Consolo v. George

May 3, 1996 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 94-1202

JOSEPH F. CONSOLO,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

DANIEL F. GEORGE, ET AL.,

Defendants - Appellants.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Nathaniel M. Gorton, U.S. District Judge]

[Hon. Mark L. Wolf, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Boudin, Circuit Judge,

Aldrich, Senior Circuit Judge,

and Young,* District Judge.

Donald V. Rider, Jr., Assistant City Solicitor, with whom

David M. Moore, City Solicitor, and Diana H. Horan, Assistant

City Solicitor, were on brief for appellants.
Thomas C. Cameron, with whom Dennis J. Curran, and Curran &

Cameron, were on brief for appellee.

* Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.

Per Curiam. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988(b) and 1st
Per Curiam

Cir. R. 39.2, Joseph F. Consolo ("Consolo") here seeks attorney

fees incurred in defending a jury verdict in his favor both on

appeal and through a futile petition for certiorari.

BACKGROUND
BACKGROUND

A jury awarded Consolo $90,000 in damages against

Worcester police officers Daniel George ("George") and Michael

Mulvey ("Mulvey") for violations of Consolo's civil rights.

George and Mulvey appealed four issues to this Court and we

affirmed in all respects. Consolo v. George, 58 F.3d 791 (1st

Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 520 (1995).

On behalf of Consolo, Attorneys Thomas C. Cameron

("Cameron") and Dennis J. Curran ("Curran") filed a fee

application (the "Application") for award of appellate counsel

fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988(b). In the Application,

Consolo also requested an award of expenses and fees for

paralegal Kenneth O'Sullivan ("O'Sullivan"). Consolo also filed

a supplemental fee application (the "Supplemental Application")

for services related to opposing certiorari.

George and Mulvey's objections to the Application and

Supplemental Application fall into six general categories: (1)

the timeliness of Consolo's appeal; (2) the adequacy of records

kept by Cameron and Curran regarding their fees and expenses; (3)

whether work performed by Cameron and Curran was necessary and

productive; (4) the reasonableness of rates charged by Cameron

and Curran; (5) whether work performed by O'Sullivan was

necessary and productive; and (6) the reasonableness of expenses

charged by Cameron and Curran.

DISCUSSION
DISCUSSION

Traditionally, litigants have borne their own legal

costs. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421

U.S. 240, 247 (1975). Certain statutes and equitable doctrines

permit departure from this tradition. See In re Thirteen

Appeals, 56 F.3d 295, 304-305 (1st Cir. 1995). Under the Civil

Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, courts may award

reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party in a civil

rights action. 42 U.S.C. 1988(b). In authorizing such awards,

Congress intended to reduce the financial impediments that hinder

individuals from asserting their rights. Furtado v. Bishop, 635

F.2d 915, 918-19 (1st Cir. 1980).

Courts grant attorney's fees under 1988(b) unless

there is a special reason compelling denial. Supreme Ct. v.

Consumer's Union of the United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 737

(1980). Prevailing plaintiffs may receive fees for time spent

defending an appeal, if the plaintiff is ultimately successful.

See Souza v. Southworth, 564 F.2d 609, 613 (1st Cir. 1977).

Parties may also receive fees for time spent litigating fee

applications. Lund v. Affleck, 587 F.2d 75, 77-78 (1st Cir.

1978).

A. Timeliness of Consolo's Application
A. Timeliness of Consolo's Application

George and Mulvey object to the Application and

Supplemental Application, claiming that both are untimely. The

governing local rule regarding appellate fee applications states:

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An application . . . for an award of fees
and other expenses . . . shall be filed
with the clerk of the court of appeals
within 30 days of the date of entry of

the final circuit judgment . . . . For
purposes of the 30-day limit, a judgment
shall not be considered final until the
time for filing an appeal or a petition
for a writ of certiorari has expired, or
judgment is entered by the court of last
resort.

1st Cir. R. 39.2 (emphasis added).

Consolo filed the Application on August 8, 1995. The

Supreme Court denied George and Mulvey's Petition for Writ of

Certiorari on November 27, 1995. Consolo filed the Supplemental

Application on December 15, 1995.

