United States v. Schiavo

                  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                      FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                                           

No. 93-1912

                    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                            Appellant,

                                v.

                         KENNETH SCHIAVO,

                       Defendant-Appellee.

                                           

           APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

         [Hon. Edward F. Harrington, U.S. District Judge]
                                                        

                                           

                              Before

                    Torruella, Circuit Judge,
                                            

                  Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                              

                    and Selya, Circuit Judge.
                                            

                                           

     George W. Vien, Assistant  United States Attorney, with whom
                   
A. John  Pappalardo,  United  States  Attorney,  and  Geoffrey E.
                                                                 
Hobart,  Assistant  United States  Attorney,  were  on brief  for
      
appellant.
     Paul F. Markham for appellee.
                    

                                           

                          July 13, 1994
                                           

          TORRUELLA,   Circuit  Judge.    In  this  interlocutory
                                     

appeal,  the government  challenges  the  district court's  order

suppressing evidence seized during the course of a  motor vehicle

stop.  We affirm.

                            BACKGROUND
                                      

          Kenneth Schiavo, Howard Winter, and Gennaro Farina were

the subject of  a drug  investigation by federal  agents and  the

Massachusetts  State Police.   As part of  the investigation, the

government provided  a confidential informant ("CI")  with $9,000

in government funds in a White New Balance bag to be used for the

purchase of  drugs.1  On November  4, 1991, the CI  met Winter at

the  Centurian Pub  in  Sutton, Massachusetts,  and gave  him the

$9,000 as partial payment  for a kilogram of cocaine  that Winter

had delivered on November 1,  1991.  After Winter took the  cash,

agents followed him with  the intention of recovering the  money.

Agents also followed Schiavo,  whom they believed to  be Winter's

source of cocaine.

          After Winter  left the  Centurian Pub,  he went  to his

home in the Worcester area,  then to Pudgie's Lounge ("Pudgie's")

in  Worcester.  He then  left Pudgie's, went  home, and returned.

After  exiting Pudgie's the second time, he went to the Chandlery

Pub in Chelsea.  Prior to Winter's  arrival at the Chandlery Pub,

agents  had  followed  Schiavo  to this  location.    When Winter

arrived, Schiavo's  vehicle was parked outside.   Winter remained

                    

1  Prior to providing the CI with this money,  agents photocopied
each  bill  in order  to memorialize  the  serial numbers  of the
currency to be transferred to Winter.

                               -2-

in  the pub for approximately twenty minutes and then departed in

his  vehicle.   Approximately  five  minutes  after Winter  left,

Schiavo came out  of the  restaurant, got into  his vehicle,  and

exited the parking lot.

          Trooper  Thomas P.  Duffy  of the  Massachusetts  State

Police  and several  other investigating  agents had  developed a

strategy to recover the  $9,000.  Agents expected Winter  to meet

with Schiavo to give him the money that he had just received from

the CI.  In the event  that Schiavo met with Winter, agents would

stop Schiavo's car.

          In  accordance with this  plan, Trooper  Duffy followed

Schiavo in  an unmarked cruiser  when Schiavo left  the Chandlery

Pub.   As  Schiavo  drove onto  Broadway  Street  in  Somerville,

Massachusetts,  Trooper   Duffy,  who  was  dressed  in  uniform,

signalled  to  Schiavo to  pull over.    Schiavo pulled  into the

parking lot of  a nearby supermarket, parked, and got  out of his

vehicle.   Trooper Duffy asked Schiavo to produce his license and

registration.2    When  Schiavo  stood up  after  retrieving  the

registration from the glove  compartment, Trooper Duffy noticed a

large bulge  protruding from the  left side of  Schiavo's jacket.

Trooper  Duffy immediately  asked  Schiavo if  he  had a  weapon.

