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United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued January 20, 2004 Decided August 17, 2004
No. 03-7057
JMM CORPORATION,
APPELLANT
v.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AND
D.C. DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS,
APPELLEES
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 02cv00406)
Jonathan L. Katz argued the cause and filed the briefs for
appellant.
Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.
The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out
of time.
2
Mary T. Connelly, Assistant Corporation Counsel, argued
the cause for appellees. With her on the brief was Edward
E. Schwab, Assistant Corporation Counsel.
Before: HENDERSON, RANDOLPH, and GARLAND, Circuit
Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.
GARLAND, Circuit Judge: JMM Corporation, the operator of
an adult video store in the District of Columbia, sued the
District in federal district court, alleging that its zoning
regulations for such establishments were unconstitutional. In
light of ongoing District of Columbia administrative and
judicial enforcement proceedings against JMM, the district
court dismissed the complaint under the abstention doctrine
of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). There is no doubt
that the dismissal was appropriate if the District of Columbia
is entitled to the benefit of that doctrine. We are therefore
required to decide whether Younger is applicable to the
District, a question this circuit has heretofore avoided.
JMM contends that, because the District of Columbia is not
a state, its enforcement actions do ‘‘not merit the same
protections’’ as would a state’s. Reply Br. at 2. Younger will
apply, the appellant insists, only ‘‘[i]f and when the District of
Columbia attains statehood.’’ Id. at 3. But the District does
not have to wait until that day. We hold that the enforce-
ment actions of the District of Columbia are entitled to the
same respect that the federal courts accord those of the
states, and therefore affirm the dismissal of JMM’s complaint.
I
JMM, doing business as ‘‘Fun Fair Video,’’ sells sexually
explicit videos and provides booths for their viewing. Fun
Fair is located in a ‘‘Community Business Center District’’ in
the District of Columbia, an area that is not designated for
‘‘sexually-oriented business establishments’’ (SOBEs) under
the District’s zoning regulations.1 Nor does Fun Fair have
the required certificate of occupancy to operate as a SOBE.
1 See generally D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 11, §§ 199.1, 720, 744.1,
754.1, 1700.1, 1706.4, 3203, 3205; id. tit. 12, § 118.4.
3
In 2000, the D.C. Department of Consumer and Regulatory
Affairs (DCRA) commenced the first of what became three
sets of administrative enforcement actions against JMM.
First, in April 2000, the DCRA issued JMM a notice of
infraction for operating without a proper certificate of occu-
pancy. In June 2000, the matter was heard by an Adminis-
trative Law Judge (ALJ) of the DCRA’s Office of Adjudica-
tion. On June 20, the ALJ found that, while JMM had
obtained a certificate of occupancy for a ‘‘video store not
sexually oriented’’ (a ‘‘non-SOBE’’), it was in fact operating a
SOBE in a zone that was not designated for such use. The
ALJ ordered JMM to cease doing business until it obtained a
proper certificate. Although JMM had the right to appeal
the ALJ’s order to the D.C. Board of Appeals and Review, see
D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 1, § 503, and from there to the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals, see D.C. CODE ANN. § 2–510, it
did not do so.
Nor did JMM cease doing business. Indeed, JMM contin-
ued to operate as a SOBE throughout the course of the
district court litigation, and is still doing so. It has not
relocated, applied for a SOBE license, or ceased its business
activities.
In September 2001, the DCRA issued a second set of
notices of infraction to JMM, again for operating without a
proper certificate. These, too, were heard before an ALJ.
On March 5, 2002, the ALJ again found the charges proven,
imposed fines, and ordered JMM to cease operations until it
obtained a proper certificate. This time, JMM did appeal to
the D.C. Board of Appeals and Review, where the matter is
currently pending.
Meanwhile, on February 27, 2002, the DCRA instituted its
third enforcement action, issuing notices of intent to revoke
JMM’s non-SOBE certificate of occupancy as well as its
mechanical amusement license. In October 2002, an ALJ
found in favor of the DCRA. JMM again appealed to the
Board of Appeals and Review, where that appeal also remains
pending.
