United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued January 22, 2008 Decided March 7, 2008
No. 06-1286
TRANSCONTINENTAL GAS PIPE LINE CORPORATION,
PETITIONER
v.
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION AND
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
RESPONDENTS
PIEDMONT NATURAL GAS COMPANY, INC., ET AL.,
INTERVENORS
On Petition for Review of Orders of the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Gregory Grady argued the cause for petitioner. With him
on the briefs were Michael J. Thompson, Randall R. Conklin,
and David A. Glenn.
Beth G. Pacella, Senior Attorney, Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, argued the cause for respondent.
With her on the brief were Cynthia A. Marlette, General
Counsel, and Robert H. Solomon, Solicitor. John S. Moot,
Attorney, entered an appearance.
2
Before: TATEL, BROWN, and KAVANAUGH, Circuit
Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.
Opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part filed by
Circuit Judge BROWN.
TATEL, Circuit Judge: Its existing pipeline too small to
carry gas shipped by several new customers, petitioner
Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. (Transco) expanded its
pipeline and installed new compressors to push the added gas
through the larger pipeline. In keeping with its normal
practice, Transco sought to distribute the additional electricity
costs of running the new compressors among all its
customers. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, no
longer supportive of that approach, instead directed the
company to allocate the costs only to the customers for whom
the pipeline expansion was undertaken. Transco petitions for
review, arguing that FERC: (1) acted arbitrarily and
capriciously, and (2) failed to show that Transco’s proposal
was unjust and unreasonable and that FERC’s alternative was
just and reasonable. We disagree on both counts and deny the
petition.
I.
Transco operates a natural gas pipeline system that
connects Gulf of Mexico production sites with customers
along the Eastern seaboard. Its system consists of large
pipelines and nearly 350 compressors that move gas through
the pipelines. This case arises out of Transco’s “Cherokee”
project, which, in order to accommodate several new
shippers, expanded Transco’s main pipeline in Alabama and
added new compressors to push the additional gas through the
expanded system.
3
After completing the Cherokee project, Transco filed new
proposed rates with FERC pursuant to the Natural Gas Act
(NGA), 15 U.S.C. § 717 et seq., which gives FERC authority
to review proposed rates and assure that they are “just and
reasonable.” Id. § 717c(a). Under NGA section 4, a pipeline
proposing new rates must “prove [to FERC] that its proposed
rates are just and reasonable.” Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y.,
Inc. v. FERC, 165 F.3d 992, 1007 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citing 15
U.S.C. § 717c). By contrast, “when the Commission or an
intervenor seeks to impose on the pipeline rates different from
either present rates or rates proposed by the pipeline,” NGA
section 5 applies and “the Commission or the intervenor must
prove that the pipeline’s present rates are not just and
reasonable and that the new rates proposed by the
Commission or the intervenor are just and reasonable.” Id.
(citing 15 U.S.C. § 717d). Also relevant here, under
longstanding FERC policy, “[t]he cost of [new facilities] may
be recovered in either of two ways: through ‘incremental’
pricing, which imposes an additional charge payable solely by
customers who are directly served by the expansion facilities
. . . ; or ‘rolled-in’ pricing, in which the cost[s] of the new
facilities are added to the pipeline’s total rate base and
reflected in rates charged to all customers system-wide.”
Midcoast Interstate Transmission, Inc. v. FERC, 198 F.3d
960, 964 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (citing TransCanada PipeLines
Ltd. v. FERC, 24 F.3d 305, 307 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).
Transco had always rolled in compressor energy costs,
and in its rate filing with FERC, it sought to do the same with
the costs of running the Cherokee compressors. Under this
approach, all customers paid a pro rata share of all
compression power costs, and would for the Cherokee
compressors as well. Several Transco customers objected,
arguing that because Transco had undertaken the Cherokee
project to benefit new customers and needed the added
4
compression only for their benefit, the new customers should
pay the full power costs of the additional compressors.
Following a hearing, an administrative law judge found
that the parties challenging Transco’s proposed rate had
demonstrated that it was unjust and unreasonable because it
conflicted with a 1999 FERC policy statement expressing the
Commission’s goal of charging only those customers who
benefit from a project for the costs of that project.
Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 101 F.E.R.C. ¶ 63,022
at 65,095-96 (2002) (citing Certification of New Interstate
Natural Gas Pipeline Facilities, 88 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,227 (1999)
(“1999 Policy Statement”)). The ALJ also found that the
challenging parties had shown that their alternative pricing
approach was just and reasonable. Id. Under that approach,
the new customers for whose benefit the expansion was
undertaken would pay all the power costs of the project’s
compressors, as well as paying their pro rata share of the
power costs of the rest of Transco’s system. The Commission
affirmed the ALJ’s order. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line
Corp., 106 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,299 at 62,125-26 (2004). Transco
now petitions for review, arguing first that FERC acted
arbitrarily and capriciously, and second that FERC failed to
demonstrate that Transco’s proposed rate was unjust and
unreasonable and that FERC’s alternative was just and
reasonable.
II.
We “review FERC orders under the Administrative
Procedure Act’s . . . arbitrary and capricious standard,”
Sithe/Independence Power Partners, L.P. v. FERC, 165 F.3d
944, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1999), under which “[w]e must uphold an
agency’s action where it ‘has considered the relevant factors
and articulated a rational connection between the facts found
and the choice made.’” Nat’l Ass’n of Clean Air Agencies v.
5
EPA, 489 F.3d 1221, 1228 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting Allied
Local & Reg’l Mfrs. Caucus v. EPA, 215 F.3d 61, 68 (D.C.
Cir. 2000)). Our review is “‘particularly deferential’ when
FERC is involved in the highly technical process of
ratemaking,” E. Ky. Power Co-op, Inc. v. FERC, 489 F.3d
1299, 1306 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting Ass’n of Oil Pipe Lines
v. FERC, 83 F.3d 1424, 1431 (D.C. Cir. 1996)), and we
“accept the Commission’s factual findings if they are
supported by substantial evidence.” Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. §
825l(b)).
Transco offers several reasons why it thinks FERC acted
arbitrarily and capriciously when it directed that the Cherokee
electricity costs be priced incrementally. All lack merit.
First, Transco argues that FERC erred in relying on its
1999 Policy Statement because that statement dealt only with
capital costs, not power costs. The 1999 Policy Statement,
however, is far broader than Transco admits. The statement
announces the Commission’s general goal of eliminating the
subsidization of new customers by existing customers:
“Under the Commission’s no-subsidy policy, existing
shippers should not have the rates under their current
contracts changed because the pipeline has built an expansion
to provide service to new customers.” Certification of New
Interstate Natural Gas Pipeline Facilities: Order Clarifying
Statement of Policy, 90 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,128 at 61,392 (2000).
We think FERC reasonably concluded that this language
could cover the operational costs of expansion projects as
well as their capital costs, and “we defer to FERC’s
interpretation of its orders so long as the interpretation is
reasonable.” Entergy Servs., Inc. v. FERC, 375 F.3d 1204,
1209 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
6
Second, Transco argues that FERC incorrectly found that
existing Transco customers would subsidize the Cherokee
shippers if the electricity costs of the new compressors were
rolled in, and relied on this mistaken conclusion in issuing its
order. To be sure, FERC’s concerns about subsidization did
play a major role in its decision. The Commission found that
existing Transco customers had no need for the new
compressors, that powering the new compressors cost $2.4
million each year, and that if the electricity costs were rolled
in, Cherokee shippers would pay only $135,000 of that
amount. See 101 F.E.R.C. ¶ 63,022 at 65,095; 106 F.E.R.C. ¶
61,299 at 62,125-26. From these facts, FERC concluded that
rolling in rates would, contrary to the 1999 Policy Statement,
force existing Transco customers to subsidize the Cherokee
shippers. 106 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,299 at 62,125-26.
Transco disputes neither that its existing customers had
no need for the new compressors, nor that its new customers
would pay only $135,000 of the $2.4 million annual power
costs of operating them. Instead, it claims there is no subsidy
because the Cherokee compressors benefit all Transco
customers by compressing gas from all shippers, not just
Cherokee shippers. Moreover, Transco insists, the added
compression “improves overall system flexibility, as well as
reliability, e.g., facilitating continuation of service without
interruption in the event of compressor maintenance or
outage.” Pet’r’s Br. 13. Transco also suggests that the new
compressors produced a smaller increase in system-wide
power costs than FERC believed because the new
compressors caused other compressors to be “used less than
they otherwise would have been.” Id. at 14.
