United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued February 14, 2002 Decided June 14, 2002
No. 01-7085
David J. Gorman, d/b/a Cashbackrealty.com,
Appellant
v.
Ameritrade Holding Corporation and Freetrade.com, Inc.,
Appellees
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 00cv01259)
John M. Shoreman argued the cause and filed the briefs
for appellant.
Brian D. Craig argued the cause for appellees. With him
on the brief was Robert S. Brennen.
Before: Henderson and Garland, Circuit Judges, and
Williams, Senior Circuit Judge.
Garland, Circuit Judge: In this case, we consider whether
the courts of the District of Columbia may assert general
jurisdiction over a defendant that is "doing business" in the
District through the medium of the Internet. We hold that
they may, although we ultimately affirm dismissal of the
complaint because service of process on the defendant was
insufficient.
I
Plaintiff David Gorman is the sole proprietor of Cashback-
realty.com, a real estate broker with its principal place of
business in McLean, Virginia. Defendant Ameritrade Hold-
ing Corporation is a securities broker-dealer licensed in the
District of Columbia with its principal place of business in
Omaha, Nebraska. Ameritrade provides online brokerage
services through its Internet site to individuals across the
country, including District residents. In November 1999,
Ameritrade acquired Freetrade.com, Inc., as well as its Inter-
net domain name, "Freetrade.com." Like Ameritrade, defen-
dant Freetrade has its principal place of business in Omaha.
Gorman alleges that he had an agreement with the prior
owner of Freetrade, under which Cashbackrealty.com was
entitled to a front-page link on the Freetrade.com website.
According to Gorman, although Ameritrade assumed the obli-
gations of this agreement when it acquired the Freetrade.com
domain name, it refused to provide a front-page link for
Cashbackrealty.com.
On June 2, 2000, Gorman filed a complaint in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging
that Ameritrade and Freetrade (hereinafter referred to col-
lectively as "Ameritrade") were in breach of contract for
refusing to honor the front-page-link agreement. Without
permitting discovery, the district court dismissed Gorman's
complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction and insufficiency of
service of process. With respect to personal jurisdiction, the
court held that a "company that acts to encourage or maxim-
ize the use by District of Columbia residents of its website
does not establish the necessary 'minimum contacts' with this
forum through Internet accessibility," and does not "operate
so continuously and substantially within [the District] that it
is fair to allow anyone to sue the enterprise in [the District]
on any claim, without regard to where the claim arose."
Gorman v. Ameritrade Holding Corp., No. 00-1259, Mem.
Op. at 3 (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 2001) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The court further held that Gorman's service of his
complaint upon the Securities Director of the District of
Columbia was insufficient under District of Columbia law.
Id. at 2-3. We review the district court's grant of Ameri-
trade's motion to dismiss de novo, see Second Amendment
Found. v. United States Conference of Mayors, 274 F.3d 521,
523 (D.C. Cir. 2001), and we consider its two grounds for
dismissal in Parts II and III below.
II
The district court has subject matter jurisdiction in this
breach of contract action because of the diversity of citizen-
ship of the parties. 28 U.S.C. s 1332(a). In a diversity case,
the court's personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants
depends upon state law, here the law of the District of
Columbia, the application of which is subject to the con-
straints of constitutional due process. See Crane v. Carr, 814
F.2d 758, 762 (D.C. Cir. 1987); 4 Charles Alan Wright &
Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure s 1068.1,
at 592 & n.2 (3d ed. 2002). The requirements of due process
"are satisfied when in personam jurisdiction is asserted over
a nonresident corporate defendant that has 'certain minimum
contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.' " Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia,
S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984) (quoting International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)) (additional
internal quotation marks omitted).
