Fredette v. Allied Van Lines, Inc.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 94-1893
No. 94-1895

DORIS FREDETTE and PAUL FREDETTE,

Plaintiffs, Appellees,

v.

ALLIED VAN LINES, INC., and TRANSIT HOMES OF AMERICA, INC.,

Defendants, Appellants.

No. 94-1894

DORIS FREDETTE and PAUL FREDETTE,

Plaintiffs, Appellants,

v.

ALLIED VAN LINES, INC., MULLEN BROS., INC. of NORTH ADAMS,
and TRANSIT HOMES OF AMERICA, INC.,

Defendants, Appellees.

APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Frank H. Freedman, Senior U.S. District Judge]

Before

Boudin, Circuit Judge,

Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge,

and Stahl, Circuit Judge.

Joseph B. Bertrand with whom Marie G. Leary and Martin Magnuson

McCarthy & Kenney were on briefs for defendant Allied Van Lines, Inc.

and defendant Mullen Bros., Inc. of North Adams.
William Gordon Prescott with whom David W. Murphy, Jr., and Katz,

Lapointe & Murphy, P.C. were on brief for defendant Transit Homes of

America, Inc.
David R. Cianflone with whom Cianflone & Cianflone, P.C. was on

briefs for plaintiffs.

September 28, 1995

BOUDIN, Circuit Judge. We have before us cross-appeals

in a case concerning long-distance moving arrangements that

went seriously awry. The plaintiffs in the district court

were Paul and Doris Fredette; the defendants were Allied Van

Lines, Inc., ("Allied"), Mullen Brothers, Inc. of North Adams

("Mullen Brothers") and Transit Homes of America, Inc.

("Transit"). The facts, taken in the light most favorable to

the jury verdict, Borden v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 935

F.2d 370, 379 (1st Cir. 1991), are as follows.

In September 1990, General Electric Company ("GE") laid

off Paul Fredette, who was then working as a machinist in its

Pittsfield, Massachusetts, plant. GE offered Paul Fredette a

position in its Hickory, North Carolina plant, and he

accepted. The Fredettes contacted defendant Mullen Brothers

to arrange the move of their mobile home to North Carolina.

Mullen is a local Massachusetts mover licensed only for

intrastate moves; for interstate moves like the Fredettes',

Mullen acts as an agent for Allied.

In January 1991, a Mullen sales representative, Chad

Lindburg, came to the Fredettes' Pittsfield home to inspect

and inventory their mobile home and personal belongings. The

mobile home was a one-bedroom unit with an attached porch and

canopy and a detached shed. The Fredettes explained to

Lindburg that they wanted to move the home and all of its

contents and that they wanted to be fully insured. After

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that meeting, the Fredettes left for North Carolina and

stayed with relatives while Paul Fredette began work at the

GE plant there. They also purchased a lot for the home.

In mid-February, the Fredettes returned and signed an

agreement with Lindburg committing Allied to move the mobile

home and its contents at a cost of $20,520; the Fredettes

handed over a check, apparently believing that this amount

represented all payments required for the move. Allied

planned to transport the household possessions itself. It

subcontracted the move of the mobile home to Transit and

hired another company to move the porch and shed. According

to the contract, the move was to begin on February 16, 1991,

with a guaranteed delivery date no later than February 25,

1991.

Transit, in turn, hired James Bedford to move the mobile

home and he inspected it on the day that the contract was

signed. The Fredettes then returned to North Carolina. On

February 21, 1991, Lindburg told them that Bedford had

discovered pre-existing structural damage after he moved the

home off its Pittsfield lot. Bedford told Transit that the

home was not roadworthy because it was sagging on its axles.

Transit told Bedford not to move the home and told Allied

that the home would not be moved until the Fredettes

furnished Transit with a broad liability release. The

Fredettes' personal belongings were placed in storage.

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The Fredettes returned to Pittsfield, photographed the

home and hired their own expert, Stanley Bator, who

determined that the home could be safely moved if a fourth

axle were added. The Fredettes refused to sign the broad

release demanded by Transit, but on March 1, 1991, Doris

Fredette signed a promissory note to Allied for up to $2,500

to cover costs of adding an axle. A fourth axle was added,

and on March 7, 1991, Bedford moved the home from Pittsfield,

arriving in North Carolina on March 12. On arrival, the

Fredettes and an expert they hired found (and photographed)

substantial damage to the interior and exterior of the home.