FERC considered and reasonably rejected these
arguments. Responding to Transco’s claim that the new
compressors benefited all customers, FERC said:
7
[U]nder the 1999 Pricing Policy Statement
. . . , a claim of generalized system benefits is
not enough to justify requiring the existing
shippers to subsidize the uncontested increase
in electric costs caused by the Cherokee
project. . . . There is no showing that the added
compression . . . has improved the quality of
service received by the existing shippers.
While [Transco] claim[s] that the added
compression provides redundancy and
potential backup when older compressors are
out of service or undergoing maintenance,
there has been no showing that there were any
service interruptions in the past which would
have been prevented by the installation of the
new compressors.
Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 112 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,170
at 61,924 (2005) (footnote omitted). FERC’s factual findings
in this passage were all supported by substantial evidence:
Transco presented no proof of any specific benefits to its
existing customers from the Cherokee project. And FERC
reasonably concluded that generalized system benefits are
insufficient to justify rolling in rates under its 1999 Policy
Statement given that statement’s directive that rolling in rates
is not justified “simply because the existing customers receive
some benefit from the construction of the new facilities.” 90
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,128 at 61,394 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). Furthermore, even if, as Transco asserts, the
Cherokee compressors caused less of an increase in system-
wide power costs than FERC believed—an assertion Transco
provided no hard numbers to support—FERC still correctly
concluded that existing customers would have, at least to
some extent, subsidized the Cherokee shippers if Transco had
been allowed to roll in rates. While we recognize that
8
Transco’s existing customers indirectly benefit from the
added compressors, we are bound to respect FERC’s policy
decision that such benefits fail to justify imposing substantial
new costs on captive customers who have no need for the
added compression.
Finally, Transco claims FERC’s new approach will make
its system less efficient because it will have to run its
compressors based on which customers pay for them rather
than using the compressors that will most efficiently move
gas through the system. FERC’s new approach may well be
less efficient than Transco’s existing pricing, but FERC
thought it more important to avoid subsidization of new
shippers than to ensure the most efficient use of
compressors—exactly the type of policy choice about which
we defer to FERC, especially given that our review is
“‘particularly deferential’ when FERC is involved in the
highly technical process of ratemaking.” E. Ky. Power, 489
F.3d at 1306 (quoting Ass’n of Oil Pipe Lines, 83 F.3d at
1431).
III.
“Under NGA § 5, before replacing an existing rate or
tariff with a new one, the Commission must demonstrate by
substantial evidence that the existing rate or tariff has become
unjust or unreasonable, and that the proposed rate is both just
and reasonable.” Am. Gas Ass’n v. FERC, 428 F.3d 255, 263
(D.C. Cir. 2005) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 717d; W. Res., Inc. v.
FERC, 9 F.3d 1568, 1579-80 (D.C. Cir. 1993)). Transco
claims that FERC flunked both parts of this test because it
failed to demonstrate any problem with Transco’s current rate
and to explain, much less justify, the new rate it imposed. We
disagree.
9
FERC provided substantial evidence showing that
Transco’s existing rate was unjust and unreasonable. Rolling
in the power costs of the Cherokee compressors forced
existing Transco customers to subsidize the power costs of
compressors they had no need for—a result FERC thought
unacceptable under its 1999 Policy Statement. See 90
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,128 at 61,393 (“Existing shippers . . . should
not be subject to increases in rates during the term of their
existing contracts to reduce the rates faced by new shippers
subscribing to expansion capacity.”).
FERC also adequately explained the new rate it imposed:
[T]he structure for fuel and electric charges
should be as described in Northwest Pipeline
Corporation, 99 FERC ¶ 61,365 at ¶ 37
(2002)[,] where the Commission stated that
“expansion shippers are to pay both the
compressor fuel rate charged to existing
shippers and any additional fuel costs
attributable to the proposed expansion, with
the additional fuel costs captured in the
surcharge . . . . The incremental fuel surcharge
is intended to amount to the difference
between the proposed incremental fuel rate and
the existing compressor fuel rate.”
