requesting a meeting 
to discuss the results of the hotel's inquiry into contracting 
out.  Prior to the meeting, Anderson informed the Union that 
contracting out security work at the available base wage rate 
of $7.50 per hour would save Reno Hilton $4.23 per hour per 
employee.  Also, prior to the meeting, hotel officials made the 
decision to contract out its security work in January 1997, 
unless the Union would agree to a wage cut equal to the 
projected cost savings of contracting out.2  Reno Hilton's 
financial statement purported to show a decline of $10,587,156 
in net revenues in 1996 from the prior year.

     Before the contracting out decision was implemented in 
January 1997, Reno Hilton made two offers to the Union to 
avoid subcontracting.  At the meeting with the Union Presi-
dent in late November 1996, Anderson stated first, that Reno 
Hilton would save over $500,000 annually by contracting out 
the security work of rank-and-file employees;  second that the 
Union counter-proposals projecting over $400,000 annual sav-
ings were unacceptable;  and third, that if the Union wanted 
to avoid contracting out, it would have to agree to a base 
wage rate for Reno Hilton's security staff of $7.75 per hour, 
which included the $0.25 per hour profit margin it would have 
to pay the subcontractor.  In response to the Union's protest 
that the proposed wage decrease was an attempt to drive it 
out, inasmuch as Reno Hilton had not tried to lower wages in 
this manner during the contract negotiations, Anderson 
claimed that the cost saving benefits of contracting out had 
only recently become apparent.  The Union rejected this 
avoidance offer.

__________
     2  In January 1997, Reno Hilton discharged all of the security 
bargaining unit employees and contracted out their work to Ameri-
can Protective Services, which has supplied Reno Hilton the same 
number of full-time security officers as those utilized prior to the 
contracting out.  Approximately thirteen of Reno Hilton's former 
security employees obtained employment with American Protective 
Services.

     Another avoidance offer was made the following month.  In 
early December 1996, Reno Hilton informed the Union that 
the hotel would contract out its security work in January 
1997.  On December 20, 1996, the Union filed unfair labor 
practice charges on the ground that the company contracted 
out its security work in retaliation for the employees' union 
activity while protecting the jobs of "loyal" employees.  At an 
eleventh hour meeting before Reno Hilton contracted out, 
Anderson reiterated the $7.75 offer, informing the Union that 
no amount of cost savings proposed by the Union would 
substitute for accepting that wage rate.  Reno Hilton also 
proposed to make severance pay contingent upon the employ-
ees' agreeing not to sue Reno Hilton.  The Union rejected the 
offer.

     In response to the Union's December 1996 charges, the 
ALJ ruled that Reno Hilton had violated ss 8(a)(3) and (1) of 
the Act by contracting out its security employees' work and 
dismissing all of its security employees, and recommended 
immediate and full reinstatement of the employees with back 
pay and benefits.  The Board affirmed substantially all of the 
ALJ's rulings, findings, and conclusions, and expanded the 
remedies to include a broader cease-and-desist order,3 rescis-
sion of the subcontract with American Protective Services, 
and restoration of the status quo ante by ordering Hilton to 
re-establish an in-house security force.  Reno Hilton peti-
tioned the court for review under 29 U.S.C. s 160(f), and the 
Board cross-petitioned for enforcement of its order under 
s 160(e).

                               II.

     Under s 8(a)(3) of the Act, it is an unfair labor practice for 
an employer "to encourage or discourage membership in any 
labor organization," "by discrimination in regard to hire or 

__________
     3  The amended order provided for the expungement from the 
employment records of the terminated security employees all refer-
ences to the unlawful discharge, and required Reno Hilton to 
produce employment records necessary to calculate back pay due to 
the terminated employees.