Schiavo responded that  he did  not.   Pointing to  the bulge  in

Schiavo's jacket, Trooper Duffy asked  Schiavo, "Is this all  you

here?,"  to which  Schiavo  responded, "Mostly."   Trooper  Duffy

                    

2  Trooper  Duffy was  wearing a transmitting  device during  his
encounter with Schiavo.

                               -3-

again asked Schiavo  about the  nature of the  bulge and  Schiavo

informed  him that it  was a bag.   At that  point, Trooper Duffy

conducted a pat frisk of Schiavo.

          After  Trooper Duffy completed  the pat  frisk, Schiavo

began to unzip  his jacket in an apparent effort  to show Trooper

Duffy that  he was not  carrying a weapon.   Without being asked,

Schiavo stuck his hand  inside his coat.  Concerned  that Schiavo

was indeed armed, Trooper Duffy immediately instructed Schiavo to

raise  his hands.    Trooper Duffy  noticed  a brown  bag  inside

Schiavo's jacket and  asked what it  contained.  Schiavo  stated,

"Just open my coat and take it."  Schiavo then told Trooper Duffy

that the bag contained approximately $11,000.

          When Trooper Duffy inspected  the contents of the paper

bag, he found that it contained the white New Balance plastic bag

that the  CI had  given to  Winter  earlier.   The bag  contained

$8,500.  After discovering this money, Trooper Duffy seized money

from  Schiavo's shirt  pocket and  the two  front pockets  of his

pants.   In  total, Trooper  Duffy seized  $12,500 from  Schiavo,

including the $9,000 given to Winter by the CI.

          After   his  indictment,  Schiavo  filed  a  motion  to

suppress the currency as evidence.  The district court found that

because the incriminating nature of the bulge in Schiavo's pocket

was  not immediately apparent  to Trooper Duffy  upon his initial

pat  frisk, the  "plain feel"  doctrine espoused in  Minnesota v.
                                                              

Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993), did not justify seizure of the
         

money  during the  Terry protective  patdown  search.   The court
                        

                               -4-

further found that Trooper Duffy at no time had probable cause to

believe that Schiavo possessed the serialized money and therefore

Trooper Duffy did  not have  a justification to  seize the  money

based on exigent circumstances.

                        STANDARD OF REVIEW
                                          

          We  review  the  district  court's  findings  of  fact,

following the  suppression hearing,  including mixed findings  of

fact  and  law, for  clear error.    United States  v. Rodr guez-
                                                                 

Morales,  929  F.2d 780,  783  (1st Cir.  1991).    We afford  no
       

deference, however,  to findings of the district  court under the

wrong legal standard.  Id.
                         

                       PLAIN FEEL DOCTRINE
                                          

          "[S]earches and seizures conducted outside the judicial

process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate are per se
                                                                 

unreasonable  under the Fourth Amendment -- subject only to a few

specifically   established   and  well   delineated  exceptions."

Minnesota  v. Dickerson, 113  S. Ct. 2130,  2135 (1993) (internal
                       

citations and quotations omitted).   One exception, recognized in

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), is that "where a police officer
             

observes unusual  conduct which leads him  reasonably to conclude

in  light of his experience  that criminal activity  may be afoot

the  officer  may briefly  stop  the suspicious  person  and make

reasonable  inquiries  aimed  at  confirming  or  dispelling  his

suspicions."  Id.  (internal citations  and quotations  omitted).
                

Under Terry, an officer  may also conduct a patdown  search where
           

the  officer is justified in  believing that the  person is armed

                               -5-

and  dangerous to the officer or others.   Terry, 392 U.S. at 24.
                                                

This  protective  search  must  be  "limited  to  that  which  is

necessary for the  discovery of  weapons which might  be used  to

harm  the officer  or others  nearby."  Id.  at 26;  Dickerson at
                                                              

2136.

