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United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued February 24, 2005 Decided June 10, 2005
No. 04-5157
MARIAN K. HANSSON
APPELLANT
v.
GALE A. NORTON, SECRETARY,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
APPELLEE
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 02cv02028)
David C. Vladeck argued the cause and filed the briefs for
appellant.
Marina U. Braswell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the
cause for appellee. With her on the briefs were Kenneth L.
Wainstein, U.S. Attorney, and Michael J. Ryan, Assistant U.S.
Attorney. R. Craig Lawrence entered an appearance.
2
John A. Payton and Paul R. Wolfson were on the brief for
amicus curiae NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund,
Inc. in support of appellant.
Before: EDWARDS, ROGERS and GARLAND, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.
ROGERS, Circuit Judge: Marion Hansson seeks to recover
$37,077.94 in attorney’s fees that she incurred in settling her
administrative complaints against the Bureau of Indian Affairs
(“BIA”) in the Department of the Interior for discrimination on
the basis of her national origin and age in violation of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
(2000), and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (2000). When the Secretary
of the Interior awarded only one-fourth of the requested
attorney’s fees, Hansson filed suit in the district court, alleging
that the Secretary’s final fee award violated Title VII, Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) regulations,
and the parties’ settlement agreement. The district court granted
the Secretary’s motion to dismiss the complaint, ruling that it
lacked subject matter jurisdiction under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(f)(3).
Upon de novo review, see Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 360 F.3d
188, 190-91 (D.C. Cir. 2004), we hold that the district court
lacked jurisdiction over Hansson’s complaint because it was a
contract claim against the United States for more than $10,000,
over which the Court of Federal Claims has exclusive
jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2000).
This court generally treats settlement agreements as contracts
subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Federal
Claims, see Shaffer v. Veneman, 325 F.3d 370, 372 (D.C. Cir.
2003), and the court recently held in Brown v. United States, 389
3
F.3d 1296, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 2004), that a claim for breach of a
Title VII settlement agreement is a contract claim within the
meaning of the Tucker Act. Because Hansson’s claim for
attorney’s fees neither requires an interpretation of Title VII
with respect to her discrimination complaint nor seeks equitable
relief, it involves “only straightforward contract issues” that
belong in the Court of Federal Claims. Shaffer, 325 F.3d at 373.
Accordingly, we vacate the opinion and judgment of the district
court and remand the case to the district court with instructions
to transfer the case to the Court of Federal Claims. See 28
U.S.C. § 1631 (2000).
I.
Marian Hansson, “an American of Kiowa (American
Indian) origin” who is over sixty years of age, is employed by
the BIA as a curator of American Indian art. Compl. ¶ 2, at 2.
In November 2001, she retained the law firm of Gebhardt &
Associates, LLP (“Gebhardt”), to file several administrative
complaints with the BIA alleging employment discrimination on
the basis of her national origin and age. On June 28, 2002, the
BIA executed a Resolution Agreement granting Hansson
substantially all of the relief sought in her complaints, including
“reasonable attorney’s fees and costs” in accordance with the
EEOC regulations at 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e) (2004).
Resolution Agreement ¶ 8m, at 8. In exchange, Hansson agreed
to withdraw all pending and potential discrimination complaints
against the BIA, through the date of the Resolution Agreement.
Id. ¶ 5, at 3. The settlement agreement provided that “should the
Agency fail to honor its obligations as set forth in this
Resolution Agreement for any reason not attributed to acts or
conduct by the Complainant, the provisions outlined in 29
C.F.R. § 1614.504 shall govern.” Id. ¶ 11, at 9.
In accordance with the Resolution Agreement, Gebhardt
submitted to the BIA a statement of its fees and costs associated
4
with its representation of Hansson, totaling $37,077.94. By
letter of September 12, 2002, the Director of the Office for
Equal Opportunity (“OEO”) for the Department of the Interior
awarded Gebhardt $8,959.44, explaining that the law firm was
not entitled to fees for pre-complaint services or for services
related to Hansson’s age discrimination claim. The OEO letter
also stated that this was the agency’s final decision regarding
Hansson’s claim for attorney’s fees and costs, and that she could
appeal the decision to the EEOC within 30 days or, “[i]n lieu of
an appeal to the Commission, [she could] file a civil action in an
appropriate United States District Court” within 90 days,
naming the Secretary of the Interior as the defendant.
