Hill, Joyce M. v. Norton, Gale A.

                  United States Court of Appeals

               FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

      Argued November 14, 2001   Decided December 28, 2001 

                           No. 00-5432

                         Joyce M. Hill, 
                                     Appellant

                                v.

            Gale A. Norton, Secretary, United States 
                       Department of the Interior, et al.,
                            Appellees

          Appeal from the United States District Court 
                   for the Districtof Columbia 
                         (No. 99cv01926)

                            ---------

     Erik S. Jaffe argued the cause and filed the briefs for 
appellant.

     Kathryn E. Kovacs, Attorney, United States Department of 
Justice, argued the cause for appellees.  With her on the 
brief were John C. Cruden, Acting Assistant Attorney Gener-
al, Jeffrey Dobbins and Larry M. Corcoran, Attorneys.

     Before:  Edwards and Rogers, Circuit Judges, and 
Williams, Senior Circuit Judge.

     Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Edwards.

     Edwards, Circuit Judge:  The Migratory Bird Treaty Act 
("MBTA"), 16 U.S.C. ss 703-712 (2000), extends protection to 
all birds covered by four migratory bird treaties, which, in 
relevant part, define migratory birds to include the family 
Anatidae.  Congress has delegated authority to the Secretary 
of Interior ("Secretary") to implement the treaties covered by 
the MBTA.  See 16 U.S.C. s 712(2).  Under this authority, 
the Secretary has published lists of protected migratory 
birds.

     The instant case arose when appellant Joyce Hill filed a law 
suit pro se in District Court claiming that the Secretary's 
regulation violated the MBTA in excluding mute swans from 
the List of Migratory Birds promulgated at 50 C.F.R. s 10.13 
(2000).  The District Court rejected Hill's claim and granted 
summary judgment in favor of the Secretary.  Hill now 
appeals from that adverse judgment.

     The disposition of this case is very nearly governed by 
Chevron step one.  See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. 
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).  This is so 
because the plain meaning of the statute and the applicable 
treaties strongly indicates that mute swans are qualifying 
migratory birds under the MBTA.  We hesitate, however, to 
decide this case on Chevron step one grounds, because of the 
odd regulatory scheme created by the MBTA which refers to 
four different treaties to glean a single substantive definition 
of migratory birds and the absence of any agency pronounce-
ment on the specific issue before the court.  We therefore 
assume, arguendo, that the disputed agency action is not 
positively foreclosed by the plain meaning of the statute.

     Even indulging in such an assumption, however, the Secre-
tary's position fails under Chevron step two.  The Secretary 
points to nothing in the MBTA, treaties, or administrative 
record to support the exclusion of mute swans from the List 
of Migratory Birds.  And the statute and relevant treaty 

support Hill's claim that mute swans should be included on 
the list.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the District 
Court on Hill's MBTA claim, grant judgment for appellant, 
and vacate the Secretary's List of Migratory Birds, codified 
at 50 C.F.R. s 10.13, insofar as the list excludes mute swans.  
We affirm the judgment of the District Court rejecting Hill's 
complaint resting on the National Environmental Policy Act 
("NEPA").  We agree with the trial court that the NEPA 
claim is meritless.

                          I. Background

A.   Mute Swans

     Mute swans - scientifically titled cygnus olor - are undis-
puted members of the family Anatidae.  Mute swans in the 
United States probably descend from European birds intro-
duced for ornamental purposes beginning in the mid-19th 
century.  Michael A. Ciaranca, et al., Mute Swan, The Birds 
of North America No. 273, 1 (1997).  Mute swans generally do 
not migrate long distances, making only "short-distance sea-
sonal movements" to find ice-free water.  Id. at 3.  They are 
"highly territorial" and can treat other species with "direct 
antagonism."  Id. at 10.  Indeed, the Government claims that 
mute swans "occupy habitat and consume food used by migra-
tory, endangered, and threatened species."  Keith M. Weaver 
Decl. p 16, reprinted in Joint Appendix ("J.A.") 24.  There is 
also information to suggest that mute swans cause ecological 
damage:  "As an exotic, feral species, the Mute Swan's effects 
on native ecosystems are a concern.  Potential effects range 
from overgrazing aquatic vegetation to displacing native wa-
terfowl."  Ciaranca, supra, at 2.  See also Mem. from Rowan 
W. Gould, Acting Director of Fish and Wildlife Service, to 
Regional Directors 1 (Mar. 24, 1995), reprinted in J.A. 79 ("If 
uncontrolled, mute swans pose a serious threat to the ecologi-
cal integrity of many areas, including the National Wildlife 
Refuge System and other Federal lands committed to the 
maintenance of natural wildlife diversity.").

