United States v. Boots

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 94-1811

UNITED STATES,

Appellee,

v.

FRANCIS BOOTS,

Defendant, Appellant.

No. 94-1812

UNITED STATES,

Appellee,

v.

ELLWYN COOK,

Defendant, Appellant.

No. 94-1813

UNITED STATES,

Appellee,

v.

DEWEY LAZORE,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE

[Hon. Morton A. Brody, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Stahl, Circuit Judge,

Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,

and Lynch, Circuit Judge.

Robert A. Costantino, for appellant Francis Boots.

Ronald Cohen, for appellant Ellwyn Cook.

Stephen R. Kaplan, for appellant Dewey Lazore.

Margaret D. McGaughey, with whom Jay P. McCloskey, United States

Attorney, was on brief for appellee.

March 29, 1996

CAMPBELL, Senior Circuit Judge. In this

consolidated appeal, defendants-appellants Francis Boots,

Ellwyn Cook, and Dewey Lazore challenge their convictions for

conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371, to commit three

offenses, and their convictions of the substantive offenses:

1) to devise a scheme or artifice using the wires in

interstate commerce with intent to defraud Canada and the

Province of Nova Scotia of excise duties and tax revenues, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. 1343; 2) to devise a scheme or

artifice to deprive the residents of the Passamaquoddy

Reservation in Maine of the honest services of their police

chief, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1343 and 1346; and 3) to

travel interstate with the intent to facilitate bribery, a

crime under Maine state law, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

1952. Judgment was entered in the United States District

Court for the District of Maine following a jury trial.

I. Facts
I. Facts

Construed in the light most favorable to the

government, the evidence indicates that between April and

November 1992, defendants took part in a scheme to transport

tobacco from a Native American reservation in upstate New

York ("Akwasasne") into New Brunswick, Canada, without paying

the taxes and excise duties levied upon the importation of

tobacco by Canadian laws. The tobacco was transported

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surreptitiously into Canada through the Passamaquoddy

Reservation in Pleasant Point, Maine, bypassing customs

checkpoints at the Canadian border.

At the trial, Passamaquoddy Tribe member Anthony

Stanley testified that on April 15 he was called to discuss

some tobacco business by Beverly Pierro, a friend of his

friend, Francis Boots. Later that day, Stanley approached

his friend Frederick Moore, who was then serving as chief of

police of the Passamaquoddy Tribe ("the Tribe") at Pleasant

Point. Stanley told Moore that two Mohawks from Akwasasne

were in Calais, Maine and wanted to meet with him that

evening to discuss "mov[ing] tobacco." Moore (who was

familiar with Akwasasne from having spent time there twelve

years earlier at an Indian solidarity demonstration1) agreed

to meet. However, unknown to Stanley, Moore then contacted a

law enforcement officer at the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)

for advice and received a go-ahead to see what the two

Mohawks wanted.

The four -- Stanley, Moore, Cook, and Lazore -- met

that evening at a motel. It could be found from the evidence

that Cook and Lazore knew that Moore was a police chief.2

1. The terms "Native American," "Indian," and "aboriginal"
used herein are taken from the defendants' briefs and
testimony.

2. Stanley testified that when Moore asked in their initial
phone call whether the two knew that he was a police chief,
Stanley said yes. Moore testified that at the evening

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The two said that they wanted to bring tobacco from Akwasasne

to Passamaquoddy and sell it to Moore and Stanley, who would

profit by selling it to established markets in New Brunswick,

Canada. Moore declined to purchase their tobacco, but said

he would listen further to their objectives and the price

they would pay for his involvement.

Cook explained that the aim was to transport

tobacco "unmolested by either government." He indicated that

they could not transport the tobacco themselves because their

names were known. The group proceeded to discuss law

enforcement efforts on the reservation, possible border

crosspoints, a storage place for the tobacco, and the

potential for growth in their trading activities, with

Moore's help and his recruitment of others. Cook offered to

pay Moore $20 per case of tobacco transported. Moore said

that he would think about the proposal and reply within a

week. At the end of the meeting, he was given some tobacco

which he split with Stanley.

meeting he was not in uniform, but was wearing a baseball hat
that had the insignia of the Pleasant Point Police Department
on it. He admitted that the two defendants never stated at
the meeting that they were approaching him because he was a
police chief. However, Moore testified that he told them he
was armed and was a cop. The four also specifically
discussed law enforcement on the reservation, in response to
Lazore's inquiry about whether they had anything to fear from
police officers. The following day, Lazore and Cook saw
Moore when he was in uniform in his police cruiser and waved
to him from their car.

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Moore updated his contact at BIA and the next day

agreed to work undercover for the Federal Bureau of

Investigation (FBI). The following week he went with agents

of the FBI and Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) to view

possible offloading sites near St. Andrews, New Brunswick,

Canada. Moore took Stanley to some of the same places later

in the month.