          During  a lawful Terry-type search, police officers may
                                

seize an  object in "plain view"  without a warrant  if they have

probable  cause to  believe it  is contraband  without conducting

some further  search of  the object,  i.e., if  its incriminating

character  is  "immediately  apparent."   Dickerson  at  2136-37.
                                                   

Likewise, the "plain  feel" doctrine permits an  officer to seize

an object, if its incriminating character is immediately apparent

during a lawful protective pat-search.  Id. at 2137-38.
                                          

          In  the present case, there is no doubt that the police

were justified under Terry  in stopping Schiavo and frisking  him
                          

for weapons.  The issue we must therefore address is "whether the

officer who  conducted the  search was acting  within the  lawful

bounds marked  by Terry at the  time he gained  probable cause to
                       

believe"  that the  bulge  in Schiavo's  jacket was  contraband.3

Id. at 4548.  The district court found that he did not.  We quote
  

from the district court's Memorandum and Order:

            At the suppression hearing, Trooper Duffy
            repeatedly asserted that  he did not know
            what  the bulge  contained even  after he
            had conducted the pat frisk.  In fact, he
            indicated  that only  after he  had taken
            the  bag of  money from  Schiavo's jacket

                    

3  The government  does not assert that the  serialized money was
in "plain view" at the time of the search.  

                               -6-

            and examined its contents  was he able to
            determine  what the  bulge was.   Because
            Trooper Duffy did not know what the bulge
            was  after  the  initial  pat  frisk  and
            because he  needed to conduct  a further,
            unwarranted  search of the  bulge and its
            contents  to determine  what it  was, the
            "plain   feel"   doctrine   espoused   in
            Dickerson does not apply.
                     

          The  district court properly applied the legal standard

described in Dickerson.  The district court's conclusion that the
                      

incriminating nature  of the  bulge in Schiavo's  pocket was  not

"immediately apparent"  is not clearly erroneous.   Trooper Duffy

"overstepped the bounds of  the strictly circumscribed search for

weapons  allowed under  Terry."   Id. at  4548.   Trooper Duffy's
                                    

continued exploration of the brown paper bag in  Schiavo's pocket

"after having concluded that it contained no weapon was unrelated

to the  sole justification of the  search under Terry: .  . . the
                                                     

protection  of the police officer's  and others nearby."   Id. at
                                                             

4548 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

             PROBABLE CAUSE AND EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES
                                                     

          The  Supreme  Court  has  held that  in  light  of  the

exigency arising out  of the likely  disappearance of a  vehicle,

warrantless searches of  a vehicle do not  contravene the Warrant

Clause  of the Fourth Amendment when such searches are based upon

probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of a

crime.   California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 569 (1991); Carroll
                                                                 

v. United States, 267  U.S. 132, 158-159 (1925).  In Acevedo, the
                                                            

Supreme Court extended this  exception to containers found within

a movable vehicle.  The Court held that where police had probable

                               -7-

cause to  search a  container, in that  case, a  brown paper  bag

located in the  trunk of  the car, the  Fourth Amendment did  not

require "the  police to obtain  a warrant to  open the sack  in a

movable vehicle simply because they lack probable cause to search

the entire car."  Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 573.
                         

          Although the  government  does  not  contend  that  the

currency  was   seized  pursuant  to  a   vehicular  search,  the

government does  maintain  that exigent  circumstances  justified

seizure  of the  money without a  warrant.   The search  of one's

person  is more intrusive on  the rights protected  by the Fourth

Amendment than the search  of an automobile.  Cardwell  v. Lewis,
                                                                

417  U.S.  583,  590  (1974) (citing  Almeida-S nchez  v.  United
                                                                 

States,  413  U.S. 266,  179  (1973)  (Powell, J.,  concurring)).
      

Hence, circumstances which could  justify a warrantless search of

an automobile  will not necessarily justify  a warrantless search

of a person.   In the present case, we  need  not reach the issue

of whether exigent circumstances justified the warrantless search

of the paper bag located in Schiavo's jacket because we find that

the district court did not err  in holding that the police lacked

probable cause to  believe that Schiavo had  the serialized money

at the time of the search at issue in this case.