tenure of employment or any term or condition of employ-
ment."  29 U.S.C. s 158(a)(3).  Such conduct also would 
violate s 8(a)(1) because it "interfere[s] with, restrain[s], or 
coerce[s] employees in the exercise of" their labor rights.  29 
U.S.C. s 158(a)(1);  see Power Inc. v. NLRB, 40 F.3d 409, 417 
n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1994).  An employer violates ss 8(a)(3) and (1) 
if it takes adverse action against an employee because of the 
protected union activity.  See 29 U.S.C. ss 158(a)(3), (1);  
LCF, Inc. v. NLRB, 129 F.3d 1276, 1281 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

     At the outset, Reno Hilton maintains that the General 
Counsel's decision not to pursue a s 8(a)(5) charge against 
the hotel for bad faith in bargaining for the contracting out 
clause precludes an unfair labor practice claim under 
s 8(a)(3) for exercising its rights under that clause.  We 
disagree.  A decision not to prosecute is made for many 
reasons, sometimes for reasons unrelated to the merits of the 
charge.  See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831, 105 
S. Ct. 1649, 1655-56, 84 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985).  Reno Hilton 
offers nothing to show that the General Counsel's decision 
was based on an affirmative finding of good faith by Reno 
Hilton in all its actions under the parties' agreement.  Even 
assuming the General Counsel's exercise of its prosecutorial 
discretion could support an inference that the hotel had 
bargained for the contracting out clause in good faith, Reno 
Hilton proffers no persuasive authority for the proposition 
that such an inference precludes a s 8(a)(3) violation for 
discrimination in the exercise of rights under the bargained-
for contracting out provision.

     In contending that its exercise of its contracting out rights 
under the parties' agreement cannot be deemed a s 8(a)(3) 
violation, Reno Hilton relies on the Sixth Circuit's decision in 
"Automatic" Sprinkler Corp. of America v. NLRB, 120 F.3d 
612, 620 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1675, 140 
L.Ed.2d 813 (1998).  In that case, the court held that the 
employer's exercise of its contractual right to subcontract did 
not constitute a violation of s 8(a)(3).  But as the dissenting 
judge noted, the majority did not address the findings of the 
ALJ as adopted by the Board that the employer's conduct 
was motivated by anti-union animus.  See id. at 622 (Ryan, J., 

dissenting).  Further, the decision in Automatic Sprinkler, 
which has not yet been cited with approval outside of the 
Sixth Circuit, is at odds with the general principle that a 
party cannot exercise its contractual rights in violation of the 
law.  Thus, the Tenth Circuit in Capitol Steel & Iron Co. v. 
NLRB, 89 F.3d 692, 696-97 (10th Cir. 1996), declined to 
countenance the calculated use of waiver clauses in a contract 
to undermine the collective bargaining process, affirming the 
Board's finding of a s 8(a)(5) violation where the employer 
had announced wage increases "in such a way and at such a 
time as to sway the employees who would immediately there-
after vote on [the employer's] 'last and final offer.' "  Similar-
ly, the Third Circuit in NLRB v. Joy Technologies, Inc., 990 
F.2d 104, 111 n.7 (3d Cir. 1993), noting that "contract lan-
guage does not exempt the Employer from its obligation to 
act lawfully under the NLRA," affirmed the Board's finding 
that the employer had unlawfully abused the superseniority 
clause in the parties' contract by transferring a position so as 
to "ensure that Beightol would remain union committeeman 
and obtain the higher-paying position."  So too, in Gannett 
Rochester Newspapers v. NLRB, 988 F.2d 198, 203 (D.C. Cir. 
1993), this circuit observed that "[u]nder the clear-and-
unmistakable standard [for waiver], courts may 'not infer 
from a general contractual provision that the parties intended 
to waive a statutorily protected right unless the undertaking 
is explicitly stated.' "  Id. (quoting Metropolitan Edison Co. 
v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 708 (1983) (internal quotation omit-
ted)).  Even when the waiver is explicit, moreover, the waiver 
is not read broadly.  See id.  Because the record is devoid of 
evidence to infer, much less show, that the Union waived its 
s 8(a)(3) rights by entering into the agreement with Reno 
Hilton, there is no basis for adopting either Reno Hilton's 
contention or the Sixth Circuit's analysis in Automatic Sprin-
kler.

