Blackman v. District of Columbia

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 14, 2006 Decided July 21, 2006

No. 04-7139

MARY ANN BLACKMAN, MIKEISHA BLACKMAN,
BY HER MOTHER AND FRIEND, ET AL.,
APPELLEES

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, ET AL.,
APPELLANTS

No. 04-7144

DORA CHAVEZ, IN HER OWN RIGHT
AND AS PARENT AND NEXT FRIEND OF ERIK CHAVEZ,
APPELLEE

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ET AL.
APPELLANTS

No. 04-7145

CHAWNTAVIA WATKINS, A MINOR,
BY HER LEGAL CUSTODIANS AND NEXT FRIENDS
ETHEL AND JOSEPH HARDEN, ET AL.,
 2

APPELLEES

v.

CLIFFORD B. JANEY, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY
CEO/SUPERINTENDENT, D.C. PUBLIC SCHOOLS;
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION,
APPELLANTS

No. 04-7147

DE’MITRIA RICE, A MINOR,
BY HER MOTHER ALICIA RICE, NEXT FRIEND, ETC. ,
APPELLEES

v.

CLIFFORD B. JANEY, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY,
CEO/SUPERINTENDENT, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
PUBLIC SCHOOLS; DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
APPELLANTS

Appeals from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 00cv00330)
(No. 97cv01629)
(No. 98cv03036)
(No. 98cv03081)

Mary L. Wilson, Assistant Attorney General, District of
Columbia, argued the cause for the appellants. Robert J.
Spagnoletti, Attorney General and Edward E. Schwab, Deputy
 3

Attorney General, District of Columbia, were on brief.

Donna L. Wulkan and Daniel C. Lewis argued the cause for
the appellees. Alan I. Horowitz, Steven R. Dixon, Elizabeth T.
Jester and Tilman L. Gerald were on brief.

Before: HENDERSON and GARLAND, Circuit Judges, and
EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Riders to
appropriations acts the Congress enacts for the District of
Columbia (District) limit the amount of attorney’s fees a party
may collect from the District after prevailing in a suit “under the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act” (IDEA), 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1400 et seq. The appellees1 brought suit against the District

1
We review three district court orders: Blackman v. District of
Columbia, 328 F. Supp. 2d 36 (D.D.C. 2004), Chavez v. District of
Columbia, 328 F. Supp. 2d 21 (D.D.C. 2004), and Watkins v. Vance,
328 F. Supp. 2d 27 (D.D.C. 2004), in which order the district court
granted the attorney’s fees petitions in both Watkins v. Vance, No. 98-
cv-3081 and Rice v. Vance, No. 00-cv-0330. Notices of appeal were
filed in all four cases. Between the district court orders and the
notices of appeal, Clifford Janey replaced Paul Vance as
CEO/Superintendent of the District of Columbia Public Schools and
as defendant in Watkins v. Vance (now Watkins v. Janey) and Rice v.
Vance (now Rice v. Janey). We sua sponte consolidated for briefing
and argument these appeals: Blackman v. District of Columbia, No.
04-7139, Chavez v. District of Columbia, No. 04-7144, Watkins v.
Janey, No. 04-7145, and Rice v. Janey, No. 04-7147. A reference to
“appellees” includes all of the appellees in this consolidated appeal.
A reference to “Blackman appellees” or “Chavez appellees” includes
only the individual appellees in the designated order. A reference to
“Watkins appellees” includes the individual appellees in the Watkins
 4

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce the IDEA’s guarantee of a
free appropriate public education. In three separate orders, the
district court awarded them attorney’s fees above the limits the
rider imposed. The District appeals all three orders. Because
the district court did not properly certify as final two of the
orders, we lack jurisdiction over those two. Regarding the third
order, we agree with the District’s argument that an action
brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce IDEA rights is
a suit “under” the IDEA and thus subject to the rider.
Accordingly, we reverse the district court as to that order and
remand.
I.
In response to “the growth in legal expenses and litigation
associated with special education in the District of Columbia
and the usurping of resources from education to pay attorney
fees,” H.R. Rep. No. 105-670, at 50 (1998), the Congress
attached a rider, section 130, to the Omnibus Consolidated and
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999, limiting
the amount of fees the District could pay to prevailing parties in
IDEA cases, see Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277,
§ 130, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998) (section 130). Specifically, section
130 prohibited any funds appropriated in the 1999
Appropriations Act from being used by the District to pay fees
to any attorney prevailing against the DCPS in an action “under
the [IDEA]” above the amount specified therein.2 Id. The

order and the Rice order. A reference to the “District” as defendant
includes superintendent Janey as defendant as well. See infra p. 4.
2
In its entirety, section 130 provides:
None of the funds contained in this Act may be made
available to pay the fees of an attorney who represents a party
who prevails in an action, including an administrative
 5