     Generally, state governments have assumed responsibility 
for the management of mute swan populations.  Recently, 

however, Department of the Interior ("DOI") officials at the 
Blackwater National Wildlife Refuge secured a permit from 
the Maryland Department of Natural Resources to kill up to 
50 mute swans per year.  DOI officials claim to have taken 
only ad hoc measures to control mute swan populations, and 
they assert that "no concerted effort to eradicate mute swans 
from any refuge has been undertaken by the [Fish and 
Wildlife Service]."  Ronald E. Lambertson Decl. p 8, reprint-
ed in J.A. 67.

B.   Statutory and Regulatory Background

     The MBTA states that,

     [u]nless and except as permitted by regulations made as 
     hereinafter provided in this subchapter, it shall be unlaw-
     ful ... to pursue, hunt, ... [or] kill ... any migratory 
     bird ... included in the terms of the conventions be-
     tween the United States and Great Britain [on behalf of 
     Canada] ... , the United States and the United Mexican 
     States ... , the United States and the Government of 
     Japan ... , and the ... United States and the Union of 
     Soviet Socialist Republics.
     
16 U.S.C. s 703.  The MBTA does not define "migratory 
bird" but merely refers to the treaties for a definition.  The 
Secretary, however, has declared that:

     Migratory bird means any bird, whatever its origin and 
     whether or not raised in captivity, which belongs to a 
     species listed in s 10.13.
     
50 C.F.R. s 10.12.  Section 10.13, in turn, lists "all species of 
migratory birds protected by the [MBTA]."  50 C.F.R. 
s 10.13.  The only swans on the List of Migratory Birds in 
s 10.13 are trumpeter, tundra, and whooper swans.  The 
Secretary's regulations do not explain why mute swans are 
excluded from the List of Migratory Birds.

     The four treaties to which the MBTA refers each provide 
different definitions of covered birds.  The 1916 treaty with 
Great Britain ("the Canada Treaty") broadly defines migrato-
ry birds to include "Anatidae or waterfowl, including brant, 
wild ducks, geese, and swans."  Convention for the Protection 

of Migratory Birds, Aug. 16, 1916, art. I, s 1(a), U.S.-Gr. 
Brit., 39 Stat. 1702.  The Proclamation to the Canada Treaty 
refers to birds that migrate across national borders:

     Whereas, Many species of birds in the course of their 
     annual migrations traverse certain parts of the United 
     States and the Dominion of Canada;  and
     
     Whereas, Many of these species are of great value ... 
     but are nevertheless in danger of extermination through 
     lack of adequate protection during the nesting season or 
     while on their way to and from their breeding grounds.
     
Id.  Canada and the United States amended the 1916 treaty 
with a 1995 Protocol that revised the definition of migratory 
birds to include "Anatidae, or waterfowl (ducks, geese and 
swans)."  Protocol Amending the 1916 Convention for the 
Protection of Migratory Birds in Canada and the United 
States, Dec. 14, 1995, art. I, s 1, U.S.-Can., Sen. Treaty Doc. 
104-28.

     The 1936 treaty with Mexico also defines migratory birds 
broadly to include "Familia Anatidae."  Convention for the 
Protection of Migratory Game Birds and Game Mammals, 
Feb. 7, 1936, art. IV, U.S.-Mex., 50 Stat. 1311.  The introduc-
tory Proclamation to the Mexico Treaty refers to "migratory" 
birds without regard to their origin:

     Whereas, some of the birds denominated migratory, in 
     their movements cross the United States of America and 
     the United Mexican States, in which countries they live 
     temporarily;
     
     Whereas it is right and proper to protect the said 
     migratory birds, whatever may be their origin, in the 
     United States of America and the United Mexican States, 
     in order that the species may not be exterminated.
     