                               III.

     Consequently, the heart of Reno Hilton's appeal turns out 
to be its contention that the Board lacked substantial evi-
dence of anti-union animus to find a violation of ss 8(a)(3) and 

(1).  First, it maintains that the General Counsel did not 
establish a violation of the Act under Wright Line,4 because 
the ALJ misstated the test, gave controlling weight to evi-
dence outside the s 10(b) period, failed to consider changed 
circumstances prompting the contracting out decision, and 
made inappropriate comparisons between Reno Hilton and 
other Hilton hotels.  Second, Reno Hilton maintains that it 
rebutted any evidence of anti-union animus by establishing 
that its decision to contract out was driven by economic 
considerations, and that the ALJ erred by not considering 
such evidence and by drawing negative inferences from Reno 
Hilton's failure to call certain witnesses.  Neither contention 
is persuasive.

     The court will affirm the findings of the Board unless they 
are "unsupported by substantial evidence in the record con-
sidered as a whole," General Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 117 F.3d 
627, 630 (D.C. Cir. 1997), or unless the Board "acted arbitrari-
ly or otherwise erred in applying established law to the facts."  
Allegheny Ludlum Corp. v. NLRB, 104 F.3d 1354, 1358 (D.C. 
Cir. 1997) (quotation and citation omitted).  The court must 
"take account of anything in the record that 'fairly detracts' 
from the weight of the evidence supporting the Board's 
conclusion."  General Elec., 117 F.3d at 630 (quoting Univer-
sal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488, 71 S. Ct. 456, 
464-65, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951)).  Even if the court might have 
reached a different conclusion had the court considered the 
issue de novo, the court will uphold the Board's decision if it 
is supported by substantial evidence in the record.  See 
Synergy Gas Corp. v. NLRB, 19 F.3d 649, 651 (D.C. Cir. 
1994).  The court gives even greater deference to the Board's 
determination of questions of motive, see Laro Maintenance 

__________
     4  251 N.L.R.B. 1083, enf'd, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. 
denied, 455 U.S. 989, 102 S. Ct. 1612, 71 L.Ed.2d 848 (1982), which 
was upheld in NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 
U.S. 393, 399-403, 103 S. Ct. 2469, 2473-75, 76 L.Ed.2d 667 (1983), 
overruled in part on other grounds by Director, Office of Workers' 
Compensation Programs, Dep't of Labor v. Greenwich Collieries, 
512 U.S. 267, 276-78, 114 S. Ct. 2251, 2257-58, 129 L.Ed.2d 221 
(1994).

Corp. v. NLRB, 56 F.3d 224, 229 (D.C. Cir. 1995), and 
"accept[s] the ALJ's credibility determinations that are 
adopted by the Board 'unless they are patently unsupport-
able.' " Schaeff Inc. v. NLRB, 113 F.3d 264, 266 (D.C. Cir. 
1997) (quoting NLRB v. Creative Food Design Ltd., 852 F.2d 
1295, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 1988));  see also Capital Cleaning Con-
tractors, Inc. v. NLRB, 147 F.3d 999, 1004 (D.C. Cir. 1998).

     When examining an allegation of a s 8(a)(3) violation, the 
Board applies the two-stage test first articulated in Wright 
Line, under which the Board's General Counsel has the 
burden of persuasion to show that union activity was a 
substantial or motivating factor in the employer's decision to 
contract out.  See Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. at 1089;  South-
west Merchandising Corp. v. NLRB, 53 F.3d 1334, 1339-40 
(D.C. Cir. 1995);  see also Laro Maintenance Corp., 56 F.3d 
at 228.  The employer, in turn, may rebut the inference by 
showing by a preponderance of the evidence that it would 
have taken the same action absent the union activity and the 
employer's anti-union motivation.  See Wright Line, 251 
N.L.R.B. at 1089.

