United States v. London

                  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

                      FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                                      

No. 93-1898

                          UNITED STATES,
                            Appellee,

                                v.

                        MICHAEL B. LONDON,
                       Defendant, Appellant
                                    

                              Before

                     Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                                     
            Coffin and Bownes, Senior Circuit Judges,
                                                              
       Selya, Cyr, Boudin, Stahl and Lynch, Circuit Judges.
                                                                    
                                      

                          ORDER OF COURT

                    Entered:  October 20, 1995
                                      

          The panel of judges that rendered  the decision in this

case having voted to deny the petition for rehearing submitted by

the appellant and the  suggestion for the holding of  a rehearing

en banc having  been carefully  considered by the  judges of  the

court in regular active service and a majority of said judges not

having voted to order that the  appeal be heard or reheard by the

court en banc.
                       

          It is  ordered  that a  petition  for rehearing  and  a

suggestion for rehearing en banc be denied.
                                          

                   TORRUELLA,  Chief  Judge   (Dissenting).     I
                             TORRUELLA,  Chief  Judge   (Dissenting).
                                                     

believe the panel opinion in this case is contrary to the Supreme

Court's  decision in  Ratzlaf v.  United States,  114 S. Ct.  655
                                                         


(1994).  I reach this conclusion for primarily two reasons.

          First,  Ratzlaf  held  that   in  order  to  sustain  a
                                   

conviction  for  "structuring"  under  31 U.S.C.     5324(3)  the

government  must prove  that the  defendant acted  with knowledge

that  his  conduct  was   unlawful.    In  my  view,   the  clear

implication, if  not the plain  language, of Ratzlaf  precludes a
                                                              

structuring conviction based on  the "reckless disregard"  theory

utilized  in this  case.   Second, in  denying the  petition, the

majority virtually ignores  the fact that our  decision in United
                                                                           

States v. Aversa, 984 F.2d 493  (1st Cir. 1993) (en banc),  which
                          

upheld  a reckless  disregard jury  instruction, was  vacated and

remanded by the Supreme Court "for further consideration in light

of"  Ratzlaf.   See  Donovan v.  United  States, 114  S. Ct.  873
                                                         

(1994).   Because the Court  had just decided  Ratzlaf, one would
                                                                

think  that if  Aversa was  consistent with  that case  the Court
                                

would  simply have  denied  the writ  of  certiorari.   The  most

logical  inference from this state  of affairs is  that the Court

viewed our pre-Ratzlaf decision in Aversa as contrary to Ratzlaf,
                                                                          

and wanted to give us a chance to remedy it.  We should do so.

          Because  I  believe  the  panel  opinion  misinterprets

settled  law, I  dissent  from the  denial  of the  petition  for

rehearing or rehearing en banc.