Defendants Cook and Lazore next met with Moore,

Stanley, Pierro, and her boyfriend, Jake Boots (brother of

defendant, Francis Boots) on April 28, 1992. They discussed

navigation routes and law enforcement concerns, among other

matters. Moore told the group that he had access to the

schedules and communications of most of the law enforcement

agencies. They met again the next day, and Moore took Pierro

and Jake Boots by boat from the Passamaquoddy Reservation to

the Canadian shore while explaining points about navigation.

The first tobacco delivery was made on May 2.

Defendants Cook, Lazore, and Francis Boots, along with Pierro

and Jake Boots, brought 50 cases of tobacco to Stanley's

house, where they met Moore. Moore supplied a boat and

navigated it to St. Andrews with Stanley and Jake Boots.

They met two contacts who paid them $1000, which Stanley and

Moore split (Moore giving his share to the FBI). Moore made

similar deliveries across the border accompanied by Stanley,

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Jake Boots, or both on May 11, May 16, and June 27. Moore

and Stanley attempted to deliver tobacco on June 1, but

returned with the cases because their Canadian contact did

not show. Moore delivered tobacco on June 9, accompanied by

an FBI and border agent. No deliveries were made between

July and November due to the incarceration of a key contact,

Stanley Johnson. Moore and Jake Boots, assisted by Pierro,

made the last delivery on November 7.3

Moore testified that, in all, almost 1850 kilograms

of tobacco were transferred across the Canadian border.4

The government's expert on Canadian taxes stated that the

total per kilogram tax on tobacco was $106.47 Canadian.5 He

inferred that taxes had not been paid, because the packages

were not stamped as is customarily done. The wire fraud and

conspiracy counts in the indictment alleged that wires were

used in furtherance of a scheme to defraud Canada and the

Province of Nova Scotia of tobacco taxes due. To establish

this element, the government introduced evidence of four

3. Anthony Stanley, Beverly Pierro, Jake Boots, and Stanley
Johnson were also charged with various offenses, and entered
guilty pleas during the trial.

4. Omitting the June 9 transfer by Moore and law
enforcement agents, the amount transferred was 1500
kilograms.

5. This sum includes an excise duty of $18.33, excise tax
of $35.64, and a provincial excise tax of $52.50.

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interstate telephone conversations between Moore and Pierro

from May 1992 through July 1992.

During the period of tobacco deliveries, Moore (at

the FBI's request) did not disclose his role to the tribal

governor, who supervised him.6 The tribal governor learned

of Moore's activity in late June, when Stanley brought it to

the attention of the tribal council. Moore was suspended on

June 25 without pay and was later dismissed in August for

neglect of duty and insubordination. He testified that he

believed the dismissal was not a result of his tobacco

trading activities, but rather related to an investigation of

the tribal governor.

Boots and Cook argued, in defense, that they

pursued the above activities with a good faith belief in an

aboriginal right to trade tobacco freely with Canada. This

belief was based upon their adherence, as members of the

Ganiengehaga Nation, to a constitution called the "Great Law

of Peace," and on the fact that their reservation, Akwasasne,

includes lands in New York State, Ontario, and Quebec. The

two defendants testified that they recognized neither a

formal border between the United States and Canada nor a

Canadian right to tax the sacred product of tobacco, though

6. For his investigatory work, Moore received from the
federal government $350 per week between August and mid-
December, a $25,000 payment in December, and various
expenses.

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they admitted they were aware that Canada claimed such a

right and imposed such imposts. Boots maintained that he

believed the shipped tobacco was intended for an Indian

market in Canada. He further stated that Moore was hired

because of his navigational skills and not because of his

statusas thePassamaquoddy policechief. Lazore didnot testify.

II. Discussion
II. Discussion

Defendants assert on appeal that the district court

erred in the following ways: 1) in refusing to dismiss the

indictment or grant a judgment of acquittal, on the ground

that a "scheme to defraud" Canadian authorities of duties and

taxes is not cognizable under the wire fraud statute; 2) in

finding the Maine bribery statute, which provided the basis

for the Travel Act violation, applicable to Moore as police

chief of a Native American reservation; 3) in denying a

judgment of acquittal on the wire fraud counts charging a

scheme to deprive Passamaquoddy Tribe members of the honest

services of their police chief, despite alleged interference

of the federal statute with tribal sovereignty; and 4) in

refusing to include their specific version of a good faith

defense in the jury instructions. They claim that their

convictions of conspiracy and independent statutory

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violations must be reversed because of these errors.

