United States v. Medina Puerta

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 93-2167

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

ANTONIO MEDINA PUERTA,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Robert E. Keeton, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Selya, Circuit Judge,

Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,

and Boudin, Circuit Judge.

Morris M. Goldings with whom Richard S. Jacobs and Mahoney,

Hawkes & Goldings were on brief for appellant.

Timothy Q. Feeley, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom

Donald K. Stern, United States Attorney, was on brief for the United

States.

October 21, 1994

BOUDIN, Circuit Judge. On September 5, 1991, a grand

jury indicted Antonio Medina Puerta, charging him with one

count of bank fraud under 18 U.S.C. 1344 and one count of

transportation in foreign commerce of stolen or fraudulently

obtained funds under 18 U.S.C. 2314. The gist of the

events described in the indictment was that Medina had

deposited a $365 check in his Bank of Boston account,

knowingly misrepresented the amount as $365,000, ultimately

received a credit of $365,000 to his account, and then

transferred $350,000 of these fraudulently obtained funds to

his account in an English bank.

At arraignment on October 8, 1991, the magistrate-judge

ordered that pre-trial motions by the defense be filed by

November 1, 1991. On this deadline, Medina filed a number of

motions that were subsequently resolved. Medina's trial date

was repeatedly delayed, largely at his own request, until

January 4, 1993. In the meantime, on November 24, 1992,

following a change of counsel by Medina, his new counsel

submitted five additional pre-trial motions, accompanied by a

motion seeking leave to file the motions late.

One of these motions--with which this appeal is in part

concerned--asked that the case be dismissed on the ground

that it was being pursued in breach of a promise by the

prosecutor made in 1987 not to prosecute if Medina made

restitution to the bank of $200,000. The government opposed

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the motion to file out of time. On December 30, 1992, the

district court denied the request to file motions out of time

(with exceptions not here relevant), ruling that good cause

had not been shown for the late filing. The court also said

that it had "nevertheless" examined the substantive motions

to see whether an exception should be made in the interests

of justice; in giving a negative answer, the court found the

assertions made in support of the motion to dismiss were

insufficient to justify an evidentiary hearing.

Medina was tried in January 1993. The evidence, taken

in the light most favorable to the government, see United

States v. Ford, 22 F.3d 374, 382 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 63

U.S.L.W. 3265 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1994), showed the following. In

1986 Medina was a research associate at a non-profit research

organization in Boston then known as the Eye Research

Institute. Medina had been born and raised in Spain and was

fluent in both English and Spanish. He had Spanish graduate

degrees in optics and engineering and a graduate degree in

electrical engineering from Massachusetts Institute of

Technology.

On November 3, 1986, Medina deposited a check in his

account in that branch of the Bank of Boston where he did

most of his banking. The check was a bank check prepared by

Banco Central of Spain, dated October 30, 1986, at Toledo,

Spain, and was made payable to Medina. The written

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designation of the amount was, in Spanish, "Dolares USA,

Trescientos Sesenta Y Cinco," which translates as "three

hundred and sixty-five U.S. dollars." There was also an

arabic-numeral expression of the amount in a small box on the

right-hand side of the check: "USD 365,ooo." The words

"First National Bank of Boston" appear on the check, and both

the government and Medina have described it as a check drawn

on Banco Central's own checking account at the Bank of

Boston.

When Medina deposited the check in his account on

November 3, 1986, he listed the amount on the deposit slip as

"$365,000." Two days later, on November 5, Medina returned

to the branch and requested a customer service

representative, Lisa Popielski, to wire $350,000 from

Medina's checking account to an account in England. Apart

from the November 3 deposit, Medina's balance was about

$3,000. Popielski said that she needed to verify that the

check had been collected and asked Medina to return the next

day. When Medina returned on November 6, Popielski told him

that the $365,000 credit had been deleted from his account

and the check had been returned to him by mail. She told him

to bring the check back to her if he intended to redeposit

it.