Under the District of Columbia's long-arm statute, local
courts may exercise so-called "specific jurisdiction" over a
person for claims that arise from the person's "transacting
any business" in the District. D.C. Code s 13-423(a)(1). See
generally Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472-
73 & n.15 (1985); Crane, 814 F.2d at 763. However, because
Gorman's breach of contract claim against Ameritrade does
not arise out of any business transacted between the parties
in the District, this font of jurisdiction is unavailable.
District of Columbia law also permits courts to exercise
"general jurisdiction" over a foreign corporation as to claims
not arising from the corporation's conduct in the District, if
the corporation is "doing business" in the District. See D.C.
Code s 13-334(a); AMAF Int'l Corp. v. Ralston Purina Co.,
428 A.2d 849, 850 (D.C. 1981); see also Helicopteros, 466 U.S.
at 414 n.9; Crane, 814 F.2d at 763.1 Under the Due Process
Clause, such general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation is
only permissible if the defendant's business contacts with the
forum district are "continuous and systematic." Helicopteros,
466 U.S. at 415 (quoting Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining
Co., 342 U.S. 437, 438 (1952)); see El-Fadl v. Central Bank of
Jordan, 75 F.3d 668, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see also Crane, 814
F.2d at 763 (describing the required contacts for general
jurisdiction as "continuous and substantial"); Hughes v. A.H.
Robins Co., 490 A.2d 1140, 1142, 1149 (D.C. 1985) (same).2
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has indicated that
__________
1 D.C. Code s 13-334(a) provides:
In an action against a foreign corporation doing business in the
District, process may be served on the agent of the corporation
or person conducting its business, or, where he is absent and
can not be found, by leaving a copy at the principal place of
business in the District, or, where there is no such place of
business, by leaving a copy at the place of business or resi-
dence of the agent in the District, and that service is effectual
to bring the corporation before the court.
Although on its face s 13-334(a) appears only to specify proper
methods of service, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has
held that compliance with the statute gives rise to personal jurisdic-
tion over a foreign corporation doing business in the District.
AMAF Int'l Corp., 428 A.2d at 850; see El-Fadl v. Central Bank of
Jordan, 75 F.3d 668, 673 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
2 See generally Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco
Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 568 (2d Cir. 1996) (declaring that "[b]ecause
the reach of "doing business" jurisdiction under s 13-334(a)
is coextensive with the reach of constitutional due process.
See Hughes, 490 A.2d at 1148 ("[W]e may find jurisdiction if
[the defendant] ... has 'been carrying on in [the District] a
continuous and systematic, but limited, part of its general
business.' " (quoting Perkins, 342 U.S. at 438)); see also
Everett v. Nissan Motor Corp., 628 A.2d 106, 108 (D.C. 1993).
In his pleadings below, Gorman contended that Ameritrade
"sells securities and provides other online brokerage services
to residents of the District of Columbia on a continuous
basis," and is therefore "continuously doing business in the
District of Columbia." Pl.'s Opp'n to Mot. to Dismiss at 1-2.
He further argued that he was "[a]t the very least ...
entitled to jurisdictional discovery to determine the exact
nature of Ameritrade's contacts with the District." Id. at 5.
And although "[a]s a general matter, discovery ... should be
freely permitted, and this is no less true when discovery is
directed to personal jurisdiction," Edmond v. United States
Postal Serv. Gen. Counsel, 949 F.2d 415, 425 (D.C. Cir. 1991),
the district court granted Ameritrade's motion to dismiss
without permitting the plaintiff to undertake discovery.
