UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 94-1473
JOHN M. HEGARTY AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF
KATHERINE A. HEGARTY, AND INDIVIDUALLY,
Plaintiff, Appellee,
v.
SOMERSET COUNTY, GARY WRIGHT, RENE GUAY, WILFRED HINES,
THOMAS GIROUX JR., WILLIAM CRAWFORD, JR.,
Defendants, Appellants.
No. 94-1474
JOHN M. HEGARTY AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF
KATHERINE A. HEGARTY,
Plaintiff, Appellee,
v.
SOMERSET COUNTY, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees,
GARY WRIGHT,
Defendant, Appellant.
Before
Selya, Cyr and Boudin,
Circuit Judges.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER OF COURT
Entered May 31, 1994
Katherine Hegarty was shot and killed in her Jackman, Maine
home by police officers attempting to execute a warrantless entry
and arrest. Her husband, James, both individually and on behalf
of his wife's estate, brought suit for money damages, against the
officers involved, county and state supervisory personnel, and
Somerset County. The suit alleged claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
1983 as well as pendent state claims under the Maine Civil Rights
Act, 5 M.R.S.A. 4681-4685 (Supp. 1993), and the Maine Tort
Claims Act, 14 M.R.S.A. 8101-8118 (1980 & Supp. 1993).
The defendants moved for summary judgment on the basis of
qualified immunity. The court granted summary judgment in favor
of Somerset County and the supervisory personnel on the federal
and state civil rights claims. The court denied summary judgment
on the basis of qualified immunity to the individual officers
involved - Gary Wright, Rene Guay, Wilfred Hines, Thomas Guiroux,
Jr., and William Crawford, Jr.1
The five officers have taken an immediate interlocutory
appeal of the denial of qualified immunity. See Mitchell v.
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985). These defendants asked the
district court to stay discovery in the case while these appeals
are pending. The district court denied that request. It ordered
(a) plaintiff to designate experts and disclose expert testimony
by May 15, 1994; (b) defendants to designate experts and disclose
expert testimony by June 1, 1994; and (c) both parties to
complete discovery by July 1, 1994. It set an expected trial
date of August 15, 1994.
In denying the officers' request to stay discovery, the
court concluded that "a significant amount of discovery remains"
and that "that discovery would not disrupt greatly the operation
of State government." It also stated that "The Court made it
clear to counsel that the whole purpose with proceeding with
discovery is not to waste the time pending the First Circuit
Court decision in the event the Court affirms the District Court
1Apart from asserting qualified immunity as a defense to
Hegarty's claims under 1983 and the Maine Civil Rights Act, all
the defendants asserted "discretionary immunity" under state law
for the claims brought pursuant to the Maine Tort Claims Act.
The court found that all the defendants, except Somerset County,
are immune from suit on Hegarty's state tort claims on the basis
of discretionary immunity.
So, what remains is this: Hegarty's 1983 and Maine Civil
Rights Act claims against the five individual officers and
Hegarty's Maine Tort Claims Act claims against Somerset County.
opinion on qualified immunity."
On May 9, 1994, we entered an order granting the officers'
emergency request to stay district court discovery pending their
appeal of the denial of qualified immunity. The request was
granted "pending further order of this court." We now elaborate
the basis for our May 9 order and extend the stay of discovery
pending our determination of these appeals.
A qualified immunity defense is an immunity from suit and
the rationale for allowing an immediate appeal from the denial of
qualified immunity is that the immunity from suit is effectively
lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial. See
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. at 525-27. The immunity from suit
includes protection from the burdens of discovery. "Until this
threshold immunity question is resolved, discovery should not be
allowed." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). We
recognize that Harlow's reference to staying discovery was in the
context of the district court's resolution of the immunity
question. But in light of the Court's later determination that a
denial of qualified immunity is entitled to immediate appellate
review, see Mitchell v. Forsyth, supra, we believe that the stay
of discovery, of necessity, ordinarily must carry over through
the appellate court's resolution of that question, so long as the
appeal is non-frivolous. The rationale for staying discovery
applies with no less force while the appeal, to which the
officers are entitled, proceeds. It is important to note what is
not involved here. As the officers concede, the district court,
prior to its ruling on the issue of qualified immunity, properly
ordered some discovery limited to that issue. See Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 n.6 (1987) (reciting that discovery
tailored specifically to the question of qualified immunity may
be necessary before a motion for summary judgment on qualified
immunity grounds can be resolved). What the district court
thereafter authorized, and what we have stayed pending these
appeals, is more extensive discovery directed at the merits of
the case.2
We need go no further. For the reasons cited, we stay
further discovery pending resolution of the instant appeals.
2We also point out that the underlying case is one for money
damages only and does not request injunctive relief, as to which
a defense of qualified immunity is immaterial. Cf. Lugo v.
Alvarado, 819 F.2d 5 (1st Cir. 1987) (concluding that equitable
claims stand on a different footing than damage claims, so as to
authorize a district court to permit discovery as to the
equitable claims).