4
On March 5, 2002—the day of the ALJ hearing on the 2001
infractions and a week after the DCRA issued its 2002
notices of revocation—JMM filed the instant action against
the District of Columbia and the DCRA in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia. JMM’s com-
plaint, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleged that the
District’s SOBE regulations violate the First, Fifth, and
Fourteenth Amendments because, inter alia, they are uncon-
stitutional content-based restrictions, and are vague and
overbroad. JMM sought money damages, an order declaring
the regulations unconstitutional, and an injunction against
their enforcement. JMM also sought a preliminary injunc-
tion barring all pending enforcement actions.
On May 15, 2002, the district court denied the preliminary
injunction, on the basis of the abstention doctrine of Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and the absence of a risk of
imminent irreparable injury. Mem. Op. & Order at 3 (D.D.C.
May 15, 2002). Two months later, on July 12, 2002, the
DCRA sued JMM in the Superior Court of the District of
Columbia to enforce the uncontested June 20, 2000 ALJ
decision that had ordered JMM to cease doing business. On
March 31, 2003, the district court dismissed all of JMM’s
claims for injunctive and declaratory relief based on Younger
abstention. At the same time, the district court stayed
JMM’s claims for money damages, pending JMM’s appeals of
the DCRA administrative enforcement orders and the Dis-
trict’s civil enforcement action in D.C. Superior Court. The
parties do not dispute that the stay was appropriate if the
Younger doctrine was properly applied. See Deakins v.
Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 202 (1988). JMM now appeals the
dismissal of its claims for injunctive and declaratory relief.2
II
In Younger v. Harris and its progeny, the Supreme Court
held that, except in extraordinary circumstances, a federal
court should not enjoin a pending state proceeding (including
2 We have jurisdiction to hear that appeal under the collateral
order doctrine. See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706,
712–15 (1996).
5
an administrative proceeding) that is judicial in nature and
involves important state interests. Ohio Civil Rights
Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 626–27
(1986); Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar
Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 431 (1982); Younger, 401 U.S. at 41.3
‘‘This Court has never decided,’’ however, ‘‘whether the Dis-
trict of Columbia is a state for Younger abstention purposes.’’
Bridges v. Kelly, 84 F.3d 470, 476 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
‘‘ ‘Instead, every time the question has arisen, we have as-
sumed that the doctrine applies to the District and nonethe-
less determined, in light of the facts of each particular case,
that Younger abstention has not been appropriate.’ ’’ Id.
(quoting LaShawn A. v. Kelly, 990 F.2d 1319, 1322 (D.C. Cir.
1993)).4 In this case, however, we cannot simply assume the
applicability of Younger abstention, because if applicable it
would be appropriate here. See infra Part III. Accordingly,
we must decide the question that this circuit has long avoided.
The Younger Court rested its abstention doctrine both on
‘‘equitable principles’’ and on ‘‘concerns for comity and feder-
alism.’’ Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n, 477 U.S. at 626–27; see
New Orleans Public Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans,
491 U.S. 350, 364 (1989); Huffman v. Pursue, 420 U.S. 592,
604 (1975); Younger, 401 U.S. at 43–44. We consider below
the applicability of each of these considerations to proceed-
ings brought by the District of Columbia.
A
The first source of the policy against federal interference
with state court proceedings identified by Younger was ‘‘the
3 The Court extended Younger to declaratory as well as injunc-
tive relief in Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 73 (1971).
4 See, e.g., District Properties Assocs. v. District of Columbia,
743 F.2d 21, 28 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Silverman v. Barry, 727 F.2d
1121, 1123 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Family Div. Trial Lawyers v.
Moultrie, 725 F.2d 695, 701 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Sullivan v.
Murphy, 478 F.2d 938, 962 n.35 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see also Handy v.