Congress attached virtually identical riders to subsequent
appropriations acts for 2000, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006.3
See Transportation, Treasury, Housing and Urban Development,
the Judiciary, the District of Columbia, and Independent
Agencies Appropriations Act, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-115, § 122,
119 Stat. 2396, 2519 (2005); District of Columbia
Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-335, § 327, 118 Stat.
1322, 1344 (2004); Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub.
L. No. 108-199, § 432, 118 Stat. 3, 141 (2004); Consolidated
Appropriations Resolution, 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-7, § 144, 117
Stat. 11, 131–32 (2003); District of Columbia Appropriations
Act, 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-522, § 122, 114 Stat. 2440, 2464
(2000); Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2000, Pub. L.
No. 106-113, § 129, 113 Stat. 1501, 1517 (1999).4

proceeding, brought against the District of Columbia Public
Schools under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(20 U.S.C. [§§] 1400 et seq.) if--
(1) the hourly rate of compensation of the attorney
exceeds [$50]; or
(2) the maximum amount of compensation of the
attorney exceeds [$1,300], except that compensation
and reimbursement in excess of such maximum may
be approved for extended or complex representation
in accordance with section 11-2604(c), District of
Columbia Code.
Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations
Act, 1999 § 130.
3
The rider to the 2002 Appropriations Act, Section 140(a) of the
District of Columbia Appropriations Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-96,
115 Stat. 923 (2001), is discussed infra p. 5–6.
4
Hereafter, a reference to “section 130” includes the analogous
provisions in the 2000, 2001, 2003, 2004 and 2005 appropriations
 6

In Calloway v. District of Columbia, 216 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir.
2000), we first interpreted the section 130 language.5 In that
case, the District argued that section 130 prohibited the court
from awarding fees above the cap. Id. at 9. We rejected the
argument, finding that the rider only prohibited the District from
paying attorney’s fees greater than the prescribed amount but
had no effect on the district court’s authority to award higher
fees. Under our Calloway holding, if the Congress should
someday lift the fees cap provision, a prevailing party could then
seek the unpaid fees above the cap nunc pro tunc. Id. at 9–11.
Following Calloway, the Congress changed the statutory
language in the 2002 District of Columbia Appropriations Act,
section 140(a) of which provides:
Notwithstanding 20 U.S.C. 1415, 42 U.S.C. 1988, 29
U.S.C. 794a, or any other law, none of the funds
appropriated under this Act, or in appropriations Acts
for subsequent fiscal years, may be made available to
pay attorneys’ fees accrued prior to the effective date
of this Act that exceeds [sic] a cap imposed on
attorneys’ fees by prior appropriations Acts that were
in effect during the fiscal year when the work was
performed, or when payment was requested for work
previously performed, in an action or proceeding
brought against the District of Columbia Public
Schools under the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (20 U.S.C. [§§] 1400 et seq.).
District of Columbia Appropriations Act, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-
96, § 140(a), 115 Stat. 923, 958 (2001) (Section 140(a)).

acts.
5
We also considered the fees cap provisions in Petties v. District
of Columbia, 227 F.3d 469 (D.C. Cir. 2000), and Kaseman v. District
of Columbia, 444 F.3d 637 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
 7

The appellees instituted four separate section 1983 actions
against the District, Blackman v. District of Columbia, No. 97-
cv-1629, Chavez v. District of Columbia, No. 98-cv-3036,
Watkins v. Vance, No. 98-cv-3081, and Rice v. Vance, No. 00-
cv-0330, which the district court consolidated with other
pending section 1983 class actions.6 The district court

