United States v. Crass

                  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                      FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                                           
                                                     

No. 94-1789

                    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                            Appellee,

                                v.

                          MICHAEL CRASS,

                      Defendant, Appellant.

                                           
                                                     

           APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                 FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

          [Hon. Ronald R. Lagueux, U.S. District Judge]
                                                                

                                           
                                                     

                     Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                                     

                  Aldrich, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                                         

                     and Cyr, Circuit Judge.
                                                     

                                           
                                                     

   Edward C. Roy, with whom Roy & Cook was on brief for appellant.
                                                
   Zechariah Chafee,  Assistant  United States  Attorney, with  whom
                             
Sheldon Whitehouse, United States Attorney, was on brief for appellee.
                          

                                           
                                                     

                          March 24, 1995
                                           
                                                     


          CYR, Circuit Judge.  Appellant Michael Crass challenges
                    CYR, Circuit Judge.
                                      

his conviction and  sentence for  using a firearm  during and  in

relation to  a  drug trafficking  crime.   See  18 U.S.C.     924
                                                        

(c)(1).  Finding no error, we affirm.

          On  June  4,  1993,  the  Providence  Police Department

executed a search warrant  at the Crass apartment and  discovered

marijuana  and  cocaine  throughout.1   On  a  closet shelf,  the

police  found  seventeen  baggies  of cocaine  and  two  pistols.

Although  the  hand grip  on one  firearm  was broken,  both were

loaded  and operable.    The  putative  owner testified  for  the

defense  that he  had left  one unloaded  firearm with  Crass for

repair six months prior  to the search,  and the other for  safe-

keeping a week before the search. 

          Crass first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence,

which  we  review in  the light  most  favorable to  the verdict.

United States  v. Cotto-Aponte, 30  F.3d 4,  5  (1st  Cir. 1994).
                                        

Notwithstanding  their proximity  to the  baggies of  cocaine, he

contends on appeal, as he  did below, that the firearms  were not

used  during and in relation  to a drug  trafficking crime within

the meaning  of 18 U.S.C.   924(c)(1).   He principally relies on

United States v. Bruce, 939 F.2d  1053 (D.C. Cir. 1991), for  the
                                

claim  that there  was insufficient  evidence of  a "facilitative

nexus," see United States  v. Paulino, 13  F.3d 20, 26 (1st  Cir.
                                               

                    
                              

     1Crass pled guilty to  three drug trafficking offenses based
on the evidence seized from his apartment.

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1994), between the firearms  and the drugs found in  the closet.2

          Under  our  "facilitative nexus"  test, a  section 924-

(c)(1) conviction may lie even though the evidence establishes no

more than that  a firearm served a passive purpose  during and in
                                                    

relation to  the commission of  a drug crime,  as by  affording a

means  of safeguarding  drugs  possessed for  distribution.   The

close  proximity  between the  firearms  and  the cocaine  seized

inside  the same closet enabled the jury reasonably to infer that

Crass  kept  the firearms  for  the purpose  of  safeguarding the

cocaine,  see United States v.  Bergodere, 40 F.3d  512, 519 (1st
                                                   

Cir.  1994),  clearly  establishing the  necessary  "facilitative

nexus."  See Smith v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2050 (1993).
                                             

          Second, Crass claims surprise and prejudice from police

testimony concerning  the street value  of the cocaine  seized in

the search.  At a pretrial  hearing on his request for disclosure

of expert testimony to  be presented by the government,  see Fed.
                                                                      

R. Crim.  P. 16(a)(1)(E), Crass  sought to ascertain  whether the

government  intended  to  have  "police officers  com[e]  in  and

testify[] about giving  opinions about  the use of  the guns  and
                                                                      

being  consistent with their experience and  that kind of thing."

(emphasis added).  The government disavowed any such intention. 

                    
                              

     2Neither party noted that Bruce had been overruled in United
                                                                           
States v. Bailey,  36 F.3d 106,  115 (D.C. Cir.  1994) (en  banc)
                          
(Ginsburg, J.), cert. denied, 63 U.S.L.W. 3642 (U.S. 1995), which
                                      
explicitly adopted our "facilitative nexus" test.  