Shaw, Bransford, Veilleux & Roth, 325 F.3d 346, 352 n.7 (D.C. Cir.
2003).
6
basic doctrine of equity jurisprudence that courts of equity
should not act TTT when the moving party has an adequate
remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied
equitable relief.’’ Younger, 401 U.S. at 43–44, 46. In Trai-
nor v. Hernandez, the Court explained that these ‘‘two classic
preconditions for the exercise of equity jurisdiction’’—no ade-
quate remedy at law and irreparable injury—‘‘assumed new
dimensions’’ in Younger. 431 U.S. 434, 441 (1977). The
adequate remedy at law ‘‘inquiry was to be broadened to
focus on the remedies available in the pending state proceed-
ing’’ as compared to the federal action. Id. And the ‘‘other
precondition for equitable relief—irreparable injury—would
not be satisfied unless the threatened injury was both great
and immediate.’’ Id. at 442; see Younger, 401 U.S. at 48–49.
These two principles apply in full measure to District of
Columbia enforcement proceedings. First, the defendant in
District proceedings has an adequate remedy for its asserted
constitutional violations because it has ‘‘an opportunity to
raise [its] constitutional claims’’ as defenses, Younger, 401
U.S. at 49. Where the proceedings begin in Superior Court,
the defendant can raise any constitutional claims in that
court,5 appeal an adverse decision to the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals,6 and if still dissatisfied seek review in the
United States Supreme Court.7 Where the proceedings be-
gin at the administrative level, the defendant can appeal to
and make its constitutional challenges in the D.C. Court of
Appeals,8 and again seek further review in the Supreme
5 See D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 11–921, –923.
6 See D.C. CODE ANN. § 11–721.
7 See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a), (b).
8 See D.C. CODE ANN. § 2–510(a) (providing that any person
adversely affected or aggrieved by an agency decision ‘‘is entitled to
a judicial review thereof’’ in the D.C. Court of Appeals); id. § 2–
510(a)(1) (providing that the D.C. Court of Appeals’ authority to
review administrative agency proceedings includes the power ‘‘to
decide all relevant questions of law, to interpret constitutional and
statutory provisions, and to determine the meaning or applicability
of the terms of any action’’); see also id. § 11–722.
7
Court.9 Whether or not the defendant can also raise its
constitutional defenses at the administrative level, ‘‘it is suffi-
cient under [Younger] that constitutional claims may be
raised in state-court judicial review of the administrative
proceeding.’’ Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n, 477 U.S. at 629.10
Second, the defendant in a District proceeding will not
suffer irreparable injury by being foreclosed from obtaining
an injunction in federal court. As Trainor explained, the
burden of defending an enforcement action is ‘‘not sufficient
to warrant interference by the federal courts with legitimate
state efforts to enforce state laws; only extraordinary circum-
stances would suffice.’’ 431 U.S. at 442.11 Such extraordi-
nary circumstances include situations in which ‘‘there is a
showing of ‘bad faith’ or ‘harassment’ by state officials re-
sponsible for the prosecution,’’ or ‘‘where the state law to be
applied TTT is ‘flagrantly and patently violative of express
constitutional prohibitions.’ ’’ Id. at 443 n.7 (quoting Youn-
ger, 401 U.S. at 53–54). There is no reason why these factors
cannot be applied to District proceedings as readily as to
state proceedings, with injunctions being permitted only
where the appropriate showings are made. Accordingly,
there is nothing about the equity source of the Younger
9 See 28 U.S.C. § 1257.
10 As noted in Part III, it is well settled that Younger applies
‘‘to state administrative proceedings in which important state inter-
ests are vindicated, so long as in the course of those proceedings the
federal plaintiff would have a full and fair opportunity to litigate his
constitutional claim,’’ Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n, 477 U.S. at 627,
and the proceedings are ‘‘judicial in nature,’’ Middlesex, 457 U.S. at
433–34. Because these prerequisites demand a case-by-case deter-
mination of the appropriateness of applying Younger to a specific
District administrative proceeding, our holding is, of course, limited
to the specific proceedings before us—as to which the prerequisites
are satisfied.
