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United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued April 7, 2005 Decided May 31, 2005
Reissued August 25, 2005
No. 03-3147
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
APPELLEE
v.
CHAKA TOURE HUTCHINSON,
APPELLANT
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 00cr00255-01)
A.J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender, argued the cause and
filed the briefs for appellant. William G. Spencer, Assistant
Federal Public Defender, entered an appearance.
Suzanne C. Nyland, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the
cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Kenneth L.
Wainstein, U.S. Attorney, John R. Fisher, Elizabeth Trosman,
and Patricia A. Heffernan, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.
2
Before: EDWARDS, ROGERS and GARLAND, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.
ROGERS, Circuit Judge: Chaka T. Hutchinson, who was
walking to a friend’s house after work, was stopped and
questioned by two police officers and a detective who were
investigating an assault that had occurred earlier in the evening.
According to the police, Hutchinson very closely fit a lookout
description for the assailant. As part of the investigative stop,
the police asked for and received identification from Hutchinson
and attempted to verify it through a computerized records check.
The issue on appeal is whether the retention of his identification
was related to the purpose of the stop or caused the stop to go on
for too long, thereby making illegal his subsequent arrest and the
search of his bag. United States v. Hutchinson, 268 F.3d 1117,
1123 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“Hutchinson I”). We conclude, in light
of the close match between the lookout description and
Hutchinson’s appearance, and the proximity in time and place
between the assault and the investigative stop, which reasonably
prompted concerns whether Hutchinson was the suspect for
whom the police were looking, that the district court did not err
in ruling that it was reasonable for the police to retain
Hutchinson’s proffered identification on site for two to five
minutes in order to attempt to verify his identification through
a computerized records check and allay the officers’ reasonable
articulable suspicion. Accordingly, because there was no Fourth
Amendment violation, we affirm the judgment of conviction.
I.
This case was twice remanded to the district court to make
findings of fact regarding the duration of the investigative stop,
specifically “whether retention of Hutchinson’s identification for
the purpose of running the ‘WALES’ [Washington Area Law
Enforcement System] check was related to the purpose of the
3
stop or caused the stop to go on for too long, thereby tainting the
evidence and statements obtained by the police after the
attempted ‘WALES’ check.” Hutchinson I, 268 F.3d at 1123.
In remanding the case a second time, the court stated that the
district court was “free to consider new evidence and to make
factual findings necessary to understand whether the information
available from the ‘WALES’ system could have assisted the
police in determining whether Hutchinson was the suspect
whom they were pursuing.” United States v. Hutchinson, No.
02-3038 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 27, 2002) (unpublished judgment). The
court reviews the district court’s determination of
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution de novo, and its findings of historical fact for
clear error. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699
(1996); United States v. Christian, 187 F.3d 663, 666 (D.C. Cir.
1999).
The relevant facts are as follows: Around midnight on July
27, 2000, the police broadcasted a “lookout” for a suspect to a
stabbing that had occurred between 11:30 p.m. and 11:45 p.m.
on 13th and Kenyon Streets, Northwest, Washington, D.C. An
eyewitness, who saw the stabbing from an elevated position
approximately fifty yards away, informed the police that the
perpetrator was a Black male in his twenties, 5'6" to 5'9" tall,
wearing dark clothes, with “a bush [hair style] which was pulled
back with a tie in the back.” Approximately an hour after the
stabbing occurred, the police stopped Hutchinson at 13th and
Monroe Streets, Northwest, approximately two to three blocks
from the scene of the stabbing. The officers first saw
Hutchinson walking east on Monroe Street, toward 13th Street,
wearing dark blue pants and a white shirt, and carrying a
shoulder bag; he was a Black male and had a bush hair style,
pulled back and tied. Detective Hilliard was “very surprised that
he . . . fit the lookout so closely,” observing that “the bush
pulled back into a tail was the very striking characteristic,”
4
although he appeared to be between 5'11" to 6' tall. See
Hutchinson I, 268 F.3d at 1118. Hutchinson does not claim that
the police lacked articulable suspicion to stop and question him.
Id. at 1120.
Following a pat-down by one of the officers, during which
nothing was found on Hutchinson, Detective Hilliard asked
Hutchinson about his whereabouts, to which Hutchinson
responded he had just left work and was on his way to a friend’s
house nearby, and for identification, which Hutchinson tendered.
Hutchinson does not claim that his rights were infringed when
the police asked for his identification, which he furnished
without protest. See id.
At this point, Detective Hilliard went to his police cruiser
to make notes on the identification and to run a computerized
records check. On his way, Detective Hilliard asked Hutchinson
if he would have a problem if he and Officer Diggs looked
through his bag. Hutchinson did not respond. While Detective
Hilliard “was comfortable that this wasn’t our suspect,” or
“d[id]n’t appear to be the guy that we’re looking for,” he also
realized that Hutchinson could have taken off a dark shirt and
put the weapon used in the stabbing in his bag. The Detective
remained in his cruiser for two to five minutes, but was unable
to use the “WALES” system. Returning to where Hutchinson
and the two officers were standing, Detective Hilliard asked if
Hutchinson had a problem with an officer looking in his bag.