1. Supplemental Fee Application
1. Supplemental Fee Application

George and Mulvey note that parties may petition the

Supreme Court for rehearing up to 25 days after denial of

certiorari. Sup. Ct. R. 44.2. For purposes of 1st Cir. R. 39.2,

George and Mulvey contend that final judgment does not occur

until this 25 day period ends.

However, "[t]he order of denial will not be suspended

pending disposition of a petition for rehearing except by an

order of the Court or a Justice." Sup. Ct. R. 16.3. The Supreme

Court issued no such order in the instant case. Without a

delaying order, denial of certiorari is final judgment for the

purposes of the local rule. After this final judgment, Consolo's

attorneys had 30 days to file an application for attorney's fees.

1st Cir. R. 39.2. Consolo met this requirement by filing on

December 15, 1995. Therefore, Consolo's Supplemental Application

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is timely under 42 U.S.C. 1988(b) and 1st Cir. R. 39.2.

2. Fee Application
2. Fee Application

Rule 39.2 serves three purposes: (1) it promotes

fairness by requiring parties to apply for fees within a

reasonable time after a case's resolution; (2) it advances

judicial efficiency by reducing of the number of fee applications

filed; and (3) it prevents this Court from issuing awards under

1988(b) inconsistent with subsequent decisions on the case.

George and Mulvey contend that Consolo filed his

Application prematurely, and that the Court should deny both the

Application and the Supplementary Application.2 George and

Mulvey argue that we should interpret 1st Cir. R. 39.2 to deny

applications filed before final judgment. Because Consolo filed

his Application before the Supreme Court denied certiorari, the

Application was most certainly premature. Consolo's Supplemental

Application, however, amended and expanded his Application.

Thus, even though Consolo's first application was premature, the

Supplemental Application incorporated and cured the Application.

Since the Supplemental Application is timely under 1st Cir. R.

39.2, we must, therefore, examine the claims presented in both

the Application and Supplemental Application.

B. Reasonableness of Consolo's Applications
B. Reasonableness of Consolo's Applications

This Court has customarily thought it best to calculate

reasonable fees through the lodestar time and rate method.

2 Paradoxically, George and Mulvey also argue in the alternative
that Consolo's first application was late, first acknowledging
but then choosing to ignore the plain test of 1st Cir. R. 39.2.

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Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. 104 Acres of Land, 32 F.3d 632, 634

(1st Cir. 1994); but see In re Thirteen Appeals, 56 F.3d at 305-

308 (common fund cases). The lodestar is a numerical point of

reference reached by multiplying the total number of hours

reasonably spent by a reasonable hourly rate. Grendel's Den,

Inc. v. Larkin, 749 F.2d 945, 950 (1984) (citing Hensly v.

Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433-34 [1983]). The lodestar is a

presumptively reasonable fee, but it is subject to upward or

downward adjustment for special circumstances. Lipsett v.

Blanco, 975 F.2d 934, 937 (1st Cir. 1992) (citing Blum v.

Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 897 [1984]).

1. Adequacy of record keeping
1. Adequacy of record keeping

For the Court to determine whether hours billed are

reasonable, applicants must provide highly detailed records of

their time expenditures. Phetosomphone v. Allison Reed Group,

Inc., 984 F.2d 4, 7 (1st Cir. 1993) (citing Grendel's Den, Inc.,

749 F.2d at 952). The Court demands specific information

regarding the number of hours, dates, and the nature of work

performed. Deary v. City of Gloucester, 9 F.3d 191, 197-98 (1st

Cir. 1993) (citing Calhoun v. Acme Cleveland Corp., 801 F.2d 558,

560 [1st Cir. 1986]). Lack of contemporaneous records calls for

substantial reduction or denial of fee awards, except in

"extraordinary circumstances." Id. While this Court has not

demanded inclusion of the actual, contemporaneously kept time

sheets or records in fee applications, their inclusion aids the

Court in more easily assessing the validity, necessity, and

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reasonableness of hours billed. Applicants fail to supply such

records at their peril. See id. (noting that submission of

actual time slips allowed a trial court to deny 78 of 699.4 hours

requested).