Ameritrade contends that Gorman was not entitled to
discovery because there are no factual circumstances under
which the district court could have asserted personal jurisdic-
tion over Ameritrade. The defendant concedes that it en-
gages in "electronic transactions" with District residents, and
that "Ameritrade undoubtedly derives revenue from those
customers." Reply Mem. in Supp. of Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss
__________
general jurisdiction is not related to the events giving rise to the
suit, courts impose a more stringent minimum contacts test" than
for specific jurisdiction); 4 Wright & Miller s 1067.5, at 499-507
(noting that, although "[s]pecific jurisdiction ... may be asserted
when the defendant's forum contacts are isolated or sporadic, but
the plaintiff's cause of action arises out of those contacts with the
state," when "the cause of action sued on does not arise from the
defendant's contacts with the forum state, an assertion of general
jurisdiction must be predicated on contacts that are sufficiently
continuous and systematic to justify haling the defendant into a
court in that state").
at 6. But Ameritrade maintains that those transactions do
not occur in the District of Columbia. Rather, the firm
declares, Ameritrade's business is conducted "in the border-
less environment of cyberspace." Appellees' Br. at 5.
"Cyberspace," however, is not some mystical incantation
capable of warding off the jurisdiction of courts built from
bricks and mortar. Just as our traditional notions of personal
jurisdiction have proven adaptable to other changes in the
national economy,3 so too are they adaptable to the transfor-
mations wrought by the Internet. In the last century, for
example, courts held that, depending upon the circumstances,
transactions by mail and telephone could be the basis for
personal jurisdiction notwithstanding the defendant's lack of
physical presence in the forum.4 There is no logical reason
__________
3 Cf. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 476 (holding that specific
jurisdiction "may not be avoided merely because the defendant did
not physically enter the forum State," since "it is an inescapable
fact of modern commercial life that a substantial amount of business
is transacted solely by mail and wire communications across state
lines, thus obviating the need for physical presence within a State in
which business is conducted"); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292-93, 294 (1980) (noting that the "limits
imposed on state jurisdiction by the Due Process Clause ... have
been substantially relaxed over the years ... largely attributable to
a fundamental transformation in the American economy," and that
" '[a]s technological progress has increased the flow of commerce
between the States, the need for jurisdiction over nonresidents has
undergone a similar increase' " (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958))); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355
U.S. 220, 222-23 (1957) (noting a trend "expanding the permissible
scope of state jurisdiction over foreign corporations ... [i]n part
... attributable to the fundamental transformation of our national
economy over the years," including a "great increase in the amount
of business conducted by mail across state lines").
4 See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 84 F.3d at 572 (noting that a
defendant's mail-order sales to forum residents may satisfy the
"continuous and systematic" standard (citing Sollinger v. Nasco
Int'l, Inc., 655 F. Supp. 1385 (D. Vt. 1987))); Michigan Nat'l Bank
v. Quality Dinette, Inc., 888 F.2d 462, 466 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding
why the same should not be true of transactions accomplished
through the use of e-mail or interactive websites. Indeed,
application of this precedent is quite natural since much
communication over the Internet is still transmitted by ordi-
nary telephone lines. See AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland,
216 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2000); Bell Atlantic Tel. Cos. v.
FCC, 206 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Accordingly, the test
that we will apply to determine whether the District has
general personal jurisdiction in this case is the traditional
__________
that, inter alia, appellees' "mail order solicitations of Michigan
businesses," and the fact that they "made at least one sale in
Michigan each and every month" for two years, "indicate that
appellees have conducted a 'continuous and systematic part of their
general business' in Michigan ... thereby warranting general per-
sonal jurisdiction"); cf. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298,
308 (1992) (holding that "[i]n 'modern commercial life' it matters
little that ... solicitation is accomplished by a deluge of catalogs
rather than a phalanx of drummers," that the "requirements of due
process are met irrespective of a corporation's lack of physical
presence in the taxing State," and that due process therefore
permits "the imposition of [a] collection duty on a mail-order house
that is engaged in continuous and widespread solicitation of busi-
ness within a State"); McGee, 355 U.S. at 223 (basing a finding of
specific jurisdiction on the mailing of an insurance contract into the
state and the mailing of premiums from the state); Travelers
Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 648 (1950) (holding that an
Omaha mail-order company, with no physical presence in Virginia,
was subject to Virginia regulation because it "did not engage in
mere isolated or short-lived transactions[;] [i]ts insurance certifi-
cates, systematically and widely delivered in Virginia ... , create
continuing obligations between the Association and each of the
many certificate holders in the state"); Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen
Screening, Inc., 282 F.3d 883, 892 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that a
defendant's "contact with Michigan customers through the mail and
the wires," where it "constitute[d] the doing of business there,
rather than simply the exchange of information," rendered the
assertion of specific jurisdiction consistent with due process); Neal
v. Janssen, 270 F.3d 328, 332 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that "making
phone calls and sending facsimiles into the forum" may be sufficient
to confer specific jurisdiction); Oriental Trading Co. v. Firetti, 236
F.3d 938, 943 (8th Cir. 2001) (same).