6
Because the appellees were either “prevailing parties” at the
administrative level or had reached private agreements with the DCPS,
they had no IDEA cause of action. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)
(limiting IDEA cause of action to “[a]ny party aggrieved . . . .”). They
therefore instituted actions against the District under section 1983
alleging a “deprivation of . . . rights . . . secured by the . . . laws,” 42
U.S.C. § 1983—to wit, the IDEA’s guarantee of the right to a free
appropriate public education (FAPE). We have not yet decided
whether a section 1983 action can be brought to enforce the FAPE
right. In Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984), the plaintiffs
pursued a section 1983 claim, alleging that the school district had
discriminated against their child based on his handicapped condition
in violation of the equal protection clause. Their equal protection
claim was brought pursuant to section 1983 and was “virtually
identical to” one cognizable under the IDEA’s predecessor, the
Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA). Id. at 1009. The United
States Supreme Court held that the EHA’s comprehensive remedies
demonstrated the Congress’s intent that a FAPE claim be pursued
solely through the EHA. Accordingly, the plaintiffs could not
maintain a section 1983 action and the Court reversed the grant of
attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. It expressly declined,
however, to address “a situation where the EHA is not available.” 468
U.S. at 1021. In Robinson v. Pinderhughes, 810 F.2d 1270, 1271 (4th
Cir. 1987), the Fourth Circuit subsequently held that certain parties
could maintain a section 1983 action to enforce an EHA claim. There,
the plaintiffs, like the appellees here, prevailed at the administrative
level but faced a school district that refused to implement the
administrative decision. The court held that the EHA lacked an
enforcement mechanism to secure the right the plaintiffs had won at
the administrative level and thus the plaintiffs could enforce that right
 8

consolidated two of the actions, which were class actions,
Blackman v. District of Columbia, No. 97-cv-1629, and Jones v.
District of Columbia, No. 97-cv-2402, to form one class with
two subclasses, only one of which, the Jones subclass, is
applicable here:
[A]ll children, now and in the future, who are entitled
to have DCPS provide them with a free appropriate
public education [FAPE] and who have been denied
same because DCPS either (a) has failed to fully and
timely implement the determinations of hearing
officers, or (b) failed to fully and timely implement
agreements concerning a child’s identification,
evaluation, educational placement, or provision of
FAPE that DCPS has negotiated with the child’s parent
or educational advocate.
Blackman v. District of Columbia, 328 F. Supp. 2d 36, 39
(D.D.C. 2004) (second alteration in original). The court
consolidated Chavez with Blackman and Jones on March 19,
1999, see Chavez v. District of Columbia, No. 98-cv-3036
(D.D.C. March 19, 1999); Watkins on February 17, 1999, see
Watkins v. Vance, No. 98-cv-3081 (D.D.C. Feb. 17, 1999); and
Rice on February 29, 2000, see Rice v. Vance, No. 00-cv-330
(Feb. 29, 2000).7 All appellees are members of the Jones
subclass.
On June 3, 1998, the district court granted partial summary

via section 1983. Because none of the parties addresses the issue here,
we save it for another day and assume, without deciding, that the
appellees’ section 1983 actions are cognizable.
7
The Blackman appellees are parties to Blackman v. District of
Columbia but after Blackman’s consolidation with Jones and the class
certification, they became members of the Jones subclass. See
Blackman, 328 F. Supp. 2d at 37.
 9

judgment to the appellees on the liability issue. The court
nonetheless declined to grant class-wide preliminary injunctive
relief, believing that where “irreparable injury was threatened
absent some action by the District, the District would not ignore
its obligation to take such action [to remedy violations] even
absent resolution of the claims of the class as a whole.”
Blackman v. District of Columbia, 185 F.R.D. 4, 5 (D.D.C.
1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). By 2000, however,
the district court was dissatisfied with the District’s lack of
response and therefore appointed a special master to assist it in
handling individual preliminary injunction motions.
The appellees then moved for attorney’s fees under section
1988(b). Section 1988(b) provides that “the court, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United
States, a reasonable attorney’s fee” in a section 1983 action. 42
U.S.C. § 1988(b). Before moving for attorney’s fees, the Chavez
and Watkins appellees had sought and obtained preliminary
injunctive relief. The district court awarded fees to the Chavez
and Watkins appellees based on the relief they obtained. See
Chavez v. District of Columbia, No. 98-cv-3036 (D.D.C. March
31, 2000). The Blackman appellees, by contrast, did not obtain
preliminary injunctive relief but instead had earlier reached
private agreements with the DCPS, which the DCPS then failed
to honor. After the district court appointed the special master,
the Blackman appellees sought a preliminary injunction to
require the DCPS to comply with the respective agreements.
Before the special master acted, the Blackman appellees reached
new agreements with the DCPS, whereby the latter agreed to
implement the original agreements. The special master
therefore recommended to the court that their motions for
preliminary injunctions be denied and the district court agreed.
See Blackman, 328 F. Supp. 2d at 40. The Blackman appellees
then sought attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). The
District argued that the Blackman appellees were not “prevailing
parties” within the meaning of section 1988(b) because they had
 10