106 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,299 at 62,126. Although the first sentence
of this passage is crystal clear, Transco insists—as we
understand its argument—that the second sentence leaves the
rate unclear by suggesting that Cherokee shippers will have to
pay only the electricity costs of the Cherokee compressors,
rather than also paying their pro rata share of electricity costs
throughout the rest of the system. But as we read the second
sentence, and as FERC’s counsel confirmed at oral argument,
10
the “proposed incremental fuel rate” mentioned in the second
sentence represents the final total rate to be charged Cherokee
shippers. That rate has two components: (1) “the existing
compressor fuel rate,” i.e., the Cherokee customers’ share of
the system-wide fuel costs, and (2) the “incremental fuel
surcharge,” i.e., the cost of electricity just for the Cherokee
project. Thus, as FERC reiterated in its order on rehearing:
“expansion shippers are to pay both the [system-wide] fuel
rate charged to existing shippers and any additional fuel costs
attributable to the proposed expansion.” 112 F.E.R.C.
¶ 61,170 at 61,925 (quoting Nw. Pipeline, 99 F.E.R.C.
¶ 61,365 at 62,541).
Finally, though we think it a close question, FERC
adequately justified the rate it imposed. As Transco points
out, FERC’s explanation in its initial decision of why it
imposed the rate it did appears in only two relatively
unilluminating sentences:
[T]he just and reasonable replacement for the
system-wide fuel and electric power cost rates
charged to the Cherokee . . . shippers is an
incremental rate for electric compression based
on Transco’s most recent operating
experience. . . . Transco . . . concedes that . . .
[it] can determine how much fuel or electric
power is used to operate any particular
compressor unit over a particular time.
106 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,299 at 62,126 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). Yet prior to these two sentences,
FERC had repeatedly discussed its goal—expressed in the
1999 Policy Statement—of avoiding subsidization of new
shippers by existing shippers. See, e.g., id. at 62,114, 62,126.
11
Moreover, on rehearing, FERC clarified that the 1999 Policy
Statement justified the rate it imposed:
[T]he 1999 Pricing Policy Statement must be
applied to this project. Thus, . . . a showing
that Transco’s existing shippers are subsidizing
additional fuel or electric power costs incurred
in order to serve the Cherokee shippers would
justify requiring incremental charges to the
Cherokee shippers.
112 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,170 at 61,924. Because the Commission
made just such a finding—i.e., that rolling in rates would
force existing shippers to subsidize the Cherokee shippers—
the 1999 Policy Statement “justif[ied] requiring incremental
charges to the Cherokee shippers.” Id.
Thus, although FERC’s explanation in its initial decision
for imposing incremental rates left something to be desired,
the decision as a whole and the rehearing decision clarify its
analysis, and “we will uphold a decision of less than ideal
clarity if the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.”
Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S.
281, 286 (1974). Here we can discern the Commission’s path
from its goal of avoiding subsidization to the rule it imposed,
especially given that, as FERC pointed out, it had imposed
precisely this rule in several recent cases presenting the same
issue. See 101 F.E.R.C. ¶ 63,022 at 65,096 (citing PG&E Gas
Transmission, Nw. Corp., 99 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,366 (2002); Kern
River Gas Transmission, 98 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,205 (2002)).
In reaching this conclusion, we are not, as the dissent
suggests, “speculat[ing] that the 1999 Policy Statement[] . . .
could justify the new rates.” Dissenting Op. at 4. To the
contrary, FERC’s decision on rehearing makes quite clear that
12
the 1999 Policy Statement was the reason FERC imposed
incremental rates, 112 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,170 at 61,924, and the
dissent does not quarrel with our conclusion in Part II that
FERC reasonably applied the 1999 Policy Statement to power
costs.
Our dissenting colleague also argues that FERC failed to
consider adequately the efficiency and cost-shifting effects of
its order. But FERC acknowledged Transco’s argument that
its new rule would reduce system efficiency, 112 F.E.R.C. ¶
61,170 at 61,922, and concluded that this risk was outweighed
by the need to avoid subsidization. As to cost shifting, FERC
found that “the annual cost of electricity used by the . . .
Cherokee compressors is $2,380,399,” while “Cherokee
shippers pay only $135,151 annually in electricity costs,
resulting in a $2,245,248 subsidy from existing shippers.”
106 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,299 at 62,125. Never disputing these
numbers, Transco argues only that: (1) generalized system
benefits justify the subsidy; (2) no subsidy exists because the
system is integrated; and (3) FERC’s approach will lead to
reverse subsidies. But FERC rejected the first and second
arguments as insufficient under the 1999 Policy Statement, id.
at 62,126, and Transco provided no evidence to support its
third argument. As FERC explained:
Transco[] cannot simply sit back and make
vague allegations of offsetting benefits and
then contend that the proponents of section 5
action have failed to meet their burden of
showing that the existing shippers are
subsidizing the additional electric power costs
incurred as a result of the Cherokee expansion.