Here, Consolo's Application and Supplemental

Application included affidavits that distilled records

contemporaneously kept by Cameron, Curran, and O'Sullivan. The

Application and Supplemental Application did not include their

original time sheets. Normally an attorney's account of time

spent must be scrutinized with care. Calhoun, 801 F.2d at 560;

Grendel's Den, Inc., 749 F.2d at 950. Without original time

sheets, we hold an applicant's summary of hours spent to an even

higher level of scrutiny. Here, we must use our own experience

and judgment to determine if Cameron and Curran's billing

accurately reflects time spent. We resolve inconsistencies and

ambiguities against the applicant.

Before calculating the lodestar, we must address two

issues of some concern to this Court. The first issue relates to

the Application. On July 19, 1994, Curran filed a Motion to

Enlarge Time to File Brief. The Motion to Enlarge would have

extended the deadline to file Consolo's Appellate Brief from

July 14, 1994 to July 21, 1994. In that Motion to Enlarge,

Curran represented that Consolo's attorneys needed the additional

time "to proofread the Brief, review transcript references and

reproduce trial exhibits for this appeal." Plaintiff-Appellee's

Motion to Enlarge Time to File Brief at 2. The Court granted

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this Motion on July 21, 1994, so counsel could perform these

clerical tasks. In the Application, Curran and Cameron requested

reimbursement for work performed during this additional week.

Some of the work claimed during this period is unrelated to the

limited, clerical tasks described in the Motion to Enlarge.3

Poor record keeping by Cameron and Curran may have

resulted in inaccurate billing during this period.

Alternatively, Curran may have misrepresented the reasons for his

Motion to Enlarge Time. In either case, the Court is not

disposed to grant attorney's fees for these inconsistencies. See

Brewster v. Dukakis, 3 F.3d 488, 494 n.6 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting

that courts can and should deny recovery for such "sloppy" record

keeping). Unfortunately, Consolo's application did not

adequately distinguish between time spent on clerical (permitted

under the Motion to Enlarge) and non-clerical tasks.4 Because

3 Work that falls outside of Consolo's Motion to Enlarge Time
includes:

July 15, 1994 "[B]egin drafting Statement of Facts."
July 18, 1994 "Revise Statement of Facts."
July 19, 1994 "[R]evise Statement of Facts for Brief."

4 This is the source of much difficulty concerning the
Application and Supplemental Application. Cameron and Curran
provided the number of hours spent on Consolo's case per day, and
roughly the subject matter or task on which they spent this time.
While they did divide the number of hours spent by attorney, they
did not divide the number of hours by task. For example, Curran
claims he spent 5.05 hours on July 14, 1994, "continu[ing] review
of ten volumes of trial transcript to prepare [the] Statement of
Facts for Brief; [and in] telephone conferences with [the]
Clerk's Office and with [defense counsel]." This forces the
Court to guess how much time Curran spent in review of the
volumes and how much was spent in telephone conferences.
Applicants should consider detail almost as important as
conscientious and accurate reporting.

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we are unable to distinguish these time periods, any work

performed inconsistent with the Motion to Enlarge will result in

denial of award for that day. Thus, we will not consider

Curran's application for 10.3 hours on July 15 and 19, 1994 in

our calculation of the lodestar. Similarly, we will ignore

Cameron's application for 1.3 hours on July 18, 1994.

The second issue relates to the Supplemental

Application; it contains disturbingly similar inaccuracies as

those discussed above. Under oath, Curran stated that he spent

one hour making revisions to the Supplemental Application and

supporting materials drafted by Cameron. Yet, Curran requests .9

hours for his own work spent to draft the Supplemental

Application. He also claims a separate .8 hours to revise the

Supplemental Application. We demand the strictest level of

accuracy, honesty, and good faith in applications for fees under

1988(b). The Court will deny any section of an application

containing inaccurate statements; we will similarly deny

applications that are knowingly incorrect. Thus we deny .9 hours

from calculation of the lodestar in Consolo's Supplemental

Application.