neither obtained a favorable ruling at the administrative level
nor obtained injunctive relief from the district court, citing the
Supreme Court’s decision in Buckhannon Board & Care Home,
Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human
Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001). The district court disagreed,
concluding that the Blackman appellees “sought and achieved a
remedy for defendants’ ongoing violations of the IDEA. Such
an effort to secure a remedy through Court-established
procedures is—and must be—inextricably intertwined with the
Court’s conclusion that the violation existed in the first
instance.” Blackman, 328 F. Supp. 2d at 44–45.
The District argued in all four actions (Chavez, Watkins,
Rice and Blackman) that section 130 (or section 140(a)) capped
the attorney’s fees the District could pay them but the district
court rejected its argument. With regard to section 130, the
court held that the language “under the [IDEA]” did not apply
to the appellees’ suits which were brought under section 1983,
not the IDEA. The district court similarly interpreted section
140(a), finding that “[b]y its plain meaning, the restrictions of
Section 140(a) (2002) apply only to cases brought under the
IDEA itself. To interpret this provision to preclude awards in
connection with substantive Section 1983 claims would render
the language in the final portion of the sentence incomplete
because there is no reference to actions brought under Section
1983.” Watkins, 328 F. Supp. 2d at 35; see Blackman, 328 F.
Supp. 2d at 43 n.3; Chavez, 328 F. Supp. 2d at 22. The court
also rejected the District’s argument that the court’s
interpretation would render section 140(a)’s opening
proviso—“Notwithstanding 20 U.S.C. 1415, 42 U.S.C. 1988, 29
U.S.C. 794a, or any other law” (emphasis added)—superfluous.
See Blackman, 328 F. Supp. 2d at 43 n.3; Chavez, 328 F. Supp.
2d at 23; Watkins, 328 F. Supp.2d at 34–36. The court gave two
reasons for its construction. First, “the provision still prevents
parties from using other statutes, including Section 1988, to
collect the IDEA attorneys’ fees awarded for counsel’s pre-
 11

Section 140 (2002) efforts by courts under Calloway but that
remain unpaid because of the statutory cap.” Watkins, 328 F.
Supp. 2d at 35. And second, it “prevents plaintiffs from filing
a separate Section 1983 action seeking payment for such past
attorneys’ fees awarded under the IDEA in the event the
statutory cap is ever dissolved.” Id.
The District appeals all three orders, arguing that section
130 and section 140(a) limit the amount of attorney’s fees the
appellees can recover because a section 1983 action to enforce
the FAPE right provided by the IDEA amounts to an action
“under the [IDEA].” It appeals the Blackman order on the
additional ground that the Blackman appellees are not
“prevailing parties.”
II.
In this consolidated appeal, the District raises three “merits”
issues: (1) whether section 130 limits the attorney’s fees the
District may pay to all appellees;8 (2) whether section 140(a)
limits the attorney’s fees the District may pay to all of the
appellees; and (3) whether the Blackman appellees are
“prevailing part[ies]” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §
1988(b). Our review of these issues of statutory construction is
de novo. See, e.g., Calloway, 216 F.3d at 5 (citing United States
v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490, 512 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
A.
Although neither side contests our jurisdiction, “it is well
established that a court of appeals must first satisfy itself of its
own jurisdiction, sua sponte if necessary, before proceeding to
the merits.” Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc. v.

8
To repeat, all appellees include the Blackman appellees, the
Watkins appellees (including the Rice appellees) and the Chavez
appellees. See supra note 1.
 12

Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 917 F.2d 48, 53 (D.C. Cir. 1990),
aff’d, 501 U.S. 252 (1991). Our jurisdiction, if it exists, arises
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which “generally extends only to final
district court orders,” Outlaw v. Airtech Air Conditioning &
Heating, Inc., 412 F.3d 156, 159 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (citing DSMC
Inc. v. Convera Corp., 349 F.3d 679, 682 (D.C. Cir. 2003))
(emphasis added); that is, orders that dispose of an entire case
both as to parties and issues. See Haynesworth v. Miller, 820
F.2d 1245, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Nevertheless, if the case
involves “more than one claim for relief” or “multiple parties,”
the district court “may direct the entry of a final judgment as to
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties”; the
court may do so, however, “only upon an express determination
that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express
direction for the entry of judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
All three orders—Chavez, Watkins, and Blackman—are
nonfinal because they do not dispose of all of the claims of all
of the parties in the consolidated class action.9 Our jurisdiction,

