United States v. Twitty

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 95-1056

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

WILLIAM A. TWITTY,

Defendant, Appellant.

ERRATA SHEET
ERRATA SHEET

The opinion of this court issued December 28, 1995, is amended as
follows:

Page 3, line 22: Change "July 1990" to "July 1991".

Page 6, second full paragraph, line 9: Insert the word "not"
after the word "does".

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 95-1056

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

WILLIAM A. TWITTY,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Nathaniel M. Gorton, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Boudin, Circuit Judge,

Aldrich and Coffin, Senior Circuit Judges.

Evan Slavitt, by Appointment of the Court, with whom Mary P.

Murray, and Hinckley, Allen & Snyder were on briefs for appellant.

Michael J. Pelgro, Assistant United States Attorney, Organized

Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force, with whom Donald K. Stern, United

States Attorney, was on brief for the United States.

December 28, 1995

BOUDIN, Circuit Judge. By a superseding indictment,

William Twitty was charged with four others with conspiring

to violate federal firearms laws by unlawfully purchasing,

possessing and selling handguns. 18 U.S.C. 371. Twitty

was also named in two other counts: one for unlawfully

dealing in firearms, id. 922(a)(1)(A), and the other for

unlawfully possessing handguns with obliterated serial

numbers, id. 922(k). The events alleged took place in the

Boston area from 1990 to 1993.

Prior to trial, three co-defendants--Erik Martin, his

wife Stephanie Martin, and Twitty's half-brother Stephen

Jordan--pled guilty. The last co-defendant, Pierre Cameron,

pled guilty after the jury was selected for his joint trial

with Twitty. The evidence against Twitty, taken in the light

most favorable to the verdict, United States v. Brien, 59

F.3d 274, 275 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 401

(1995), permitted the jury to find the following facts (which

we supplement, as required, in discussing individual issues).

In January 1990, Cameron assisted Erik Martin in

securing a federal firearms license, enabling the latter to

order firearms wholesale through the mails and to deal in

firearms. Twitty and the Martins were very close friends.

Beginning in March 1990, Erik Martin used his federal license

and local permits to acquire handguns for Twitty, Cameron,

and later Jordan. Stephanie Martin was involved primarily in

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receiving the shipments and, in one instance, in placing an

order at Twitty's behest when Erik Martin was unavailable.

Twitty introduced Jordan to Erik Martin in September

1990. While Jordan often dealt directly with Erik Martin,

Twitty and Jordan were involved with each other on certain

occasions. For example, Twitty delivered purchase money from

Jordan to Martin in one instance in late 1990. In the same

period, Twitty drove Jordan and Erik Martin to a store where

Jordan bought a grinding device, later used to obliterate

serial numbers from the guns and stored for a time in

Twitty's basement.

In early 1991, shortly after Jordan's apartment was

raided by police, Twitty began to order handguns through Erik

Martin on a large scale. Twitty acquired a beeper. Despite

having a very low paying job, Twitty began to show signs of

unusual prosperity, buying new clothes, jewelry, and cars and

making large deposits in a new bank account. There was

evidence, including police seizures of firearms, that the

guns ordered by Twitty were being resold illegally in the

Boston area and that Twitty and Erik Martin were obliterating

the serial numbers. Cameron also bought guns from Erik

Martin but in much smaller numbers.

In July 1991, federal agents tracing a recovered firearm

sought to interview Erik Martin. The last gun shipment to

Martin arrived on July 10 and that same day he conferred with

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Twitty about the federal inquiry. Over the next several

days, Twitty sought to destroy evidence of the transactions

at the Martin house and asked Martin to have Cameron make up

phony paperwork to help conceal the disposition of the

weapons. Twitty also told Erik Martin to file a false police

report that the latter's records, required to be kept by him

as a licensed dealer, had been stolen.

At the end of July, Twitty left his home and his job

without explanation. Erik Martin met him by accident in

November 1991 and they discussed the continuing federal

investigation, Twitty promising to help Martin "straighten

the whole matter out" so that Martin could avoid jail. In

December 1991, Twitty was interviewed by federal agents and

denied knowledge of the firearms conspiracy. Shortly after

his arrest, in September 1993, Twitty gave handwriting

exemplars that were intentionally distorted.

At trial, Twitty did not contest the existence of a

firearms conspiracy, virtually conceding that a conspiracy

existed among Erik Martin and others. Instead, Twitty denied

his own participation in the conspiracy and sought to

undermine the credibility of Erik Martin, who provided much

of the direct evidence of Twitty's involvement. The jury

convicted Twitty on all three counts. He was later sentenced

to 97 months' imprisonment and now appeals both his

conviction and his sentence.