The following day, November 7, Medina returned with the

check and Popielski told Medina that the check had been

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returned for lack of his endorsement; he then signed the back

of the check, Popielski filled out a second deposit slip for

him in the amount of $365,000, and Medina redeposited the

check into his account. On November 12, Medina returned to

the bank and signed a wire transfer order, directing the

transfer of $350,000 to an account in his name at Lloyd's

Bank in Cambridge, England. Later that morning the funds

were wired to England.

When interviewed by the FBI in early December 1986,

Medina admitted that he had deposited the check but explained

that he thought that the check was funding from a Spanish

ministry for a research grant for his work at the Eye

Research Institute. He said that he had purchased about

$150,000 worth of equipment in Spain where it remained and

where some of the research was to be conducted. Medina

subsequently gave to the FBI a letter from a Spanish ministry

stating that a committee had agreed to propose the funding of

a grant.

Medina also submitted to the FBI a summary document

prepared within the National Institutes of Health which

recommended NIH approval of a research application by Medina

with proposed funding of $282,286. There was evidence at

trial that this application had never been finally approved

and that, if it had been funded, the Eye Research Institute

and not Medina would have received the funds. There was also

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some evidence, apparently disputed, that Medina had in fact

purchased $138,755 in specialized equipment in Spain.

At trial it developed that the bank had stumbled

repeatedly. The processing section of the bank had queried

Banco Central about the check, and on November 6, the day

before Medina had redeposited the check, Banco Central had

wired that the proper amount of the check was $365. When

Medina redeposited the check on November 7, only $365 was

debited against Banco Central's account, but Medina was

credited with a $365,000 deposit. An interoffice adjustment

slip was prepared to reduce Medina's deposit by $364,635, but

Medina's account records were not corrected until on or about

November 25 when most of the money had long since been

transferred to England.

Although Medina did not testify, his position at trial

was that this was an innocent misunderstanding. Medina did

present an expert witness who was familiar with Spain and

Spanish accounting who gave testimony on the differences

between American and Spanish practices in the writing and

punctuation of arabic numbers on large checks. The

government's position was that Medina had certainly read the

written Spanish words on the check, which indisputedly

represented its amount as $365, and had known that he was not

entitled to $365,000.

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On January 28, 1993, the jury convicted Medina on both

counts. Thereafter, Medina filed post-trial motions renewing

his request for an evidentiary hearing on the government's

supposed breach of a promise not to prosecute. In a

supplemental memorandum, Medina said that new evidence showed

that the government had a motive to retaliate which explained

its breach of the alleged promise not to prosecute. The

court denied the motions, calling the proffer inadequate. On

September 30, 1993, the court sentenced Medina to 18 months'

imprisonment and required that Medina pay fines or

restitution in a total amount of $150,000. The court stayed

the sentence pending this appeal.

Medina's initial arguments on appeal relate to his pre-

and post-trial requests for a hearing on his claim that the

government breached its promise not to prosecute if

restitution were made. The government says that the original

pre-trial motion was submitted late, together with the

request for leave to file; leave was not granted because no

adequate excuse for the delay was given; and that should be

the end of the matter. Medina, scarcely acknowledging the

refusal to grant his motion to file late, attacks the

district court's ruling that the proffer was insufficient to

justify an evidentiary hearing.

We see no reason to choose between the alternative

grounds for denial of a hearing--lateness and lack of merit--

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because each is adequate. The original motion was filed long

after the deadline with no explanation other than a change of

counsel. Where the district court refuses to allow a new

motion to be filed out of time, the standard on appeal is

abuse of discretion. E.g., United States v. Roberts, 978

F.2d 17, 21 n.5 (1st Cir. 1992). If the district judge had

rested solely on the lateness of the pre-trial motion and

refused to entertain a post-trial replicate of the same

motion, there would be no abuse of discretion. Nor would the

district court's precautionary comment on the merits in

denying leave to file either remove the lateness objection or

alter our standard of review.

The result is no different if we do consider the merits.