9
Chavez involved only one plaintiff—Dora Chavez, in her own
right and as parent and next friend of Erik Chavez. See Chavez, No.
98-cv-3036 docket report. Rice involved two plaintiffs—De’Mitria
Rice by her parent and next friend Alicia Rice and Alicia Rice in her
own right. Rice, No. 00-cv-330 docket report. The Watkins order
resolved the only remaining issues in that action. See Watkins, 328 F.
Supp. 2d at 30 n.1. The orders in these cases thus could be considered
final orders if they had retained their separate identities after their
consolidation with Blackman and Jones. To determine whether
consolidated cases retain their separate identity or become one case for
the purpose of appellate jurisdiction, we “focus on the reasons for the
consolidation.” United States ex rel. Hampton v. Columbia/HCA
Healthcare Corp., 318 F.3d 214, 216 (D.C. Cir. 2003). That is, “when
a district court consolidates cases and treats them as such ‘for all
purposes,’ an order deciding fewer than all the claims of all the parties
cannot be appealed without a Rule 54(b) certification.” Id. (quoting
Phillips v. Heine, 984 F.2d 489, 490 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (internal
 13

accordingly, turns on whether the district court properly certified
these orders for appeal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
54(b). We review each order to assure that the district court
made (1) “an express determination that there is no just reason
for delay” and (2) “an express direction for the entry of
judgment.” Id. (emphasis added). The Blackman order states
only “MINUTE ORDER granting defendants’ renewed motion
for expedited certification of order under Federal Rule 54(b).”
Blackman, No. 97-cv-1692, slip op. at 1 (D.D.C. Jan. 25, 2005).
The Watkins order provides that “this Order constitutes a final
appealable Order.” Watkins, 328 F. Supp. 2d at 35. We believe
that both the Blackman and Watkins orders are facially deficient.
In Building Industry Association of Superior California v.
Babbitt, 161 F.3d 740, 743 (D.C. Cir. 1998), we held that the
“express direction and determination is a bright-line
requirement” that prohibits us from “imply[ing] a Rule 54(b)
determination.” The mandate of Rule 54(b) is plain and without
exception. Cf. Everett v. U.S. Airways Group, Inc., 132 F.3d
770, 773 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“[A]bsent an express direction for
entry of judgment, an order that disposes of less than all the
claims—no matter with what firmness and apparent finality—is
not appealable . . . .” (internal quotations omitted)). While the
Blackman and Watkins orders can be construed to contain an
“express direction,” see Blackman, No. 97-cv-1692, at 1 (D.D.C.

quotation marks omitted)). After consolidating the actions here, the
district court “treat[ed] them as such for all purposes,” id. (internal
quotations marks omitted), including through the remedy phase, see
Blackman v. District of Columbia, 2006 WL 679906 (D.D.C. March
17, 2006). Accordingly, they “cannot be appealed without a Rule
54(b) certification.” Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 318 F.3d at
216. The Blackman order is nonfinal for a different reason—it
resolved the claims of only three—Diane Blackwell, Dionne Timmons
and Victoria Harris—of more than 150 plaintiffs and therefore did not
dispose of all claims for all parties.
 14