Id.

     The 1972 treaty with Japan defines migratory birds more 
specifically:

     (a) The species of birds for which there is positive evi-
     dence of migration between the two countries from the 
     recovery of bands or other markers;  and
     
     (b) The species of birds with subspecies common to both 
     countries or, in the absence of subspecies, the species of 
     birds common to both countries.  The identification of 
     these species and subspecies shall be based upon speci-
     mens, photographs or other reliable evidence.
     
Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds and Birds 
in Danger of Extinction, and Their Environment, Mar. 4, 
1972, art. II, s 1, U.S.-Japan, 25 U.S.T. 3331.  The Japan 
Treaty also contains an annex that specifically lists "species 
defined as migratory birds."  Id. at art. II, s 2(a).  The only 
swan identified in the annex is the whooper swan, cygnus 
cygnus.  Id. at Annex.

     Finally, the 1976 treaty with the Soviet Union defines 
migratory birds as:

     (a) The species or subspecies of birds for which there is 
     evidence of migration between the Soviet Union and the 
     United States derived as a result of banding, marking or 
     other reliable scientific evidence;  or
     
     (b) The species or subspecies of birds, populations of 
     which occur in the Soviet Union and the United States 
     and have common flyways or common breeding, winter-
     ing, feeding, or moulting areas, and for these reasons 
     there exists or could exist an exchange of individuals 
     between such populations.  The identification of such 
     species or subspecies will be based upon data acquired by 
     banding, marking, or other reliable scientific evidence.
     
Convention Concerning the Conservation of Migratory Birds 
and Their Environment, Nov. 19, 1976, art. I, s 1, U.S.-
U.S.S.R., 29 U.S.T. 4649.  Similar to the Japan Treaty, the 
Soviet Union Treaty includes an annex listing species by 
name.  Only three swan species - whooper, bewick's, and 
whistling swans - are listed in the Annex.  Id. at Annex.

     The first regulations implementing the MBTA simply im-
ported the language of the Canada treaty.  See, e.g., U.S. 

Dep't of Agric., Bureau of Biological Survey, 11 Service and 
Regulatory Announcements 1, 2 (Aug. 21, 1916) (defining 
migratory birds, in relevant part, as "Anatidae or waterfowl, 
including brant, wild ducks, geese, and swans"). After a few 
rounds of statutory changes that placed regulatory authority 
with the President and the Secretary of Interior, the Presi-
dent, by Executive Order, delegated sole authority to the 
Secretary to promulgate regulations under the MBTA.  See 
Exec. Order No. 10,250, 16 Fed. Reg. 5,385 (June 7, 1951).  
The Secretary initially maintained the established definition 
of migratory birds.  See, e.g., 50 C.F.R. s 10.1 (1961).

     In 1965, the Secretary issued a Notice of Proposed Rule 
Making which sought to, among other things, "further clarify 
and define the term 'migratory birds' " by adding a require-
ment that birds be "indigenous to the United States."  30 
Fed. Reg. 5,640 (Apr. 21, 1965).  These regulations were 
adopted in 1965, see 30 Fed. Reg. 7,571 (June 10, 1965), but 
the indigenous requirement was short-lived.  Two years later, 
the Secretary amended the MBTA regulations by adding a 
definition of migratory birds that did not include the indige-
nous requirement.  See 32 Fed. Reg. 10,855 (July 25, 1967) 
(printing new 50 C.F.R. s 1.11).  This new definition did not, 
however, replace the old definition, thus leaving the regula-
tions with two different definitions of migratory birds.

     These dual definitions remained in place until 1973, when 
the Secretary deleted 50 C.F.R. s 1.11 and changed the 
definition of migratory birds to include

     all birds, whether or not raised in captivity, included in 
     the terms of the [migratory bird] conventions between 
     the United States and any foreign country.
     