Again Hutchinson did not reply, but began to remove the bag
from his shoulder. When Detective Hilliard asked Hutchinson
what was wrong, Hutchinson replied, “Well, you [are] going to
lock me up anyway.” Detective Hilliard asked if he had a
weapon in his bag, and Hutchinson said he had a gun.
On the second remand, the government introduced expert
evidence on the computerized records system, known as
5
“WALES.” “WALES” is a database maintained by the
Metropolitan Police Department that allows the police to input
local data and to communicate with other law enforcement
agencies nationwide. It contains criminal history information
regarding arrests, address information, physical description
(race, sex, date of birth, height, weight, any scars or markings),
police and correctional identification numbers, and warrant
information. It also contains motor vehicle information (driver’s
licenses, vehicle registrations, vehicle identification numbers),
social security numbers, aliases, fingerprint classifications,
warnings about particular persons, and attempts to locate both
missing cars and people. In addition, “WALES” interfaces with
several other law enforcement records systems, including the
National Law Enforcement Telecommunication System
(“NLETS”), which allows an exchange of information between
individual State databases and is maintained by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”); the Criminal Justice
Information System (“CJIS”), which contains arrest information
from the police district or central cell (jail); and the National
Crime Information Center (“NCIC”), which is maintained by the
FBI. Thus, an officer calling in for a “WALES” check, using a
given name, date of birth, or social security number would have
the benefit of the computer search of multiple files in the system
as a means of verifying information that has been provided. The
officer would also receive information indicating whether the
person is wanted by law enforcement authorities, the driver’s
license status, additional social security numbers or dates of
birth, aliases, and any cautionary information. The search itself,
from initiation of the name check to the dispatcher to a response
from the dispatcher as a result of the “WALES” and NCIC
inquiries, should “[o]rdinarily [take] no more than two to three
minutes.”
The district court concluded that the retention of
Hutchinson’s identification for the purpose of a “WALES”
6
check was related to the purpose of the stop and did not
unnecessarily lengthen the investigative stop. Given the
Detective’s “persistent doubt” whether Hutchinson was the
suspect for whom the police were looking, the district court
found that the officer would want to record the identification
information in a notebook for future reference. The district
court further found that because the “WALES” check “would
potentially help Detective Hilliard identify if [Hutchinson] were
the stabbing suspect, by finding out if [he] was being truthful
with the officers . . . the retention of [Hutchinson’s]
identification did not unnecessarily prolong the stop.”
Regarding the search of Hutchinson’s bag, the district court
concluded that “the short focused inquiry” was “reasonable
under the circumstances,” inasmuch as the Detective, although
“comfortable that this guy d[id]n’t appear to be the guy that
we’re looking for,” could not be certain without determining if
Hutchinson had a dark shirt in his bag.
II.
As the prior remands made clear, the only question is
whether it was reasonable for the police to retain Hutchinson’s
identification on site in order to attempt a “WALES” check and
thereby prolong the Terry stop for an additional two to five
minutes. Hutchinson I, 268 F.3d at 1123. During oral
argument, counsel for the United States repeatedly stated it did
not mean to suggest the police may run a “WALES” check
during every Terry stop. We, too, reject any such suggestion,
for the permissible scope and duration of a Terry stop
necessarily varies with the circumstances in each case. See, e.g.,
United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985). When,
measured in objective terms, an officer has good reason to doubt
the identity of a pedestrian who is properly detained based on
reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity, limited
further investigation related to the stop may be warranted to
verify the pedestrian’s identification.
7
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Supreme Court
upheld against a Fourth Amendment challenge a confrontation
on the street between a citizen and the police. The Court
observed that it “has always recognized”:
No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully
guarded, by the common law, than the right of every
individual to the possession and control of his own
person, free from all restraint or interference of others,
unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.
Id. at 9 (quoting Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250,
251 (1891)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Referencing “a
sensitive area of police activity,” id. at 9, involving “the power
of the police to ‘stop and frisk’ . . . suspicious persons,” id. at
10, and its precedent that “a search which is reasonable at its
inception may violate the Fourth Amendment by virtue of its
intolerable intensity and scope,” id. at 18 (citations omitted), the
Court in Terry observed “[t]he scope of the search must be
‘strictly tied to and justified by’ the circumstances which
rendered its initiation permissible,” id. at 19 (citations omitted).
Thus, “an investigative detention must be temporary and last no
longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.”
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499 (1983) (plurality opinion);
see also id. at 510-11 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment);
see Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40 (1984); United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881-82 (1975); cf.