This is particularly the case [here], where
Transco has possession of the information
needed to estimate the value of any benefit
13
accruing to existing customers from the
Cherokee shippers’ contribution to fuel costs.
112 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,170 at 61,924-25.
IV.
Having considered Transco’s remaining arguments and
found them without merit, we deny the petition for review.
So ordered.
BROWN, Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting: While
I agree with most of the majority’s conclusions, I dissent from
its holding that FERC satisfied the section 5 burden of
showing the new rates it wants to impose on Transco are just
and reasonable.
I
To accommodate the demands of its Cherokee customers,
Transco increased its pipeline’s capacity by installing new
compressors and then charging these customers to cover the
construction costs. Transco then sought to continue its
practice of charging all of its customers for the energy costs
for running all compressors (including the new compressors),
in proportion to each customer’s actual usage. After some of
Transco’s mainline customers challenged these rates, FERC
ordered Transco to make the Cherokee customers pay the
same proportional rate as mainline customers for running the
preexisting compressors and also pay the entire energy costs
for running the Cherokee compressors. See Transcon. Gas
Pipe Line Corp., 106 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,299, 62,126 (2004);
Resp’t’s Br. 9, 27. At the same time, the mainline customers
would pay only their proportionate energy costs for running
the preexisting compressors. Transco points out these new
rates are illogical because its pipeline operates on an
integrated basis, so all of its compressors serve all of its
customers. Once new compressors are up and running, they
push natural gas through the pipeline to all customers, and it
makes no sense to attribute these compressors’ usage only to
the Cherokee customers.
When a pipeline proposes new rates under NGA section
4, it has the burden of showing these rates are just and
reasonable. Normally, if FERC rejects a section 4 rate
change, this court simply defers to FERC’s rate-setting
2
expertise. However, when FERC or intervenors seek to
impose new rates under NGA section 5, they have the burden
of showing the new rates are just and reasonable. See
“Complex” Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. FERC, 165
F.3d 992, 1000–01 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam). “[T]his
court has strictly policed the statutory line that separates”
section 4 and section 5. Id. (emphasis added). Since this is a
section 5 case, FERC has to show the rate-change proponents
carried their burden of demonstrating the new rates are just
and reasonable. In fulfilling this obligation, FERC has to do
more than make mere “conclusionary statements”; it must
“examine the cost-shifting effect of its order[].” See
Algonquin Gas Transmission Co. v. FERC, 948 F.2d 1305,
1312, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 1991). The panel majority fails to hold
FERC to this obligation and thus undermines the distinction
between section 4 and section 5.
II
As the majority concedes, FERC’s only explicit
justification for the new rates is a “relatively unilluminating,”
maj. op. 10, claim that Transco “‘can determine how much
fuel or electric power is used to operate any particular
compressor unit over a particular time,’” id. (quoting 106
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,299 at 62,126). This is not just unedifying; it is
completely beside the point. No one doubts Transco can
determine the energy costs for running the Cherokee
compressors. The question is whether FERC has shown it is
just and reasonable for the Cherokee shippers to pay the full
energy costs for operating these compressors, as well as
paying their proportionate share for operating the preexisting
compressors. This is a rather difficult task, as the Cherokee
compressors serve both Cherokee and mainline customers.
Far from meeting this challenge, FERC failed to grapple with
3
the cost-shifting and pipeline efficiency impacts of its new
rates.
By not “examin[ing] the cost-shifting effect of its
order[],” FERC failed to satisfy the strictures of section 5.
Algonquin Gas, 948 F.2d at 1315; see also North Carolina v.
FERC, 584 F.2d 1003, 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (FERC cannot
fail “to make findings as to the impact the plan would actually
have on ultimate consumers” (emphasis omitted)). FERC’s
only attempt to consider costs was its finding that under
Transco’s preexisting rates, the annual electricity cost for
running the Cherokee compressors was $2,380,399, while
Cherokee customers paid only $135,151 in total energy
charges. See 106 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,299 at 62,125. While these
figures appear vaguely nefarious at first glance, they are
largely a red herring, since FERC does not argue the
Cherokee compressors primarily serve the Cherokee
customers. More significantly, even if these numbers indict
Transco’s preexisting rates, it was FERC’s duty to consider
how the new rates would affect actual customers, and it
completely failed to do so. Notably, the passages the majority
cites to argue FERC considered the cost-shifting effect of the
new rates focus exclusively on Transco’s preexisting rates
and say nary a word about the new rates. See Maj. op. 12.