38 Fed. Reg. 22,015, 22,016 (Aug. 15, 1973).  The Secretary 
also published a list of covered migratory birds, 50 C.F.R. 
s 10.13, "[f]or reference purposes only."  Id. at 22,017.  The 
only swans included on the final list were the trumpeter and 
whooper swans.  See 50 C.F.R. s 10.13 (1973).

     The Secretary proposed revised regulations in 1984 that 
added a different qualification to the List of Migratory Birds.  

See 49 Fed. Reg. 23,197, 23,198 (June 5, 1984).  The operative 
definition of migratory birds remained the same, but the 
Secretary proposed to "[a]dd species that are of regular 
occurrence in the United States that were not included on the 
last List," and also to "[d]elete species whose occurrence in 
the United States is deemed accidental, i.e., the U.S. is 
outside the species' normal range and occurrence is infre-
quent and irregular."  Id.  The Secretary adopted these 
changes, see 50 Fed. Reg. 13,708 (Apr. 5, 1985), and the 
regulations remained in effect until this lawsuit was filed.

C. Procedural Background

     Appellant Hill, appearing pro se, filed a complaint in Dis-
trict Court on July 16, 1999, which was amended on July 30, 
1999.  Her principal claim was that the Secretary's failure to 
include the mute swan on the List of Migratory Birds 
protected under the MBTA was arbitrary and capricious 
under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA").  On Sep-
tember 27, 2000, the District Court granted summary judg-
ment for the federal defendants.  The trial court rejected the 
defendants' argument that Hill lacked standing to pursue her 
claim.  On this point, the District Court found that the 
"Federal Defendants' failure to protect the mute swan under 
the MBTA is causally linked to the diminished presence of 
the swan in and about [Hill's] property on the Eastern Shore 
of Maryland," that the decline in mute swans reduces Hill's 
aesthetic enjoyment of her property, and that the decline 
"will be ameliorated if Federal Defendants include the bird 
under the MBTA."  Hill v. Babbitt, Civ. Act. No. 00-01926, 
slip op. at 5 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2000).  On the merits, the trial 
court found that the treaties underlying the MBTA impose 
conflicting obligations, thus creating an ambiguity in the 
MBTA with regard to whether mute swans must be included 
on the list of protected migratory birds.  Faced with this 
purported ambiguity, the District Court held that "agency 
deference is the most plausible alternative" and granted 
judgment for the federal defendants.  Id. at 13.  The trial 
court also ruled against Hill on her NEPA claim, holding that 
she had introduced nothing to support the contention that the 
government was obliged to conduct an Environmental Impact 

Statement ("EIS") under the NEPA.  Id. at 6 n.15.  Hill filed 
a notice of appeal on November 27, 2000.

                          II. Discussion

A.   Jurisdiction

     The Secretary no longer challenges Hill's standing to pur-
sue her claims in federal court, and with good reason.  There 
is no doubt that the District Court was correct in holding that 
Hill satisfies the standing requirements of Article III.  See 
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., (TOC), 
Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 183 (2000) ("environmental plaintiffs ade-
quately allege injury in fact when they aver that they use the 
affected area and are persons 'for whom the aesthetic and 
recreational values of the area will be lessened' by the 
challenged activity." (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 
727, 735 (1972)));  Wabash Valley Power Ass'n, Inc. v. FERC, 
268 F.3d 1105, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that if injury is 
traceable to agency decision and a favorable decision by the 
court will nullify the action that gave rise to injury, then 
plaintiff has satisfied causation and redressability require-
ments of Article III standing).

     Because the MBTA does not create a private right of action 
or otherwise provide a process for judicial review, the Secre-
tary's disputed failure to include the mute swan on the List of 
Migratory Birds can only be challenged by Hill under the 
APA.  Though the APA does not directly grant subject 
matter jurisdiction to the federal courts, see Califano v. 
Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977), challenges brought under 
the APA fall within the reach of the general federal jurisdic-
tion statute, 28 U.S.C. s 1331.  Road Sprinkler Fitters Local 
Union 669 v. Herman, 234 F.3d 1316, 1319 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

     As Hill notes,

     This case primarily presents the straight-forward ques-
     tion whether the Mute Swan (Cygnus olor) is a member 
     of the family anatidae as that phrase is used in two 
     treaties between the United States and, respectively, the 
     
