Morris Communications, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 24, 2009 Decided May 12, 2009

No. 08-1080

MORRIS COMMUNICATIONS, INC.,
APPELLANT

v.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
APPELLEE

On Appeal of an Order
of the Federal Communications Commission

Frederick M. Joyce argued the cause for the appellant.
Ronald E. Quirk Jr. entered an appearance.
Maureen K. Flood, Counsel, Federal Communications
Commission, argued the cause for the appellee. Matthew B.
Berry, General Counsel, Jacob M. Lewis, Associate General
Counsel, and Richard K. Welch, Acting Deputy Associate
General Counsel, Federal Communications Commission were
on brief. Daniel M. Armstrong, Associate General Counsel, and
Joseph R. Palmore and James M. Carr, Counsel, Federal
Communications Commission, entered appearances.
Before: GINSBURG, HENDERSON and KAVANAUGH, Circuit
Judges.
 2

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.
KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Morris
Communications, Inc. (Morris), a family-owned mobile, paging
and communications service provider, appeals the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) order
denying its requests to waive the automatic cancellation of its
nine specialized mobile radio (SMR) licenses. For the reasons
set forth below, we affirm the Commission’s order.
I.
On April 15, 1996, the FCC notified Morris that it had
successfully bid for nine 900 MHz SMR licenses covering
certain areas in the southeast United States. FCC Announces
Winning Bidders in the Auction of 1,020 Licenses to Provide
900 MHz SMR in Major Trading Areas, 11 F.C.C.R. 18,599,
18,611-22 (Apr. 15, 1996). Morris chose to pay its winning bids
in quarterly installments, which made the licenses “conditioned
upon the full and timely performance of [Morris’s] payment
obligations under the installment plan.” 47 C.F.R.
§ 1.2110(d)(4) (1994). Indeed, Morris’s licenses expressly
stated that “authorization is conditioned upon the full and timely
payment of all moneys due pursuant to sections 1.2110 and
90.812 of the Commission’s rules and the terms of the
Commission’s installment plan . . . . Failure to comply with this
condition will result in the automatic cancellation of this
authorization.” E.g. Morris Commc’ns, Inc., License KNNY352
at 7 (Oct. 16, 1996).
For five years Morris made the quarterly payments either on
time or within the two consecutive 90-day automatic grace
 3

periods authorized by 47 C.F.R. § 1.2110(g).1 On July 31, 2001,
however, Morris failed to make the installment payment on each
of its nine licenses. It also failed to make payment plus late fees
by the end of the two 90-day grace periods, that is, January 31,
2002. Earlier in January 2002, the FCC began outsourcing its
loan servicing to a private vendor, Colson Services Corporation
(Colson). Colson had notified Morris by letter in early January
that it was taking over the FCC’s loan servicing and that Morris
was to send all payments to Colson. It enclosed a form that
required Morris to designate an employee responsible for bill
handling. Morris returned the form, designating its controller as
the responsible employee. Colson sent the January 31, 2002

1
47 C.F.R. § 1.2110(g)(4) (2006) provides:
Any licensee that fails to submit its quarterly
payment on an installment payment
obligation . . . may submit such payment [plus a
5% late fee] on or before the last day of the next
quarter . . . without being considered delinquent.
. . . If any licensee fails to make the Required
Installment Payment on or before the last day of
the first additional quarter . . . , the licensee may
submit its Required Installment Payment on or
before the last day of the next quarter [plus a
10% late fee]. . . . If an eligible entity obligated
to make installment payments fails to pay the
total Required Installment Payment, interest and
any late payment fees associated with the
Required Installment Payment within two
quarters (6 months) of the Required Installment
Payment due date, it shall be in default, its
license shall automatically cancel, and it will be
subject to debt collection procedures.
47 C.F.R. § 1.2110(g)(4)(i)-(iv).
 4