11 Younger held this to be true even where a defendant levels a
facial First Amendment challenge against a regulation and contends
that its existence has a chilling effect on his free speech. See
Younger, 401 U.S. at 54; infra note 24.
8
doctrine that precludes its application to the District of
Columbia.
B
The second source of the Younger abstention doctrine—
identified as the ‘‘ ‘more vital consideration’ ’’—was ‘‘concerns
for comity and federalism.’’ Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n, 477
U.S. at 626–27 (quoting Younger, 401 U.S. at 44); see Quack-
enbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 723 (1996); New
Orleans, 491 U.S. at 364. Younger’s federalism concern does
not apply per se to the District of Columbia, because ‘‘[t]he
federal seat of government is constitutionally different from
the states,’’ Madley v. United States Parole Comm’n, 278
F.3d 1306, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 2002), and ‘‘the Superior Court is a
congressionally created court and, thus, ‘federal’ in its cre-
ation.’’ Handy v. Shaw, Bransford, Veilleux & Roth, 325
F.3d 346, 351 (D.C. Cir. 2003). But Younger’s larger concern
for comity—proper respect for a coordinate legal system—
plainly does apply.
As the Court explained in Huffman, Younger’s comity/fed-
eralism component requires courts to ‘‘abide by standards of
restraint that go well beyond those of private equity jurispru-
dence.’’ 420 U.S. at 603. Comity includes the concern that
‘‘interference with a state judicial proceeding prevents the
state TTT from effectuating its substantive policies,’’ id. at 604,
and ‘‘disrupt[s] the State’s efforts to protect interests which it
deems important,’’ id. at 608. ‘‘Such interference,’’ the Court
said, ‘‘also results in duplicative legal proceedings, and can
readily be interpreted as ‘reflecting negatively upon the state
courts’ ability to enforce constitutional principles.’ ’’ Id. at
604 (quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462 (1974)).
As we said in Family Division Trial Lawyers v. Moultrie,
‘‘[t]he only justification for federal court interference during a
state proceeding would be a premise that the state courts
cannot be trusted to adequately protect federal constitutional
rights, a premise unequivocally rejected by the Younger
court.’’ 725 F.2d 695, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
9
All of these comity concerns apply with equal force to the
District of Columbia. See generally id. Federal court inter-
ference with District enforcement proceedings may prevent
the District from effectuating its substantive policies and
disrupt its efforts to protect interests it regards as important.
It will certainly result in duplicative legal proceedings and
may be interpreted to reflect negatively on the District’s
ability to enforce constitutional principles. But just as with a
state, there is no reason to presume that the courts of the
District cannot be trusted to adequately protect federal con-
stitutional rights. To the contrary, ‘‘Congress has created a
trial and appellate court system of general jurisdiction for the
District separate from the United States courts (of which we
are a part) and intended to serve the District in much the
same manner as the court systems of the various states.’’
Madley, 278 F.3d at 1308.
In 1970, Congress reorganized the courts of the District of
Columbia pursuant to its authority under Article I, § 8, cl. 17
of the Constitution. See Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S.
389, 390–92 (1973); D.C. CODE ANN. § 11–101(2). Prior to
passage of the District of Columbia Court Reorganization Act
of 1970 (DCCRA),12 the local court system had limited juris-
diction, and the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia ‘‘had concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of
General Sessions [one of three local trial courts] over most of
the criminal and civil matters handled by that court.’’ 411
U.S. at 392 n.2 (citing D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 11–521 through 523
(1967)). The DCCRA transferred ‘‘all ‘local’ jurisdiction TTT
from the Federal courts to a new Superior Court of the
District of Columbia and the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals.’’ H.R. REP. NO. 91–907, at 23 (1970).13 A substantial
impetus for ‘‘the total transfer of local jurisdiction’’ out of the
federal courts into the reorganized local court system was the
‘‘overall problem of concurrent jurisdiction,’’ which had pro-
duced a ‘‘ping-pong’’ between the federal and local courts,
12 Pub. L. No. 91–358, tit. I, § 111, 84 Stat. 473, 475–521 (1970).
13 See D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 11–101, –721, –901, –921, –923.
10
particularly with respect to the ‘‘disposition of criminal mat-
ters.’’ Id. at 33.