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1. In this court, Twitty's boldest argument is to

claim, essentially for the first time, that the evidence

showed three different conspiracies (between Erik Martin and,

respectively, Cameron, Twitty, and Jordan). Twitty agrees

now that the evidence was sufficient to show his own

involvement but only in the narrow conspiracy between him and

Erik Martin. And he argues that he was prejudiced by the

admission of evidence that related solely to the other two

supposedly separate conspiracies, those between Martin and

Cameron and between Martin and Jordan.

Twitty's argument is a common one in conspiracy appeals.

Whenever a conspiracy involves successive transactions and

multiple players, it is usually possible to slice the

enterprise into discrete portions. Even a single conspiracy

is likely to involve subsidiary agreements relating to

different individuals and transactions. And more often than

not, none of the agreements is explicit; agreement is

inferred from conduct; and the conceptual tests used to

distinguish between one conspiracy and many are not sharp

edged. See, e.g., United States v. Drougas, 748 F.2d 8, 17

(1st Cir. 1984).

In this case, the government offers a number of answers

to Twitty's argument, including a claim that he waived it,

but we think that taken together two points are sufficient.

First, ample evidence linked Twitty and Jordan to single

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conspiracy with the Martins. Twitty introduced Jordan to

Erik Martin; conveyed money from Jordan to Martin; traveled

with both when Jordan purchased a grinding device that could

obliterate serial numbers; pressed Martin to expand

operations after Martin lost some of Jordan's gun-purchasing

money; discussed gun deliveries with Jordan; and stayed in

continuing touch with him.

On the bases of these and other connections, the jury

did not have to stretch to conclude that Twitty, Erik and

Stephanie Martin, and Jordan conspired together to traffick

in weapons. Twitty's and Jordan's illegal dealings with the

Martins occurred in the same time frame, in the same area and

in the same manner. Taking these overlaps together with the

direct contacts between Twitty and Jordan, we think that a

single hub and spoke conspiracy among the four was shown.

E.g., see United States v. Dworken, 855 F.2d 12, 24 (1st Cir.

1988).

Second, it is more of a stretch to include Cameron in

the same conspiracy, although perhaps not impossible. But if

we assume arguendo that Cameron engaged in a separate

conspiracy with the Martins, we think that the variance

between the larger five-person conspiracy charged, and the

smaller four-person conspiracy amply proved against Twitty,

was harmless. So long as the statutory violation remains the

same, the jury can convict even if the facts found are

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somewhat different than those charged--so long as the

difference does not cause unfair prejudice. United States v.

Glenn, 828 F.2d 855, 858 (1st Cir. 1987).

No such prejudice has been shown here. Even if the

conspiracy charged had been narrowed to four persons, some of

the evidence against Cameron could have been admitted to

explain how Erik Martin began his business and how, at the

end, Twitty attempted to use Cameron to conceal his own

wrongdoing. While the evidence against Jordan involved

drugs, Twitty's appeal briefs point to nothing especially

dramatic about the bulk of the evidence against Cameron.

Some guns were recovered from Cameron's apartment but, given

the guns recovered from Jordan and the Martins and the large

volume of orders by Martin, the presence of guns was hardly

in doubt.

2. Twitty's next set of objections involves the

admissibility of evidence designed to show that the guns

obtained through the Martins were unlawfully re-sold by

Twitty and others. The first objection is easily resolved.

During 1991 and 1992, the police recovered from third parties

handguns with obliterated serial numbers. The government at

trial offered evidence of such incidents to show that the

serial numbers (restored in whole or part) and gun types

matched those ordered by Martin and passed on to Twitty,

Jordan, or Cameron. Much of this evidence was undisputed.

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As to two such instances, however, Twitty says that the

evidence was insufficient to connect the seized guns to guns

ordered through Martin. In one, the gun types matched a

delivery to Martin on the same day; Martin testified that he

had delivered them to Twitty, who immediately ground down the

numbers; and the partly restored numbers matched those of the

guns Martin had received. All that was required for

admission was evidence sufficient to permit a reasonable jury

to conclude that the guns were the same, Fed. R. Evid.

901(a), and that was plainly present.

In the other instance, a handgun was recovered six days

after delivery of three guns of the same type to Martin for

Twitty. Although the recovered weapon had an obliterated

serial number, an expert testified that three restored digits

(two others could not be restored) were consistent with those

on one of the guns received by Martin six days earlier.

Again, this was sufficient for the court to admit the

evidence, since a rational jury could find that this weapon

was one of the guns received by Martin.