          "In  enforcing  the   Fourth  Amendment's   prohibition

against  unreasonable  searches  and   seizures,  the  Court  has

insisted  upon probable  cause  as a  minimum  requirement for  a

reasonable search  permitted by  the Constitution."   Chambers v.
                                                              

Maroney,  399 U.S.  42,  51 (1970);  see  also United  States  v.
                                                             

                               -8-

Ramsey, 431  U.S. 606, 622 (1977) (vehicular  searches inside the
      

country require probable cause).   Absent probable cause, exigent

circumstances would  not bring the warrantless  search of Schiavo

within the bounds of the Fourth Amendment.4

          The government challenges the district  court's finding

that at the  time of  the search, Trooper  Duffy lacked  probable

cause to believe that Schiavo possessed the serialized money.  In

its initial Memorandum and Order5 the district court stated:

            I note in passing that Duffy did not have
            probable cause to believe that  the money
            was in Schiavo's  possession.  More  than
            two  hours had  passed  between the  CI's
            delivery  of  the  money  to  Winter  and
            Winter's   arrival   at  the   Chandlery.
            During  this  time,  Winter   stopped  at
            several places,  at any  one of  which he
            could have  left the  money.   There  was
            therefore  not  even  probable  cause  to
            believe that  Winter had the money in his
            possession when he entered the Chandlery.
            Further, no  one ever saw  Winter deliver

                    

4   The government argues  that probable  cause developed  during
Trooper  Duffy's  encounter with  Schiavo.    This contention  is
without  merit.   This  argument overlooks  the district  court's
factfinding.  The district court  found that, "only after Trooper
Duffy  had taken  the  bag of  money  from Schiavo's  jacket  and
examined its contents  was he  able to determine  what the  bulge
was."   This is a fact-specific finding, well within the district
court's  ken.    Given   the  "greatly  circumscribed"  scope  of
appellate review  applicable to  such findings, United  States v.
                                                              
Rutkowski, 877 F.2d  139, 144 (1st Cir. 1989), we must accept it.
         
Thus,  because Trooper  Duffy was  not  acting within  the lawful
bounds marked by Terry at the time he realized that  the bulge in
                      
Schiavo's jacket  was either contraband  or evidence of  a crime,
the search that gave rise to this discovery does not satisfy  the
requirements of the  Fourth Amendment.   See Wong  Sun v.  United
                                                                 
States,  371  U.S.  471 (1963)  ("fruit  of  the  poisonous tree"
      
doctrine).  

5   Following  the  Supreme Court's  decision  in Dickerson,  the
                                                           
district  court reconsidered  and  reaffirmed its  initial  Order
allowing Schiavo's motion to suppress the currency seized. 

                               -9-

            any  money to  Schiavo at  the Chandlery.
            Duffy conceded that he had only a "hunch"
            that  Schiavo  had  the serialized  money
            when  he  left   the  Chandlery.[6]     I
            consequently find that prior  to stopping
            Schiavo,  Duffy's hunch  did not  rise to
            probable  cause  to believe  that Schiavo
            possessed   the    serialized   currency.
            Although  Duffy did not  conduct a search
            of  Schiavo's vehicle, I simply note that
            the evidence indicates that he would not,
            therefore,  have  had  probable cause  to
            support a warrantless search of Schiavo's
            vehicle.

          This  finding  by the  district  court  is not  clearly

erroneous.    We  therefore  affirm the  district  court's  order

suppressing  the evidence  seized  during the  stop of  Schiavo's

vehicle.

          Affirmed.
                  

                    

6  In a footnote the district court stated that  "This hunch only
extended  to the money being generally inside the vehicle.  Duffy
admitted that he  never anticipated  that the money  would be  on
Schiavo's person."

                               -10-