Congress’ intent was to give the District ‘‘a court system
comparable to those of the states,’’ H.R. REP. NO. 91–907, at
23, one ‘‘separate and apart from the United States District
Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit,’’ id. at 5. In ‘‘constituting the lower trial
court as a purely local court, similar to a state court, it
follow[ed] that appeals from the local court should be treated
like those in the state systems, and that the channel of
appeals should be directly to the United States Supreme
Court.’’ Id. at 34–35. Thus, the reorganization made ‘‘the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals the highest local
court,’’ id. at 35, ‘‘similar to a state Supreme Court,’’ id. at 5,
and made its decisions reviewable by the United States
Supreme Court, id. at 35.14 The House Report stated that,
when the reorganization was complete, ‘‘the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia’’ would be ‘‘on a
par with other United States District Courts, exercising
federal jurisdiction only, and the Superior Court of the Dis-
trict of Columbia will have all purely local jurisdiction.’’ Id.
at 34.15
As both this court and the Supreme Court have noted,
‘‘from [the passage of the DCCRA] onward, the relationship
of the federal to the local judiciary was to be akin to that
historically existent in the states.’’ Steorts v. American
14 See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(b) (treating the D.C. Court of Appeals
as the ‘‘highest court of a state’’ for purposes of Supreme Court
review by certiorari); id. § 2113 (treating the D.C. Court of Ap-
peals as a ‘‘state court’’ and ‘‘the highest court of a state’’ for
purposes of other Supreme Court review provisions); see also D.C.
CODE ANN. § 11–102. In Huffman, a case that extended Younger
beyond state criminal proceedings, the Supreme Court put signifi-
cant weight on the availability of federal court review through
§ 1257 for ‘‘any federal claim properly asserted in and rejected by
state courts.’’ 420 U.S. at 605.
15 See also 28 U.S.C. § 1451 (treating the Superior Court as a
state court for purposes of removal jurisdiction).
11
Airlines, Inc., 647 F.2d 194, 196 (D.C. Cir. 1981).16 Accord-
ingly, ‘‘both our case law and other federal statutes treat the
D.C. courts like state courts.’’ Handy, 325 F.3d at 351 n.5.17
Indeed, it should not escape notice that the very statute upon
which JMM relies for its cause of action in this case, 42
U.S.C. § 1983, treats the District of Columbia as if it were a
state.18
16 See Key v. Doyle, 434 U.S. 59, 64 (1977) (‘‘The Aim of the
[DCCRA] was to establish ‘a Federal–State court system in the
District of Columbia analogous to court systems in the several
States.’ ’’) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 91–907, at 35); Palmore, 411 U.S.
at 392 n.2 (noting that the DCCRA ‘‘invested the local courts with
jurisdiction equivalent to that exercised by state courts’’).
17 See Madley, 278 F.3d at 1308 (treating a court of the District
as a state court for purposes of a petition for habeas corpus under
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)); United States v. District of Columbia, 669
F.2d at 741 & n.4 (treating the District as a state for purposes of
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1345); Steorts, 647 F.2d at 196–97
(holding that the substantive law of the forum controls in diversity
cases in the District as it does in a state); see also District of
Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983)
(holding that final determinations of the D.C. Court of Appeals, like
those of state courts, are reviewable only by the U.S. Supreme
Court); statutes cited supra notes 14, 15.
