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United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued March 11, 2003 Decided April 25, 2003
No. 01-1228
SIERRA CLUB, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS
v.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY AND
CHRISTINE TODD WHITMAN, ADMINISTRATOR,
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
RESPONDENTS
ENGINE MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION, ET AL.,
INTERVENORS
Consolidated with
01-1231, 01-1232, 01-1237, 01-1238
On Petitions for Review of an Order of the
Environmental Protection Agency
–————
Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.
The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out
of time.
2
James S. Pew argued the cause for petitioners Sierra Club,
et al. With him on the briefs were Howard Fox, David B.
Rivkin, Jr. and Lee A. Casey.
Rachel Zaffrann, Assistant Attorney General, New York
State Attorney General’s Office, argued the cause for peti-
tioners States of New York and Connecticut. With her on
the briefs were Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General, Peter H.
Lehner, Assistant Attorney General, Richard Blumenthal,
Attorney General, Connecticut Attorney General’s Office, and
Mark Kindall, Assistant Attorney General. Kimberly P.
Massicotte, Assistant Attorney General, entered an appear-
ance.
Claudia M. O’Brien argued the cause for petitioner Inter-
national Truck and Engine Corporation. With her on the
brief were Laurence H. Levine and Robert M. Sussman.
David W. Marshall was on the brief for amicus curiae
Clean Air Task Force in support of environmental petitioners.
Angeline Purdy and David J. Kaplan, Attorneys, U.S.
Department of Justice, argued the cause for respondents.
With them on the brief was Patrice Simms, Counsel, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency. John C. Cruden, Assis-
tant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, entered
an appearance.
Claudia M. O’Brien argued the cause for intervenors In-
ternational Truck and Engine Corporation, et al. in support of
respondent. With her on the brief were Laurence H. Levine,
Robert M. Sussman, Janice K. Raburn, David Thomas Deal,
Richard A. Penna, Howard E. Shapiro, Jed R. Mandel and
Timothy A. French.
James S. Pew and Howard I. Fox were on the brief for
intervenors Sierra Club, et al. in support of respondent.
Before: RANDOLPH and ROGERS, Circuit Judges, and
WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.
Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge
WILLIAMS.
3
WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge: In the 1990 Amendments
to the Clean Air Act Congress directed the Environmental
Protection Agency to regulate emissions of what the agency
calls Mobile Source Air Toxics—that is, toxic chemicals emit-
ted by motor vehicles. Section 202(l ) of the amended Clean
Air Act requires the Administrator first to complete a study
assessing the ‘‘need for, and feasibility of, controlling emis-
sions of toxic air pollutants TTT associated with motor vehicles
and motor vehicle fuels,’’ 42 U.S.C. § 7521(l )(1), and then to
promulgate regulations ‘‘based on’’ that study, id.
§ 7521(l )(2). The regulations are to contain standards
which the Administrator determines reflect the greatest
degree of emission reduction achievable through the
application of technology which will be available, taking
into consideration the standards established under sub-
section (a) of this section, the availability and costs of the
technology, and noise, energy, and safety factors, and
lead time.
Id. In March 2001 EPA released the regulations, Control of
Emissions of Hazardous Air Pollutants From Mobile
Sources, 66 Fed. Reg. 17,230 (March 29, 2001) (the ‘‘Final
Rule’’). Here we review challenges brought by the Sierra
Club and several other environmental groups; by the states
of New York and Connecticut, also seeking greater stringen-
cy; and by the International Truck Corporation, seeking
removal of ‘‘diesel particulate matter and diesel exhaust or-
ganic gases’’ (in sum, diesel exhaust) from the EPA’s list of
toxics. Finding most of the claims of the first two sets of
petitioners ill founded, and International Truck’s claim un-
ripe, we uphold all aspects of the rule, save one—the agency’s
unexplained rejection of proposals to require ‘‘on-board diag-
nostics’’ for very heavy heavy-duty vehicles.