In substance, Medina's proffer asserted that in July 1987 an

assistant U.S. attorney advised Medina's then counsel that

the government would not prosecute Medina if he would agree

to make restitution to the bank in the amount of $200,000.

The proffer then concluded: "By the end of 1988, I [Medina]

had paid the Bank of Boston an amount greater than $200,000."

Medina's affidavit was also the basis for the post-trial

motion making the same request for a hearing on the same

ground.

This affidavit does not say that Medina ever formally

accepted the government's offer or that his payments to the

bank were in compliance with the purported agreement. Our

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sense that the affidavit is the product of artful drafting is

reinforced by indications that the Bank of Boston recovered

substantial amounts by attaching Medina's account at another

bank. Medina also made no effort, as far as we can

ascertain, to remedy the deficiencies in his affidavit after

they were first noted by the district court. Evidentiary

hearings are not required when there is no likely prospect

that they will be fruitful. United States v. McAndrews, 12

F.3d 273, 280 (1st Cir. 1993).

The supplementary post-trial claim that the prosecution

was based on a vindictive motive is scarcely worth comment.

Medina's further affidavit on this issue is both sketchy and

jumbled, but rests importantly on a lawsuit brought by Medina

against the government. The government pointed out in a

motion to strike Medina's submission that the lawsuit in

question was brought after Medina had been indicted. Its

untimeliness aside, Medina's new affidavit added little to

the prior one and provided no independent basis for an

evidentiary hearing.

Several of Medina's merits arguments are significant.

We start with those that relate only to bank fraud which was

the offense charged in count I of the indictment. As it

stood at the time Medina deposited his check (it has since

been twice amended), the statute in pertinent part read as

follows:

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(a) Whoever knowingly executes, or attempts to execute,
a scheme or artifice --

(1) to defraud a federally chartered or
insured financial institution or

(2) to obtain any of the moneys, funds,
credits, assets, securities, or other
property owned by, or under the custody
or control of, a federally chartered or
insured financial institution by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises . . . .

[shall be punished as set forth in the
statute].

18 U.S.C. 1344(a).

Count I of the indictment charged that Medina had

executed or attempted to execute a scheme both to defraud a

federally chartered or insured bank and to obtain its

property by false or fraudulent representations. Consistent

with the statutory language, the district judge told the jury

that it could convict on count I if it found either a scheme

to defraud or a scheme to obtain property by means of false

or fraudulent representations.

Medina's first objection is that under subsection

(a)(2), two or more misrepresentations are required1 and

that here, according to Medina, the government charged only

one misrepresentation and proved none at all. The government

responds that the evidence was adequate to show a scheme to

1This issue was left open in United States v. Lilly, 983

F.2d 300, 305 n.10 (1st Cir. 1992), and we have no occasion
to decide it here.

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defraud under subsection (a)(1) so that it does not matter

whether misrepresentations need to be multiple or were

adequately proved under subsection (a)(2). But here, the

false or fraudulent representations charge was also submitted

to the jury as an alternative basis for convicting under

count I. Thus, at least in theory, a problem might be

presented for the government if it had charged only one false

representation or failed to prove any.

In fact, we think that the government's indictment

alleged multiple representations and the evidence permitted

the jury to find at least two. The indictment charged Medina

with making false and fraudulent "representaions" [sic], and

the district court charged the jury that "representations"

were required. Although the indictment also said that

Medina's conduct involved submitting "a check he represented

to be in the amount of $365,000.00, knowing the check to be

in the true amount of $365.00," we do not see why this

generic statement prevented the government from proving that

this representation was made more than once.

As for the adequacy of the evidence, two

misrepresentations could easily have been found. Medina's

first deposit slip said that the check was in the amount of

$365,000 when the words on the check said plainly, although

in Spanish, that the amount was $365. When the check was

redeposited on November 7, Medina again submitted a deposit

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slip in the larger amount. Medina does not claim that the

check was actually for $365,000. Instead he says that

Popielski completed the second deposit slip and that there is

no evidence to show that he (Medina) filled out the first

one.