18 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (providing that ‘‘[e]very person who,
under color of any statute, ordinance, [or] regulation TTT of any
State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects TTT any
citizen of the United States TTT to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured’’) (emphasis added); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(d) (treating the District as a state for purposes of diversity
jurisdiction); id. § 1367(e) (treating the District as a state for
purposes of supplemental jurisdiction). The District has not, how-
ever, been treated as a state for all purposes. See, e.g., Palmore,
411 U.S. at 395 (holding that a statute of the District of Columbia
was not ‘‘a ‘statute of any state’ within the meaning of’’ then–28
U.S.C. § 1257(2), which defined the scope of Supreme Court review
by appeal (as distinct from certiorari)); District of Columbia v.
Carter, 409 U.S. 432 (1973) (holding that the District was not a state
for purposes of the pre–1979 version of 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
12
Moreover, this circuit has treated the District of Columbia
courts as state courts in the application of two other absten-
tion doctrines. One is Pullman abstention, which holds that
‘‘when a federal constitutional claim is premised on an unset-
tled question of state law, the federal court should stay its
hand in order to provide the state courts an opportunity to
settle the underlying state-law question and thus avoid the
possibility of unnecessarily deciding a constitutional ques-
tion.’’ Harris County Comm’rs Court v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77,
83 (1975) (citing Railroad Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S.
496 (1941)); see Justice v. Superior Ct. of District of Colum-
bia, 732 F.2d 949, 950 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (applying Pullman to
the District). Like Younger abstention, Pullman abstention
is based on considerations of both equity and comity.19 The
other abstention doctrine—known as Colorado River absten-
tion—permits discretionary abstention in light of parallel
proceedings in another court. See Colorado River Water
Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976).
In that context, we have reviewed ‘‘dismissal in favor of
parallel proceedings in Superior Court under the standard
applicable to a parallel state court proceeding,’’ see Handy,
325 F.3d at 351, rather than under the standard applicable to
a parallel proceeding in another federal district court, see id.
at 350.20 Finally, we note that the First Circuit has applied
19 See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 12 n.9 (1987)
(noting that ‘‘considerations similar to those that mandate Pullman
abstention are relevant to a court’s decision whether to abstain
under Younger’’); Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 177 (1959)
(noting that Pullman abstention ‘‘serves the policy of comity inher-
ent in the doctrine of abstention’’); Pullman, 312 U.S. at 501
(declaring that abstention is ‘‘appropriate to our federal system
whereby the federal courts, exercising a wise discretion, restrain
their authority because of scrupulous regard for the rightful inde-
pendence of the state governments and for the smooth working of
the federal judiciary’’) (internal quotation marks omitted).
20 See Reiman v. Smith, 12 F.3d 222, 223–25 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(applying Colorado River abstention analysis to parallel Superior
Court proceeding). In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v.
Mercury Construction Corp., the Court noted that Colorado River
13
Younger itself to Puerto Rico’s local court system and admin-
istrative proceedings, see, e.g., Maymo–Melendez v. Alvarez–
Ramirez, 364 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2004), which are entitled to no
greater comity than those of the District of Columbia.21
–––––––––––––––––––––––––
In sum, the general considerations of comity described in
the Younger line of cases apply with full force to the District
of Columbia. And while comity’s federalism component does
not apply per se, Congress has made clear that it intends
federal courts generally to treat the District of Columbia
judicial system as if it were a state system, an intent that this
circuit has long respected and effectuated. When these
considerations are combined with the fact that the other
source of the Younger doctrine—principles of equity jurispru-
dence—are also fully applicable to the District of Columbia,
the conclusion that this circuit should regard the District as a
state for purposes of Younger abstention is inescapable.