one: Were Ameritrade's contacts with the District "continu-
ous and systematic"? See GTE New Media Servs. Inc. v.
Bell South Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1350 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ("We
do not believe that the advent of advanced technology, say, as
with the Internet, should vitiate long-held and inviolate prin-
ciples of federal court jurisdiction."); 4A Wright & Miller
s 1073.1, at 327-28.
For support of its claim that Internet-based transactions
are outside the jurisdiction of District of Columbia courts,
Ameritrade relies on our decision in GTE. Ameritrade mis-
reads the case. In GTE, we held that defendants who
operated Internet Yellow Pages websites accessible to D.C.
residents had insufficient contacts with the District to permit
the exercise of specific jurisdiction under the District's long-
arm statute. In reaching that conclusion, we emphasized that
District residents did not engage in business transactions
with the defendants. Rather, "[a]ccess to an Internet Yellow
Page site is akin to searching a telephone book--the consum-
er pays nothing to use the search tool, and any resulting
business transaction is between the consumer and a business
found in the Yellow Pages, not between the consumer and the
provider of the Yellow Pages." GTE, 199 F.3d at 1350. The
"mere accessibility of the defendants' websites," we held, does
not "establish[ ] the necessary 'minimum contacts' with this
forum." Id.5
__________
5 In GTE, we described Internet cases in which other courts of
appeals had dismissed complaints for lack of specific jurisdiction as
also involving "essentially passive" sites. See GTE, 199 F.3d at
1348 (describing Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414,
419-20 (9th Cir. 1997), as finding that an Arizona court lacked
personal jurisdiction over a Florida corporation where the corpora-
tion's website "was essentially passive," where the defendant did
not encourage Arizona residents to access the site, and where there
was no evidence that any part of the defendant's business was
sought or achieved in Arizona or that any Arizona resident other
than the plaintiff had ever visited the site); id. (citing Bensusan
Restaurant Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d 25, 29 (2d Cir. 1997), as holding
that New York's long-arm statute did not extend to the operator of
a Missouri jazz club whose website merely had a hyperlink to a
This case, however, is substantially different from GTE.
Ameritrade's contact with the District is not limited to an
"essentially passive" website through which customers merely
access information about the financial markets. GTE, 199
F.3d at 1348; see supra note 5. To the contrary, Ameritrade
concedes that District residents use its website to engage in
electronic transactions with the firm. See Reply Mem. in
Supp. of Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss at 6. The firm's customers
can open Ameritrade brokerage accounts online; transmit
funds to their accounts electronically; and use those accounts
to buy and sell securities, to borrow from Ameritrade on
margin, and to pay Ameritrade brokerage commissions and
interest. Using e-mail and web-posting, Ameritrade trans-
mits electronic confirmations, monthly account statements,
and both financial and product information back to its cus-
tomers. As a result of their electronic interactions, Ameri-
trade and its District of Columbia customers enter into
binding contracts, the customers become the owners of valu-
able securities, and Ameritrade obtains valuable revenue.6
__________
New York club of the same name); id. (quoting Mink v. AAAA
Dev. LLC, 190 F.3d 333, 337 (5th Cir. 1999), as declining to find
jurisdiction where the defendant's website was accessible to forum
residents, but where "[t]here was no evidence that [the defendant]
conducted business over the Internet by engaging in business
transactions with forum residents or by entering into contracts over
the Internet"); see also SOMA Med. Int'l v. Standard Chartered
Bank, 196 F.3d 1292, 1297 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that a "passive"
website that merely makes information "available" is insufficient to
confer general jurisdiction); Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta
Nat'l Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2000) (same).