     Reno Hilton maintains that the ALJ misstated and misap-
plied the Wright Line test by referring to the General 
Counsel's initial burden as a "prima facie showing," and by 
failing to consider Reno Hilton's proffered economic justifica-
tion or evidence of its cost savings matching offers as part of 
the threshold determination whether the General Counsel 
met its initial burden.  Any misstatement or misapplication of 
the Wright Line test is immaterial, however, so long as there 
is substantial evidence supporting the Board's determinations 
that anti-union animus was a motivating factor in the employ-
er's decision to contract out its unit security work and that 
Reno Hilton failed to carry its burden of proof that it would 
have made the same decision regardless of such animus.  Cf. 
NLRB v. GATX Logistics, Inc., 160 F.3d 353, 357 (7th Cir. 
1998).

     The Board relied primarily on the following factual findings 
by the ALJ in concluding that the General Counsel carried 
his burden of persuasion showing that Reno Hilton was 

motivated by anti-union animus when deciding to contract out 
its security work.  First, there was the matter of timing.  
The contracting out decision came on the heels of heavy union 
activity, most notably following the strike preceding negotia-
tion of the collective bargaining agreement.  The timing of 
the decision to contract out is suspect in view of evidence that 
Reno Hilton knew long before the Union's certification that 
contracting out its security work could save a significant 
amount of money given Reno Hilton's above-market wages 
for its security employees.  As the court pointed out in Meco 
Corp. v. NLRB, 986 F.2d 1434, 1437 (D.C. Cir. 1993), timing 
is a telling consideration in determining whether employer 
action is motivated by anti-union animus.  See also General 
Elec., 117 F.3d at 638 (citing Parsippany Hotel Management 
Co. v. NLRB, 99 F.3d 413, 422 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).

     Second, reasonable inferences of anti-union motivation were 
virtually compelled by the statements of Reno Hilton officials 
during the Union campaign to the effect that the hotel would 
strongly consider contracting out security jobs if the Union 
prevailed in the election.5  Particularly compelling is the 
evidence of comments by security director Bennett to Boekh-
out regarding his post-unionization efforts to contract out the 
security work while preserving the jobs of the anti-union 
employees.6  There was evidence as well of other discussions 

__________
     5  Contrary to Reno Hilton's contention, the Board could prop-
erly consider evidence outside of the s 10(b) six-month-limitations 
period for purposes of illuminating the events taking place within 
the period.  See Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n. AFL-CIO, 989 
F.2d 515, 519 (D.C. Cir.1993).  The evidence of the hotel's unfair 
labor practices during the election was not so remote in time as to 
be unrelated to the hotel's decision to contract out, see Meco Corp., 
986 F.2d at 1437, particularly where, as here, the formulation of 
that decision began two weeks after the certification of the Union.

     6  Boekhout's unrebutted affidavit stated in pertinent part:

     On or about October 25 or 26, [1995], about a month or so after 
     the election, I was in the security office when Director of 
     Security Dave Bennett returned from a meeting upstairs....  
     He told me that they had made a presentation to Jim Anderson 
     
of job protection for anti-union employees, including a sugges-
tion by the head of human resources at Reno Hilton that job 
titles could be manipulated to avoid termination of employer-
allied employees due to the contracting out of all security 
work.  Although Bennett ultimately was unable to protect 
jobs as he promised, the various statements by hotel officials 
strongly support the inference that the security employees' 
union activity was a substantial and motivating factor in Reno 
Hilton's decision to contract out its security work.