Jan. 25, 2005) (“ORDER granting defendants’ renewed
motion . . . under Federal Rule 54(b)); Watkins, 328 F. Supp. 2d
at 36 (“[T]his Order constitutes a final appealable Order.”),
neither contains an “express determination that there is no just
reason for delay” and under our precedent we cannot imply one.
See Bldg. Indus. Ass’n of Super. Cal., 161 F.3d at 743–44; see
also Granack v. Continental Cas. Co., 977 F.2d 1143, 1144-45
(7th Cir. 1992) (order described as “Final Appealable Judgment
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b)” insufficient);
Auriemma v. City of Chicago, 906 F.2d 312, 313 (7th Cir. 1990)
(order purporting to be “final and appealable” insufficient).
Despite the clarity of Rule 54(b) and our precedent, at oral
argument the parties argued that so long as it is apparent or
discernible from the record that “there is no just reason for
delay,” the Building Industry holding does not require that the
order contain an “express determination.” Not so. We held in
Building Industry that the district court need not express its
reasoning behind an “express declaration” so long as the
reasoning is apparent or discernible from the record. Bldg.
Indus. Ass’n of Superior Cal., 161 F.3d at 744 (“Where the
district court’s reasoning is apparent to us, or discernible from
other parts of the record, we would perhaps find literal
compliance with the Rule quite sufficient.” (emphasis added)).
On the other hand, even if the record indicates no just reason for
delay, an order is not final under Rule 54(b) unless it contains
the “express determination” thereof. See Granack, 977 F.2d at
1145 (“A court’s intention to enter an express determination [ ]
is irrelevant absent an express determination.” (internal
quotation omitted)). Neither the Blackman order nor the
Watkins order meets Rule 54(b)’s “bright-line requirement” and
we are therefore without jurisdiction to review them.
In contrast, the Chavez order provides in part: “Order
finally deciding the attorney’s fees claims by these plaintiffs;
and there being no just reason for delaying an appeal, it is . . .
 15

ORDERED, that the Order constitutes a final, appealable
judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).” Chavez v. District of
Columbia, No. 98-cv-3036 (D.D.C. Dec. 2, 2004) (emphasis
added). It therefore contains the requisite “express direction”
and “express determination.” Moreover, we can discern the
court’s rationale for its “express determination” from the record.
See Mem. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. for Expedited Certification of
Order under Federal Rule 54(b); see also Chavez, 328 F. Supp.
2d. 21. Accordingly, we have jurisdiction over the Chavez
appeal.
B.
The sole merits issue before us, then, is whether section
140(a) limits the amount of attorney’s fees the District can pay
to the Chavez appellees.10 This issue is one of statutory
construction and, as noted, our review is de novo. We start with
the plain meaning of the text, looking to the “ ‘language itself,
the specific context in which that language is used, and the
broader context of the statute as a whole.’ ” United States v.
Barnes, 295 F.3d 1354, 1359 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997)). If the
language has a “ ‘plain and unambiguous meaning,’ our inquiry
ends so long as the resulting ‘statutory scheme is coherent and
consistent.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Wilson, 290 F.3d 347,
352 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting Robinson, 519 U.S. at 340
(internal quotations omitted))). We agree with the District that
the plain meaning of the phrase “an action or proceeding . . .
under the [IDEA],” in the context of section 140(a) as a whole,
includes not only an action alleging the IDEA as its statutory
basis but also a section 1983 action brought to enforce the FAPE

10
Section 140(a) applies not only to funds appropriated in the 2002
Appropriations Act but also to “appropriations Acts for subsequent
fiscal years.” For this reason, we need not reach the District’s section
130 argument.
 16

right granted by the IDEA.
As the Supreme Court has noted, the word “under” has
many dictionary definitions and we draw its meaning from the
context of the statute before us. Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129,
135 (1991). Both the High Court and this court have interpreted
a provision analogous to the one before us. In Ardestani, the
Court interpreted the attorney’s fees provision of the Equal
Access to Justice Act (EAJA). The EAJA requires a court to
award fees to a party prevailing in “an adjudication under
section 554” of the APA. See 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1), (b)(1)(C)(i).
The Court decided that “the most natural reading of the EAJA’s
applicability to adjudications ‘under section 554’ is that those
proceedings must be ‘subject to’ or ‘governed by’ § 554.”
Ardestani, 502 U.S. at 135. The Court also approvingly cited
this court’s decision interpreting the same phrase. Id. Our
decision in St. Louis Fuel & Supply Co. v. FERC, 890 F.2d 446
(D.C. Cir. 1989), held that the term “under,” as used in the
EAJA’s attorney’s fees provision, “means ‘subject [or pursuant]
to’ or ‘by reason of the authority of.’ ” Id. at 450 (alteration in
original); see also D.C. Hosp. Ass’n. v. District of Columbia,
224 F.3d 776, 779 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“ ‘Under’ is defined as
‘required by[,] in accordance with[, or] bound by.’ ” (quoting
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2487 (1981)
(alteration in original)).
The appellees maintain that the district court correctly
determined that section 140(a)’s applicability to actions “under
the [IDEA]” means that attorney’s fees are subject to the cap
only if the IDEA is the explicit statutory basis of the plaintiff’s
cause of action. Appellees’ Br. 32–33 (“Even with the addition
of the ‘notwithstanding’ clause to Section 140, Section 140 does
not cap the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees any more than Section 130
caps those fees: both sections cap attorneys’ fees only in actions
‘brought under’ the IDEA. Section 140(a) means that when
claims are ‘brought under’ the IDEA, the District is not
 17