6 See http://www.ameritrade.com/tell_me_more/tell_me_more.fht
ml; http://www.ameritrade.com/getting_started/html/apply_online.
html; http://www.ameritrade.com/getting_started/html/fund_ac
count.html; http://www.ameritrade.com/getting_started/html/login.
html; http://www.ameritrade.com/getting_started/forms/ATI_845_F.
pdf; http://www.ameritrade.com/getting_started/html/tc.html (form
contract at pp 26, 37, 38).
What may serve best to take the mystery out of the
process--and to demonstrate that nothing about the Ameri-
trade website need alter our traditional approach to personal
jurisdiction--is the fact that Ameritrade also offers its cus-
tomers the alternative of accomplishing virtually all of the
above-described transactions by ordinary mail or telephone.7
Indeed, if anything, Ameritrade appears susceptible to appli-
cation of the "doing business" test in a much more literal way
than a traditional brokerage firm. Ameritrade's website al-
lows it to engage in real-time transactions with District of
Columbia residents while they sit at their home or office
computers "in the District of Columbia." And by permitting
such transactions to take place 24 hours a day,8 the site
makes it possible for Ameritrade to have contacts with the
District of Columbia that are "continuous and systematic" to
a degree that traditional foreign corporations can never even
approach.
In short, on the record before this court, it is quite possible
that, through its website, Ameritrade is doing business in the
District of Columbia by continuously and systematically "en-
ter[ing] into contracts with residents of a foreign jurisdiction
that involve the knowing and repeated transmission of com-
puter files over the Internet." Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot
Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (describ-
ing similar websites as ones where the defendant "clearly
does business over the Internet," in the context of a case
involving specific jurisdiction); see Mink v. AAAA Dev. LLC,
190 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir. 1999) (adopting the Zippo test for
assertions of general jurisdiction). Of course, determining
whether Ameritrade is actually "doing business" in the Dis-
trict requires an examination of the frequency and volume of
the firm's transactions with District residents. But those
facts are unavailable because Gorman was not permitted to
__________
7 See http://www.ameritrade.com/getting_started/html/apply_on
line.html; http://www.ameritrade.com/getting_started/html/check.
html; http://www.ameritrade.com/getting_started/html/login.html.
8 See http://www.ameritrade.com/services/ways_trade.fhtml.
undertake discovery. Because the plaintiff has "demon-
strate[d] that it can supplement its jurisdictional allegations
through discovery, ... jurisdictional discovery is justified"
and should have been afforded. GTE, 199 F.3d at 1351; see
El-Fadl, 75 F.3d at 676; Edmond, 949 F.2d at 425; Crane,
814 F.2d at 760, 764. Accordingly, were it not for the
conclusion of the following Part--that although dismissal on
personal jurisdiction grounds was unwarranted, dismissal for
insufficient service of process was justified--we would re-
mand the case for jurisdictional discovery.9
III
Even if there are sufficient contacts for a court to assert
personal jurisdiction over a defendant, it lacks power to do so
unless the procedural requirements of effective service of
process are satisfied. See Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd. v. Rudolf
Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987). Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4(h)(1) provides that a foreign corporation may be
served
in a judicial district of the United States in the manner
prescribed for individuals by subdivision (e)(1), or by
delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to
an officer, a managing or general agent, or to any other
agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive
service of process and, if the agent is one authorized by
statute to receive service and the statute so requires, by
also mailing a copy to the defendant.
