United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued September 13, 2001 Decided October 9, 2001
No. 00-1433
U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. and
Office of Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice,
Petitioners
v.
Federal Labor Relations Authority,
Respondent
American Federation of Government Employees
Local 709,
Intervenor
On Petition for Review and Cross-Application
for Enforcement of an Order of the
Federal Labor Relations Authority
---------
Howard S. Scher, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,
argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was
William Kanter, Deputy Director.
Ann M. Boehm, Attorney, Federal Labor Relations Au-
thority, argued the cause for respondent. With her on the
brief was David M. Smith, Solicitor. William R. Tobey,
Deputy Solicitor, entered an appearance.
Stuart A. Kirsch and Mark D. Roth were on the brief for
intervenor.
Before: Tatel and Garland, Circuit Judges, and Williams,
Senior Circuit Judge*.
Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Judge Williams.
Williams, Senior Circuit Judge: This is an appeal from the
Federal Labor Relations Authority's finding of an unfair
labor practice on the part of the Department of Justice's
Office of the Inspector General ("OIG"). The FLRA found
that the OIG had violated the so-called Weingarten rule
during its investigation of a Department employee, see NLRB
v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975) (codified as to
federal employees in 5 U.S.C. s 7114(a)(2)(B)), by refusing
the employee's request for the assistance of a union represen-
tative. Believing the case to be controlled by Supreme Court
precedent, we uphold the FLRA's decision.
* * *
The OIG received a report that an employee of the Federal
Correctional Institution Englewood, in Littleton, Colorado
had smuggled illegal drugs into that facility. The employee,
a member of a bargaining unit, asked for union representa-
tion, but the investigating agents denied the request and
interviewed him anyway. The criminal investigation was
later closed when the prison warden wrote a memorandum to
the employee informing him that "there was nothing to
substantiate the allegations, and that there would be no
further investigation."
The union representing the employee filed an unfair labor
practice charge, claiming that the agents' denial of the em-
__________
* Senior Circuit Judge Williams was in regular active service at
the time of oral argument.
ployee's request had violated 5 U.S.C. s 7114(a)(2)(B). That
section requires an agency to give an employee the opportuni-
ty to have a union representative at an interrogation under
certain circumstances. The FLRA's General Counsel issued
a complaint. The ALJ granted summary judgment for the
FLRA, and the Department and OIG filed exceptions. In the
meantime the Supreme Court issued an opinion upholding a
prior FLRA decision that a NASA Inspector General was a
"representative of the agency" within the meaning of
s 7114(a)(2)(B), and that he therefore violated that section
when he interviewed a NASA employee without allowing
adequate union representation. National Aeronautics and
Space Administration v. FLRA, 527 U.S. 229 (1999)
("NASA"). Following that decision, the FLRA adopted the
ALJ's decision and order. U.S. Department of Justice v.
Federal Labor Relations Authority, 56 FLRA 556 (2000). It
rejected the Department's argument that, in view of the
Court's statement in NASA that it was not considering the
applicability of s 7114(a)(2)(B) to "law enforcement officials
with a broader charge," 527 U.S. at 244 n.8, the section could
not properly be applied to the OIG's criminal investiga-
tions--as distinct from the administrative investigation at
issue in NASA. Like the FLRA, we find no basis for carving
out such an exception from NASA.
* * *
The statutory provision at issue here provides in relevant
part:
(2) An exclusive representative of an appropriate unit in
an agency shall be given the opportunity to be represent-
ed at--
(B) any examination of an employee in the unit by a
representative of the agency in connection with an
investigation if--
(i) the employee reasonably believes that the exami-
nation may result in disciplinary action against the
employee; and
(ii) the employee requests representation.
5 U.S.C. s 7114(a)(2)(B) (emphasis added). As the section is
part of the FLRA's organic statute, we owe its interpretation
deference under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See NASA, 527
U.S. at 234. To the extent that the FLRA decision is simply
an interpretation of NASA itself, however, we owe the FLRA
no deference. See New York v. Shalala, 119 F.3d 175, 180
(2d Cir. 1997) (holding that "an agency has no special compe-
tence or role in interpreting a judicial decision"); cf. Profes-
sional Reactor Operator Society v. United States Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, 939 F.2d 1047, 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(deference is inappropriate when the agency interprets a
statute it is not charged to administer). In fact the case
turns on the force of the Department's efforts to distinguish
NASA, and we agree with the Authority's conclusion that the
attempted distinctions are flawed. Like the Court in NASA
itself, we need not consider whether s 7114(a)(2)(B) permits
other readings. See NASA, 527 U.S. at 234.