Bedford refused to place the mobile home on the lot

until the Fredettes removed a fence and made other

adjustments. The Fredettes hired Irvin Finger, who did the

required work, but Bedford still refused to move the home

onto the lot, saying that the ground was too hilly and muddy

to do it safely. After consulting with Allied and Transit,

Bedford left the mobile home near the lot and returned to

Massachusetts. The Fredettes hired a local company which

promptly placed the home onto the lot for an additional fee.

A week later, after a number of requests by the

Fredettes, Allied sent a crew to block and level the home.

The contents of the home and the porch, including the front

steps, had not yet arrived. Apparently Allied and the

Fredettes were engaged in a dispute about the storage fees

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incurred during the moving delay, and Allied refused to

deliver the personal belongings until the storage fee was

paid. Delivery occurred on April 11, 1991, and the Fredettes

moved into their home the next day, 45 days after the

original guaranteed delivery date.

While the home was en route, Paul Fredette became

depressed and, as a result, was terminated from his job with

GE. His anxiety and depression continued after the move and

were confirmed by medical testimony at trial. He returned to

work in May of 1991, but left again in September, again

because of depression. Doris Fredette also suffered

emotional distress. Ultimately, the Fredettes brought suit

in Massachusetts state court, alleging a number of claims

against Allied, Transit and Mullen.

The defendants removed the suit to federal district

court, and ultimately the parties went to trial on four

counts: count I alleged a violation of the Carmack

Amendment, 49 U.S.C. 11707; count II charged breach of

contract; count IV alleged a violation of Massachusetts

consumer protection law, Mass. Gen. L. ch. 93A, based on the

intentional infliction of emotional distress; and count V

charged intentional infliction of emotional distress.1

1Count III, a state-law claim for property damage, was
dismissed as preempted by the Carmack Amendment.

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Counts I, II and V were tried to a jury beginning April

11, 1994; Count IV, the 93A claim, was heard by the court

afterward. After the Fredettes rested, the district court

dismissed Mullen as a party. On April 14, 1994, the jury

found for the Fredettes and against Allied on the breach of

contract claim and the claim of intentional infliction of

emotional distress. It found for the Fredettes and against

Transit on the Carmack Amendment claim and the claim of

intentional infliction of emotional distress. The jury

awarded $36,000, representing $18,500 on the Carmack

Amendment claim against Transit; $7,500 on the contract claim

against Allied; and $5,000 each against these defendants on

the emotional distress claim. The district court then found

in favor of Allied and Transit on the Fredettes' 93A claim.

Allied and Transit duly filed post-trial motions,

generally preserving the claims now made on appeal, but

motions were denied. Allied and Transit now appeal from the

judgments against them. The Fredettes cross appeal from the

rejection of their claim against Mullen and the district

court's denial of their 93A claim.

1. The Carmack Amendment Claim. The Carmack Amendment,

49 U.S.C. 11707, incorporates common law principles of

liability and makes a common carrier liable for "the actual

loss or injury to the property" that it transports

interstate. Id. 11707(a)(1). Transit was responsible for

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the move of the mobile home, and the jury awarded the

Fredettes $18,500 against Transit for damages to the home.

Transit argues that the Fredettes failed to present

sufficient evidence of the damages to take the case to the

jury; alternatively it seeks remittitur or, in the

alternative, a new trial on the issue of damages.

A plaintiff suing under the Carmack Amendment may

recover as damages only the "actual loss or injury to the

property," ordinarily measured either by the reduction in

market value caused by the defendant or by replacement or

repair costs occasioned by the harm. See, e.g., Oak Hall Cap

& Gown Co., Inc. v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc., 899 F.2d

291, 296 (4th Cir. 1990). There is no recovery under the

statute for punitive damages or for damages unrelated to the

property at issue. Cleveland v. Beltman North Amer. Co.,

Inc., 30 F.3d 373, 379 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.

Ct. 901 (1995).

Evidence as to the nature and extent of physical damages

sustained by the home move was presented primarily by Doris

and Paul Fredette and by Irvin Finger; Finger was a

contractor who had examined the home at the Fredettes'

request when it arrived in North Carolina and compared it to

photographs of the home taken on the Pittsfield lot

immediately prior to the move. Finger supplied a written

list of repair tasks and a proposed price of $10,500.

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"Before and after" photographs of the home were also admitted

into evidence.