With more cause, Twitty objects to statistical evidence

offered at trial by the government for the same general

purpose, namely, to show the conspiracy's resale of guns. A

Boston police ballistic expert testified that, in the summer

of 1991, he noticed a sharp increase in police recoveries of

Davis .380 caliber semiautomatic pistols with serial numbers

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obliterated in the same manner. Based on police department

computer records, he testified that there were no such

recoveries from 1988 to May 1991 and that from mid-May 1991

to the end of the year, there were 30 such recoveries, plus

13 in 1992 and 9 in 1993.

According to the witness, similar, but less dramatic,

increases occurred in the same time frames in two other

categories of weapons with obliterated serial numbers: the

Raven .25 caliber semiautomatic pistol and the Intratec Tec-9

9mm semiautomatic pistol. The significance of these figures

was that other government evidence showed that Martin had

received at least 255 handguns from July 1990 to July 1991,

all but about 30 being delivered after April 1, 1991; and 206

of these weapons were of the three types whose street

seizures had increased markedly in 1991 and thereafter.

On appeal, Twitty says that the evidence was irrelevant,

unnecessary, duplicative, and prejudicial. As to relevance,

Twitty does not attack the quality of the data, see, e.g.,

United States v. Trenkler, 61 F.3d 45, 59 n.21 (1st Cir.

1995), nor does this case involve the kind of statistical

inference whose remoteness from the facts of the case has on

occasion troubled courts. See, e.g., Smith v. Rapid Transit,

Inc., 58 N.E.2d 754, 755 (Mass. 1945). Twitty argues only

that the evidence did not show that the seized guns listed in

the computer came from the conspiracy, but we think that the

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inference from the statistics, the weapon types, and the

timing showed enough of a connection.

Twitty next argues--to support his claim that this

statistical evidence was unnecessary and duplicative--that

the existence of a gun trafficking conspiracy was effectively

conceded at trial and that other non-statistical evidence

sufficed to prove that some guns ordered by Martin had been

resold. But other considerations aside, the statistical

evidence tended to support claims of sales by or through

Twitty since he had prompted many of the orders and the

increase in recoveries coincided with his greater

involvement. This reinforced the very connection to the

conspiracy that Twitty sought to deny at trial.

Twitty's most direct argument is that the statistical

evidence was unduly prejudicial, tending to link him with a

gun epidemic in Boston. Yet proving that the weapons reached

the street merely spells out what was implicit in the proof

that large numbers of guns were delivered to Martin for

Twitty and that Twitty's financial condition had improved

sharply. The statistical evidence from the ballistics expert

was not lurid or blood-curdling. The balancing of probative

value against unfair prejudice is weighted in favor of

admissibility, see Fed. R. Evid. 403, and confided primarily

to the sound discretion of the trial judge. United States v.

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Sutton, 970 F.2d 1001, 1008 (1st Cir. 1992). There was no

abuse of discretion here.

3. Twitty's most potent claim relates to his sentence.

Under amendments effective on November 1, 1991, the

Sentencing Guidelines increased the penalties for firearms

offenses. Twitty points out that no more guns were obtained

after July 1991, no sales after that time were proved, and

that after July his own contacts with other conspirators were

minimal. He contends that either the conspiracy was

abandoned or he had withdrawn from it prior to November 1,

1991, entitling him to the lower penalty available under the

earlier version of the guidelines. See United States v.

Garafano, 36 F.3d 133, 134 (1st Cir. 1994).

The pre-sentence report said that the conspiracy should

be deemed to continue past November 1, 1991, because not all

of the weapons had been recovered by that date; but on appeal

even the government does not defend this position, which

would extend many such conspiracies indefinitely. Nor does

it matter that the indictment alleged a conspiracy continuing

to on or around December 1991 and the jury convicted, for on

the evidence presented, and under the charge given to it, the

jury had no reason to care whether the conspiracy ended in

July or December or whether Twitty withdrew from it in its

wind-down phase.

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There is one other basis for applying the amended

guideline but we think that it is insufficient, although

possibly a close call. In an alternative finding, the

district judge ruled that the conspiracy included a cover-up

effort that did continue past November 1991. Mere efforts to

conceal a crime do not automatically extend the life of the

crime itself, but acts of concealment can extend the life of

a conspiracy if the proof shows "an express original

agreement among the conspirators to continue to act in

concert in order to cover up" their crime. Grunewald v.

United States, 353 U.S. 391, 404 (1957); e.g., United States

v. Bigos, 459 F.2d 639, 643 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 409

U.S. 847 (1972) (hijacking plan included explicit agreement

to cover up).

In this case the government does urge that there were

express agreements to conceal when, as already recounted,

Twitty in July 1991 enlisted Martin to persuade Cameron to

provide a false cover story to mislead federal agents and to

file a false theft report with the Boston police. While

these events occurred prior to November 1991, Twitty met the

Martins in November, promising to help keep Martin out of

jail and thereafter lied to federal agents. If ordinary

conspiracy rules governed, the July actions might be enough

to infer that the conspiracy had been enlarged to include

concealment as an objective.