     That evidence notwithstanding, Reno Hilton contends that 
the Board erred by failing to consider evidence at each step 
of analysis under Wright Line. Reno Hilton points to the 
evidence that on two occasions it offered to refrain from 
contracting out its security work if the Union would match 
the subcontractor's wages.  The ALJ did not refer to these 
two avoidance offers in his decision.  On a different evidentia-
ry record, the Board might view evidence of two avoidance 
offers as successfully rebutting the evidence of anti-union 
animus.  Here, however, there was evidence that Reno Hilton 
was engaged in a pervasive, continuing effort to undermine 
union organizing efforts prior to certification and afterwards, 
when it limited the Union's knowledge of the contracting out 
plans and frustrated the Union's efforts by offering an unrea-
sonable $7.75 wage rate, which not only was below the 

__________
     and the others (he didn't name who) at the meeting concerning 
     going to contract security and they had bought it.  He said that 
     they had told them that they could save more than $500,000.  
     He told me that they had said do it.  He then told me that they 
     may have lost the battle but that they had won the war.  He 
     said that they were gone.  I believe I said oh, s[* * *].  
     Bennett told me not to worry about it, that my job was 
     protected, that he had managed to save the 10 or 11 of us.  
     Bennett did not actually say the word subcontracting [i.e., 
     contracting out], but I knew what he meant.  When he said 
     "they were gone" I knew he meant the [employees in the] 
     Union.  When he referred to the 10 to 11 of us he meant those 
     security officers who supported the Company and not the 
     Union.
     
prevailing average wage rate in the area, but represented a 
severe wage cut for most Reno Hilton security employees.7  
Under the circumstances, the two avoidance offers could 
hardly rebut the pervasive and stark evidence of anti-union 
animus.  Because the evidence was legally irrelevant, the 
ALJ's failure to address it is of no moment.  The relevant 
comparison, in analyzing the s 8(a)(3) charge that Reno Hil-
ton discriminated against its security employees because of 
their protected union activity, is between the unionized secu-
rity employees and their non-union predecessors.  It follows, 
therefore, that the General Counsel satisfied the first step of 
the Wright Line test:  there is substantial evidence in the 
record to support the Board's finding that Reno Hilton was 
motivated by anti-union animus when it decided to contract 
out its security work.

     As to the second step of Wright Line, Reno Hilton con-
tends that its financial statement for 1996 and other evidence 
established that it would have contracted out its security 
work absent anti-union animus.  Specifically, Reno Hilton 
relies on evidence that the decision to subcontract was being 
considered prior to its security employees' union activity as 
part of an ongoing cost reduction plan, and was prompted, in 
1996, primarily by falling revenues and profits.  Reno Hilton 
produced evidence that it and its sister hotel, the Flamingo 
Hilton-Reno, had been engaged in cost-cutting programs, 
including closing, combining, or consolidating certain opera-
tions and laying off employees.8  The ALJ concluded, and the 

__________
     7  A 1995 Reno Hilton wage survey indicated that Reno Hilton's 
maximum wage rate of $12.62 per hour for security employees was 
almost three dollars higher than the $9.64 average maximum wage 
rate paid by nine competing hotels.  Seventy percent of Reno 
Hilton's security employees were paid at or near the top rate.

     8  No other Hilton Hotel casino has a unionized security staff, 
nor has any Hilton Hotel casino contracted out the work of its 
security force.  Reno Hilton relies on evidence that it engaged in 
joint cost-cutting measures with the Flamingo Hilton-Reno, yet 
maintains that consideration of the Flamingo Hilton-Reno's com-
parative treatment of its security employees is irrelevant.  We 
decline, in any event, to draw any inference from the fact that the 
Flamingo Hilton-Reno, which is in the same wage market as the 

