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United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued January 16, 2007 Decided March 9, 2007
No. 05-5454
VANESSA BAILEY,
APPELLANT
v.
JOHN E. POTTER, POSTMASTER GENERAL OF THE UNITED
STATES POSTAL SERVICE,
APPELLEE
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 98cv02224)
Michael J. Kator argued the cause and filed the briefs for
appellant. Irving Kator entered an appearance.
Heather Graham-Oliver, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued
the cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Jeffrey A.
Taylor, U.S. Attorney, and Michael J. Ryan, Assistant U.S.
Attorney. R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered
an appearance.
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Before: ROGERS, GARLAND and BROWN, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.
ROGERS, Circuit Judge: This is an appeal from the denial,
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, of motions to enforce a
settlement agreement. We hold that because the district court
did not dismiss the underlying complaint in accordance with
FED. R. CIV. P. 58(a), the district court retained jurisdiction over
the motions to enforce the settlement agreement. Accordingly,
we reverse and remand the case to the district court.
I.
On September 17, 1998, Vanessa Bailey sued the Postal
Service pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1974, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29
U.S.C. § 794, alleging discrimination based on race, sex, and
psychological handicap. On July 9, 2001, during jury selection,
the parties informed the district court that they had settled their
dispute. Under the terms of the settlement, the Postal Service
would pay Bailey $285,000 and Bailey would resign from her
position with the Postal Service within 60 days. The district
court accepted the settlement terms and stated: “The terms of
the settlement agreement have been put forward on the record,
the offer and acceptance. With that, the case will be dismissed.”
No separate order dismissing the case, however, was ever filed
and entered on the docket.
On September 28, 2001, Bailey filed a motion for
enforcement of the settlement agreement. The district court
referred the motion to a magistrate judge on January 30, 2002.
After various proceedings before the magistrate judge, he
referred the case to mediation, which failed. On September 26,
2005, after four years had passed, the district court ruled, sua
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sponte without briefing from the parties, that it lacked
jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement and denied
Bailey’s (by now several) motions for enforcement. The district
court cited Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375
(1994), which holds that, at least where settlement was not
incorporated into the order of dismissal or there was not an
independent statutory basis for jurisdiction, the district courts
had no inherent power to enforce a settlement agreement. Id. at
381-82. Upon ruling that ancillary jurisdiction would not serve
the same purpose, as settlement agreements generally required
their own source of jurisdiction, the district court suggested that
Bailey might invoke diversity jurisdiction and move for
reconsideration or seek relief in the District of Columbia courts.
Again, no separate order dismissing the case was filed and
entered on the docket. Bailey appeals and our review is de novo.
See Loughlin v. United States, 393 F.3d 155, 162 (D.C. Cir.
2004).
II.
This court has jurisdiction, under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, of “all
final decisions of the district courts of the United States.” 28
U.S.C. § 1291. For a decision to be “final,” Rule 58(a)(1)
requires that “[e]very judgment and amended judgment must be
set forth on a separate document.” By requiring the filing and
entry on the docket of a separate document, Rule 58(a) is
designed to provide clear, automatic notice to litigants of when
final judgment has been entered and the period to appeal has
begun to run. Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381, 384-85
(1978). It is to be “interpreted to prevent loss of the right of
appeal, not to facilitate loss.” Id. at 386. Where the court would
have jurisdiction of an appeal once a Rule 58(a) document was
filed and entered, a remand would be a pointless exercise in
which “[w]heels would spin for no practical purpose.” Pack v.
Burns Int’l Security Serv., 130 F.3d 1071, 1072 (D.C. Cir.
4
1997); see United States v. Haynes, 158 F.3d 1327, 1330 (D.C.
Cir. 1998).
Although the district court did not file and enter a separate
order of dismissal pursuant to Rule 58(a), this appeal is not
premature. The order of September 26, 2005 denying Bailey’s
motion for enforcement of the settlement agreement was
tantamount to a final judgment on her claims. The facts in the
instant case closely track those in Nix v. Billington, 448 F.3d 411
(D.C. Cir. 2006). Nix also involved a Title VII claim. There,
the district court denied the plaintiff’s request for a status
hearing on the remaining retaliation claims on the ground that it
lacked subject matter jurisdiction. This court held that because
the district court, in denying a status conference for lack of
jurisdiction, “disengaged itself entirely from the case,” id. at
415, its disengagement was “tantamount to a final judgment on
[the plaintiff’s] claims.” Id. So too here. The record indicates
that the district court denied Bailey’s motions to enforce the
settlement agreement because it believed that it had, after
accepting the terms of the parties’ settlement, previously
dismissed her complaint, and that the only thing that remained
of Bailey’s case were her motions for enforcement. In denying
the motions on subject matter jurisdiction grounds, the district
court disengaged itself from her case and, as in Nix, its
disengagement was “tantamount to a final judgment on
[Bailey’s] claims.” Id.
In fact, Bailey’s Title VII claims were still pending before
the district court on September 26, 2005. Although the district
court stated on July 9, 2001, upon learning of the parties’
settlement agreement, “[w]ith that, the case will be dismissed,”
no separate order of dismissal was ever filed and entered on the
docket. Because the district court did not issue the appropriate
order pursuant to Rule 58(a) dismissing the complaint, it
continued to have jurisdiction over Bailey’s case. Cf. Shaffer v.
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Veneman, 325 F.3d 370, 374 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Reed v. United
States, 891 F.2d 878, 880 (11th Cir. 1990). The district court’s
reliance on Kokkonen was therefore misplaced and we need not
address Bailey’s alternative argument that the district court erred
because there was an independent statutory basis for jurisdiction
under 39 U.S.C. § 409 (suits by and against the Postal Service).
Because a Rule 58 order of dismissal was never filed and
entered on the docket pursuant to FED. R. CIV P. 79 to indicate
the case had been dismissed, Bailey’s time to appeal never
commenced to run and her appeal is timely.1 The relevant entry
on the docket referred only to the fact that the case had settled
before selection of the jury and that the jury pool was
discharged. Accordingly, we reverse and remand the case to the
district court.
1
The 2002 amendment to Rule 58 (at (b)(2)(B), providing a
judgment is entered when 150 days have run from the entry in the civil
docket under Rule 79(a)), took effect after the relevant time period in
this matter and would not affect Bailey’s appeal in any event because
no civil docket entry was made noting the dismissal of her case.