On October 16, 2002, Hansson sued the Secretary in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia,
alleging that the final decision to award less than one-fourth of
the requested attorney’s fees was arbitrary, capricious, and in
violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k),1 the EEOC
regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e), and the Resolution
Agreement. She sought recovery of the $37,077.94 in attorney’s
fees incurred in settling her administrative complaints — the
same amount her attorney requested pursuant to the Resolution
Agreement — plus reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred
in maintaining this action. The Secretary moved to dismiss the
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Title VII
and for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and Hansson
cross-moved for summary judgment. The district court granted
the Secretary’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, and Hansson appeals.
1
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) provides that “[i]n any action or
proceeding under this subchapter the court, in its discretion, may allow
the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee . . . as part of the
costs.”
5
II.
In dismissing Hansson’s complaint, the district court ruled
that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), which grants jurisdiction over
“actions brought under” Title VII, does not extend to actions
brought solely to recover attorney’s fees incurred during Title
VII administrative proceedings. It relied on North Carolina
Department of Transportation v. Crest Street Community
Council, Inc., 479 U.S. 6 (1986), which held that 42 U.S.C. §
1988 does not authorize courts to award attorney’s fees in
actions brought solely to recover attorney’s fees incurred during
Title VI administrative proceedings. Id. at 15. On appeal,
Hansson contends that her case is governed by New York
Gaslight Club v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54 (1980), which stated that
Title VII’s “authorization of a civil suit in federal court
encompasses a suit solely to obtain an award of attorney’s fees
for legal work done in state and local proceedings.” Id. at 66.
She maintains that the district court erred in relying on Crest
Street because the language and structure of Title VI are
different from that of Title VII: first, § 1988 authorizes an award
of attorney’s fees in “actions or proceedings to enforce” Title
VI, while § 2000e-5(k) authorizes an award of attorney’s fees
for any “action or proceeding under” Title VII, and second,
administrative proceedings are voluntary under Title VI, while
they are mandatory under Title VII.
In supplemental briefs on appeal the parties addressed two
issues: first, whether Hansson was a “prevailing party” within
the meaning of § 2000e-5(k) in light of the court’s recent
decision in Alegria v. District of Columbia, 391 F.3d 262 (D.C.
Cir. 2004), which applied Buckhannon Board & Care Home,
Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human
Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001), to the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. (2000); and
second, whether the district court had jurisdiction over
Hansson’s claim for attorney’s fees in light of the court’s recent
6
decision in Brown, 333 F.3d 1296. The court expresses
appreciation to the parties for this assistance. We now conclude
that Hansson’s claim for attorney’s fees is a contract claim that
belongs in the Court of Federal Claims, and we do not reach the
question whether Title VII authorizes an award of attorney’s
fees in an action brought solely to recover attorney’s fees or the
question whether Hansson is a “prevailing party.”
Although Hansson maintains on appeal that her complaint
raises a Title VII claim for attorney’s fees and not a contract
claim to enforce the Resolution Agreement, the record indicates
otherwise. Hansson’s complaint seeks “relief for harm caused
to her by [the Agency’s] unlawful refusal to comply with the
Resolution Agreement . . . in that the Agency has without
justification refused to pay reasonable attorney’s fees.” Compl.
¶ 1, at 1. Specifically, the complaint alleges three “causes of
action”: first, that the Secretary’s final fee award “is arbitrary,
capricious, and unsupported by law, in violation of 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(k) and 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e)”; second, that it
“violates the Resolution Agreement signed by [Hansson] and the
BIA”; and third, that it “constitutes an improper deferral of
decision-making authority from the BIA to the Office of the
Secretary.” Id. ¶¶ 14-16, at 4. Hansson’s complaint does not
allege that the denial of her requested attorney’s fees violated
Title VII because it was discriminatory; nor does she seek
redetermination of her original discrimination claims. Cf. Scott
v. Johanns, No. 04-5267 (D.C. Cir. June 3, 2005). On appeal,
Hansson relies primarily on the first cause of action, which
appears to invoke this court’s authority under the Administrative
Procedure Act to review final agency actions. See 5 U.S.C. §
704 (2000). Such review is precluded, however, if there is
another “adequate remedy in a court,” id., or if “any other
statute,” such as the Tucker Act, “expressly or impliedly forbids
the relief which is sought,” id. § 702, in what is “essentially a
contract action,” Albrecht v. Comm. on Employee Benefits, 357
7
F.3d 62, 68 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
Moreover, while Hansson claims she has the right to bring
an independent Title VII action for attorney’s fees, any such
action would be waived by her execution of the Resolution
Agreement and could not be pursued until it was reinstated
pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.504(a), or until there was a
determination that the Secretary had breached the Agreement.
