UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 92-1832
BOSTON AND MAINE CORPORATION,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
TOWN OF HAMPTON,
Defendant, Appellee.
BEFORE
Torruella and Cyr, Circuit Judges,
and Keeton,* District Judge.
ORDER OF COURT
Entered October 19, 1993
On March 5, 1993, this court entered judgment affirming
the judgment of the United States District Court for the District
of New Hampshire. An Order denying appellant's petition for
rehearing was entered on April 9, 1993.
On or about October 1, 1993, the Clerk of this court
received from Appellant Boston and Maine Corporation ("B & M") a
Motion to Enlarge Time in Which to File a Renewed Petition for
Rehearing, a Petition for Rehearing, and a Motion to Recall
Mandate. The Clerk received from Appellee Town of Hampton
("Hampton"), on or about October 7, 1993, its Objection to Motion
to Enlarge Time, and on or about October 12, 1993, received its
revised Objection to Motion to Recall Mandate.
* Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.
Calling attention to the Opinion of the Supreme Court
of New Hampshire in Schoff v. City of Somersworth, handed down
August 31, 1993 (explicitly declaring erroneous two parts of this
court's assessment of the substantive law of New Hampshire
regarding municipal liability), B & M moves that this court
recall its mandate and enlarge the time for a petition for
rehearing. Citing Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp.,
424 F.2d 427 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 801 (1970), B & M
asserts that, under Fed. R. App. P. 26(b) and 40, this court "has
the power to accept a petition for rehearing which is filed
beyond the stated 14 day time limit for filing of such
pleadings." B & M's Motion to Enlarge Time, p. 4.
Although Rule 40 does grant the appellate courts
authority to extend the time for filing a petition for rehearing,
a court can do so only while it has jurisdiction over the case.
We lack jurisdiction here. The mandate issued in this case on
April 20, 1993, and "[i]ssuance of the mandate formally marks the
end of appellate jurisdiction." Johnson v. Bechtel Associates
Professional Corp., 801 F.2d 412, 415 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
Braniff Airways, the sole support cited by B & M for
its proposed enlargement of time, is not to the contrary. In
Braniff Airways, the Second Circuit determined that the case
before it was still "sub judice." Braniff Airways, 424 F.2d at
429. The court then based its decision in part on Huddleston v.
Dwyer, 322 U.S. 232 (1944), in which the Supreme Court "indicated
that so long as the case was 'sub judice' the court of appeals
should have entertained the petition for rehearing based on a
change in state law" after its decision. Braniff Airways, 424
F.2d at 429. Mandate having issued in the case before us,
however, it is no longer sub judice and we lack authority to
consider a petition for rehearing.
Other circuits have similarly declined to consider a
petition for rehearing when no part of the case remained sub
judice. See, e.g., Johnson, 801 F.2d at 415 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(court did not have jurisdiction over petition for rehearing
after mandate had been issued); Iverson v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 257 F.d 408, 409 (3d. Cir. 1958) ("With the
mandates on the judgments here involved outstanding, it is
doubtful whether this court would have jurisdiction to consider a
petition for rehearing.").
Precedents suggest, however, that even after the
judgment of a court of appeals has become final and the court no
longer has jurisdiction to consider a subsequently filed petition
for rehearing, the court may reestablish jurisdiction by
recalling its mandate (either on motion or on its own
initiative). See Johnson, 801 F.2d at 416; Greater Boston
Television Corp. v. FCC, 463 F.2d 268 (D.C. Cir. 1971); see also
Powers v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 483 F.2d 963 (1st Cir. 1973).
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B & M has moved for a recall of mandate in this case.
We are troubled by the "intricate maze of
relationships," Goncalves v. INS, Nos. 92-1122 and 92-2272, slip
op. at 15 (1st Cir. Sept. 28, 1993), that would be created, were
we to assert this suggested "inherent authority" to recall a
mandate. What, for example, would be the effect on jurisdiction
in the district court, after a mandate is recalled and then
reissued? And what reasoned explanation would justify the
divergence between fixed time limits on the district court's
ability to amend a judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 and the
absence of like time limits on the suggested inherent authority
of the appellate courts to recall a mandate, even if acting on
precisely the same grounds? Would vesting such exceptional power
solely in courts of appeal create an area of essentially
original, rather than appellate, jurisdiction in courts of appeal
over closed cases?
Another troubling thought about this procedural maze is
that the precedents for recalling a mandate may have been rooted
in practices developed before adoption of the Federal Rules (of
Civil Procedure and Appellate Procedure), and at a time when a
court retained jurisdiction over cases decided in a term of court
until that term ended. To continue this practice of recalling a
mandate now, when an appellate court's "term" has less
significance, risks extending indefinitely the authority of the
court over closed cases. Neither the courts nor the parties who
rely upon the finality of their judgments would welcome such an
extension.
We conclude, however, that we need not resolve these
concerns to decide this case. Instead, we assume in B & M's
favor, without so deciding, that a court of appeals may reassert
jurisdiction over a case by recalling its mandate, and, after
jurisdiction is thus reestablished, may consider an otherwise
untimely petition for rehearing. See Johnson, 801 F.2d at 416;
Greater Boston Television Corp., 463 F.2d at 275-80. Even if
this authority to recall a mandate still exists, it "should be
exercised sparingly, and only upon a showing of exceptional
circumstances." Dilley v. Alexander, 627 F.2d 407, 411 (D.C.
Cir. 1980) (internal citations omitted); see also Powers, 483
F.2d at 964. Resort to recall power is an "extraordinary step,"
and "should not be used simply as a device for granting late
rehearing." Johnson, 801 F.2d at 416.
In denying a motion to recall mandate in a previous
case (before the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure were
adopted), this court emphasized the need to bring an orderly end
to litigation:
If we were in error [in this case], of which
we are not presently persuaded, we believe it
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would be far greater error to permit
reconsideration now after denial of petitions
for rehearing and certiorari. There must be
an end to dispute. If a situation arose,
such as a subsequent decision by the Supreme
Court, which showed that our original
judgment was demonstrably wrong, a motion to
recall mandate might be entertained. The
present case is far from that.
Legate v. Maloney, 348 F.2d 164, 166 (1st Cir. 1965).
This earlier declaration retains its full force today.
The judgment in the case before us is not demonstrably wrong.
Indeed, as Hampton correctly argues, the precise issues of
substantive law presented by this case were not before the
Supreme Court of New Hampshire in either of the two recent cases
brought to our attention by B & M. Thus, although the Supreme
Court of New Hampshire has explicitly declared parts of our
reasoning in this case erroneous, we would only compound our
error by reopening a dispute in which our judgment was not
demonstrably wrong.
Moreover, as Hampton observes, all parties were aware
that the Schoff case was pending when this case was filed, and
plaintiff
was free to file this action in state
court..., to seek to certify the question
presented in this case to the New Hampshire
Supreme Court while this case remained open,
to move to have this court stay consideration
of this matter until the New Hampshire
Supreme Court decided Schoff, or to seek a
writ of certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court following this Court's March 5,
1993 decision. Instead, the plaintiff chose
not to pursue these alternatives and no
manifest injustice would result in requiring
the plaintiff to be bound by the ruling of
the forum it did select.
Hampton's (revised) Objection to Motion to Enlarge Time, p. 7.
In these circumstances, we conclude that it would be not only
unwarranted but unjust to recall the mandate in this case.
Appellant's motion to enlarge time to file a renewed
petition for rehearing and appellant's motion to recall mandate
are denied.
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