     United Kingdom (on behalf of Canada) and Mexico, and 
     hence are covered as a protected species under the 
     Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA), 16 U.S.C. s 703 et 
     seq.  The Department of the Interior has excluded Mute 
     Swans from a regulatory list of species that it deems 
     protected by the MBTA.  50 C.F.R. s 10.13.  Such ex-
     clusion has led to numerous adverse actions - including 
     killing and egg destruction - against Mute Swans, thus 
     injuring those who, like plaintiff, derive immense aesthet-
     ic and cultural value from the presence of Mute Swans in 
     our environment.
     
     The case presents the further question whether the 
     conduct of the Federal Defendants adverse to Mute 
     Swans constitutes "major Federal action[]" requiring 
     preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement 
     (EIS) pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act 
     (NEPA).  42 U.S.C. s 4332(2)(C).
     
Br. for Appellant at 3-4.  The District Court had subject 
matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. s 1331 to hear these 
claims, and this court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
s 1291.  We will address the two disputed issues in turn.

     B. The MBTA and the Treaties

     The MBTA covers all migratory birds, as defined by the 
four cited treaties with Canada, Mexico, Japan, and the Soviet 
Union.  The Government concedes that the most restrictive 
treaty definition of migratory birds - i.e., the one found in the 
Canada treaty - governs the disposition of this case.  See 
Alaska Fish & Wildlife Fed'n v. Dunkle, 829 F.2d 933, 941 
(9th Cir. 1987) (holding that "[t]he United States-Canada 
Convention is the most restrictive of the four treaties, and all 
of the Secretary's regulations must be in accord with that 
treaty").  The Government also concedes that under the 
literal terms of the most restrictive treaty - the Canada 
treaty - "swans," without limitation, are migratory birds and 
therefore presumptively within the protected class.  Further-
more, Government Counsel acknowledged at oral argument 
that, because of the seasonal movements of some mute swans 
across the U.S.-Canada border, mute swans are undoubtedly 

"migratory birds."  Finally, no party doubts the authority of 
the Secretary, under s 712(2) of the MBTA, to issue regula-
tions that create and refine lists of migratory birds, such as 
the list promulgated at 50 C.F.R. s 10.13.  The only MBTA 
issue before this court, therefore, is whether the Secretary 
was justified in excluding the mute swan from the List of 
Migratory Birds.

     Under the familiar Chevron analysis, "the reviewing court 
must first exhaust the traditional tools of statutory construc-
tion to determine whether Congress has spoken to the precise 
question at issue."  Bell Atl. Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 131 F.3d 1044, 
1047 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quotations and citations omitted).  The 
parties, unsurprisingly, disagree over the meaning of the 
MBTA.  Hill argues that a simple syllogism decides this case:  
the operative treaty defines migratory birds as "swans";  
mute swans are, indeed, swans;  and, therefore, the treaty 
covers mute swans.  The Secretary, on the other hand, claims 
that the statute's purported simplicity actually ensconces its 
ambiguity:  the MBTA does not define migratory birds;  while 
the Canada Treaty references all swans, its Proclamation 
speaks only of birds that migrate between the U. S. and 
Canada;  though swans are at home all over the world, only 
some swans migrate between the U.S. and Canada or are 
native to the signatory nations;  therefore, it would make no 
sense to include every swan species within the protective 
ambit of the MBTA.  And, of course, the Secretary claims 
that any statutory ambiguity is properly resolved pursuant to 
the agency's delegated authority to regulate under the 
MBTA.

     Hill clearly has the better of this argument, for the statute 
appears as plain as she suggests.  The Secretary's argument 
is specious:  it rests on a convoluted and strained attempt to 
find ambiguity where none appears.  Absent some limiting 
language, references to "swans" and "family Anatidae," as are 
found in the Canada treaty, undisputably include mute swans.  
We can discern no ambiguity.  And the literal terms of the 
statute and treaty do not produce nonsensical results, as the 
Government suggests.  Rather, the disposition of the princi-

pal issue in this case is very nearly governed by Chevron step 
one, and that disposition favors appellant Hill.