2. Necessity of work performed by Consolo's attorneys
2. Necessity of work performed by Consolo's attorneys

Defendants strenuously object to Consolo's application

for fees regarding preparation for, and attendance at, two Civil

Appeal Management Program pre-argument conferences (the "Appeal

Conferences"). Both Cameron and Curran attended these two Appeal

Conferences. The Court requires these conferences to promote

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judicial efficiency. We give notice that the Court demands a

high degree of comprehension of the legal and factual issues

presented. Thus, this Court will award fees for preparation for,

and attendance at, the Appeal Conferences. However, 1988(b) is

not a full employment program. Where one attorney would have

been sufficient, 1988(b) will not allow recovery of fees for

the work of two; the Court will discount the work of superfluous

attorneys. Hart v. Bourque, 798 F.2d 519, 523 (1st Cir. 1986)

(citing King v. Greenblatt, 560 F.2d 1024, 1027 [1st Cir. 1977],

cert. denied, 438 U.S. 916 [1978]). Courts should ordinarily

greet a claim that several lawyers were required to perform a

single set of tasks with healthy skepticism. Pearson v. Fair,

980 F.2d 37, 47 (1st Cir. 1992) (internal citations omitted).

Similarly, we should not shift fees for time spent in review of

another attorney's research. Hart, 798 F.2d at 522-23. This

Court will only include the work of one attorney's preparation

and appearance for the Appeal Conferences when calculating the

number of "reasonable hours" for the lodestar. Since it appears

that Curran performed the great majority of the preparatory work

for these conferences, we find that his work was reasonable under

Hart and Pearson. Therefore, when calculating the number of

reasonable hours for the lodestar, we will not include 2 hours on

March 30, 1994, and .75 hours on May 12, 1994, claimed by Cameron

in conjunction with the Appeal Conferences.

George and Mulvey object to the Application regarding

work performed in preparation for oral argument. While Cameron

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presented oral argument, Curran provided research. George and

Mulvey would limit Consolo's recovery for this overlap. Such

limitations are appropriate where there is redundancy in legal

work. Hart, 798 F.2d at 523. At best, Curran and Cameron's

arrangement was an inefficient use of resources. For example,

while Cameron's attendance would have been sufficient, Curran

joined his co-counsel in conferences with consultants. Section

1988(b) does not compel recovery for waste.5 This Court will

consider only one attorney's work in research of the oral

argument toward the number of "reasonable hours spent" for the

lodestar. Therefore, we deduct 7.6 hours from our calculation of

reasonable hours spent.6

We do, however, allow recovery of the fees for both

attorneys' attendance at the appellate hearing, as Curran was

present to answer any factual questions regarding the trial and

Cameron argued the substantive issues of law. Courts should not

read the requirements of "reasonable hours expended" to limit

their own factfinding process.

5 The attendance of two attorneys at the Appeal Conferences is
not per se superfluous. However, given the lack of

contemporaneous time records and the application's
inconsistencies, Consolo's application fails to meet its burden
of proof for this expense.

Similarly, we do not hold as matter of law that Cameron and
Curran's research arrangement was duplicative. Nevertheless, in
this instance we find that Consolo has failed to justify this
expense.

6 We deduct 1.1 hours for work on August 25, 1994; 1.8 hours for
work on September 6, 1994; .7 hours for work on September 7,
1994; and 4.0 hours for work on September 8, 1994.

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3. Reasonable fees per hour
3. Reasonable fees per hour

The fee per hour for work on the litigation is the

"core rate." Brewster, 3 F.3d at 492 n.4. Applicants should

bill other work, including work on the application itself, at a

reduced "non-core rate." Id. A reasonable hourly rate is the

prevailing market rate in the relevant legal community for

similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skills.

Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 & n.11. "Absent more unusual

circumstances . . . the fee rates of the local area should be

applied even when the lawyers seeking fees are from another

area." Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 555 (10th Cir. 1983).

Consolo contends that the relevant legal market is Boston, where

this Court heard the appeal. Consolo provided an affidavit

declaring that $175 per hour is a reasonable fee for such work in

Boston. George and Mulvey claim that the relevant legal

community is Worcester, where the incidents giving rise to the

claim occurred. George and Mulvey provide no evidence regarding

Boston area fees, but provide an affidavit declaring that the

relevant per hour fee in Worcester is $150. Here, the district

judge allowed Consolo's request for $175 per hour for trial work

in Worcester. We defer to the determination by the trial judge

and consider $175 the "core rate," a reasonable fee per hour for

purposes of the lodestar.7

7 Because the trial court concluded that $175/hr. was a
reasonable fee in Worcester and George and Mulvey admit that
$175/hr. was a reasonable fee in Boston, we need make no
determination as to whether the trial court or the appellate
court's legal community is used in calculation of the lodestar.