* * *
Before delving into the environmental and state petitioners’
attacks on specific features of the rule, we begin by address-
ing three general statutory issues. The environmental peti-
4
tioners say that the whole rule violated the statutory mandate
because it was not ‘‘based on’’ a study meeting the require-
ments of § 202(l )(1). Petitioners acknowledge that the EPA
did conduct a study (several studies, in fact), and that the
agency used information gleaned from those studies in the
rulemaking. But they claim that the studies were inade-
quate. As we understand the claim, petitioners do not ask us
to grade the study against the substantive standards of (l )(1),
but rather to find that its alleged inadequacies doom the
Final Rule.
But we do not read the statute as making the validity of the
rule depend on that of the study. In the first place, petition-
ers do not propose a method of review for determining
whether a rule was or was not ‘‘based on’’ a study, nor does
any seem immediately apparent; moreover, the statute
doesn’t say that the rule must be based exclusively on the
study. More importantly, for purposes of assessing the
EPA’s rule, the requirement that the rule be ‘‘based on’’ the
study bears no plausible relationship to the criteria that
obviously govern the agency—those of § 202(l )(2), quoted
above. The study subsection, § 202(l )(1), directs the Admin-
istrator only to evaluate the ‘‘need for’’ and ‘‘feasibility of’’
‘‘means and measures’’ for controlling mobile air toxics. To
the extent that a ‘‘feasibility’’ analysis in the study involves
the same considerations as § 202(l )(2), it adds nothing; to
the extent that it involves something else, we do not think it
can override (l )(2)’s explicit requirements. Thus, the agen-
cy’s failure to have studied ‘‘feasibility’’ per se would not
affect the validity of the rule.
The state petitioners’ attacks on EPA’s exposure modeling
similarly fail to undermine the rule. EPA acknowledges that
its modeling can be improved, updated and refined, but
petitioners have identified no portion of the Final Rule in
which the agency specifically relied on the exposure modeling
for justification, and haven’t pointed to any decision that
would have turned out differently but for the modeling’s
flaws.
Finally, petitioners point out that § 202(l )(2) is ‘‘technolo-
gy-forcing,’’ so that the agency must consider future advances
5
in pollution control capability. See, e.g., Husqvarna AB v.
EPA, 254 F.3d 195, 201 (D.C. Cir. 2001). This is not disput-
ed, but doesn’t take petitioners far. The statute also intends
the agency to consider many factors other than pure techno-
logical capability, such as costs, lead time, safety, noise and
energy. And its language does not resolve how the Adminis-
trator should weigh all these factors in the process of finding
the ‘‘greatest emission reduction achievable.’’ Petitioners
offer no construction of the statute contradicting the agency’s
overall approach, and thus present no occasion for us to
attempt any final analysis of the statutory meaning. The sole
possible exception to this is a short passage in the environ-
mental petitioners’ brief attacking the agency’s observation
that the ‘‘anti-backsliding program [imposed by the agency
and discussed below] at negligible cost is the most stringent
program that we can justify in the near term.’’ Final Rule,
66 Fed. Reg. at 17,245/2 (emphasis added); see Environmen-
tal Petitioners’ Initial Brief at 17 n.11. Petitioners imply that
the agency regarded ‘‘more than negligible’’ cost as automati-
cally disqualifying a standard under § 202(l )(2), but the
reference plainly doesn’t express that idea. Petitioners also
quote to us a fragment from National Lime Ass’n v. EPA,
627 F.2d 416, 431 n.46 (D.C. Cir. 1980), purportedly to show
that we have previously ruled that achievability means ‘‘capa-
ble of being met.’’ But that snippet merely pointed out that
achievability cannot mean something stronger than ‘‘capable
of being met’’; the rest of the discussion is not on point.
Thus, there is no real issue before us on the degree to which
the statute constrains consideration of cost. Compare the
very severe constraints that we found under the ‘‘feasibility’’
standard of the Occupational Safety and Health Act. United
Steel workers v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1272–73 (D.C. Cir.
1980). Except for certain explicit statutory questions, there-
fore, our review will be under the familiar APA standard of
‘‘arbitrary and capricious.’’
* * *
We now turn to petitioners’ attacks on specific elements (or
omissions) of the Final Rule.
6
1. Fuel Controls
EPA concluded that in light of the drastic regulatory
requirements that it was already imposing on the automobile
and fuel industries through prior rulemakings, namely ‘‘Tier
2,’’ Control of Air Pollution from New Motor Vehicles: Tier 2
Motor Vehicle Emission Standards, 65 Fed. Reg. 6698 (Feb.