Board agreed, that the evidence supporting Reno Hilton's 
contention that it was motivated by lawful business consider-
ations "is sorely wanting, as not one individual who was 
instrumental in making such a decision was called by [Reno 
Hilton] as a witness in this proceeding."  The Board correctly 
noted that the ALJ had improperly drawn adverse inferences 
from Reno Hilton's failure to produce testimony from rele-
vant witnesses who were no longer in its employ at the time 
of the hearing.  See Reno Hilton Resorts, 326 NLRB No. 154, 
1998 WL 723981, *2 n.1 (citing Irwin Industries, Inc., 325 
NLRB No. 149, 1998 WL 261141, *35 n.12 (May 19, 1998);  
Goldsmith Motors Corp., 310 NLRB 1279, 1280 n.1 (1993));  
see also Property Resources Corp., 285 NLRB 1105, 1105 n.2 
(1987), enf'd 863 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1988).  But, the record 
also contained potentially damaging evidence from Bennett, 
who remained Reno Hilton's director of security and had 
written a crucial memorandum in February 1996 on contract-
ing out, the only remaining copy of which was missing a key 
portion.9  The absence of Bennett's testimony, therefore, 
represents a glaring omission in Reno Hilton's case, especially 
as it relates to Bennett's partially-recovered memorandum.10

__________
Reno Hilton, has not reduced the wage rates of its security staff as 
Reno Hilton proposed to the Union as an alternative to subcontract-
ing because there is insufficient information in the record about 
Flamingo Hilton-Reno's financial condition during the relevant 
period.

     9  The omitted portion of Bennett's memorandum was relevant 
to whether Reno Hilton had a legitimate business justification for 
contracting out its security service;  it purported to set forth 
Bennett's "ideas as to why a contract security company can better 
service us than in-house security."  Memorandum of February 26, 
1996, from Bennett to the president of Reno Hilton.

     10  Reno Hilton's challenge to the ALJ's refusal to reopen the 
administrative record is meritless.  Reno Hilton sought to admit 
evidence that, nearly three weeks after the hearing, Reno Hilton 
contracted out one of its restaurant operations, resulting in the 
termination of 132 non-union employees.  Although the ALJ did not 
elaborate on his ruling denying the motion to reopen the record, the 
court will not find an abuse of discretion unless it "clearly appear[s] 

     No more availing is Reno Hilton's contention that its 
economic defense rebutted the evidence of anti-union motiva-
tion.  In LCF, Inc. v. NLRB, 129 F.3d 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1997), 
on which Reno Hilton relies, the employer presented over-
whelming evidence of its grim economic situation that out-
weighed the inference arising from the otherwise suspect 
timing of its decision to contract out.  See id. at 1282-83.  By 
contrast, the persuasive force of Reno Hilton's evidence that 
falling revenues and profits in 1996 were the impetus for the 
contracting out decision is severely weakened by the evidence 
that it proposed contracting out two weeks after the Union's 
certification.  This occurred despite the claim of Hilton's Vice 
President when bargaining began that it had no present 
intentions to contract out Reno Hilton's security work.  Nor 
did Reno Hilton present any evidence to explain why it chose 
to contract out all of its security service in response to the 
revenue decline.  It presented no testimony from any deci-
sion maker linking the decision to contract out to the revenue 
decline.  It presented no testimony even as to when the 
revenue decline became apparent to management;  the only 
testimony on the revenue decline is from Mike Caryl, who by 
his own testimony, was not a decision maker.  Given the 
totality of the circumstances, the Board could find that evi-
dence of changed circumstances in the form of a financial 
statement suggesting a decline in earnings fails to demon-
strate that the decision to contract out was prompted by that 
decline.

     Accordingly, because there is substantial evidence in the 
record to support the Board's finding of anti-union animus 
and its rejection of Reno Hilton's defense that the contracting 
out of the entire security service would have occurred for 
economic reasons absent anti-union animus, we deny the 

__________
that the new evidence would compel or persuade to a contrary 
result."  Cooley v. FERC, 843 F.2d 1464, 1473 (D.C. Cir. 1988) 
(alteration in original) (quotation and citation omitted).  The prof-
fered evidence does not meet this standard, and hence we find no 
abuse of discretion.  See Thomas-Davis Medical Ctrs. v. NLRB, 
157 F.3d 909, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citing Road Sprinkler Fitters 
Local Union No. 669 v. NLRB, 789 F.2d 9, 14 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).

petition for review and grant the Board's petition for enforce-
ment of its order.