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 701 (1981). More recently,
the Supreme Court in Sharpe advised that:
In assessing whether a detention is too long in duration
to be justified as an investigative stop, we consider it
appropriate to examine whether the police diligently
pursued a means of investigation that was likely to
confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during
8
which time it was necessary to detain the [suspect].
470 U.S. at 686.
Hutchinson’s principal claim of error on appeal stems from
the district court’s rejection of his argument that information
from “WALES” would have shed no light on whether he was the
stabbing suspect, and thus retention of his identification was
unrelated to the purpose of the stop. As he would have it,
“[n]othing about the WALES evidence introduced at the second
remand hearing has, or could have had, any bearing on whether
[he] was hiding a dark shirt and/or knife in his bag.” Br. for
Appellant at 30. Nor, in his view, does “WALES” evidence
bear on whether he was being truthful with the officers, because
the government introduced no evidence relating to Hutchinson’s
proffered identification that could be tested for truthfulness. For
the following reasons, we conclude Hutchinson’s challenge to
the extension of time for an investigative technique misses the
mark. We hold that, taken together, the following three factors
show that Hutchinson’s Fourth Amendments rights were not
violated.
First, the purpose of the attempted “WALES” check was
closely tied to the Detective’s uncertainty about whether
Hutchinson was the stabbing suspect for whom the police were
looking. As the district court found,“the value of a WALES
check lies, at least in part, in its ability to indicate whether an
individual is providing false information to police. This in turn
could ‘dispel suspicion,’or alternatively, suggest to the officers
that they should investigate further.” See Sharpe, 470 U.S. at
686. By confirming that Hutchinson either was or was not
providing false identification information to the police, a
“WALES” check ultimately could assist Detective Hilliard in
evaluating whether or not Hutchinson was the stabbing suspect.
The district court noted that Hutchinson “did not dispute expert
9
testimony that a WALES check could verify that the person is
who they say they are.” Regardless of the type of identification
Hutchinson tendered, then, Hutchinson is in no position to argue
now that a “WALES” check would be unhelpful to the police in
resolving their uncertainty about whether he was the stabbing
suspect. While he is correct that information from “WALES”
would not tell the police whether he had a dark shirt in his bag,
if he was being untruthful about his identification, the police
would have reason not to take at face value his explanation of
his whereabouts and to continue their investigation of him as the
stabbing suspect. On the other hand, if his identity were
confirmed, the police could “concentrate their efforts
elsewhere,” Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 124 S. Ct. 2451,
2458 (2004), and he could be on his way.
Second, the description of the assailant in the lookout
closely matched Hutchinson’s appearance, and he was stopped
only two or three blocks from the scene of the crime, less than
an hour after the stabbing. Notwithstanding the Detective’s
statement that he was pretty much satisfied that Hutchinson was
not the stabbing suspect for whom they were looking, it was not
unreasonable for the Detective to attempt to resolve his lingering
uncertainty quickly through a “WALES” check to verify
Hutchinson’s identification. This uncertainty was reasonably
prompted by the close match between Hutchinson’s appearance
and the lookout report, his proximity to the crime scene both
temporally and geographically, and the Detective’s concern that
Hutchinson might have taken off a dark shirt.
Third, the stop was relatively brief, minimally intrusive, see
Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 685, and was not prolonged for the purpose
of making a generalized inquiry, such as whether there were
outstanding warrants for the suspect, unrelated to the stop. The
district court emphasized that “the entire stop was a very swift
exercise between the time Detective Hilliard took [the tendered]
10
identification and the time [Hutchinson] indicated he had a
weapon in his bag.” The time taken to make notes on the
tendered identification and to attempt a “WALES” check took
between two to five minutes; the government’s expert testified
that a “WALES” check ordinarily would take no more than two
to three minutes. The time taken for the “WALES” attempt
occurred in the context of the Detective’s uncertainty in view of
Hutchinson’s close match to the lookout. While it is true that
before returning Hutchinson’s identification, the Detective asked
a second time whether Hutchinson would allow a search of his
bag, Hutchinson began removing the bag from his shoulder, and
after a few follow-up questions acknowledged that he had a gun
in his bag. The Detective’s inquiry at this point was hardly
surprising given that he was unable to confirm the validity of
Hutchinson’s identification through “WALES” and still was
uncertain whether Hutchinson was the lookout suspect and,
more specifically about whether he might have a dark shirt or
the weapon used in the stabbing in his bag; this uncertainty was
heightened when Hutchinson did not respond for a second time
to the request to search his bag.
Under the circumstances, the police acted diligently to
dispel their reasonable articulable suspicions quickly through a
“WALES” check and brief, focused questioning, see Sharpe,
470 U.S. at 686, and consequently the seizure of Hutchinson’s
identification “last[ed] no longer than [wa]s necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the stop.” Royer, 460 U.S. at 500
(plurality opinion); see also id. at 510-11 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in the judgment). Accordingly, because there was no
Fourth Amendment violation, we affirm the judgment of
conviction.