10, 2000) and ‘‘Heavy–Duty,’’ Control of Air Pollution from
New Motor Vehicles: Heavy–Duty Vehicle and Engine Stan-
dards, 66 Fed. Reg. 5002 (Jan. 18, 2001), it should for the
time being limit anti-toxics regulation of motor vehicle fuel to
an ‘‘anti-backsliding’’ provision, also called the ‘‘Toxic Perfor-
mance Requirement’’ (‘‘TPR’’). This provision prevents a
refinery or importer from increasing the toxicity of its fuel’s
emissions over a baseline level determined by its emissions
performance from 1998–2000. Final Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. at
17,245/2. Many refiners have voluntarily overcomplied with
existing regulations, finding it economically advantageous to
strip their fuel of more toxic chemicals than necessary, evi-
dently because the market value of the extracted chemicals in
certain regions more than covers the extra removal costs.
Final Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. at 17,245/3. Absent the regulation,
backsliding would presumably occur if the chemicals’ market
prices fell. The rule measures backsliding by reference to
the agency’s ‘‘Complex Model,’’ which calculates the expected
toxicity of emissions as a function of the concentrations of five
toxic chemicals in the fuel—benzene; formaldehyde; 1,3 bu-
tadiene; acetaldehyde; and polycyclic organic matter. Thus
the standard aggregates chemicals; a refiner could, for exam-
ple, offset an increase in benzene with a decrease in acetal-
dehyde.
The environmental petitioners challenge both the agency’s
allowance of aggregation and its failure to impose emissions
caps rather than merely preventing backsliding. As to aggre-
gation, they stress that § 202(l )(2) requires that the regula-
tions ‘‘shall, at a minimum, apply to emissions of benzene and
formaldehyde.’’ 42 U.S.C. § 7521(l )(2). The anti-backsliding
rule, of course, does apply to benzene and formaldehyde, as
well as to the three other chemicals, so it achieves literal
compliance with the statute. Nor does the agency interpreta-
7
tion appear unreasonable on the facts. We can imagine a
case where it would not make sense merely to include ben-
zene or formaldehyde in a basket of toxics. For example, it
might be shown that the Complex Model weights chemicals
incorrectly in light of their adverse health effects, or that
differences among the chemicals, in terms of the relation
between health effects and achievable controls, called for
some sort of weighting adjustment or even ranking. But no
such claim is made. Thus we see neither statutory violation
nor capriciousness in the agency’s decision to allow companies
to trade benzene or formaldehyde increases against less
costly reductions in other toxics.
As for the agency’s choice of a mere anti-backsliding rule
rather than a more aggressive emissions cap, petitioners
argue first that the rule achieves no actual ‘‘reduction’’ in
emissions, and so cannot be considered the statutorily re-
quired ‘‘greatest possible reduction achievable.’’ But this
errs at the outset by assuming that the emissions level
prevailing at some historic point of time is the only permissi-
ble baseline against which ‘‘reductions’’ might be measured.
The statute does not state any such baseline. Of course, a
regulation allowing higher than historic levels could not quali-
fy as a ‘‘reduction’’ if the projected increase were purely
hypothetical; but petitioners make no such contention. Fur-
thermore, even if there were no risk that emissions might
increase above the status quo, reduction below that level
might not be ‘‘achievable’’ in light of the various criteria for
assessing achievability.
This takes us to petitioners’ argument that more stringency
is achievable, namely an emissions cap rather than the agen-
cy’s anti-backsliding rule. As we noted, petitioners have not
argued that the statute embodies some specific system for
balancing the relevant variables. But they find a statutory
hook in the concept of ‘‘lead time.’’ Specifically, they argue
that the EPA arbitrarily decided that any regulation it would
adopt must take effect by January 1, 2002; this faulty deci-
sion, they believe, wrongly tilted the balance against an
emissions cap, which would have been impossible to achieve in
8
that short time frame. More broadly, petitioners assert that
the agency’s choice of time frame dictated an outcome without
meaningful reductions.
In fact, however, we see no evidence that the agency’s
choice of time frame preceded its evaluation of alternatives.