installment payment notices to Morris but without addressing
them to the controller and the notices did not reach Morris’s
controller until February 4, 2002—four days after the payments
were due. Morris remitted the full amount owed to the FCC on
February 5, 2002.
On April 26, 2002, the FCC notified Morris that “an Event
of Default ha[d] occurred,” that “the License[s] automatically
cancelled by operation of the Rules and [that] the Commission
[wa]s commencing debt collection procedures.” Letter from
Mark Reger, CFO, FCC, to Morris Communications, Inc. at 1
(Apr. 26, 2002). The letter further noted that “all of [Morris’s]
obligations . . . ha[d] been accelerated.” Id. at 2. On May 2,
2002, Morris requested a waiver from the automatic cancellation
rule. In its request, Morris explained the circumstances leading
up to its late February 5, 2002 installment payments and asked
the Commission to review its request “as expeditiously as
possible.” Letter from Frederick M. Joyce and Marianne Roach
Casserly, Attorneys, Alston & Bird LLP, to Mark Reger, CFO,
FCC, at 5 (May 2, 2002) (Waiver Request). On May 6, 2002,
Morris again wrote to the Commission, “request[ing] that the
Commission stay the effectiveness of the decisions set forth in
[the Commission’s] letters dated April 26, 2002.” Letter from
Frederick M. Joyce and Marianne Roach Casserly, Attorneys,
Alston & Bird LLP, to Mark Reger, CFO, FCC, at 1 (May 6,
2002) (Request for Stay).
The FCC responded on May 9, 2002, acknowledging receipt
of the Waiver Request and informing Morris that “[w]ithin 30
days of this letter we will mail you either a resolution to your
item or a letter telling you when you can expect a resolution.”
Letter from Mark A. Reger, CFO, FCC to Frederick M. Joyce
and Marianne Roach Casserly, Attorneys, Alston & Bird LLP,
at 1 (May 9, 2002). Thirty days came and went, however, and
 5

Morris heard nothing from the Commission. More time elapsed
and, even after Morris’s repeated telephone calls and written
inquiries, the Commission did not respond. Morris continued to
make timely payments on its nine licenses until October 29,
2002. At that point, Morris stopped making payments on seven
of the nine licenses.
Not having received any reply from the FCC by December
2002, Morris then began construction on the two SMR stations
on whose licenses it had continued making payments and
notified the FCC of the stations’ construction.2 Letter from
Frederick M. Joyce and Ronald E. Quirk, Jr., Attorneys, Alston
& Bird LLP, to William Kunze, Chief, Commercial Wireless
Division, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, FCC (Jan. 14,
2003). Morris also submitted—and the FCC processed—two
corresponding Notifications of Buildout. See 47 C.F.R.
§ 1.946(d) (buildout notification required within 15 days of end
of construction period).
On January 21, 2003, Morris filed another Waiver Request
with the FCC. In it, Morris asked the FCC for (1) “a one-year
extension of time, up to and including December 31, 2003, to
fully construct a digital 900 MHz SMR system in all its
authorized [Major Trading Areas],” (2) a “waiver of [section]
1.946(e) of the Commission’s rules, which states that requests
for extension of time to construct must be filed before the
expiration of the construction of coverage period,” and (3) a

2
Morris completed construction of the stations by December 31,
2002, because otherwise “its authorization terminate[d] automatically
(in whole or in part as set forth in the service rules), without specific
Commission action, on the date the construction or coverage period
expires.” 47 C.F.R. § 1.946(c); see also id. § 90.665. December 31,
2002 was the date the construction period ended for the two stations.
 6

one-year forbearance of its installment payment obligations on
each of its nine licenses. Morris Commc’ns, Inc., Petition for
Rule Waiver at 6 (Jan. 21, 2003). In support of its request,
Morris noted “the unique and unusual regulatory uncertainty
surrounding [its] licenses” and “the fact that demand for 900
MHz SMR services in the vast majority of these predominantly
rural markets simply has not occurred.” Id. at 7.
On April 25, 2005, after almost three years of nothing but
silence from the Commission, the Auctions and Spectrum
Access Division (Division) finally denied both of Morris’s
waiver requests noting that “Morris ha[d] failed to demonstrate
that the underlying purpose of the Commission’s payment rule
would not be served, or would be frustrated, by its application
in this particular case.” Ronald E. Quirk, Jr., 20 F.C.C.R. 8176,
8179 (Apr. 25, 2005). The Division also noted that “Morris
acknowledges that it is facing financial difficulties and that it
cannot . . . continue to make its installment payments for these
licenses.” Id. at 8181. Morris thereafter stopped making
installment payments on its remaining two licenses.
On May 25, 2005, Morris appealed the Division’s decision
to the full Commission. In its application for review, Morris
argued, inter alia, that the Division ignored FCC precedent in
denying Morris’s waiver requests, was equitably estopped from
revoking Morris’s licenses, did not provide a reasoned
explanation for its action and denied Morris procedural due
process. While review was pending, Morris offered to negotiate
a settlement agreement with the FCC whereby it could retain its
nine licenses, fulfill its payment obligations for each license
within one year and continue to make its installment payments
for each of the licenses until paid in full. The Commission
eventually rejected the offer.
 7