     Because this case implicates several aged treaties about 
which the Secretary has said virtually nothing, we hesitate to 
decide the matter under Chevron step one.  This hesitation 
comes in part from our recognition of the rule that a court 
must pay "great weight" to "the meaning given [to treaties] 
by the departments of government particularly charged with 
their negotiation and enforcement."  Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 
U.S. 187, 194 (1961).  In this case, however, we have nothing 
more than the Secretary's List of Migratory Birds, with 
nothing to explain why mute swans are excluded from the list.  
Thus, in a situation in which we would normally look to the 
Government for guidance in assessing the meaning of disput-
ed treaties, the record is barren.  We could, of course, simply 
apply Chevron step one in Hill's favor, for the Canada treaty 
and the MBTA, together, support her claim.  Instead, we will 
give the Government the benefit of the doubt, at least for 
now, and analyze the case under Chevron step two.  In other 
words, because the Secretary has yet to address the issue at 
hand, we will assume, arguendo, that the disputed agency 
action is not positively foreclosed by the plain meaning of the 
statute.  We do not mean to say, however, that the Secretary 
can overcome the apparent plain meaning of the statute and 
the treaties if and when the Secretary offers an explanation 
for the List of Migratory Birds.  See Prod. Workers Union of 
Chicago v. NLRB, 793 F.2d 323, 328 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("When 
the intent of Congress is clear ... the court must give effect 
to the intent of Congress regardless of the agency's opin-
ion.").  We leave that question for another day.

     Turning to Chevron step two, we must determine "whether 
the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of 
the statute."  467 U.S. at 843.  In other words, we must defer 
to the Secretary's interpretation of the MBTA only if it is 
reasonable and consistent with the statutory purpose and 
legislative history.  See Bell Atl. Tel. Cos., 131 F.3d at 1049.  
If the terms of the disputed statute (and, in this case, the 
disputed treaties) militate against the agency's position, and if 

the agency has offered no support for its decision, then the 
agency decision cannot be upheld under Chevron step two.

     This court cannot presume the reasonableness of an agen-
cy's decision when the terms of the statute (and treaties) 
appear to be contrary to that decision and the agency has 
failed to justify its position.  Counsel for the Secretary of-
fered several arguments supporting the reasonableness of the 
mute swan's exclusion from the List of Migratory Birds:  the 
mute swan is not a native species, the mute swan's aggressive 
and territorial nature causes harm to other protected species 
and habitats, and extending protection to the mute swan 
might affect other treaty obligations of the United States and 
statutory obligations of the Secretary.  We have no idea 
whether these arguments are pertinent, and, if so, whether 
they are compelling.  It does not matter, however, for we do 
not assume that the arguments of counsel are the same as the 
Secretary's official position.  In fact, the agency record in this 
case is utterly silent on any basis, let alone any reasonable 
basis, to support the exclusion of mute swans from the List of 
Migratory Birds.  And, it is well understood that "[t]he 
courts may not accept appellate counsel's post hoc rationaliza-
tions for agency action."  Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. 
United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962).

     In arguments to this court, counsel for the Secretary 
contended that the non-native character of the mute swan 
justified the bird's exclusion from the list.  However, no 
agency decision explains the definition of "native," whether 
the mute swan is native or non-native, and most importantly, 
why the native or non-native character of a species is relevant 
under the statute and treaties.  This complete absence of 
support from the record is especially important here, because 
Hill argues that other birds on the List of Migratory Birds 
are non-native under many common definitions.  See Reply 
Br. for Appellant at 20-21.  To uphold the Secretary's exclu-
sion on this ground would require this court to determine that 
an unpublished, unmentioned, undefined, and uncertain factor 
could reasonably exclude an otherwise qualified bird from 
protection.

     Government counsel also claimed that the mute swan's 
destructive and aggressive nature support the mute swan's 
exclusion from the List of Migratory Birds.  The Secretary 
points to nothing in the statute, treaties, or administrative 
record to support this conclusion, however.  In fact, it is 
unclear how such a consideration could ever overcome a 
statutory requirement to the contrary.

