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United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued November 13, 2003 Decided January 2, 2004
No. 02-7120
MORRIS J. WARREN,
APPELLANT
v.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
APPELLEE
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(01cv00349)
Susan S. Friedman, Student Counsel, argued the cause for
appellant. With her on the briefs were Steven H. Goldblatt,
Director of the Appellate Litigation Program, appointed by
the court, and Cary Berkeley Kaye, Supervising Attorney.
Morris J. Warren, pro se, was on the briefs for appellant.
Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.
The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out
of time.
2
Mary L. Wilson, Assistant Corporation Counsel, argued
the cause for appellee. With her on the brief was Edward E.
Schwab, Acting Deputy Corporation Counsel.
Before: RANDOLPH and ROBERTS, Circuit Judges, and
WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge RANDOLPH.
RANDOLPH, Circuit Judge: Morris Warren, representing
himself, sued the District of Columbia under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
for constitutional violations he claims to have suffered while
incarcerated in a private prison in Youngstown, Ohio. The
Corrections Corporation of America operated the prison pur-
suant to a contract with the District. The issue is whether
the district court erred in dismissing the complaint for failure
to state a claim of municipal liability under Monell v. Dep’t of
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
On request, the clerk of the district court provides prison-
ers with a packet containing information on how to file a civil
rights complaint, as well as a complaint form. Warren ob-
tained a packet, completed the form in handwriting, and filed
it in the district court. The court dismissed his complaint,
but then granted him leave to amend, which Warren did using
another form. Under the headings ‘‘Statement of Claim’’ and
‘‘Relief,’’ Warren complained about the Youngstown facility
and what happened to him there and alleged that the District
of Columbia ‘‘knew or should have known’’ that he had been
mistreated. Warren’s five-page response to the District’s
motion to dismiss provided more detail.
It is often stated that pro se prisoner complaints should be
‘‘liberally construed.’’ E.g., Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S.
364, 365 (1982); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976);
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). But that does not
distinguish such complaints from any others. The general
rule, applicable in all cases, is ‘‘that the complaint will be
construed liberally on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.’’ 5A CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1357 (2d ed. 1987). In pro se prisoner cases,
courts frequently add—after noting the ‘‘liberal construction’’
3
rule—that the complaint should not be dismissed under Rule
12(b)(6) unless ‘‘it appears ‘beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would
entitle him to relief.’ ’’ Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 (quoting
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957)). But again this
is not unique for prisoner cases. It is the ‘‘accepted rule’’ in
every type of case. Conley, 355 U.S. at 45–46. Perhaps
courts are more forgiving in pro se prisoner cases because the
complaints are often handwritten; they may not follow formal
pleading conventions; and they may not draw fine lines
between the legally relevant and the legally irrelevant. For
example, in one such case, we derived the prisoner’s cause of
action not only from his formal complaint but also from other
papers he had filed. See Anyanwukatu v. Moore, 151 F.3d
1053, 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
Viewing Warren’s complaint and his response to the Dis-
trict’s motion to dismiss together, as did the district court, we
discern the following allegations: prison officials used com-
mon needles to draw blood from Warren and members of his
‘‘pod,’’ deprived him of medication for a month, locked him
down ‘‘for no apparent reason,’’ forced him to ‘‘lay [sic] on the
cold floor naked between 15 to 20 hours everyday [sic],’’
denied him ‘‘cell running water or toilet water [for] over 72
hours, weeks at a time,’’ sprayed tear gas ‘‘everyday [sic] in
the cells and pods,’’ and destroyed his property. Warren
alleges that, as a result of this mistreatment, he caught
pneumonia, suffered a mild stroke, and became infected by
‘‘yellow jaundice’’ (from the needle).
Warren claims the District ‘‘knew or should have known’’
about his mistreatment yet did not act to stop it. He
describes several ways in which the District learned or should
have learned about his situation: his own complaints to the
mayor and to Department of Corrections Director Odie
Washington, his wife’s telephone calls, newspaper articles
describing the mistreatment of prisoners at Youngstown, and
the activities of a contract monitor appointed pursuant to the
settlement of a class action brought by the Youngstown
prisoners against the District and the Corrections Corpora-
tion.
4
Under Monell, municipalities are liable for their agents’
constitutional torts only if the agents acted pursuant to
municipal policy or custom. 436 U.S. at 694. Respondeat
superior does not apply. Id. In order to state a claim
against a municipality, the plaintiff therefore must allege not
only a violation of his rights under the Constitution or federal
law, but also that the municipality’s custom or policy caused
the violation. See Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S.
115, 123–24 (1992); Baker v. District of Columbia, 326 F.3d
1302, 1306 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
The District argues that the district court properly dis-
missed the complaint because Warren failed to allege any
constitutional violations. The District never mentioned this
argument in the district court but thinks Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 476 n.6 (1970), allows a prevailing
party to defend the judgment on any ground. The law is
otherwise. The Supreme Court has entrusted to the discre-
tion of the courts of appeals the ‘‘matter of what questions
may be taken up and resolved for the first time on appeal.’’
Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121 (1976). In this court,
the general rule is that a prevailing party may defend the
judgment on any ground decided or raised below. See Rog-
ers v. District of Columbia, 194 F.3d 174 (D.C. Cir. 1999);
District of Columbia v. Air Florida, Inc., 750 F.2d 1077,
1084–85 (D.C. Cir. 1984). That too is the general rule in the
Supreme Court. See, e.g., Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg,
492 U.S. 33, 38–39 (1989). While we have discretion to
consider issues not presented to the district court, Roosevelt
v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 958 F.2d 416, 419 n.5 (D.C.
Cir. 1992), the District has offered us no good reason for
departing from our general rule. If on remand the District
continues to believe that Warren has not alleged constitution-
al violations, it may file an appropriate motion. Nothing we
say in this opinion resolves the issues the District wishes to
raise here for the first time.
This brings us to the question whether Warren sufficiently
alleged that a District custom or policy caused the claimed
violations of his constitutional rights. Causation would exist
if, for instance, the municipality or one of its policymakers
5
explicitly adopted the policy that was ‘‘the moving force of the
constitutional violation.’’ Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; see City of
St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 123–30 (1988). Or a
policymaker could knowingly ignore a practice that was con-
sistent enough to constitute custom. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at
130. Or the municipality may not have responded ‘‘to a need
TTT in such a manner as to show ‘deliberate indifference’ to
the risk that not addressing the need will result in constitu-
tional violations.’’ Baker, 326 F.3d at 1306 (citing Canton v.
Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989), and Daskalea v. District of
Columbia, 227 F.3d 433, 441 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).
Appointed counsel emphasizes the ‘‘deliberate indifference’’
theory of municipal liability. ‘‘Deliberate indifference,’’ we
wrote in Baker, 326 F.3d at 1306, ‘‘is determined by analyzing
whether the municipality knew or should have known of the
risk of constitutional violations,’’ but did not act. Although
this is an objective standard, it involves more than mere
negligence. It does not require the city to take reasonable
care to discover and prevent constitutional violations. It
simply means that, faced with actual or constructive knowl-
edge that its agents will probably violate constitutional rights,
the city may not adopt a policy of inaction. See Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 841 (1994) (describing the holding in
Canton).
Here Warren has alleged that the District ‘‘knew or should
have known’’ about the ongoing constitutional violations, but
did nothing. If Warren can prove the violations, and prove as
well that the District had actual or constructive knowledge of
them, he will have established the District’s liability. On a
motion to dismiss under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), the court
must assume the truth of all well-pleaded allegations. It
follows that Warren has stated a cause of action and that his
complaint should not have been dismissed.
The District objects that Warren failed to plead ‘‘facts’’
establishing knowledge by the District. The district court
said much the same: Warren’s ‘‘proffered evidence was not
sufficient to impute knowledge[.]’’ Warren v. District of
Columbia, Civ. No. 01–0349 (HHK), mem. op. at 4 n.4 (D.D.C.
6
Aug. 1, 2001). But at this stage of the litigation, Warren
needed only to supply ‘‘a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’’ FED. R.
CIV. P. 8(a), which he has done. See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v.
Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002); Leatherman v. Tarrant
County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S.
163 (1993). It is of no moment that Warren’s allegation of
actual or constructive knowledge on the part of the District
was conclusory. Many well-pleaded complaints are concluso-
ry. See generally 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1218 (2d ed.
1990). And while we do not have to accept conclusions of law
as true, conclusions of fact are another matter. For example,
in Taylor v. FDIC, 132 F.3d 753 (D.C. Cir. 1997), we found
that whistleblowers’ bare allegation that they ‘‘disclosed a
possible violation of law’’ was ‘‘a statement of material fact
that must be accepted as true for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.’’
Id. at 762. See also Krieger v. Fadley, 211 F.3d 134, 136
(D.C. Cir. 2000); Maljack Productions, Inc. v. Motion Pic-
ture Ass’n of Am., Inc., 52 F.3d 373, 376 (D.C. Cir. 1995). On
the other hand, in Tulare County v. Bush, 306 F.3d 1138
(D.C. Cir. 2002), we refused to accept as true plaintiffs’
allegation that the President’s creation of a national monu-
ment violated the Antiquities Act, a legal conclusion with
which we disagreed. See also Mountain States Legal Found.
v. Bush, 306 F.3d 1132 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Here we must
accept as true Warren’s factual statements, such as: ‘‘[T]hey
stuck the same needles in everybody’s arms to draw blood[.]’’
And we must also accept as true his allegation of constructive
knowledge because mixed questions of law and fact—such as
negligence and constructive knowledge—are treated like fac-
tual issues for the purposes of Rule 12(b)(6). See FED. R. CIV.
P. Form 9 (allowing conclusory allegation of negligence);
Blackmore v. Coleman, 701 F.2d 967, 970 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(negligence and constructive knowledge both mixed questions
of law and fact).
Our decision to reverse and remand leaves many issues
open: whether the mistreatment Warren alleges actually
occurred; whether the treatment that did occur violated his
constitutional rights; whether any or all of the incidents fall
7
within the scope of the settlement we mentioned earlier;
whether the District had actual or constructive notice of the
violations or whether Warren can establish municipal liability
under some other theory. We have nothing to say on these
issues. We hold only that the complaint should not have been
dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.
Reversed and remanded.