See, e.g., Brown, 389 F.3d at 1297; Saksenasingh v. Sec’y of
Educ., 126 F.3d 347, 350 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Contrary to
Hansson’s suggestion, nothing in the Resolution Agreement
preserves Hansson’s right to bring a Title VII action for
attorney’s fees in district court pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.407
if the parties disagree on the amount of fees.2 The Resolution
Agreement states that Hansson “will receive no relief or other
consideration beyond that recited in this Resolution Agreement.”
Resolution Agreement ¶ 6, at 4. While Hansson points to the
EEOC regulations incorporated by the Resolution Agreement,
those regulations provide only administrative procedures for
contesting the final fee award. The Resolution Agreement states
that “[t]he Agency shall pay reasonable attorney’s fees and costs
. . . in accordance with the EEOC regulations at 29 C.F.R. §
1614.501(e).” Id. ¶ 8m, at 8. Those regulations provide that the
final fee award “shall include a notice of right to appeal to
EEOC,” 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e), not that Hansson retains the
2
Title VII provides that any federal employee “aggrieved by
the [agency’s] final disposition of his [or her] [discrimination]
complaint . . . may file a civil action as provided in section 2000e-5 of
this title.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c). The EEOC regulations at 29
C.F.R. § 1614.407 explain that a complainant “is authorized under
[T]itle VII . . . to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court . . . [w]ithin 90 days of receipt of the final action on an
individual or class complaint if no appeal has been filed [with the
EEOC].”
8
right to bring a Title VII action for attorney’s fees in district
court pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.407.
The Resolution Agreement also states that “should the
Agency fail to honor its obligations as set forth in this
Resolution Agreement . . . the provisions outlined in 29 C.F.R.
§ 1614.504 shall govern.” Resolution Agreement ¶ 11, at 9.
Those provisions provide:
If the complainant believes that the agency has failed
to comply with the terms of a settlement agreement or
decision, the complainant shall notify the EEO
Director, in writing, of the alleged noncompliance
within 30 days of when the complainant knew or
should have known of the alleged noncompliance. The
complainant may request that the terms of the
settlement agreement be specifically implemented or,
alternatively, that the complaint be reinstated for
further processing from the point processing ceased.
29 C.F.R. § 1614.504(a).
As the Secretary points out, Hansson failed to notify the EEO
Director of any alleged breach of the Resolution Agreement.
Furthermore, 29 C.F.R. § 1614.504 does not authorize Hansson
to file a Title VII action in district court, for it provides only that
her complaint may be “reinstated for further processing at the
point processing ceased,” which, for Hansson, was in the
administrative process.
Nor, contrary to Hansson’s contention, did the OEO letter
of September 12, 2002 contemplate the preservation of a Title
VII action for attorney’s fees: while advising Hansson that she
could file a civil action in district court in lieu of appealing the
Secretary’s final fee award to the EEOC, it did not indicate that
9
Hansson could bring a Title VII action for attorney’s fees that
was otherwise waived by her execution of the Resolution
Agreement. Rather, the portion of the OEO letter on which
Hansson relies appears to be boilerplate language paraphrasing
29 C.F.R. § 1614.407, which was not incorporated by the
Resolution Agreement. Thus, nothing in the Resolution
Agreement or the OEO letter preserves Hansson’s right to file
a Title VII action for attorney’s fees in district court.
Accordingly, Hansson’s claim “turns entirely on the terms of a
contract,” and appears to belong in the Court of Federal Claims.
Albrecht, 357 F.3d at 69.
While the court generally treats settlement agreements as
contracts within the meaning of the Tucker Act, see Shaffer, 325
F.3d at 372, it also recognizes that when a settlement agreement
incorporates substantive provisions of federal law such that
enforcement of the agreement requires the interpretation and
application of federal law, that enforcement action arises under
federal law and belongs in the district court. See id. at 372-73;
Bd. of Trustees v. Madison Hotel, Inc., 97 F.3d 1479, 1484-86
(D.C. Cir. 1999). Here, the Resolution Agreement incorporates
29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e), which describes the familiar lodestar
method for calculating attorney’s fees:
The starting point shall be the number of hours
reasonably expended multiplied by a reasonable hourly
rate. There is a strong presumption that this amount
represents the reasonable fee. In limited circum-
stances, this amount may be reduced or increased in
consideration of the degree of success, quality of
representation, and long delay caused by the agency.
29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e)(2)(ii)(B); see Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461
U.S. 424 (1983). Hansson acknowledges that the “reasonable
hourly rate” is guided by the Laffey matrix prepared by the U.S.