Rather, it focused on the short term because it found itself
confronting a situation where—for a brief time—it wouldn’t
be able to realistically assess achievability on a longer term
basis. Its recently promulgated Tier 2 and Heavy–Duty
standards required, among other things, deep reductions in
the sulfur content of gasoline. Compliance with these regula-
tions can be expected to impose substantial costs on refiners
well into this century. Final Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. at 17,253/2.
Moreover, at the time it issued these earlier requirements,
the agency didn’t know what technological fixes refiners and
vehicle manufacturers would use to meet them. See, e.g.,
Tier 2 Regulations, 65 Fed. Reg. at 6774–77. Hence, the
regulations’ effects on industry are still unknown, and the
agency held off socking refiners with drastic additional regu-
lations that could interfere with planning on investments and
other compliance matters. With relatively mild action now, it
would be able later to assess, in a rulemaking actually sched-
uled for 2003–04, the impact of the earlier rules and the
benefits and costs of further controls. Final Rule, 66 Fed.
Reg. at 17,253/2. Given that the agency was shooting at a
rapidly moving target (whose mobility was largely driven by
its own prior regulation), its temporary rejection of regula-
tions with long or intermediate lead times was not arbitrary.
Petitioners chide the agency for relying on future rulemak-
ings, citing cases to the effect that labeling an action ‘‘inter-
im’’ can’t save an invalid rule. See Chlorine Chemistry
Council v. EPA, 206 F.3d 1286, 1291 (D.C. Cir. 2000). But of
course cases of that sort were not ones where the agency
decision made sense on the data then available.
2. Vehicle Based Controls
The state petitioners primarily challenge the agency’s deci-
sion not to impose controls on certain motor vehicles already
on the road—‘‘in-use’’ vehicles as opposed to new ones. The
9
states favor a series of such regulations for in-use heavy-duty
vehicles, such as mandatory retrofitting of certain diesel
engines with particulate matter traps, and inspection and
maintenance requirements on heavy-duty vehicles. EPA
gave no real answer in the rulemaking, but now argues that
§ 202(l )(2) gives it no authority to promulgate regulations for
in-use vehicles. Petitioners note that an agency cannot nor-
mally prevail on the basis of a justification offered merely by
counsel rather than by the agency, see SEC v. Chenery, 318
U.S. 80, 93–94 (1943); but that limit is inapplicable when the
agency’s conclusion is one ‘‘to which it was bound to come as
a matter of law,’’ United Video, Inc. v. FCC, 890 F.2d 1173,
1190 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
Section 202(l )(2) instructs the Administrator to ‘‘promul-
gate TTT regulations under subsection (a)(1) of this section
TTT to control hazardous air pollutants from motor vehicles
and motor vehicle fuels.’’ 42 U.S.C. § 7521(l )(2) (emphasis
added). The emphasized portions create something of an
internal contradiction. The statute defines ‘‘motor vehicle’’
separately from ‘‘new motor vehicle,’’ see 42 U.S.C. § 7550(2),
(3), suggesting that any use of the term ‘‘motor vehicle’’
simpliciter encompasses in-use vehicles; but as ‘‘subsection
(a)(1)’’ authorizes regulations only for ‘‘new motor vehicles,’’
that reference seems to limit § 202(l )(2) to new ones.
There are various rather inconclusive linguistic arguments
on each side. Petitioners point out that in the neighboring
§ 202(m), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(m), added to the Clean Air Act in
the same set of amendments as (l )(2), and governing ‘‘emis-
sions control diagnostics,’’ Congress provided both that the
regulations were to be promulgated ‘‘under subsection (a)’’
and that they were to apply only to ‘‘new light duty trucks.’’
But the usage in § 202(m) may have been intended only to
make assurance double sure, and any inference from the
difference between (l ) and (m) is somewhat offset by the
wording of 42 U.S.C. § 7554(d), in which Congress authorized
regulations ‘‘under’’ subsection (a) of § 202 and then made
explicit that it was authorizing a limited retrofit mandate for
the urban buses at issue there. While that section itself
indicates that Congress has sometimes intended that
10
§ 7521(a) regulations should apply to in-use vehicles, it is
equally consistent with the idea that when Congress intends
such an override, it says so.
The EPA’s reading has its own difficulties. The first, of
course, is the reference to ‘‘motor vehicles’’ in § 202(l )(2).