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Grunewald, however, laid down special requirements of

proof resting upon a distinct policy concern, namely, that

"every conspiracy is by its very nature secret"; that "every

conspiracy will inevitably be followed by actions taken to

cover the conspirators' traces"; and that if these facts were

enough for a conspiracy to conceal, then the statute of

limitations and other safeguards would be virtually "wipe[d]

out." 353 U.S. at 402. For this reason, it held that even

egregious and organized acts of concealment were not

sufficient,1 unless agreed to as part of the original

conspiratorial plan. It summarized the point thusly:

[A] vital distinction must be made between acts of
concealment done in furtherance of the main
criminal objectives of the conspiracy, and acts of
concealment done after these central objectives
have been attained, for the purpose only of
covering up after the crime.

Id. at 405.

1In Grunewald itself, as the Court recounted,

[G]reat efforts were made to conceal the
conspiracy when the danger of exposure
appeared. For example, Bolich got rid of
certain records showing that he had used
Grunewald's hotel suite in Washington;
Patullo's accountant was persuaded to lie
to the grand jury concerning a check made
out to an associate of the conspirators;
Grunewald attempted to persuade his
secretary not to talk to the grand jury;
and the taxpayers were repeatedly told by
Halperin and his associates to keep
quiet.

353 U.S. at 403.

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While there were arguably explicit agreements to conceal

between Twitty and Martin, they occurred late in the day when

the conspirators knew that agents were on their trail and

active trafficking in guns had come to an abrupt halt. On

any realistic view of the matter, Twitty and Martin were

engaged "only [in] covering up after the crime." This might

be a closer case if the conspirators had continued their gun

trafficking and agreed to new measures of concealment as part

of an expanded conspiracy. Id. (distinguishing concealment

"in furtherance of" an ongoing conspiracy).

We do not think that our conclusion involves a

disagreement with the able trial judge about facts he found

or even characterizations, matters on which the clearly

erroneous standard is normally applied. United States v.

Wright, 873 F.2d 437, 444 (1st Cir. 1989). Rather, we read

Grunewald to impose a special burden to show that an express

agreement to conceal was, or at least became, part of the

central conspiratorial agreement and that the later acts

relied upon were in furtherance of this agreement. There are

no findings to this effect in our case and no evidence that

we think would permit such findings.2

2The government does rely on one set of concealment
measures that occurred during the course of the conspiracy--
the obliterating of serial numbers. But these arrangements,
probably designed in part to increase the selling price of
the weapons, were a narrow effort having nothing directly to
do with the acts occurring in or after November.

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Twitty also objects to the district court's decision to

apply a four-level enhancement for his role in the offense as

an organizer or leader. U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(a). This status

requires that the criminal activity of the organizer or

leader either involve five or more participants or be

"otherwise extensive." The sentencing judge found all of

these requisites, namely, that Twitty was an organizer or

leader, that there were five members in the conspiracy, and

that the activities were otherwise extensive.

The evidence indicated that during the first half of

1991, Twitty made the basic decisions about how many guns to

purchase and when to buy and sell them, substantially

increasing the number of weapons acquired through the

Martins. A defendant who "makes the critical strategic and

operational decisions" in a group enterprise can be deemed an

organizer or leader. United States v. Talladino, 38 F.3d

1255, 1261 (1st Cir. 1994). By this test, Twitty qualifies

even without regard to other evidence that tends to reinforce

his prominent role in the group.

Unless Cameron is considered a member of the conspiracy,

an issue that we do not reach, the number of clearly

established conspirators is only four. Regardless of numbers

the criminal activities themselves were "otherwise

extensive." The number of guns obtained and sold was

substantial; the conspiracy extended over many months; and

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the arrangements--acquisition from out of state sources,

obliterating of serial numbers, and distribution--was

reasonably elaborate. That is enough to support the district

court's findings. See United States v. Rostoff, 53 F.3d 398,

414 (1st Cir. 1995).

Twitty has raised several other claims regarding the

admissibility of other evidence (e.g., testimony as to an

admission made by Twitty) and the lack of an evidentiary

hearing at sentencing on Twitty's use of drugs. We have

examined his arguments on these issues but conclude that they

are without merit and do not require individual discussion.

This is not intended as criticism of counsel; the case has

been well briefed on both sides.

The judgment of conviction is affirmed. The sentence is

vacated and the case remanded for resentencing under the

earlier version of the Sentencing Guidelines.

It is so ordered.

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