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Consolo also applied for fees in conjunction with the

creation of the fee applications themselves. "Time reasonably

expended in connection with a fee application is compensable . .

. but it may be fairly compensated at a reduced rate." Brewster,

3 F.3d at 494 (internal citations omitted). Applicants often

spend such time doing little more than documenting action

previously taken. Id. In this case, we will allow "non-core"

work such as this at one-half the "core rate." Thus, the fee per

hour for work on the Application and Supplemental Application is

$87.50.

4. Lodestar calculation
4. Lodestar calculation

Consolo applied for a total of 157.9 hours under the

Application. This Court denied 11.3 hours from the calculation

of the lodestar for the obvious inconsistencies in that

application. As noted above, this Court also denied 10.35 hours

within the lodestar, as these hours represent unnecessary or

redundant work. Thus, this Court finds that 136.25 hours was a

"reasonable number of hours" for purposes of the lodestar. Of

the 136.25 hours, 116.05 hours are billed at the "core rate,"

$175 per hour, for appellate related work. The remaining 20.2

hours are billed at $87.50 per hour, half the "core rate," for

application related work. Therefore, Consolo's lodestar for his

Application is $22,076.25.8

Under the Supplemental Application, Consolo seeks fees

for 41.1 hours. Of these, Cameron and Curran spent 29.7 hours on

8 (116.05 x $175) + (20.2 x $87.50).

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certiorari-related activities; recovery for these hours is at the

"core rate" of $175. Cameron and Curran spent the remaining 11.4

hours either on Consolo's rebuttal memorandum or on the

supplemental fee application. This Court denied .9 hours from

calculation of the lodestar, due to inconsistencies regarding

time spent on the Supplemental Application. We compensate the

remaining 10.5 at one-half of the "core rate," $87.50.

Therefore, Consolo's lodestar for the Supplemental Application is

$6,116.25.9 Consolo's total lodestar is $28,192.50.10

5. Special factors
5. Special factors

Courts may depart from the lodestar to compensate for

"special circumstances." Lipsett, 975 F.2d at 937. Here, the

Court addressed the concerns of both parties when it calculated

the lodestar. We, therefore, find no reason to depart from the

lodestar in awarding appellate and certiorari fees. We must

satisfy ourselves of the overall fairness and reasonableness of

the fee under these particular circumstances. Lund, 587 F.2d at

77. This lodestar meets these requirements. Thus, the Court

awards Consolo $28,192.50 for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C.

1988(b).

6. Paralegal fees under 1988(b)
6. Paralegal fees under 1988(b)

Consolo also applied for $1,312.50 in paralegal fees.

Consolo claims that O'Sullivan spent 37.5 hours on the appeal,

for which Consolo claims compensation at $35 per hour. Courts

9 (29.7 x $175) + (10.5 x $87.50).

10 $22,076.25 + $6116.25.

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may grant paralegal fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988(b).

Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 285 (1989). Courts commonly

use the lodestar for calculation of such fees. Id.

O'Sullivan's work included attendance at the Appeal

Conferences and the oral argument before this Court. As stated

above, we deny recovery where the work performed by an attorney

is redundant. Hart, 798 F.2d at 523. We will also deny recovery

for unnecessary paralegal work. O'Sullivan's attendance at the

conferences and the hearing was unnecessary; we will not shift

this expense to George and Mulvey. Thus we deny recovery for 5.4

hours of O'Sullivan's claim.

"Purely clerical or secretarial tasks should not be

billed at a paralegal rate, regardless of who performs them."