In mid-December 2005 Morris asked the Commission for
special temporary authority (STA) to operate its two constructed
SMR stations for a period of 180 days or until the FCC issued a
decision, whichever occurred first. The Commission granted the
STA for both stations on December 28, 2005. On June 8, 2006,
Morris requested an extension of the STA for an additional 180-
day period, which request the FCC appears to have granted.
On February 21, 2008, almost three years after Morris
petitioned for review, the Commission issued its decision
denying Morris’s application for review. Morris Commc’ns,
Inc., 23 F.C.C.R. 3179 (Feb. 21, 2008). The Commission
determined that “Morris ha[d] failed to show that, by denying its
waiver requests, the Division treated it differently than similarly
situated entities” and the “Division’s denial was therefore not an
abuse of discretion.” Id. at 3186 ¶ 15. The FCC stated that “the
Commission has explained unequivocally that, because parties
remain obligated for the full amount of their debt following their
default on installment payments, the Commission’s acceptance
of a payment after such a default does not, by itself, constitute
a constructive waiver of the automatic cancellation rule or
revive an automatically canceled license.” Id. at 3187 ¶ 18.
Moreover, the Commission noted that “[t]he Division correctly
found Morris’s assertion that it was uncertain as to the exact
amount owed, and that it received its payment notice late,
insufficient by itself to justify a waiver of the installment
payment rules” because FCC precedent makes clear that it is
“the licensee’s responsibility to know the amounts and due dates
of its installment payments.” Id. at 3188-89 ¶ 21. Regarding
Morris’s claim of equitable estoppel, the Commission concluded
that it “ha[d] done nothing, by either act or omission, that would
have led Morris to believe that the licenses had not
automatically cancelled.” Id. at 3192 ¶ 30. The Commission
further determined that the Division acted reasonably in denying
 8

Morris’s waiver requests, id. at 3193-97, and that Morris had not
been deprived of due process, id. at 3197-3201. Morris then
timely appealed to this Court. See 47 U.S.C. § 402(b)(5).
II.
A. Abuse of Discretion
Morris submits that the FCC abused its discretion in failing
to grant Morris’s two waiver requests because it failed to follow
precedent waiving “its automatic cancellation rules in
circumstances either identical to or far less compelling than
Morris’[s] situation.” Br. of Appellant at 10. We will vacate the
denial of a waiver “only when ‘the agency’s reasons are so
insubstantial as to render that denial an abuse of discretion.’”
BDPCS, Inc. v. FCC, 351 F.3d 1177, 1181 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(quoting Mountain Solutions, Ltd. v. FCC, 197 F.3d 512, 517
(D.C. Cir. 1999)). Under this standard, the Commission abuses
its discretion if it fails to “provide adequate explanation before
it treats similarly situated parties differently.” Petroleum
Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 22 F.3d 1164, 1172 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
“[H]owever, the agency’s strict construction of a general rule in
the face of waiver requests is insufficient evidence of an abuse
of discretion.” Mountain Solutions, Ltd., 197 F.3d at 517.
Under the Commission’s regulations, a waiver request may
be granted if:
(i) The underlying purpose of the rule(s)
would not be served or would be frustrated
by application to the instant case, and . . . a
grant of the requested waiver would be in the
public interest; or,
 9