III
The remaining issue, the application of Younger to this
case, is straightforward and breaks no new ground. In
Younger, the plaintiff had been charged in state court with
violating the California Criminal Syndicalism Act. He then
filed a complaint in federal court alleging that the Act on its
face, and his prosecution thereunder, violated his First
Amendment right of free speech. A three-judge district
abstention ‘‘rest[s] not on considerations of state-federal comity, TTT
but on considerations of wise judicial administration, giving regard
to conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive disposition
of litigation.’’ 460 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1983) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
21 The Supreme Court has also applied Pullman abstention to
Puerto Rico. See Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 400 U.S. 41, 44 (1970)
(directing the district court to stay its decision regarding the
constitutionality of a Puerto Rico law until the Puerto Rico Supreme
Court was given an opportunity to construe it in a way that might
avoid constitutional infirmity).
14
court found the statute void for vagueness and overbreadth,
and enjoined the prosecution. 401 U.S. at 40. The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that federal courts should not enjoin
pending state criminal proceedings absent extraordinary cir-
cumstances. Id. at 40–41, 48–54. In Huffman, the Court
extended Younger to pending civil court proceedings in which
important state interests are involved. 420 U.S. at 604; see
Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n, 477 U.S. at 627.
Although the District did not file its Superior Court action
against JMM until two months after JMM filed its federal
complaint, Younger applies as long as the state proceedings
were initiated ‘‘ ‘before any proceedings of substance on the
merits have taken place in the federal court.’ ’’ Hawaii
Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 238 (1984) (quoting
Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 349 (1975)). The district
court correctly held that to be the case here, because the only
thing that had transpired before the filing of the Superior
Court action was the denial of JMM’s motion for a prelimi-
nary injunction on the basis of Younger and the absence of a
risk of imminent irreparable injury. See Middlesex County,
457 U.S. at 436–37 (holding that dismissal of a federal com-
plaint on Younger grounds, followed by an appeal on that
issue, were not proceedings on the merits such as to render
Younger inapplicable to a subsequent state court proceeding);
id. at 437 (noting that where ‘‘the sole issue [in the federal
action] has been whether abstention is appropriate,’’ there are
‘‘no federal proceedings on the merits [that] will be terminat-
ed by application of Younger principles’’).
Moreover, although the Superior Court action was not yet
pending at the time JMM filed its federal complaint, the
DCRA administrative proceedings were and had been for
some time. The Supreme Court has extended Younger to
pending administrative enforcement actions where the state
proceedings are judicial in nature and the state interests are
important. Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n, 477 U.S. at 626–27 &
n.2; Middlesex County, 457 U.S. at 432–34. Both are true
here. The Court has regarded administrative adjudications
15
like those undertaken by the ALJ and the Board of Appeals
and Review as judicial in nature.22 And it has also found that
the enforcement of zoning regulations, like those at issue
here, constitutes an important state interest.23 Indeed, in
observing that ‘‘lower courts have been virtually uniform in
holding that the Younger principle applies to pending state
administrative proceedings in which an important state inter-
est is involved,’’ the Supreme Court cited approvingly a
Seventh Circuit case dealing with a municipal zoning ordi-
nance that governed the licensing of motion picture theaters.
Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n, 477 U.S. at 627 n.2 (citing Grand-
co Corp. v. Rochford, 536 F.2d 197, 206 (7th Cir. 1975)); cf.
Huffman, 420 U.S. at 604, 608 (regarding as important the
state’s interest in civil litigation seeking to close a theater
that exhibited pornographic films).
22 See Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n, 477 U.S. at 627 & n.2 (finding
that an employment discrimination complaint filed in an administra-
tive proceeding by a state civil rights commission was judicial in
nature); Middlesex County, 457 U.S. at 433–34 (holding that bar
disciplinary proceedings were ‘‘judicial in nature’’); see also New
Orleans Pub. Serv., 491 U.S. at 370–71 (explaining that the ‘‘proper
characterization’’ of a proceeding ‘‘depends not upon the character
of the body but upon the character of the proceedings,’’ and holding
that ‘‘a judicial inquiry investigates, declares and enforces liabilities
as they stand on present or past facts and under laws supposed
already to exist,’’ while a legislative inquiry ‘‘looks to the future and
changes existing conditions by making a new rule to be applied
thereafter’’) (internal quotation marks omitted); id at 371 (holding
that ratemaking is ‘‘an essentially legislative act’’ and not a judicial
one).