Ample evidence showed that it was Medina who submitted

the check on November 3 with a deposit slip in the amount of

$365,000; the evidence included surveillance photographs

showing him at the teller's window making a deposit

transaction at the time stamped on the bank of his deposit

slip. As for the redeposit on November 7, again confirmed by

a surveillance photograph of Medina at the teller's window,

it is irrelevant that Popielski wrote the amount on the

second deposit slip so long as Medina knowingly presented it.

Thus, there was proof of at least two false representations

by Medina, one on each presentation of the check.

Medina's second argument on count I is that the district

court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that "the

deposit of a check alone [is not] a misrepresentation" and

that "[a] check is not a factual assertion at all and

therefore cannot be characterized as true or false." These

requested statements were drawn from Williams v. United

States, 458 U.S. 279 (1982), where the Court said that a

check was merely an order to pay funds and did not constitute

an implied representation that the one who made and deposited

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it actually had funds in the account on which the check was

drawn.2 The district court refused to charge the jury in

this case with the language drawn from Williams. We believe

that its decision was correct.

The government in our own case was not relying on any

implied representation that Medina had funds on deposit

sufficient to cover the check. Rather, the government

charged that in depositing the check Medina had affirmatively

misrepresented--at least through the deposit slips--that the

check being deposited was one whose face value was $365,000.

We have read both the indictment and the government's closing

arguments to the jury, and conclude that there is no chance

that the jury misunderstood the government's theory. That

theory does not present the implied misrepresentation problem

addressed in Williams.

Next, in a very brief argument, Medina claims without

explanation that "the only possible victim" of any scheme to

defraud in the present case would have been Banco Central,

admittedly not a federally chartered or insured institution.

The evidence showed the Bank of Boston, which is covered by

the statute, was induced by Medina's misrepresentations to

pay out a large sum to Medina. It is not clear whether Bank

2Williams was a prosecution under a false statements

statute of a defendant who deposited in his account in one
bank a check--not covered by adequate funds--that he drew on
his account in a second bank.

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of Boston might have had a claim against Banco Central or its

account for the latter's mistake in depicting arabic

numerals; Banco Central, after all, had warned Bank of Boston

about the mistake before the redeposit. But that possibility

does not alter the fact that Bank of Boston was the immediate

victim of the fraud.

Finally, Medina makes the interesting argument that the

jury might have convicted Medina without true unanimity, some

(but not all) jurors believing that he had violated section

1344(a)(1), and others (but not all) believing that he

violated section 1344(a)(2). Both the government and Medina

agree that the two subsections identify separate crimes.

Accord United States v. Bonnett, 877 F.2d 1450, 1455 (10th

Cir. 1989). If so, it follows that Medina could not be

convicted of a crime unless the jurors could all agree that

at least one of the subsections had been violated. This same

problem is sometimes presented where a single crime is

defined by several alternative acts any one of which suffices

for conviction.3

The government accepts that unanimity was required but

cites us to a "general rule" that "when a jury returns a

guilty verdict on an indictment charging [in one count]

3Compare United States v. Gipson, 553 F.2d 453 (5th Cir.

1977), involving a statute directed at anyone who "receives,
conceals, stores, barters, sells or disposes of" certain
stolen property. See generally 3 W. LaFave & J. Israel,

Criminal Procedure 23.7 (1984).

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several acts in the conjunctive, the verdict stands if the

evidence is sufficient with respect to any one of the acts

charged." United States v. Murray, 621 F.2d 1163, 1171 n.10

(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 837 (1980). See also

Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 420 (1970). But it is

one thing to say that the evidence is sufficient if adequate

to establish any one of several acts charged in the

alternative; it is quite another to take the general language

of Murray and Turner to foreclose any inquiry into the

adequacy of the instructions.