This might reflect a purposeful triggering of the definitional
section, and thus override the limitation to new vehicles
seemingly required by the cross-reference to subsection
(a)(1). The government’s view has the advantage of giving
a clear utility to the term ‘‘under subsection (a)(1),’’ but pe-
titioners suggest an alternative function, namely, making
various other statutory cross-references apply to the toxics
regulations. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7525(g)(2) (disallowing is-
suance of certificates of conformity for new car models that
do not meet standards promulgated under § 7521(a)); 42
U.S.C. § 7417 (requiring the Administrator to consult with
advisory committees and independent experts before pro-
mulgating regulations under § 7521(a)). So while petition-
ers may have little evidence supporting their interpretation,
they at least point out problems in the agency’s view.
The structure of the statute as a whole, however, seems to
us to fatally undermine petitioners’ reading. Subchapter II,
Part A of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7521–54, serves
primarily to authorize EPA to impose an elaborate regulatory
system on fuel refiners and motor vehicle manufacturers—
not motor vehicle owners. As we have seen, § 7521(a) sets
forth the general authorization. Section 7525 sets up a
system for testing of vehicle and engine prototypes, to be
followed by issuance of compliance certificates, without which
sale of a new vehicle is unlawful, see § 7522(a)(1). Section
7541 requires warranties by manufacturers and carefully
limits the risk that a vehicle purchaser will have to pay
directly for significant emissions-related repairs. See
§§ 7541(a)(3), (g). Section 7521(a)(1) makes the requirements
applicable for vehicles’ ‘‘useful life,’’ which is to be implement-
ed in the system for certification of compliance.1
1 Ironically petitioners argue that § 202(l )(2)’s cross-reference
to § 202(a) can be found to serve a purpose independent of the
11
In a small number of cases, Congress explicitly departed
from that model, granting the EPA carefully hedged authori-
ty to impose a direct cost on auto owners and users (rather
than one buried in the purchase price of a vehicle). For
instance, § 7521(a)(3)(D) allows EPA regulations for the ‘‘con-
trol of rebuilding practices’’ of heavy-duty engines, though
only after a study of rebuilding practices. And § 7554(d)
provides for a mandate, to be adopted by November 15, 1991,
requiring retrofitting of urban buses—but only ones having
their engines rebuilt or replaced more than three years after
January 1, 1995. A possible exception to Congress’s great
precision in allowing EPA to impose burdens directly on
vehicle users is 42 U.S.C. § 7521(j)(4), authorizing regulation
‘‘under subsection (a)(1)’’ of ‘‘cold start’’ carbon monoxide
emissions of heavy-duty vehicles and engines. Even if this is
intended to encompass in-use vehicles (a point we need not
resolve), the linguistic case for such a reading is stronger
than for § 202(l )(2), as the authorized regulations’ scope is
far more confined (to heavy-duty vehicles, likely to be owned
primarily by firms), and an argument can be drawn from the
contrasting language of the other subsection of § 7521(j), with
their explicit spelling out of lead times. All we need resolve
here is that, given § 7521’s focus on new vehicles, and Con-
gress’s restraint and precision in allowing direct EPA bur-
dens on vehicle owners, we cannot read § 202(l )(2)’s omission
of the word ‘‘new’’ as carte blanche to regulate in-use vehicles
in connection with toxics.
The state and environmental petitioners also attack the
EPA’s decision not to require on-board diagnostic equipment
(‘‘OBD’’) for new heavy-duty vehicles over 14,000 pounds.
EPA’s explanation of this decision did little more than point
out that it had previously established such requirements for
heavy-duty vehicles under 14,000 pounds, and that it ‘‘ex-
pect[ed] to propose similar requirements for all other heavy-
latter’s restriction to new vehicles, namely incorporation of the
useful life concept. But through its connection to compliance
certification, that concept itself is logically pertinent only to manu-
facturers’ responsibilities.
12
duty vehicles in the near future.’’ See Technical Support
Document: Control of Emissions of Hazardous Air Pollu-
tants from Motor Vehicles and Motor Vehicle Fuels (Decem-
ber 2000) at 152.