     Likewise, Government counsel's argument that inclusion of 
the mute swan on the List of Migratory Birds may affect the 
Secretary's other statutory and treaty obligations is merit-
less.  According to Counsel, the North American Wetlands 
Conservation Act ("Conservation Act"), 16 U.S.C. ss 4401-
4414, indicates that Congress passed other legislation with 
the "understanding that the MBTA and the migratory bird 
treaties require the United States to protect only native 
species."  Br. of Appellees at 30.  We disagree.  The Conser-
vation Act defines migratory birds as "all wild birds native to 
North America that are in an unconfined state and that are 
protected under the [MBTA]" 16 U.S.C. s 4402(5).  To quali-
fy as a migratory bird under the Conservation Act, two 
separate, independent conditions must be met:  the bird must 
be a native wild bird and protected under the MBTA.  The 
Conservation Act does not in any way limit the definition of 
migratory bird under the MBTA and, by placing an additional 
limitation on the MBTA's definition, Congress expressly ex-
cluded some birds that qualify as migratory birds under the 
MBTA from the Conservation Act's reach.  Indeed, had 
Congress evinced the understanding claimed by counsel, the 
phrase "all wild birds native to North America" would merely 
duplicate the MBTA's definition.  Furthermore, including the 
mute swan in the List of Migratory Birds does not prevent 
the Secretary from controlling any potential harmful effects 
caused by mute swans, because 16 U.S.C. s 704 delegates 
authority to the Secretary to adopt regulations allowing the 
"hunting, ... capture, [or] killing" of protected migratory 
birds.

     In sum, the Secretary points to nothing in the statute, 
applicable treaties, or administrative record that justifies the 
exclusion of mute swans from the List of Migratory Birds.  

And, as noted above, both the MBTA and the Canada treaty 
support Hill's claim that the mute swan must be included on 
the list.  The Secretary's decision therefore fails review un-
der Chevron step two.

C.   National Environmental Policy Act

     Appellant Hill also argues that the NEPA required the 
Secretary to prepare an EIS with regard to its treatment of 
mute swans.  The NEPA requires an EIS for any "major 
Federal action[] significantly affecting the quality of the 
human environment."  42 U.S.C. s 4332(2)(C).  In her brief 
to this court, Hill identified several actions which she claims 
qualify as major federal action:  obtaining a permit from the 
Maryland Department of Natural Resources ("MDNR") to 
take up to 50 mute swans per year;  cooperating with the 
MDNR's Mute Swan management efforts, including assisting 
in burn management programs that affect mute swan nesting 
sites;  cooperating with the Atlantic Flyway Council and 
endorsing its recommendations to manage the mute swan 
population;  instructing Fish and Wildlife Regional Directors 
to control mute swans on federal land;  and deciding to 
exclude mute swans from coverage under the MBTA.

     Before the District Court, however, Hill only argued that 
the Secretary was required to conduct an EIS under the 
NEPA "for the trumpeter swan, before massive reintroduc-
tion efforts on a national level began" and before the "massive 
killing and mutilation of mute swans" began.  Amended Com-
plaint at 4-5.  The District Court found, and Hill does not 
now dispute, that the "Federal Defendants have submitted 
uncontroverted declarations which indicate none of them has 
engaged in an ongoing or proposed program to reintroduce 
trumpeter swans to the Atlantic Flyway or to exterminate 
mute swans."  Hill v. Babbitt, slip op. at 6 n.15.  Because the 
two grounds for invocation of the NEPA raised below were 
dismissed without a dispute of material fact below, Hill cannot 
now identify any "major Federal actions" properly before this 
court that would require the preparation of an EIS.  Accord-
ingly, the District Court committed no error in dismissing 
Hill's NEPA claims.

                         III. Conclusion

     For the reasons given above, we reverse the judgment of 
the District Court on Hill's MBTA claim, grant judgment for 
appellant, and vacate the Secretary's List of Migratory Birds, 
codified at 50 C.F.R. s 10.13, insofar as the list excludes mute 
swans.  We affirm the District Court's entry of summary 
judgment on Hill's NEPA claims.

                                                                           So ordered.