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          At trial,  the government  presented a  narcotics offi-

cer's testimony on  the current  street value of  the seized  co-

caine,  for the purpose of establishing  that Crass possessed the

firearms as a means of safeguarding the valuable cocaine stash he

kept in the  apartment.  Crass later urged the  district court to

exclude  the  testimony  because it  had  not  been  disclosed in

response to  the Rule 16 motion.   The court declined.   It ruled

that the  testimony did  not come within  the pretrial  discovery

request, that it was on the cusp of fact and expert testimony and

that  defense counsel  would be  allowed to  "cross-examine about

[the  expert witness's] experience in this area and what he knows

about street prices of drugs."          The   duty  to   disclose

under Rule 16 is triggered by a proper request.  United States v.
                                                                        

Carrasquillo-Plaza,  873 F.2d 10, 12  (1st Cir. 1989).   The dis-
                            

trict  court  supportably  ruled,  inter alia,  that  the  police
                                                       

testimony proffered by  the government  did not  come within  the

pretrial  motion submitted  by the  defense, because  it directly

related to  the street value of  the seized drugs  and only indi-

rectly to  the purpose for which  Crass kept the guns.   Yet more

importantly, the  defense  neither  requested  a  continuance  to

obtain its own evidence on street drug prices, nor does it allege
                                                                           

prejudice.  Even on appeal Crass makes  no claim that the "street

price" for cocaine in Providence was different than the narcotics

officer  stated.  See United  States v. Sepulveda,  15 F.3d 1161,
                                                           

1178 (1st Cir. 1993) ("The lack  of demonstrable prejudice sounds

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the death knell  for a  'delayed discovery' claim.").   Thus,  we

find neither error nor prejudice.  

          Third, Crass claims that he was entitled to a two-point

downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility  pursuant to

U.S.S.G.   3E1.1.  The defendant  bears the burden of proof under

section 3E1.1 and we review the sentencing court ruling for clear

error.   United  States v.  Morillo, 8  F.3d  864, 871  (1st Cir.
                                             

1993).         Although  Crass  acknowledges that  the Sentencing

Guidelines generally  preclude a  downward adjustment  for accep-

tance of responsibility where  the defendant "puts the government

to its burden of proof at trial  by denying the essential factual

elements of guilt, is  convicted, and only then admits  guilt and

expresses  remorse," U.S.S.G.    3E1.1 (n.2),  he argues  that he

fits within an exception to the general rule.

          In  rare situations  a defendant  may clearly
          demonstrate  an acceptance  of responsibility
          for his criminal conduct even though he exer-
          cises  his constitutional  right to  a trial.
          This may occur,  for example, where a  defen-
          dant  goes to  trial to  assert  and preserve
          issues  that do not  relate to  factual guilt
          (e.g. to make a constitutional challenge to a
          statute or a  challenge to the  applicability
          of a statute to his conduct.)

Id.  Crass contends  that he qualified for a  downward adjustment
             

for  acceptance of responsibility  notwithstanding the  fact that

the defense  represented, both at  trial and at  sentencing, that

the firearms were in  no respect related to the  drug trafficking

offenses to which he had pled guilty.

          The district  court correctly instructed the  jury that

Crass could be convicted  only if he possessed the  firearms with
                                                                           

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intent to  facilitate drug trafficking.  United  States v. Reyes-
                                                                           

Mercado, 22 F.3d 363, 367 (1st Cir. 1994) (defendant must possess
                 

firearm with intent that it be "available for possible use during

or immediately following the  transaction, or [to facilitate] the

transaction by lending courage to the possessor.").  In an effort

to  blunt  the  government's case  on  the  essential  element of

intent, the defense  called the putative  owner of the  firearms,

who testified that he had delivered  them to Crass for repair and

safekeeping.   Further, defense  counsel urged  the jury  to find

that the firearms were not possessed with intent to safeguard the
                                                          

drugs.

          Thus,  as was  his right,  Crass contested  the central

factual  element of intent both at trial  and at sentencing.  But
                                    

the jury could  not have  convicted Crass on  the firearm  charge

without  first  rejecting the  claim that  he  did not  intend to

possess the firearms for  the purpose of safeguarding  the drugs.

See  id.  Except in extraordinary circumstances not present here,
                 

see  U.S.S.G.   3E1.1  (n.2),  intent, like  any other  essential
                                               

element of the crime charged, may  not be contested by the defen-

dant without jeopardizing  a downward adjustment  for "acceptance

of responsibility" in the event the sentencing court  rejects, as

did  the jury,  the  defendant's interpretation  of the  relevant

evidence.  See United  States v. Bennett,  37 F.3d 687, 697  (1st
                                                  

Cir.  1994).  The district  court ruling was  consistent with the

law and the evidence.

          Affirmed.    
                    Affirmed.
                            

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