Subdivision (e)(1), in turn, permits individuals to be served
"pursuant to the law of the state in which the district court is
located ... for the service of a summons upon the defendant
in an action brought in the courts of general jurisdiction of
the State." Gorman contends that he perfected service of
__________
9 Because we affirm dismissal on other grounds, we need not
consider whether, in general jurisdiction cases, due process requires
not only that the defendant have "continuous and systematic"
contacts with the forum, but also that the assertion of personal
jurisdiction be "reasonable." Compare Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
84 F.3d at 567-69, with id. at 576-78 (Walker, J., dissenting).
process on Ameritrade in two ways that were consistent with
Rule 4.
First, Gorman mailed a copy of the summons and complaint
to Ameritrade's corporate headquarters in Omaha, Nebraska.
The plaintiff argues that this manner of service was effective
because it was "pursuant to the law of the state in which the
district court is located." Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1). Although
Rule 4(c)(4) of the D.C. Superior Court Rules of Civil Proce-
dure does appear to permit service upon corporations by mail,
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has held that "Rule
4's general prescription for service of process cannot replace
the specific jurisdictional requirement of D.C. Code
s 13-334(a) that service be made in the District of Columbia."
Everett, 628 A.2d at 108. Where the basis for obtaining
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation is s 13-334(a), as it is
here, a plaintiff who serves the corporation by mail outside
the District is "foreclosed from benefitting from [the stat-
ute's] jurisdictional protection." Id.; see Gowens v. Dyncorp,
132 F. Supp. 2d 38, 42 (D.D.C. 2001) (following Everett).
Second, Gorman served the summons and complaint on the
Securities Director of the Public Service Commission of the
District of Columbia. This, he contends, constituted service
upon an "agent authorized by appointment or by law to
receive service of process," Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1), by virtue
of D.C. Code s 2-2615(f). At the time Gorman filed his
complaint, that D.C. Code section provided:
Any applicant for a license under this chapter shall file
with the Department ... an irrevocable consent appoint-
ing the Securities Director ... to receive service of any
lawful process in any noncriminal suit ... against him
... which shall arise under this chapter....10
Although Ameritrade did obtain a securities license in the
District, close attention to the wording of s 2-2615(f) makes
clear that it only requires Ameritrade's consent to receipt of
__________
10 Section 2-2615 was subsequently recodified as s 3-3615, and
then repealed. See Securities Act of 2000, s 804, 47 D.C. Reg.
7837, 7886.
service by the Securities Director in suits "which shall arise
under this chapter." Because the referenced "chapter" in-
cludes only the securities laws, see D.C. Code ss 2-2601 to
-2619 (1981), and because Gorman's breach of contract com-
plaint is unrelated to any securities transaction, the Director
was not an agent "authorized by appointment or by law to
receive service of process" in this case. Accordingly, deliver-
ing a copy of the complaint to the Director did not perfect
service of process.
Gorman further contends that, even if s 2-2615(f) does not
authorize the Securities Director to receive service of process
in a case like this, service upon the Director was nonetheless
consistent with District of Columbia case law and was there-
fore "pursuant to the law of the state in which the district
court is located" under Federal Rule 4(e)(1). In support,
Gorman cites District of Columbia cases that, he claims, stand
for the proposition that "service upon a foreign corporation
'doing business' in D.C. is valid if it gives reasonable assur-
ance that the defendant would be notified, even if service is
made upon an agent of the corporation otherwise not autho-
rized to accept service." Reply Br. at 4 (emphasis added).