As in NASA, no one here questions that there was an
"examination" of a bargaining unit employee, that the exami-
nation was "in connection with an investigation," that the
employee requested representation, or that the employee
reasonably believed that he might be subject to disciplinary
action. See NASA, 527 U.S. at 233. Thus, the only issue in
dispute is whether, as the Court found there, the Authority
could find that the OIG agents were "representative[s] of the
agency" when they conducted the interview.
To support the proposed distinction between criminal and
administrative investigations, the Department points to a
provision of the Inspector General Statute that it says creates
special consequences for an investigation's being criminal. 5
U.S.C. App. s 4(d) requires any OIG agent to "report expedi-
tiously to the Attorney General whenever the Inspector Gen-
eral has reasonable grounds to believe there has been a
violation of Federal criminal law." Id. According to the
Department, this implies that whenever a criminal investiga-
tion is underway, the OIG agent is for purposes of
s 7114(a)(2)(B) no longer a "representative of the agency" but
rather answers to the Attorney General.
First we note that s 4(d) is triggered whenever an Inspec-
tor General comes upon "reasonable grounds to believe" that
federal criminal law was violated. This is a broader test than
what the Department regards as the key distinction of this
case from NASA, namely the OIG's own classification of the
investigation as criminal; our acceptance of it as controlling
would thus sweep an unknown number of administrative
inquiries into the exception. More important, nothing in
s 4(d) overrides 5 U.S.C. App. s 3(a), which requires that
each Inspector General shall "report to and be under the
general supervision of the head of the establishment in-
volved...." The NASA Court relied at least in part on this
provision in holding that OIG agents are "representatives" of
their respective agencies. 527 U.S. at 239. Section 4(d)'s
extra reporting requirement does not extract OIG agents
from the organizational spot that is assigned them by
s 3(a)--under the head of the relevant agency.
Thus the Department's effort at a statutory distinction
between criminal and administrative investigations fails. Its
remaining argument is mostly that the NASA decision rested
on factors that are peculiar to administrative investigations
and therefore it does not apply to criminal ones. None of the
distinctions seems convincing.
First, the Department argues that NASA was based on the
fear that agency managers might hand off their dirty work to
OIG agents, thus circumventing s 7114(a)(2)(B) by using the
OIG to conduct investigations for their own purposes. See
NASA, 527 U.S. at 234. With criminal investigations, the
Department says, this concern is "totally absent" because
agency managers have no "criminal investigative duties" in
the first place. But the NASA decision rested (in part) on a
recognition that the overlaps between "pure" management
activities and OIG duties would naturally generate coopera-
tion between agency managers and OIGs. 527 U.S. at 242.
It would be astonishing for us to ignore the parallel, and
equally obvious, overlap of administrative and criminal en-
forcement goals and to create an exception resting on this
ignorance. In fact, we once observed that "the results of
inspections, when no criminal proceedings ensue, are routine-
ly turned over to management for possible use in disciplinary
actions." U.S. Postal Service v. NLRB, 969 F.2d 1064, 1072
(D.C. Cir. 1992).
Second, the Department argues that NASA was in part
compelled by the fact that Inspectors General, when conduct-
ing an administrative investigation, need the cooperation of
agency managers, who can direct the employee's use of his
time--here, to attend the interview and answer questions.
See NASA, 527 U.S. at 242. The Department attributes this
power to the fact that the employee's refusal to answer
questions related to his duties may be used against him in an
administrative investigation. See Kalkines v. United States,
473 F.2d 1391, 1393 n.4 (Ct. Cl. 1973). In contrast, says the
Department, the employee's refusal to answer questions in a
criminal investigation may not be used against him. See
Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967). It follows that
the agency manager has "no role" to play in forcing the
employee to answer questions in a criminal investigation.