(ii) In view of unique or unusual factual
circumstances of the instant case, application
of the rule(s) would be inequitable, unduly
burdensome or contrary to the public
interest, or the applicant has no reasonable
alternative.
47 C.F.R. § 1.925(b)(3). The FCC may grant a waiver of the
automatic cancellation of a license due to a missed payment
deadline if the deadline was missed due to “inadvertence or
administrative error.” Winstar Broad. Corp., 17 F.C.C.R. 6126,
6128 (Mar. 25, 2002); see Delta Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 387 F.3d
897, 901 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“The FCC’s policy is to grant
waivers only for cases in which administrative error caused the
due date to be missed.”). To establish inadvertence or
administrative error, the licensee must show that it
demonstrated prior compliance with
Commission rules, good faith, or prompt
action to rectify the delinquency; there was no
record that the payment shortfall was part of
a deliberate effort to delay payment; the
public interest would not be served by rigid
enforcement of the payment deadline; and
some flexibility [is] appropriate in addressing
a minor delinquency with respect to the
payment.
Winstar, 17 F.C.C.R. at 6128-29. In Meredith S. Senter, Jr.,
Esq., 14 F.C.C.R. 5003 (FCC Auctions & Indus. Analysis Div.
Feb. 2, 1999), for example, the FCC granted a waiver to a
licensee that had made its first installment payment “nearly five
months after th[e] payment was due.” Id. at 5003. The
regulations in force at the time “provided that an entity that was
more than 90 days delinquent in any installment payment was in
 10

default; however, upon default or in anticipation of default,
licensees were permitted to request a grace period of three to six
months.” Id. Even though the licensee did not request a grace
period, the Commission granted the waiver, “recogniz[ing] that
the acceptance of [the licensee’s] late payment could have been
construed as a waiver of the payment deadline” and
“acknowledg[ing] that [the licensee’s] record of timely
payments over a period of nearly two years since payment of the
second installment [wa]s indicative of a commitment on the
[licensee’s] part . . . to meet its payment obligations.” Id. at
5004; see also Lloyd W. Coward, Esq., 14 F.C.C.R. 2173, 2174
(FCC Wireless Telecomm. Bureau Jan. 29, 1999) (waiver
granted where licensee missed installment payment deadline and
did not request grace period but FCC nevertheless accepted late
payment).
In Lakeland PCS LLC, 15 F.C.C.R. 23,733 (FCC
Commercial Wireless Div. Nov. 27, 2000), the FCC granted a
waiver where the licensee missed the installment payment plus
both 90-day grace periods, remitting payment one day after the
second grace period had ended, but continued to receive
payment notices from the FCC after that date and “timely made”
payment after receipt of the notices. Id. at 23,734. The
Commission concluded that “the circumstances presented here
are consistent with previous instances, where, as a result of
administrative oversight, we have acknowledged that a
constructive waiver of the installment payment deadlines has
occurred.” Id. at 23,735.
In David Irwin, 19 F.C.C.R. 4011 (FCC Auctions & Indus.
Analysis Div. Mar. 3, 2004), the FCC granted a waiver to a
licensee that had failed to make a timely quarterly installment
payment because the payment it had forwarded via certified mail
to the FCC three days before the due date arrived after the due
 11

date. Id. at 4011-12. Believing its payment was timely, the
licensee failed to pay the late fees for more than two quarters
and its two licenses were then automatically cancelled. Id. at
4012. In the interim, however, the licensee “requested a
statement of all amounts then-outstanding in connection with the
installment payment plan for both licenses and paid the full
amount, including all amounts assessed as late fees.” Id. at
4015. The FCC granted the request but noted that “[i]f . . . the
facts of this case had provided any indication that [the licensee]
lacked the financial wherewithal, basic responsibility or
willingness to pay the equivalent of the late fees by the January
31, 2001 deadline, then it would appear that a waiver would not
be justified.” Id. (emphasis added).
Relying on this authority, Morris asserts that the
Commission abused its discretion in failing to grant Morris a
waiver. The Commission distinguished the above-cited
precedent, however, and, we conclude, did so reasonably. First,
the Commission concluded that Senter was distinguishable
because, unlike the licensee in Senter, Morris was on notice that
the Commission’s acceptance of its post-default installment
payments did not constitute a constructive waiver.3 Moreover,
unlike the Senter licensee, Morris stopped making installment
payments on seven of its nine licenses less than one year after its