Here, the government concedes that two separate crimes

were created by the two subsections. Thus, we see no reason

why Medina would not have been entitled on request to an

instruction that the jury had to agree unanimously that

either section (a)(1) or subsection (a)(2) was violated (or

both). Of course, where two separate crimes are charged but

each in a separate count, the problem evaporates because the

jury is told that it must be unanimous on each count of

conviction. Here, the government charged a violation of both

subsections in a single count, and Medina, probably not

wishing to be charged with three counts rather than two,

apparently did not argue that count I was duplicitous. Thus,

the risk of jury confusion cannot be answered here by

pointing to the normal requirement that the jury be unanimous

on any count of conviction.

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The government argues that the district court in this

case charged the jury that it could find either a scheme to

defraud "or" a scheme to obtain monies by means of false

representations; that the government had "to prove each part

of each offense beyond a reasonable doubt"; and that the jury

verdict must be unanimous. But these instructions do not

clearly tell the jury that it had to be unanimous in finding

within count I of the indictment either a scheme to defraud

or a scheme based on false representations. That is perhaps

what the jury would have understood, but it is not

inevitable.

Still, the defense did not ask for any clarification or

instruction on this issue, so reversal can be had only for

plain error. E.g., United States v. Arias-Santana, 964 F.2d

1262, 1268 (1st Cir. 1992). We see no practical likelihood

that the jury could have divided along the lines now

suggested by Medina. Although in theory we may be talking

about two separate crimes, in this case the evidence offered

as to count I made the same conduct the basis for both the

fraud and misrepresentation branches of count I. Indeed,

that is probably why the government charged both subsections

in a single count. In all events, on this evidence, the jury

either had to believe that Medina violated both subsections

or neither. There was no realistic possibility of a split

verdict of the kind now conjectured by Medina.

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If the trial judge had been asked to clarify the point,

quite likely he would have told the jury that it had to find

unanimously either a scheme to defraud or a scheme based on

false representations. Probably he was not asked to do so

because no actual threat existed here of a non-unanimous

verdict. There was not only no plain error but arguably no

error at all. On other facts--for example, where divergent

conduct underlay the two branches of subsection (a) or the

same conduct could realistically violate one branch but not

the other--our view might be quite different.

Medina's next claim of error relates to count II of the

indictment in which he was charged with having "transmitted

and transferred in foreign commerce money in the amount of

$350,000.00, more or less, knowing the same to have been

stolen, converted and taken by fraud . . . ." The statute in

pertinent part makes it unlawful to "transport in interstate

or foreign commerce any goods, wares, merchandise, securities

or money, of the value of $5,000 or more, knowing the same to

have been stolen, converted or taken by fraud." 18 U.S.C.

2314.

Medina argues on appeal that under this statute the

property must have been stolen "before being transported."

See United States v. Tashjian, 660 F.2d 829, 840 (1st Cir.),

cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1102 (1981). Here, Medina's brief

says blandly but without explanation, "no money had been

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stolen or taken by fraud at the time of the transfer."

Possibly what Medina intends to argue is that the bank's

money was not stolen, converted or taken by fraud merely on

account of the wrongful credit to Medina's account on

November 7 because at that time no money had yet been paid

out by the bank. Put differently, Medina may be claiming

that when transferred the money had not yet been stolen.

We see no reason why the fraudulent taking required any

more than Medina's deposit of the check in Medina's account,

the misrepresentations, the availability of the money to

him, and the requisite scienter. Popielski testified that

the $365,000 was available to Medina for withdrawal on

November 10, at least two days before the wire transfer to

England. True, the bank could have nullified the deposit

before the transfer, had it been more alert; but from

November 10 onward the money was just as much available to

Medina as if it were cash stored under his mattress.

Medina's final set of arguments is directed to both of

the counts against him. He starts with a straightforward

argument that the Bank of Boston could not have been

defrauded of its money, nor could the money have been taken

by fraud, since Banco Central informed Bank of Boston prior

to the second deposit on November 7 that the amount of the

check was $365. The government concedes that a defendant,

whatever his state of mind, cannot be convicted of possessing

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drugs or stolen property if the substance is not in fact a

controlled substance or the property not stolen. E.g. United

States v. Rose, 590 F.2d 232, 235 (7th Cir. 1978), cert.

denied, 442 U.S. 929 (1979); United States v. Oviedo, 525

F.2d 881, 885-86 (5th Cir. 1976). In such cases, of course,

a change in the nature of the property can defeat an

essential element of the offense.