We cannot see that the "no role" consequence follows. In
both administrative and criminal investigations, the employee
enjoys a Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate himself in
his answers to a government investigator. The only differ-
ence appears to be that in administrative investigations, the
investigators usually grant criminal immunity to the employ-
ee, see Kalkines, 473 F.2d at 1393 n.4, so that they may
threaten the employee with administrative penalties unham-
pered by the Fifth Amendment. But this is a choice made by
the Inspector General in a given case, depending on what
penalties he or she wishes to seek. In other words, the
difference between administrative and criminal investigations
in this respect is one of investigative strategy, not one of law.
In either case, both OIG and agency management can benefit
by mutual cooperation, and it was the likelihood of such
cooperation that the NASA Court saw as militating in favor
of treating OIG interrogators as "representatives of the agen-
cy."
Third, the Department argues that in a criminal investiga-
tion an employee has the right to an attorney and therefore
doesn't need a union representative. But nothing in the
language of the statute or of NASA suggests that the applica-
tion of s 7114(a)(2)(B) depends on whether a particular em-
ployee "needs" union representation. Moreover, the section
implicates the union's rights as well. See Weingarten, 420
U.S. at 260-61. In fact, we've already rejected a suggestion
that an interrogatee's right to counsel could render
s 7114(a)(2)(B) inapplicable. American Federation of Gov-
ernment Employees, Local 1941, AFL-CIO v. FLRA, 837
F.2d 495, 499 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
Apart from the supposedly distinguishing "factors" and the
reference to s 4(d), the Department relies heavily on the
NASA Court's statement that it was not deciding the applica-
bility of s 7114(a)(2)(B) to "law enforcement officials with a
broader charge." NASA, 527 U.S. at 244 n.8. But the
reference doesn't appear to address OIG agents at all. In the
previous sentence the Court mentioned the concern that
applying s 7114(a)(2)(B) to the OIG might hinder "joint or
independent FBI investigations of federal employees." Id.
Thus the later reference to "law enforcement officials" clearly
means "FBI officials" or the like, not an agency's OIG
officials pursuing a criminal investigation on their own. As
was true for the Court in NASA, we need not address the
possible application of s 7114(a)(2)(B) to a joint OIG/FBI
investigation.
The Department also argues that application of
s 7114(a)(2)(B) to criminal investigations is "simply unwork-
able." Specifically, it says, the union representative might be
called to testify at a trial, thereby working against the
employee's true interests. But where an administrative in-
vestigation turns out to uncover criminality, the union repre-
sentative may equally be called to testify. And if the employ-
ee is concerned about the possible testimony of the union
representative, he can simply decide not to ask for one. Cf.
U.S. Postal Service, 969 F.2d at 1072 n.5 (rejecting idea that
risks of a union representative's testimony against an employ-
ee could enable the employer to deny the Weingarten right).
Perhaps inconsistently, the Department also says that appli-
cation of s 7114(a)(2)(B) will impede criminal investigations.
We have no doubt that there is a risk of such impediments,
but it presumably closely parallels the risks to effective
management (and successful criminal prosecutions) that flow
from application of s 7114(a)(2)(B) to administrative investi-
gations, risks that the Court regarded as "not weighty
enough to justify a nontextual construction of s 7114(a)(2)(B)
rejected by the Authority." NASA, 527 U.S. at 243-44.
Further, on the score of workability, the Department's
approach presents problems of its own. Many if not most
investigations will have both administrative and criminal po-
tential. Classification appears to depend--as one would ex-
pect--on the ongoing flow of information. The investigation
at issue in NASA, for instance, was instigated by information
from the FBI, see 527 U.S. at 231-32, and according to the
FLRA decision involved "a serious threat to co-workers,"
NASA, 50 F.L.R.A. 601, 1995 FLRA LEXIS 82, at *3 (1995).
See also id. at *48 (ALJ decision, noting that documents "set
forth potential threats and plans for violence"). The investi-
gator determined, "after consulting appropriate investigative
agencies," that the employee "had not violated the law and, as
a result, that the matter would be administratively, rather
than criminally, investigated." Id. at *3 n.2. At what point,
then, would the agent's investigation have become subject to
s 7114(a)(2)(B)? When the agent--to some degree indepen-
dently--decided to treat it administratively? What if he had
viewed the matter as unclassified, and interviewed the em-
ployee in part in order to decide on the classification? Such
possibilities erode the likelihood of any bright-line distinction
between administrative and criminal investigations.
* * *
Accordingly, the order of the FLRA is
Affirmed.