Whether or not the above proposition is generally a fair
statement of District of Columbia case law, none of the cases
cited by Gorman suggests that it is applicable here. The
principal case upon which he relies, Key v. S.C. Johnson &
Son, Inc., 189 A.2d 361 (D.C. 1963), does not even support the
general proposition. In Key, the D.C. Court of Appeals did
hold that service of process in a private products liability case
was perfected by delivery of a complaint to the defendant's
"government liaison officer," located in the District, who dealt
solely with government officials. 189 A.2d at 362. But the
opinion is silent as to whether the liaison officer was autho-
rized to receive service of process for the company. Similarly
inapposite is Weinstein v. Ajax Distributing Co., 116 A.2d 580
(D.C. 1955), in which the court held that process was properly
served on a foreign corporation's "location supervisor" when
he was present in the District. The court did not hold that
such service was permissible regardless of whether the super-
visor was authorized to accept it; rather, the court rejected
the defendant's claim that the location supervisor was unau-
thorized and found that the record left "no doubt" that he was
present in the District "as agent or representative of defen-
dant company and was conducting its business." 116 A.2d at
583; see id. at 582.
Gorman's best case is District Grocery Stores, Inc. v.
Brunswick Quick Freeze Co., 106 A.2d 134 (D.C. 1954),
where, in the course of holding that service had been validly
made, the Court of Appeals said that "we need not here be
concerned with the precise character of the relationship be-
tween" the company and the person upon whom process was
served. 106 A.2d at 135. Indeed, the court declared that
"[w]hether, then, the person served with process may be
regarded as the agent of the defendant corporation is, in our
view, immaterial." Id. (internal alterations and quotation
marks omitted). But the scope of the recipient's agency was
immaterial in District Grocery Stores because it was clear
that he "was, at least, conducting the business which ... the
defendant was doing in the District of Columbia." Id. (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted). And as the court emphasized,
the District's "doing business" statute expressly authorizes
service upon a foreign corporation's "agent ... or person
conducting its business." Id. (quoting D.C. Code s 13-103,
the predecessor of the current s 13-334); see supra note 1.
In this case, however, it is clear that the recipient of
service, the Securities Director of the District of Columbia, is
not a person "conducting [the] business" of Ameritrade in the
District. Nor is he otherwise a company employee or agent
whose authority the company may or may not have circum-
scribed. Rather, the Securities Director is a government
official whose authority to receive service of process on behalf
of Ameritrade is created by, and expressly limited by, the
D.C. Code. See D.C. Code s 2-2615(f). This court is without
power to extend that authority beyond the scope granted by
the statute, and no District of Columbia court has ever found
service upon such an unauthorized official to be valid against
a foreign corporation. Accordingly, we conclude that service
upon the Director was ineffective to bring Ameritrade within
the jurisdiction of the district court.
Finally, Gorman urges that it would be unfair if a foreign
corporation, lawfully subject to the jurisdiction of the District
of Columbia because it does business here, could evade that
jurisdiction by keeping its agents out of the District and
hence beyond the range of effective service of process. If
such a loophole does exist, the legislature can, of course,
remove it by amending s 13-334 to provide an alternative
method of service. But we are not at all certain that legisla-
tive action is required. Section 29-101.99(e)(2) of the D.C.
Code, cited by neither party, provides that "[w]henever any
foreign corporation does not have an agent for service of
process ... the Mayor shall be the agent for service of
process for the corporation."11 Although on its face this
section appears to close the loophole identified by Gorman, we
need not determine whether service upon the Mayor would
have been sufficient to bring Ameritrade within the jurisdic-
tion of the district court because Gorman never attempted to
make such service.
IV
Ameritrade is quite wrong in treating "cyberspace" as if it
were a kingdom floating in the mysterious ether, immune
from the jurisdiction of earthly courts. Nevertheless, in this
case Ameritrade is saved from the jurisdiction of the district
court by a much more mundane problem: the plaintiff simply
failed to serve the corporation properly. For that reason,
and for that reason alone, the judgment of the district court is
Affirmed.
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11 The section further provides that "[i]n the event of service to
the Mayor, the Mayor shall immediately cause one of the copies to
be forwarded by certified or registered mail, addressed to the
foreign corporation at its principal office or at its last known
address." D.C. Code s 29-101.99(e)(2); see also id. s 29-101.108.