September 21, 1994
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 94-1522
DANIEL COLON, JR.,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
APEX MARINE CORPORATION C/O WESTCHESTER SHIPPING COMPANY, INC.,
and WESTCHESTER MARINE, INC. and WESTCHESTER MARINE SHIPPING COMPANY,
INC. and VERTIGO, INC., d/b/a TILLIES KING SHIPPING COMPANY,
Defendant, Appellees.
ERRATA SHEET
The opinion of this Court issued on September 15, 1994, is
amended as follows:
On cover sheet, replace "[Hon. Jacob Hagopian, U.S. Magistrate
Judge]" with "[Hon. Ronald R. Lagueux, U.S. District Judge]".
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 94-1522
DANIEL COLON, JR.,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
APEX MARINE CORPORATION C/O WESTCHESTER SHIPPING COMPANY, INC.,
and WESTCHESTER MARINE, INC. and WESTCHESTER MARINE SHIPPING COMPANY,
INC. and VERTIGO, INC., d/b/a TILLIES KING SHIPPING COMPANY,
Defendant, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
[Hon. Jacob Lagueux, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Boudin, Circuit Judge,
Aldrich, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Young,* District Judge.
Carroll E. Ayers for appellant.
Gordon Arnott with whom Gregory O'Neill, Hill, Betts & Nash,
Charles N. Redihan, Jr., Thomas C. Plunkett and Kiernan, Plunkett &
Redihan were on brief for appellees Apex Marine Corporation and
Westchester Marine Shipping Company, Inc.
September 21, 1994
*Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.
Per Curiam. This case presents an interesting issue
concerning the reach of the "scope of employment" requirement
under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 688, as applied to a unique
set of facts. In explaining its decision to grant the
defense motion for summary judgment, Colon v. Apex Marine
Corp., 832 F. Supp. 508 (D.R.I. 1993), the district court
issued a decision thoroughly analyzing the precedents and the
pertinent facts. Although the legal question presented is
open to reasonable debate, we agree with the district court's
resolution and do not think that we can improve upon the
reasoning set forth in its decision. Accordingly, on the
central issue we affirm on the grounds set forth in the
decision of the district court.
The only remaining issue is the claim that the district
court abused its discretion in refusing to allow an amendment
to the complaint to assert a new cause of action based on
unseaworthiness. This case relates to an incident that
occurred in December 1987; the defense motion for summary
judgment was filed in November 1992; and the motion to amend
the complaint was filed only after the district court in
September 1993 granted the motion for summary judgment. The
motion gave no adequate reason to excuse this substantial
delay in moving to amend. Under the circumstances, we do not
think that the district court abused its discretion in
denying the motion as untimely.
-2-
Affirmed.
-3-