Jenkins, 491 U.S. at 288 n.10. Some of O'Sullivan's claimed time

is clerical.11 The court will not order a shift of fees for

this time; therefore, we deny an additional 4.05 hours requested

by Consolo for O'Sullivan's work. The remaining 28.05 hours

constitute a "reasonable number of hours" for O'Sullivan's

11 Tasks that are clearly clerical include:

March 21, 1994 Review file .15 hours
April 18, 1994 Locate documents .3 hours
in file
July 20, 1994 To Copy Cop .3 hours
July 21, 1994 Reorganize file 1.3 hours
July 22, 1994 Continue to .4 hours
reorganize file
September 6, 1994 Locate documents .2 hours
for oral argument
September 7, 1994 Locate documents .5 hours
for oral argument
January 26, 1995 Retrieve documents .5 hours
July 5, 1995 Locate documents .4 hours

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lodestar. George and Mulvey did not contest the $35 per hour

rate claimed by O'Sullivan. Thus, we adopt this as the "core

rate" for O'Sullivan's lodestar. We see no reason to deviate

from the lodestar in this case as we find no "special

circumstances" that merit an increase or decrease. See Lipsett,

975 F.2d at 937. Thus, this Court awards Consolo $981.75 for

O'Sullivan's fees.12

7. Expenses
7. Expenses

Courts may include an attorney's reasonable expenses

when awarding fees under 1988(b). Grendel's Den, Inc., 749

F.2d at 951. Section 1988(b) provides for awards of "incidental

and necessary expenses incurred in furnishing effective and

competent representation." Northcross v. Board of Educ., 611

F.2d 624, 639 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911 (1979).

Consolo claimed $290.78 in his Application for expenses relating

to the appeal. He also claimed $427.71 in the Supplemental

Application for certiorari-related expenses.

We will not shift the cost of long-term investments

made during litigation. Included in his Application, Curran

requests $117.91 for a police misconduct litigation treatise. We

do not question the usefulness of this text; however, attorneys

should make a good faith effort to minimize expenses before

filing for fees under 1988(b). We find no such effort here.

Certainly, Consolo's attorneys could have borrowed the text from

a library for a significantly smaller sum. Thus we deny payment

12 28.05 x $35.00.

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for this expense.

George and Mulvey objected to expenses for the

transcript of the Defendant's closing argument. George and

Mulvey claim that Consolo never used the transcript, and thus we

should not shift its cost. We think it is inappropriate to

cross-reference expenses to the text of an Appellant's Brief when

awarding fees. It is likely that Cameron and Curran investigated

a course of argument they later deemed unworthy. Denying such

research is contrary to the purpose of 1988(b). Thus, the

Court grants Consolo's request for $84 for the transcript of the

closing argument.

George and Mulvey also contest the use of a courier to

send Consolo's appellate brief to the Defendants' counsel. This

service cost $14. Consolo appears to have retained the courier

in good faith; it was a reasonable attempt to provide George and

Mulvey with a copy of the brief. Thus we grant the request for

$14.

Consolo requests $54.15 in photocopy and library

expenses. Parties may recover such reasonable expenses.13

See, e.g., Northcross, 611 F.2d at 639. George and Mulvey do not

object; thus this expense is granted. George and Mulvey also do

not object to a $8.39 expense for a videotape; this is granted.

The remaining $26.27 in the Application was an expense

Consolo should have obtained under Fed. R. App. P. 39.

13 Counsel billed $3.20 of Consolo's fee application for costs
to "misc." and not to Consolo. We do not consider this amount in
our calculations.

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Applicants should not seek such costs under the aegis of a

1988(b) action. Therefore, we grant $143.40 in expenses under

the Application.14

In the Supplemental Application, Consolo included a

bill from a legal publisher clearly identifying necessary and

reasonable expenses related to certiorari. While we have no

record of payment, bills such as these are rebuttable evidence of

an expense. We presume that Cameron and Curran will pay this

bill. If George and Mulvey had demonstrated otherwise, we would

not have shifted this expense. Thus, we grant $327.71 for

reproduction and service of Consolo's Brief in Opposition.

Finally, Cameron requests $100 reimbursement for admission fees

to the bar of the Supreme Court. George and Mulvey do not object

to this expense; it is thus granted.

C. Conclusion
C. Conclusion

In total, this court awards $29,745.36 to Consolo for

appellate and certiorari attorney's fees and costs pursuant to 42

U.S.C. 1988(b) and 1st Cir. R. 39.2.

14 $290.78 - ($117.91 + $26.27 + $3.20).

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