10
Attorney’s Office. See Covington v. District of Columbia, 57
F.3d 1101, 1105-11 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citing Laffey v. Northwest
Airlines, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 354 (D.D.C. 1983), rev’d on other
grounds 746 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). Enforcement of the
Resolution Agreement’s provision for reasonable attorney’s
fees, then, does not require interpretation of the substantive
provisions of Title VII with respect to Hansson’s discrimination
complaints, but only the application of well-known standards for
determining reasonable attorney’s fees. To the extent that
Hansson also seeks attorney’s fees for services related to her age
discrimination claim under the ADEA, that determination does
not involve an interpretation of Title VII, which she
acknowledges is the only basis for her claim for attorney’s fees,
as she has not asserted a claim for fees under the ADEA itself.
Hansson’s vague policy objection that the Court of Federal
Claims is not a “national court” like the district court is
unavailing in light of our precedent.
Hansson points out that the Court of Federal Claims “has
consistently held that it lacks jurisdiction to hear claims alleging
the breach of a Title VII settlement agreement due to the
comprehensive statutory scheme established under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act.” Griswold v. United States, 61 Fed. Cl.
458, 465 (2004); see Lee v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 374, 378-
79 (1995); Fausto v. United States, 16 Cl. Ct. 750, 753 (1989).
These cases can all be distinguished, however, on the ground
that they involved claims for equitable relief that the Court of
Claims lacked jurisdiction to grant. See Griswold, 61 Fed. Cl.
at 460; Lee, 33 Fed. Cl. at 376-77; Fausto, 16 Fed. Cl. at 751.
We are unaware of any case in which the Court of Federal
Claims has denied jurisdiction over an action to enforce a Title
VII settlement agreement in which only money relief is sought.
The cases cited by Hansson in her supplemental brief that
involve annual and sick leave and back pay are not to the
contrary. See Taylor v. United States, 54 Fed. Cl. 423, 423
11
(2002); Mitchell v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 437, 438 (1999).
The Federal Circuit appears to agree with the Court of
Federal Claims’ precedent that “the Court of Federal Claims
lacks jurisdiction ‘over actions for breach of settlement
agreements when the agreements ar[i]se from disputes which
would have been litigated in other fora.’” Massie v. United
States, 166 F.3d 1184, 1188 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (alteration in
original); cf. St. Vincent’s Med. Ctr. v. United States, 32 F.3d
548, 550 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Medicare Act); Chin v. United States,
890 F.2d 1143, 1146 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (Postal Reform Act). It
also appears to agree with this court’s precedent that the Court
of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction under the Tucker Act only
if “disposition of the contract claim would require review of
subject matter reserved to another body,” Massie, 166 F.3d at
1189; cf. Bobula v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 970 F.2d 854, 858
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (Civil Service Reform Act). In holding that the
Court of Federal Claims had jurisdiction over a claim for an
annuity under the comprehensive remedial scheme of the
Military Claims Act (“MCA”), the Federal Circuit distinguished
between “review of the substantive issues of the MCA claim —
the existence and extent of the government’s liability” — and
the enforcement of “an express contract embodying” the
claimant’s entitlement to the annuity under the MCA. Massie,
166 F.3d at 1189. This jurisdictional line is analogous to that
drawn by this court in Brown, 389 F.3d at 1296, Shaffer, 725
F.3d at 373, and Madison Hotel, 97 F.3d at 1485. Finally, the
Court of Federal Claims has acknowledged our decision in
Brown, see Boston Edison Co. v. United States, 64 Fed. Cl. 167,
178 (2005), and the Secretary affirmatively stated in briefing
that Hansson’s claim is one in contract within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims and through counsel
represented to the court during oral argument that, contrary to
the government’s position in other cases, see, e.g., Massie, 166
F.3d at 1188; Griswold, 61 Fed. Cl. at 461, the government
12
would not argue in the Court of Federal Claims that that court
lacks jurisdiction over Hansson’s claim for attorney’s fees.
Therefore, this court has no reason to conclude that the Court of
Federal Claims will not accept jurisdiction over Hansson’s
claim. Cf. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486
U.S. 808, 818-19 (1988).
Because Hansson’s claim for attorney’s fees neither
requires an interpretation of Title VII with respect to her
discrimination complaint nor seeks equitable relief under Title
VII, but rather seeks reasonable attorney’s fees defined by well-
established standards, it is a contract claim against the United
States for more than $10,000. Under Shaffer and Brown,
Hansson’s claim for attorney’s fees is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims under the Tucker
Act. Accordingly, we hold that the district court lacked
jurisdiction over Hansson’s complaint, and we vacate the
opinion and judgment of the district court and remand the case
to the district court with instructions to transfer the case to the
Court of Federal Claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1631.