Although Transit argues that little beyond normal wear

and tear was demonstrated, the jury was entitled to find

otherwise. The Fredettes described the condition of the home

before the move and after, testifying to the broken window

and door casing, missing shingles, soiled rugs, damage to

aluminum siding and to the roof, a broken sink, and similar

injuries discovered when the move was over. Another witness

confirmed the existence of damage to the roof and an exterior

wall. The jury was also entitled to consider the

photographs. Thus, there was ample proof of injury.

What is of more concern is the amount of damages awarded

by the jury for injury to the mobile home. Even assuming

that the jury fully accepted Finger's estimate, the award of

$18,500 against Transit--or $8,350 in excess of the damages

estimated by him--is puzzling. Possibly, as Transit

speculates, the jury included other damages for which Transit

was not liable (e.g., damage to the porch and shed which were

moved by another company), although the figures do not quite

mesh. But Transit has not claimed that the jury was

misinstructed, so we have to assume that the jury intended

the award to cover the mobile home itself.

That presents the question whether the jury was entitled

to take the descriptions and photographs of the injuries to

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the mobile home and then value those injuries more highly

than the amount assigned by the Fredettes' own witness.

Under the case law, the jury can depart upward, as well as

downward, from the opinion of the expert; and this makes good

sense wherever the jury could reasonably have valued the

damage without any expert opinion.2 The jury could do so

for a broken window or dented fender; a defective dynamo

would probably be beyond its ken.

The injuries to the mobile home are in between but much

closer to the broken window. The injuries here (e.g., soiled

rugs, repainting, damaged sidings and roof, broken door

frame) were not especially exotic in character and nothing

prevented the jurors from using their own experience and

common sense to adjust upward or downward the expert's own

estimate. The award was certainly very generous, in light of

Finger's testimony, and a remittitur could have been ordered;

but it is hard to say that it was irrational or that the

refusal to grant a new trial or remittitur on damages was an

abuse of discretion.

2. The Contract Claim. The Fredettes also won a

judgment of $7,500 against Allied for breach of contract

2See, e.g., Weber v. Chicago & Northwestern Transp. Co.,

530 N.W.2d 25, 29 (Wis. App.) ("[t]he jury is not bound by an
expert's estimate of damages"), review denied, 534 N.W.2d 85

(Wis. 1995); Birmingham Slag Div. of Vulcan Materials Co. v.

Chandler, 231 So.2d 329, 331 (Ala. Civ. App. 1970) ("a jury

is not bound by opinion evidence of damages, though
undisputed").

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based on Allied's failure to deliver their home and goods by

the guaranteed delivery date. Allied contends that the delay

resulted from events outside its control and sought an

instruction on frustration of purpose. The district court

declined to give such an instruction on the ground that the

evidence did not support it.

A party is entitled to have its legal theories presented

to the jury, if legally correct and supported by the

evidence. Sullivan v. National Football League, 34 F.3d

1091, 1106-07 (1st Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1252

(1995). The determination of whether there was evidence

sufficient to require an instruction is made by the district

court in the first instance, but is subject to appropriate

appellate review. Id. at 1107-09. Assuming arguendo that

frustration of purpose is to be determined by the jury in a

proper case, see generally E. Farnsworth, Contracts 9.7, at

722 (2d ed. 1990), no reasonable jury could have concluded

here that the contract's purpose had been frustrated.

The doctrine of frustration of purpose, recognized in

Massachusetts as elsewhere, excuses a party from contractual

obligations under certain defined circumstances. The central

condition, but not the only one, is that--although

"[p]erformance remains possible"--"the expected value of

performance to the party seeking to be excused has been

destroyed by [the] fortuitous event. . . ." Chase Precast

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Corp. v. Paonessa Co., 566 N.E.2d 603, 608 (Mass. 1991),

quoting Lloyd v. Murphy, 153 P.2d 47, 50 (Cal. 1944). If the

GE plant in North Carolina had burned down, the Fredettes

might have argued (not necessarily with success) that the

purpose of the agreement had been frustrated.

Obviously, the purpose of the Fredettes' contract with

Allied--to arrange for a move of home and possessions to

North Carolina--was not frustrated by need for a fourth axle.

Allied might have sought an instruction on impossibility or

impracticability of performance, or even on mutual mistake

relating to the immediate fitness of the mobile home for

transportation. Compare Farnsworth, supra, 9.3, 9.5, 9.6.

Whether any of these sister doctrines could properly have

been invoked is open to dispute; but the dispute need not be

resolved because no such instructions were sought.

3. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. Both

Allied and Transit argue that the trial judge erred in

instructing the jury about the elements of the emotional

distress claim. The trial judge described the elements of

intentional infliction of emotional distress as follows:

First, that the defendants intended to cause, or
should have known that its [sic] conduct would
cause emotional distress; and, Second, that the
defendants' conduct was extreme and outrageous;
and, Third, that the actions of the defendants
caused plaintiffs distress; and, Fourth, that the
plaintiffs suffered emotional distress. In
determining whether a defendants' [sic] conduct was
extreme and utterly outrageous, you must ask
yourselves whether the conduct was beyond all

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bounds of decency and utterly intolerable in a
civilized community. Liability can't be founded on
mere insults, threats, or annoyances. It should be
noted that physical harm to the plaintiffs in [sic]
not a required element of this claim.

The district court's instructions are taken almost

verbatim from a recent decision by the Massachusetts Supreme

Judicial Court, Sena v. Commonwealth, 629 N.E.2d 986, 994

(Mass. 1994). In this case, the defendants submitted

proposed instructions that would have required, on the fourth

element, that the plaintiffs' emotional distress be "severe"

and "of a nature that no reasonable person could be expected

to endure it." That language is taken from that court's

watershed decision on the tort nearly twenty years ago, Agis

v. Howard Johnson Co., 355 N.E.2d 315, 319 (Mass. 1976)

(quotations omitted). The district court declined to include

the "reasonable person" language, and an objection to this

omission was preserved.3

Since Agis, the SJC has all but ignored the "reasonable

person" language. Every time that the court has decided an

intentional infliction claim since Agis, it has omitted the

"reasonable person" language and simply required the

3The judge apparently intended to use the word "severe,"
but may well have failed to do so. The transcript and the
court's post-trial memorandum and order are seemingly in
conflict. But if "severe" was omitted, no proper objection
was preserved.

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plaintiff to show "severe" emotional distress.4 This is so

even in cases where the severity of the plaintiff's emotional

distress is at issue. See, e.g., Haddad v. Gonzalez, 576

N.E.2d 658, 667-68 (Mass. 1991). Because the district court

defined the tort precisely as the state's highest court has

done for more than a decade, we find no error, much less

prejudicial error.

Both Allied and Transit also contend that they are

entitled to judgment as a matter of law or a new trial on

this claim. The former remedy requires that "no reasonable

jury could have returned a verdict adverse to the moving

party." Havinga v. Crowley Towing & Trans. Co., Inc., 24

F.3d 1480, 1483 (1st Cir. 1994), and we review de novo the

district court's decision on such a motion. Id. As for a

new trial, this may be granted if the district court finds

that the jury's verdict is against the clear weight of the

evidence; a refusal to grant a new trial is reviewed only for

abuse of discretion. Phav v. Trueblood, Inc., 915 F.2d 764,

766 (1st Cir. 1990).

Allied and Transit argue that their conduct, even if

wrongful, was not bad enough to be deemed extreme and

4See, e.g., Bowman v. Heller, 651 N.E.2d 369, 373 n.6

(Mass. 1995); Sena, 629 N.E.2d at 994; Haddad v. Gonzalez,

576 N.E.2d 658, 667-68 (Mass. 1991); Nancy P. v. D'Amato, 517

N.E.2d 824, 827 (Mass. 1988). The court referred to the
"reasonable person" language in an opinion about negligent

infliction of emotional distress in 1982. See Payton v.

Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171, 180 (Mass. 1982).

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outrageous. In part, this argument rests on an effort to

disassociate themselves from Bedford, who refused to place

the home on the lot even after the Fredettes had made the

initial adjustment Bedford demanded. But the Fredettes

presented evidence that Transit had ratified Bedford's

demands that the North Carolina lot be levelled further, and

that Transit and Allied had approved Bedford's decision to

leave the site with the home still not in place.

There was other conduct of which the jury might have

disapproved. Transit took the lead in seeking to obtain a

release from the Fredettes that seemingly went well beyond

the danger that occasioned the demand. Allied waited a week

before sending a crew to block and level the site once the

home was moved to North Carolina, and it waited three weeks

more to deliver the Fredettes' belongings (including their

car, furniture and the steps to their home) until the

Fredettes paid the disputed storage charges.