23 See City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S.
425, 435–37 (2002) (upholding a zoning restriction against multiple
adult entertainment establishments in light of a substantial state
interest in reducing crime); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres,
Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 50 (1986) (upholding a zoning ordinance restrict-
ing the location of adult movie theaters because the ordinance was
connected to ‘‘a substantial government interest’’ in suppressing
secondary effects on the surrounding neighborhood, including
crime).
16
For Younger abstention to be appropriate in the face of
pending state proceedings, the federal plaintiff must ‘‘have a
full and fair opportunity to litigate’’ its constitutional claims in
those proceedings. Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n, 477 U.S. at
627; Trainor, 431 U.S. at 441. As discussed in Part II.A,
JMM will have the opportunity to assert all of its constitu-
tional claims as defenses in the Superior Court action. In-
deed, according to JMM’s own counsel, it has already done so.
See Status Hr’g Tr. at 7–10 (App. 17–20) (representation of
JMM’s counsel to the district court). And whether or not it
can do so in the administrative enforcement proceedings, an
issue the parties dispute, the results of those proceedings are
appealable to the D.C. Court of Appeals, where all of JMM’s
constitutional claims can also be heard. See supra Part
II.A.24
Finally, as also noted in Part II.A, we must consider
whether there are ‘‘extraordinary circumstances warranting
equitable relief.’’ Trainor, 431 U.S. at 446. These may exist
where ‘‘the pending state action was brought in bad faith or
for the purpose of harassing’’ the federal plaintiff, or ‘‘where a
state statute is flagrantly and patently’’ unconstitutional. Id.
24 JMM claims that its facial attacks on the constitutionality of
the zoning regulations cannot be heard on review of the DCRA
enforcement actions. But they plainly are defenses to those actions
and therefore can be heard on appeal. Nor does the fact that JMM
has added a facial First Amendment challenge to its attack on the
enforcement actions take its complaint outside the scope of Youn-
ger. See Huffman, 420 U.S. at 602 (noting that the Court has
‘‘unequivocally held that facial invalidity of a statute is not itself an
exceptional circumstance justifying federal interference with state
criminal proceedings’’); Younger, 401 U.S. at 50, 54 (holding that
neither a ‘‘chilling effect’’ nor ‘‘the possible unconstitutionality of a
statute on its face’’ justifies ‘‘an injunction against good-faith at-
tempts to enforce’’ a statute) (internal quotation marks omitted).
JMM further urges that, even if its general facial attacks can be
heard as a defense, one of its specific claims—that it cannot obtain a
SOBE for another location because there is no realistic process for
doing so—would not constitute an enforcement defense. We do not
see why that would be so, since this claim amounts to an allegation
that the District’s SOBE zoning system is a sham.
17
at 446–47 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Middlesex,
457 U.S. at 437; Younger, 401 U.S. at 53–54. But JMM
alleges no bad faith harassment here, nor does it contend that
the District’s zoning regulations meet the ‘‘flagrant and pat-
ently’’ unconstitutional threshold. Indeed, the latter would
be a particularly difficult case to make in light of Supreme
Court opinions upholding similar zoning restrictions against
First Amendment attack. See City of Los Angeles v. Alame-
da Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 439 (2002); City of Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 50 (1986).
To summarize: The ongoing District of Columbia proceed-
ings are judicial in nature and implicate important District
interests; those proceedings afford JMM an adequate oppor-
tunity to litigate its federal claims; and there are no extraor-
dinary circumstances warranting equitable relief. According-
ly, the criteria for application of the Younger doctrine have
been satisfied, and the district court’s dismissal of JMM’s
complaint was appropriate.
IV
We conclude that the District of Columbia is a state for
purposes of Younger abstention, and that such abstention is
warranted in this case. Accordingly, the judgment of the
district court is
affirmed.