3
This fact also distinguishes this case from Coward because there,
too, the licensee lacked notice that the FCC’s acceptance of a post-
default installment payment did not act as constructive waiver. 14
F.C.C.R. at 2173-74. As noted earlier, the Commission has since
made clear that “mere acceptance of a payment after cancellation
w[ill] not constitute a constructive waiver of the automatic
cancellation rule.” Licenses of 21st Century Telesis Joint Venture, 16
F.C.C.R. 17,257, 17,261 ¶ 12 n.24 (Sept. 21, 2001) (citing Lakeland,
15 F.C.C.R. at 23,735 n.11).
 12

default and stated post-default that it was in financial distress.4
Morris Commc’ns, Inc., 23 F.C.C.R. at 3187-88. The
Commission also reasonably distinguished Lakeland, noting that
there, unlike here, “the Commission had continued to send
payment notices to the former licensee despite the automatic
cancellation of the license.” Id. at 3188 (citing Lakeland, 15
F.C.C.R. at 23,734-35). In Lakeland, the Commission also
stated that, without more, “late payment could not revive an
automatically cancelled license.” 15 F.C.C.R. at 23,735.
Although Morris did not bring Irwin to the FCC’s attention, the
FCC’s reasoning in distinguishing Senter and Lakeland applies
to distinguish Irwin as well.5 This “court will uphold [an
agency’s] findings, though of less than ideal clarity, if the
agency’s path may reasonably be discerned” so long as it is
“satisfied that the agency has taken a hard look at the issues with
the use of reasons and standards.” Greater Boston Television
Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970). This the
Commission has done. Accordingly, we do not believe that

4
Morris so stated in its second Waiver Request, asserting, inter
alia, (1) a request for a one-year waiver “would allow [it] to utilize the
financial resources that it was using for installment payments to build
[an SMR network]”; (2) it “lack[ed] . . . appropriate equipment and . . .
demand for 900 MHz SMR services in the vast majority of [its]
predominantly rural markets simply ha[d] not occurred”; and (3)
“[d]ue to the economic downturn, [it] has had reduced financial
resources which have been exacerbated by its installment payments on
its 900 MHz SMR licenses, which have not yet generated any
revenue.” Morris Commc’ns, Inc., Petition for Rule Waiver at 6-7, 14
(Jan. 21, 2003).
5
In addition, Morris’s financial difficulties as well as its decision
to stop post-default payments make Morris critically different from the
Irwin licensee.
 13

“‘the agency’s reasons are so insubstantial as to render [its
waiver] denial an abuse of discretion.’” BDPCS, Inc., 351 F.3d
at 1181 (quoting Mountain Solutions, Ltd., 197 F.3d at 517).6
B. Equitable Estoppel
Morris further contends that the FCC should be estopped
from revoking its licenses because, by assuring Morris in the
May 9, 2002 letter that the Commission would respond to its
Waiver Request in thirty days, by accepting Morris’s late
installment payments and by expressly acknowledging that
Morris had built and was operating two SMR stations (by
processing Morris’s Notifications of Buildout and by granting
STAs for the stations), the Commission made a definite
representation to Morris on which Morris reasonably relied to its
harm. To apply equitable estoppel against the government, a
party must show that (1) “there was a ‘definite’ representation
to the party claiming estoppel,” (2) the party “relied on its
adversary’s conduct in such a manner as to change his position

6
Morris also argues that the FCC erred because it “offered no
rational explanation, and no public interest justification, for refusing
to grant Morris a waiver for the ‘administrative error’ that led to a
brief, five day payment delay.” Br. of Appellant at 13. In its order,
however, the Commission noted that “the Division correctly explained
that the payment of winning bids in compliance with the
Commission’s rules is critical to realizing the public interest objectives
of Section 309(j) of the Communications Act” and “further explained
that the Commission’s rules presume that the entity that bids the most
for a license in an auction is the entity that places the highest value on
the use of the spectrum; that such entities are presumed to be those
best able to put the licenses to their most efficient use for the benefit
of the public; and that requiring licensees to demonstrate their ability
to pay as a condition of continuing to hold licenses is essential to an
efficient licensing process.” 23 F.C.C.R. at 3194 ¶ 34.
 14