Most of the Massachusetts cases cited to us by

defendants are distinguishable, but Transit has a plausible

argument that the conduct here is not much worse than that

held insufficient in Foley v. Polaroid Corp., 508 N.E.2d 72

(Mass. 1987); there, an employee acquitted of assault was

sidetracked in his job and ostracized by other employees.

Still, in Foley the SJC thought that the company's formal

actions were consistent with "a good faith effort to maintain

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Foley's employment in a manner consistent with Polaroid's

legitimate business concerns," id. at 82; and the court

apparently equated the harassment with "mere insults,

indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other

trivialities" for which recovery is not permitted under this

claim. Id.

Here, we think that the jury was entitled, although

hardly compelled, to find bad faith; and the delays and

withholding of property and services go somewhat beyond the

verbal and other minor abuses that Polaroid employees

directed against Foley. Further, given the interplay between

Allied, Transit and Bedford, the jury was entitled to view

the conduct as a whole and not as isolated minor wrongs. So

viewed, we think that the deference to be accorded to the

jury's judgment on issues of this kind keeps the verdict just

this side of the dividing line.

4. The Fredettes' 93A Claim. The Fredettes also

claimed against the defendants for violation of

Massachusetts' far-reaching consumer protection law, Mass.

Gen. L. ch. 93A. That law proscribes "unfair or deceptive

acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce"

and provides a private right of action for aggrieved

individuals. The 93A claim was tried to the district court

after the jury verdict on the other counts. The court found

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that no violation had occurred, and ruled in favor of the

defendants. The Fredettes argue that this ruling was error.

Although 93A is phrased in terms different than the

emotional distress tort, the analogy is closer than language

might suggest. The "unfair or deceptive" label sounds like a

very low threshold, but the Massachusetts courts have

repeatedly held that 93A requires conduct that is immoral,

unethical or unscrupulous or at least attains "a level of

rascality" that goes well beyond ordinary tough business

practice. Industrial Gen. Corp. v. Sequoia Pacific Sys.

Corp., 44 F.3d 40, 43 (1st Cir. 1995) (citing numerous

Massachusetts cases).

Here, in deciding the 93A claim as the finder of fact,

the district judge was entitled to reach a judgment

independent of the jury on such issues as the existence and

extent of deception, unfairness and bad faith. Whether or

not the judge's findings can be squared with the jury's does

not matter, so long as the former's findings are not clearly

erroneous and the latter's are within the bounds of reason.

Wallace Motor Sales, Inc. v. American Motor Sales Corp., 780

F.2d 1049, 1063-64 (1st Cir. 1985). Precisely because this

is a borderline case, we think that the respective standards

of review protect both factfinders.

The Fredettes also rely on a regulation issued by the

Massachusetts Attorney General which provides that "[i]t is

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an unfair and deceptive act or practice: (a) To advertise or

promise prompt delivery where delivery is neither prompt nor

expeditious." 940 C.M.R. 3.15. But we read this to refer to

a pattern of conduct, or at least to an individual occasion

in which the promisor knows that it is making untrue

representations. Whatever other criticisms may be made of

Allied, nothing suggests that its original delivery date was

a representation made in bad faith.

The Fredettes' other theory is that the defendants

behaved unfairly and deceptively by specifying a price that

the Fredettes believed to be all-inclusive and then imposing

a succession of additional charges and demands (e.g., the

storage fees, expenses relating to the new lot). But the

district judge as the trier of fact was entitled to take a

more benign view and regard these extra demands as not

clearly beyond what was agreed to or as occasioned by

developments that no one had foreseen. This view, although

not compelled, was not clearly erroneous.

5. The Dismissal of Mullen. At the close of their

brief as appellants, the Fredettes argue that Mullen should

not have been dismissed as a defendant at the close of the

evidence. Lindburg, they say, acted as the agent for both

Mullen and Allied; and Mullen is responsible, they argue, for

the wrongs they attribute to Lindburg. These wrongs they

identify as (1) misadvising the Fredettes that their move was

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"fully covered" and "fully insured" and (2) mishandling the

original inspection and measurements of the home and thereby

causing a significant portion of the delay in the move.

It is not clear why this claimed error matters to the

Fredettes since Allied and Transit are presumably solvent,

and the Fredettes cannot collect twice for the same wrongs.

But in any event we see little indication that Lindburg was

independently culpable: there is no evidence that he told the

Fredettes anything he had reason to believe to be untrue; and

the Fredettes point us to nothing in the record that would

show that Lindburg knew or should have known that the mobile

home would sag when removed from its supports.

Affirmed.

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