The government may overstate the matter in arguing that

"[i]n contrast the crime of bank fraud focuses on Medina and

his state of mind, and not on the conduct of the bank." It

might be difficult to defraud an individual, or obtain

property by fraud, if the "victim" were well aware that the

defendant's statements were untrue. But the analogy is

unrealistic as applied to a large bank which happens to have

the true facts somewhere in its files. There is no

indication that Banco Central's warning was known to the bank

teller who accepted the check for credit on November 7 or to

Popielski when she facilitated the deposit and authorized the

wire transfer.

It may well be that for other purposes, say under the

Uniform Commercial Code, notice to the bank through proper

channels is, in some sense and for some purposes, notice to

everyone within the bank. But Medina did defraud the bank

representatives with whom he dealt; and money was credited to

his account and transferred out of the bank because of their

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belief in his statements, and not on some independent basis.

It is hard to imagine any reason of practical policy to

accept the unitary-victim argument that Medina may be urging.

Absent compelling authority, we reject the argument.

Medina next says that the same deposit and transfer has

been charged as two separate offenses in two counts, making

the indictment multiplicitous. This argument rests on the

fact that in part of count I the government mentioned the

transfer of $350,000 out of Medina's account. The same

transfer, including a reference to the original taking by

fraud, is the heart of count II of the indictment. Although

multiplicity is forbidden by double jeopardy principles, the

use of the same evidence or conduct in relation to two

different counts does not itself establish multiplicity.

Even "where the same act or transaction constitutes a

violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to

be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or

only one is whether each provision requires [as an element]

proof of a fact which the other does not." United States v.

Blockburger, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). Here, section 1344

required proof that a scheme had been executed against a

federally insured bank; section 2314 required proof of

interstate or foreign transportation of stolen property.

Each provision thus requires proof that the other does not.

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Medina's last argument is that the evidence simply did

not permit a rational jury to find him guilty on either count

and, alternatively, that the district court should at least

have ordered a new trial. The denial of a motion to direct

an acquittal is reviewed de novo, United States v. Gonzalez-

Torres, 980 F.2d 788, 790 (1st Cir. 1992), and the trial

court's denial of a new trial request is reviewed for abuse

of discretion. United States v. Nickens, 955 F.2d 112, 116

(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 108 (1992). We need not

differentiate sharply, because in this case the jury's

verdict was neither irrational nor against the weight of the

evidence.

Medina's conduct was largely undisputed, and the

critical issues involved his knowledge and state of mind.

Absent a confession of guilt, the government's case could not

be air-tight. Yet there was no proof that Medina had ever

applied to a Spanish ministry for a grant of $365,000 or

expected such a check from Banco Central. His persistence

and haste in getting the money deposited into his account and

then out of the country were at least suspicious. The jury

must certainly have thought that Medina's story of an

innocent mistake was fragmented, improbable in a number of

respects, and ultimately did not hang together.

It is beside the point that the bank's customer service

representative misread the check; there is no indication that

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she could read Spanish, as Medina could. She also had no way

of knowing whether Medina might or might not be expecting a

check in this amount. Medina's brief states that his own

expert witness thought that the value of the check was

$365,000. In fact, the expert, whose testimony would not in

any event be binding on the jury, testified to the value of

the check, "as reflected in that box," i.e., the box that

contained the mistaken arabic numerals "$365,ooo."

Finally, in an attempt to bolster his lack of evidence

claim, Medina's brief singles out a variety of comments and

arguments made by the prosecutor that Medina says misled the

jury. It appears that none of the statements was the subject

of objection at trial; while one or two might have been

subject to adjustment, none is especially troubling or even

remotely close to plain error. The prosecutor's remarks

provide no reason to hesitate in our appraisal of the

evidence.

Affirmed.

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