for the worse,” (3) the party’s “reliance was reasonable” and (4)
the government “engaged in affirmative misconduct.” Graham
v. SEC, 222 F.3d 994, 1007 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (internal quotations
omitted); LaRouche v. FEC, 28 F.3d 137, 142 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(internal quotations omitted); see also GAO v. Gen. Accounting
Office Pers. Appeals Bd., 698 F.2d 516, 526 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(“Estoppel generally requires that government agents
engage—by commission or omission—in conduct that can be
characterized as misrepresentation or concealment, or, at least,
behave in ways that have or will cause an egregiously unfair
result.”).
First, the May 9, 2002 letter made no representation one way
or the other regarding Morris’s Waiver Request but stated only
that “[w]ithin 30 days of this letter we will mail you either a
resolution . . . or a letter telling you when you can expect a
resolution.” Letter from Mark A. Reger, CFO, FCC to Frederick
M. Joyce and Marianne Roach Casserly, Attorneys, Alston &
Bird LLP (May 9, 2002). Nowhere did the Commission
represent that, if it failed to respond within that period, Morris
should deem the waiver granted. Second, the FCC’s acceptance
of Morris’s post-default installment payments was not a
“definite representation” that waiver was granted because
Morris had been expressly warned in the April 26, 2002 default
letter that “[a]ny amounts that were, or will be, tendered after
the acceleration are being applied to the sums owing under the
Loan Documents . . . [and the] acceptance by the Commission
of any amounts comprising less than the entire debt shall not be
deemed to be a cure of the Borrower’s Default, a waiver of any
other default under the Rules or Loan Documents, or a
reinstatement by the Commission of the terms of the Loan
Documents.” Letter from Mark Reger, CFO, FCC, to Morris
Communications, Inc. at 2 (Apr. 26, 2002). Finally, neither the
FCC’s receipt of Morris’s Notifications of Buildout nor its
 15

approval of the STAs constitutes a “definite” representation
regarding Morris’s Waiver Request. Moreover, while the
Commission’s three-year silence is egregious, it does not
constitute “affirmative misconduct.” Accordingly, Morris has
not shown that equitable estoppel should be applied to the
Commission.
C. Morris’s Remaining Arguments
Morris’s remaining arguments are also without merit.
Although the Commission failed to comply with 47 C.F.R.
§ 1.1911(e), requiring it to respond to “communications from [a]
debtor[] within 30 days whenever feasible,” its non-compliance
does not affect its automatic cancellation authority. See 47
C.F.R. § 1.1902(f) (“Nothing in this subpart [(encompassing
§ 1.1911(e))] shall supercede [sic] or invalidate other
Commission rules, such as the . . . general competitive bidding
rules . . . or the service specific competitive bidding rules, as
may be amended, regarding the Commission’s rights, including
but not limited to the Commission’s right to cancel a license or
authorization, obtain judgment, or collect interest, penalties, and
administrative costs.”) (emphasis added).7

7
To the extent Morris argues that the Commission’s processing of
the Notifications of Buildout as well as the two STAs violated 47
C.F.R. § 1.1910(b)(2), which prohibits the Commission “from taking
action on any application ‘by any entity found to be delinquent in its
debt to the Commission,’” Br. of Appellant at 14 (quoting 47 C.F.R.
§ 1.1910(b)(2)), the argument is waived because Morris failed to raise
it before the Commission. Qwest Corp. v. FCC, 482 F.3d 471, 474
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (“‘[This Court] generally lack[s] jurisdiction to
review arguments that have not first been presented to the
Commission.’”) (citation omitted).
 16

Morris’s administrative due process argument—that is, the
FCC failed to provide an “administrative hearing prior to any
revocation of its authorizations to operate the two constructed
SMR stations,” Br. of Appellant at 24—incorrectly assumes that
the Commission in fact authorized full operation of the SMR
stations. It did not. Rather, it merely granted Morris special
temporary authority while Morris’s appeal was pending. As for
Morris’s contention that the Commission violated its right to
administrative due process by automatically cancelling the nine
SMR licenses, it is also without merit. The Communications
Act of 1934 provides that “no . . . license shall be construed to
create any right, beyond the terms, conditions, and periods of the
license,” 47 U.S.C. § 301, and Morris’s licenses stated on their
face that they were “conditioned upon the full and timely
payment of all moneys due.” E.g. Morris Commc’ns, Inc.,
License KNNY352 at 7 (Oct. 16, 1996). Its licenses were thus
contingent on Morris’s timely payment of all amounts owing;
once Morris failed to make the January 31, 2002 payments, the
licenses themselves also lapsed. See L.B. Wilson, Inc. v. FCC,
170 F.2d 793, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1948) (license “right is limited in
time and quality by the terms of the license”).
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the Federal
Communications Commission.
So ordered.