To be sure, the agency had previously pointed out the
existence of technical barriers to the implementation of OBD
requirements for large vehicles. It had explained in 1999, for
instance, that a relatively high proportion of large heavy-duty
vehicles, such as cement mixers and refrigerator trucks, have
‘‘power take-off units,’’ which use engine energy to operate
ancillary equipment that users keep running much of the
time; as EPA’s OBD rules for covered vehicles (i.e., ones
under 14,000 pounds) allow diagnostics to be disabled during
such power take-off operations, imposition of the same re-
quirement on the very heavy ones would be largely ineffec-
tive. Control of Emissions of Air Pollution From 2004 and
Later Model Year Heavy–Duty Highway Engines and Vehi-
cles, 64 Fed. Reg. 58,472, 58,515 (Oct. 29, 1999). In addition,
EPA had said that the lack of vertical integration in the field
made it hard to coordinate the ‘‘engine, transmission, chassis,
and safety related diagnostics.’’ Id.
But even assuming these explanations are enough, EPA
failed to provide them in the rulemaking, depriving petition-
ers of an opportunity to offer rebuttal or to show that some
sort of requirement might still make sense—a point that EPA
seems implicitly to have conceded in its reference to likely
future proposals. See Technical Support Document at 152;
see also Respondent’s Br. at 30. Indeed, those assurances
raise the question whether its 1999 observations, on which its
brief relies here, fully reflected its thinking at the time of this
rulemaking. The decision being at best inadequately ex-
plained, we remand for further explanation, though not neces-
sarily for further notice-and-comment rulemaking. See, e.g.,
Nat’l Grain and Feed Ass’n v. OSHA, 903 F.2d 308, 310–11
(5th Cir. 1990) (applying the ‘‘usual rule that a reviewing
court should leave the agency free on remand to determine
whether supplemental fact-gathering is necessary’’).
13
3. Listing of Diesel Exhaust
Finally, we turn to International Truck’s contention that it
was unlawful for EPA to list diesel exhaust as a mobile air
toxic that may be regulated in the future. The listing makes
clear that it excludes nontoxic components of diesel exhaust,
and that EPA intends the ‘‘listing’’ simply to focus its own
and others’ attention on emissions ‘‘potentially responsible’’
for adverse health effects, or posing a ‘‘potential concern for
public health.’’ See Final Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. at 17,236/1–2.
We dismiss this complaint, however. Under the familiar test
of Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967),
looking to the fitness of the issues for judicial review and the
hardship to the parties of withholding such review, the mere
listing of diesel exhaust for purposes of future consideration
presents no ripe issue.
Petitioners claim that the issue is purely legal, and thus
presumptively fit for review. Specifically, they argue that
§ 202(l )(2) authorizes regulations of ‘‘hazardous air pollu-
tants,’’ and that diesel exhaust is not a ‘‘hazardous air pollu-
tant’’ within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(6). That
section defines ‘‘hazardous air pollutants’’ as ones initially
listed as such in § 7412(b) or that the agency has listed by
going through an elaborate process set out in § 7412(b). But
this definition applies only ‘‘[f]or purposes’’ of § 7412 itself
(except for subsection (r)), and has no bearing on the term as
it appears in § 202(l )(2). Thus the only issue is the propriety
of deciding whether a particular chemical is worthy of further
study, an issue for the review of which we can see no legal
benchmark.
And as to hardship, International Truck points us only to
various initiatives of the EPA and the Department of Defense
to study the health effects of diesel exhaust. But these are
not, so far as appears, actions legally triggered by the listing,
as were the regulatory consequences that flowed from an
agency listing of dioxin as a substance ‘‘known to be a human
carcinogen,’’ which in Tozzi v. HHS, 271 F.3d 301, 310 (D.C.
14
Cir. 2001), we found enough to show ripeness. Nor do they
match the consequences that flow from inclusion of a site on
CERCLA’s ‘‘National Priorities List’’—a drastic reputational
loss and sharply heightened exposure to very costly enforce-
ment actions—which in Mead v. Browner, 100 F.3d 152, 155
(D.C. Cir. 1996), we found adequate for a different issue,
standing. Thus we dismiss International’s petition for want
of jurisdiction.
* * *
In sum, the claims of the environmental and state petition-
ers are denied on the merits, except for the remanded issue
of on-board diagnostics, and that of International is dismissed
as unripe.
So ordered.