If anything, FERC’s figures suggest the new rates will be
grossly unfair and lead to reverse-subsidization. Under the
preexisting rates, Transco apparently charged Cherokee and
mainline customers about $135,000 in energy costs for a
particular amount of natural gas. Under the new rates,
Transco may have to charge the Cherokee customers roughly
$2.5 million for the same amount of gas that non-Cherokee
customers get for a mere $120,000.1 While this represents
1
$2.5 million is a combination of $2.38 million to run the Cherokee
compressors and the $120,000 of proportional charges for running
4
only a rough guess about how the new rates could play out, it
is notable that this is a plausible reading of the only figures
FERC offers to defend these rates. Clearly, this is insufficient
to satisfy FERC’s section 5 burden.
FERC also failed to consider the effects the new rates
will have on the pipeline’s efficient operation. See Panhandle
E. Pipe Line Co. v. FERC, 777 F.2d 739, 746 (D.C. Cir.
1985) (FERC has “large authority to take action necessary to
promote the purposes of the [Natural Gas] Act, including …
efficient service.”). To avoid grossly overcharging the
Cherokee customers, Transco may need to change from
integrated operations focused on efficient provision of natural
gas to rate-obsessed operations aimed at avoiding using the
Cherokee compressors when serving mainline customers. As
Transco’s expert explained, this later approach would make
running the pipeline “grossly inefficient, [since] maintenance
costs would increase and reliability would be compromised
[as] large turbines were cycled on and off to meet small
changes in horsepower requirements as customers’ loads vary
from hour to hour.” FERC does not grapple with this
scenario or explain how it expects Transco to accommodate
the new rates.
III
In an attempt to cure FERC’s deficient analysis, the panel
majority speculates that the 1999 Policy Statement’s goal of
not forcing mainline customers to subsidize capacity
expansion could justify the new rates. See Maj. op. 10–11.
Yet, FERC never explained why its concern about
the preexisting compressors. Since $135,000 was the proportionate
costs for running both the preexisting and Cherokee compressors,
$120,000 is a rough estimate of the proportional energy costs for
powering only the preexisting compressors.
5
subsidization was the only consideration in determining
whether the new rates in this case are just and reasonable.
See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. FERC, 506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C.
Cir. 1974) (“When the agency applies [a policy statement] in
a particular situation, it must be prepared to support the policy
just as if the policy statement had never been issued.”).
Even more significantly, the Policy Statement was not
concerned with energy costs—it was about ensuring that new
customers pay for an expansion’s construction costs,
something the Cherokee shippers have done. See
Certification of New Interstate Natural Gas Pipeline
Facilities, 88 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,227 (1999), clarified, 90 F.E.R.C.
¶ 61,128 (2000). The majority may be correct that FERC’s
authority to interpret this Policy was broad enough for it to
conclude that Transco’s preexisting energy rates caused
undesirable subsidization. See Maj. op. 5. However, this
falls far short of satisfying FERC’s section 5 burden of
proving the new rates are a just and reasonable method for
dealing with this problem—especially in light of the practical
differences between forcing expansion customers to pay
energy costs, as opposed to construction costs. As this case
shows, making expansion customers pay the full costs for
powering new compressors may force the pipeline to operate
in a grossly inefficient manner; no similar consequences flow
from forcing them to pay construction costs. Similarly,
charging expansion shippers the energy costs for running
certain compressors on an integrated pipeline may cause more
severe reverse-subsidization than billing them for discrete
capital costs undertaken for their benefit. Nothing in either
FERC’s 1999 Policy Statement or its orders in this case
addresses these crucial distinctions.
In a section 5 case, FERC cannot simply declare the new
rates are just and reasonable by relying on “conclusionary”
6
references to a policy statement focused on a different issue,
while ignoring how these rates will affect customers and the
pipeline’s efficient operation. Algonquin Gas, 948 F.2d at
1312. After all, why is subsidization by existing customers
more problematic than reverse-subsidization of existing
customers?
IV
FERC’s disregard for the consequences of the new
energy rates highlights its failure to take its section 5 burden
seriously. I would grant Transco’s petition for review.