authorized to pay attorneys’ fees above the fee caps,
‘notwithstanding’ other statutes that authorize awards and
payments of attorneys’ fees.”). We agree that such an action is
plainly brought “under the [IDEA].” But we do not agree that
the plain meaning of “under” precludes the applicability of
section 140(a) to an action using section 1983 to enforce the
IDEA’s FAPE right. Section 1983 is not the source of
substantive rights but rather “a method for vindicating federal
rights elsewhere conferred.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137,
144 n.3 (1979). The Chavez appellees’ section 1983 action
sought to vindicate rights conferred by the IDEA. Their action
is “governed by” and “subject to” the IDEA because, in the
absence of the IDEA, the appellees would have no federal right
to vindicate. At the very least, as we articulated in St. Louis
Fuel & Supply Co., their action was brought “pursuant to” or
“by reason of the authority of” the IDEA. 890 F.2d at 450.
Moreover, any ambiguity in the phrase “under the [IDEA]”
is resolved by the opening proviso of section 140(a). Section
140(a) begins, “Notwithstanding 20 U.S.C. 1415 [the IDEA
attorney’s fees provision], 42 U.S.C. 1988 [the section 1983
attorney’s fees provision], 29 U.S.C. 794a [the Rehabilitation
Act attorney’s fees provision], or any other law” (emphasis
added). By expressly referencing the attorney’s fees provisions
not only of the IDEA but also of section 1983 and of the
Rehabilitation Act, the Congress intended the cap to apply to
attorney’s fees incurred in enforcing the IDEA’s
guarantee—namely, the guarantee of a free appropriate public
education—irrespective of the statutory basis alleged in the
complaint. Were we to read the “under the [IDEA]” language
as applying only to an action labeled an IDEA action, see 20
U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2), the proviso would be nullified contrary to
the canon of construction that “[a] statute should be construed
so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be
inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.” Hibbs v.
Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004) (quoting 2A N. Singer, Statutes
 18

and Statutory Construction § 46.06, pp. 181–86 (rev. 6th ed.
2000) (alteration added)).
In an unconvincing attempt to save their interpretation of
the statute—that the cap applies only to an IDEA action
denominated as such—the Chavez appellees urge two alternative
constructions of the beginning proviso. First, they contend that
the proviso responds to our holding in Calloway that section 130
does not limit the amount of attorney’s fees the court may award
but only the District’s authority to pay them in an amount above
the cap. Appellees’ Br. 31. But the proviso in no way affects
the Calloway holding. Rather, the Congress dealt with that issue
by making section 140(a)’s cap permanent. Section 140(a)
prevents funds appropriated in the 2002 Appropriations Act “or
in appropriations Acts for subsequent fiscal years” from being
used to pay fees above the cap. If the proviso meant what the
appellees claim, there would have been no need to make section
140(a)’s limitation applicable to “appropriations Acts for
subsequent fiscal years.”
The Chavez appellees also argue that the proviso was
intended to prevent the District from paying unpaid fees if the
Congress in the future were to eliminate the cap and those
plaintiffs with unpaid fees capped in earlier years were to bring
a section 1983 action to collect the unpaid amount. Appellees’
Br. 32. This construction is also unavailing. The appellees’
argument does not give meaning to the entire proviso. It utterly
fails to address the language referring to the Rehabilitation Act’s
attorney’s fees provision and to “any other law.” The appellees
do not argue—nor could they—that the Rehabilitation Act
attorney’s fees provision would allow them to collect attorney’s
fees if the Congress were to lift the cap. Rather, the cap applies
to a section 1983 action, a Rehabilitation Act action or any other
action to enforce the right to a free appropriate public education
“under the [IDEA].”
For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss the appeals in
 19

Blackman v. District of Columbia, No. 04-7139, Watkins v.
Janey, No. 04-7145, and Rice v. Janey, No. 04-7147. The order
of the district court in Chavez v. District of Columbia, 328 F.
Supp. 2d 21, is vacated and remanded to the district court for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.