United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued September 15, 2000 Decided January 19, 2001
No. 99-7206
David H. Marlin,
Appellant
v.
District of Columbia Board of Elections and Ethics,
Appellee
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 98cv02566)
Robert K. Kelner argued the cause for the appellant.
Mark H. Lynch was on brief. Michael A. Dawson entered
an appearance.
Rudolph McGann Jr. argued the cause for the appellee.
Kenneth J. McGhie was on brief.
Before: Henderson, Randolph and Garland, Circuit
Judges.
Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge Henderson.
Karen LeCraft Henderson, Circuit Judge: David H. Mar-
lin appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment to
the District of Columbia Board of Elections and Ethics
(Board). Marlin brought this action alleging the Board's
enforcement of polling place regulations to prohibit him from
wearing a campaign sticker into his polling place on election
day violates the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution. We agree with the district court that the
Board's enforcement reflects reasonable, viewpoint-neutral
regulation of polling place speech and therefore does not
violate the First Amendment. Accordingly we affirm the
district court's summary judgment.
I.
The material facts are not in dispute. On September 15,
1998 Marlin, a resident and registered voter of the District of
Columbia (District), went to his polling place to vote in a
primary election while wearing a campaign sticker in support
of mayoral candidate Anthony Williams. When Marlin at-
tempted to turn in his completed ballot, an election worker
informed him he "could not cast his ballot while wearing the
sticker." Affidavit of David H. Marlin p 10. After a second
election worker accepted Marlin's ballot, the first worker told
Marlin he would not be permitted to vote in the general
election if he was wearing "any sticker, button, emblem, or
clothing that showed support for a candidate." Id. After the
primary Marlin and his counsel contacted the Board, which
told Marlin's counsel that the District's election regulations,
promulgated by the Board,1 prohibited voters from wearing
political paraphernalia inside a polling place but that, if
Marlin insisted on wearing a campaign sticker, he would be
__________
1 The Board is authorized by statute to promulgate regulations
governing conduct of elections. See D.C. Code Ann. s 1-1324.
permitted to vote curbside at the general election. Marlin
wore a sticker and voted curbside on November 3, 1998.
Meanwhile, on October 23, 1998 Marlin filed this action in
the district court challenging the Board's enforcement of the
regulations. In a memorandum opinion and order filed Sep-
tember 8, 1999 the district court granted summary judgment
in favor of the Board. Marlin appealed.
II.
Marlin challenges two District election regulations. The
first provides:
No partisan or nonpartisan political activity, or any other
activity which, in the judgment of the Precinct Captain,
may directly or indirectly interfere with the orderly
conduct of the election, shall be permitted in, on, or
within a reasonable distance outside the building used as
a polling or vote counting place.
3 D.C.M.R. s 708.4. The second defines "political activity" to
"include without limitation, any activity intended to persuade
a person to vote for or against any candidate or measure or to
desist from voting." 3 D.C.M.R. s 708.8. Marlin contends
the Board's enforcement of these regulations to prevent him
from wearing a political sticker when voting inside the polling
place is an unjustified restriction of his right to free expres-
sion under the First Amendment.2 The district court held
that the political activity ban is a reasonable viewpoint-
neutral regulation of a non-public forum and therefore does
not violate the First Amendment. We agree.
The United States Supreme Court has
__________
2 Although section 708.4 broadly prohibits political activity "in, on,
or within a reasonable distance outside" a polling place, Marlin
challenges the regulation only as applied, that is, to prevent him
from wearing the sticker inside the polling place. In addition, the
Board's counsel assured the district court that its policy is to
enforce the ban only "inside the polling place." JA 102.
identified three types of fora: the traditional public
forum, the public forum created by government designa-
tion, and the nonpublic forum. Traditional public fora
are those places which "by long tradition or by govern-
ment fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate."
[Perry Educ. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460
U.S. 37, 45 (1983)]. Public streets and parks fall into this
category. See Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515, 59 S.Ct.
954, 963, 83 L.Ed. 1423 (1939). In addition to traditional
public fora, a public forum may be created by govern-
ment designation of a place or channel of communication
for use by the public at large for assembly and speech,
for use by certain speakers, or for the discussion of
certain subjects. Perry Education Assn., supra, 460 U.S.,
at 45 and 46, n. 7, 103 S.Ct., at 955, n. 7. Of course, the
government "is not required to indefinitely retain the
open character of the facility." Id., at 46, 103 S.Ct., at
955.
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S.
788, 802 (1985). A content-based regulation, such as the
District's, which restricts expression in either a traditional
forum or a designated forum will be upheld only if the state
shows it "is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and
that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end." Perry Educ.
Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45 (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455,
461 (1980)). By contrast, a restriction on speech in a non-
public forum is permissible so long as it is viewpoint neutral
and "reasonable in light of the purpose which the forum at
issue serves." Id. at 46-49.3
The forum here, the interior of a polling place, is neither a
traditional public forum nor a government-designated one. It
__________
3 Although Marlin argues that public forum analysis does not
apply to polling places because they are not "proprietary" to the
government, see Brief of Appellant at 9-12, Supreme Court prece-
dent establishes that the public forum analysis is appropriate. See,
e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (applying public forum
analysis to Tennessee statute prohibiting display of campaign mate-
rials in or near polling places).
is not available for general public discourse of any sort. The
only expressive activity involved is each voter's communica-
tion of his own elective choice and this has long been carried
out privately--by secret ballot in a restricted space. See
Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 201-06 (1992) (describing
early problems with voter fraud and intimidation in the
United States and the states' responses, including secret
ballot and restricted zones around polls). In the District of
Columbia specifically, the record demonstrates that at least
as early as 1960 the Board's regulations prohibited all "parti-
san political activity," either written or oral, "in any building
while it is in use as a polling place." JA 28. District
regulations also restrict election day activity at polling places
to "the conduct of the election" and limit polling place access
to Board representatives, police officers, duly qualified elec-
tion watchers, persons engaged in voting and others autho-
rized by the Board. 3 D.C.M.R. s 708.3. Given these long-
standing limitations on polling place speech, we do not see
how the polls can fairly be described either as "places which
'by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to
assembly and debate,' " or as places designated by the gov-
ernment "for use by the public at large for assembly and
speech, for use by certain speakers, or for the discussion of
certain subjects." Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802. As the Su-
preme Court declared in Cornelius: "We will not find that a
public forum has been created in the face of clear evidence of
a contrary intent, nor will we infer that the government
intended to create a public forum when the nature of the
property is inconsistent with expressive activity." 473 U.S. at
803.
Having concluded that polling places are non-public fora,
we further conclude that the Board's enforcement of the
challenged election regulations constitutes reasonable view-
point-neutral regulation of expression within polling places.
In Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992), the petitioner
challenged similar but more extensive polling place restric-
tions in force in Tennessee. The challenged statutes prohibit-
ed "the display of campaign posters, signs or other campaign
materials, distribution of campaign materials, and solicitation
of votes for or against any person or political party or
position" within the polling building or 100 feet from its
entrance. The Burson majority concluded the regulation
satisfied at least the reasonableness test applied to regulation
of speech in non-public fora.4 The same result is compelled
here.5
Marlin does not dispute that the regulations, which apply to
all political activity, are viewpoint neutral. Nor does he
question the validity of the interests identified by the Board,
namely protecting "the orderly conduct of elections" by "cre-
ating a neutral zone within the polling place, preventing
altercations over hot-button issues, intimidation of voters,
eleventh hour smear campaigns and the like," Brief of Appel-
lee at 20-21 (emphasis original)--which interests parallel
those endorsed in Burson, namely protecting "the right of
[Tennessee's] citizens to vote freely for the candidates of their
choice" and safeguarding "the right to vote in an election
conducted with integrity and reliability," 504 U.S. at 198-99.
Marlin contends only that the broad ban is unnecessary to
prevent the evils the Board has identified. To pass constitu-
tional muster, however, regulation of speech in a nonpublic
forum need "not be the most reasonable or the only reason-
able limitation" and, "[i]n contrast to a public forum, a finding
__________
4 The plurality in Burson applied the more exacting public forum
test because it concluded the area outside the polling place was a
public forum, noting the Court had characterized as a "quintessen-
tial public forum" "those places 'which by long tradition or by
government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate,' such as
parks, streets, and sidewalks." 504 U.S. at 196-98 (quoting Perry
Educ. Assn., 460 U.S. at 45). Concurring in the judgment, Justice
Scalia expressed his view that the area outside the polling place was
a non-public forum subject only to the reasonableness test. We are
not concerned with the area outside the polling place because the
Board applies the ban only within the site. See supra note 1.
5 Marlin attempts to distinguish this case from Burson on the
ground the challenge there was facial while his is as applied. That
a challenge is as applied, however, does not alter the level of
scrutiny applied in a nonpublic forum--to wit reasonableness. See,
e.g., United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990).
of strict incompatibility between the nature of the speech or
the identity of the speaker and the functioning of the nonpub-
lic forum is not mandated." 473 U.S. at 808 (citing Perry
Educ. Assn., supra; Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418
U.S. 298 (1974)). The "decision to restrict access to a non-
public forum need only be reasonable," id., and the district's
decision to ban campaign paraphernalia from polling places is
a reasonable means of ensuring an orderly and peaceful
voting environment, free from the threat of contention or
intimidation. That narrower regulations might be as effective
or more so, as Marlin contends, does not invalidate the means
the District has chosen. Regulation of a non-public forum,
unlike that of a public forum, need not be "narrowly drawn to
achieve [its] end." Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45 (citing
Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980)). Because the
Board's enforcement of 3 D.C.M.R. ss 708.4 and 708.8 to
regulate political activity inside polling places is "reasonable
in light of the purpose which the forum at issue serves,"
Cornelius, 460 U.S. at 49, given the history and function of
polling places, see Burson, 504 U.S. at 200-09, we hold that
the regulations do not violate the First Amendment.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
court is
Affirmed.