Defendant Boots also challenges his sentence.7

A. Wire Fraud: Scheme to Defraud Canada of Duties
A. Wire Fraud: Scheme to Defraud Canada of Duties
and Taxes
and Taxes

The indictment charged a wire fraud violation in

the conspiracy count and four independent counts upon the

theory that defendants intended to defraud Canada and the

Province of Nova Scotia of tobacco duties and taxes, using or

causing the wires to be used interstate in furtherance of

7. Lazore argues that the district court erred in denying a
motion to dismiss the indictment based on lack of
jurisdiction to prosecute Native Americans for transporting
tobacco into Canada, a right claimed to be protected by the
Jay Treaty. He relies on language in Article III of the
Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation (1794) between the
United States and Great Britain, which provided:
[N]or shall the Indians passing or repassing with
their own proper goods and effects of whatever
nature, pay for the same any impost or duty
whatever. But goods in bales, or other large
packages, unusual among Indians, shall not be
considered as goods belonging bona fide to Indians.

The Jay Treaty, Nov. 19, 1794, U.S.-Gr.Brit., 8 Stat. 116,
118. The government has argued persuasively that this
argument grounded in the Jay Treaty was waived by defendants'
failure to press it sufficiently in the district court. In
any event, we discern no error in the lower court proceedings
on this ground. See generally Karnuth v. United States ex

rel. Albro, 279 U.S. 231, 239 (1929) ("[T]he privilege

accorded by article 3 is one created by the treaty, having no
obligatory existence apart from that instrument, . . . . It
is, in no sense, a vested right. It is not permanent in its
nature. It is wholly promissory and prospective, and
necessarily ceases to operate in a state of war. . . .");
Akins v. United States, 551 F.2d 1222, 1229-1230 (C.C.P.A.

1977) (duty exemption of Jay Treaty was abrogated by the War
of 1812, and though similar language was incorporated in
federal tariff acts until 1897, upon repeal of that last act
no such language preserving the right was reenacted
thereafter).

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this scheme. The relevant telephone communications took

place between Pierro and Police Chief Moore on May 25, May

31, June 7, and July 24, 1992.8 The government's evidence

supports a reasonable inference that the calls were made

between Maine and New York, where Moore and Pierro resided.

Defendants argue that the district court erred in

denying their motion to dismiss based on the government's

alleged failure to show a proper "scheme to defraud" as

section 1343 requires.9 Defendants insist, inter alia, that

(1) they made no affirmative misrepresentation to Canadian

customs authorities relative to their tobacco trading

activities; and (2) their scheme had as its object no

protected property interest within the wire fraud statute.

8. Defendants need not personally use the wires as long as
such use was a reasonably foreseeable part of the scheme in
which they participated. See United States v. Maze, 414 U.S.

395, 399 (1974); Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8-9

(1954).

9. The wire fraud statute provides:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any
scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining
money or property by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits
or causes to be transmitted by means of wire . . .
communication in interstate or foreign commerce,
any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds
for the purpose of executing such scheme or
artifice, shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both . . .
.
18 U.S.C. 1343.

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We turn first to defendants' insistence that the

absence of any affirmative misrepresentation -- such as a

false customs declaration -- rendered their smuggling

activities non-fraudulent for wire fraud purposes. The

government responds that scheming to bypass Canadian customs

authorities and not to declare the tobacco was a sufficient

form of deceit to meet the requirements of section 1343.10

Cf. United States v. Brewer, 528 F.2d 492, 496 (4th Cir.

1975) (scheme to sell cigarettes into another state without

registering with tax officials there, as required by Jenkins

Act, is mail fraud); see also McEvoy Travel Bureau, Inc. v.

Heritage Travel, Inc., 904 F.2d 786, 791 (1st Cir.), cert.

denied, 498 U.S. 992 (1990) ("the scope of fraud under these

[federal fraud] statutes is broader than common law fraud,

and . . . no misrepresentation of fact is required").

We see no need, however, to decide whether a

smuggling scheme structured like the instant one, if

10. Counts 1 and 18 through 21 charged that defendants
devised a scheme
in violation of Sections 236 & 240(1), of the
Excise Act, Revised Statutes of Canada, 1985, Ch.
E-14 and amendments thereto; Sections 155 & 160 of
the Customs Act, Revised Statutes of Canada, 1985
(2d Supp.) Ch. 1; Section 25(1)(a) of the Tobacco
Tax Act, Ch. 470 of the Revised Statutes of Nova
Scotia, 1989 and amendments thereto; and Section 7
of the Health Services Tax Act, Ch. 198 of the
Revised Statutes of Nova Scotia, 1989.
Part II of the Customs Act imposes an obligation on importers
to declare dutiable goods and pay any taxes or duties imposed
by other laws relating to customs.

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practiced upon, say, federal or other authorities within the

United States, would be a fraudulent scheme within section

1343. Even assuming it would be, we face the separate

problem that the object of the scheme here was exclusively to

defraud a foreign government, rather than our own, of customs

and tax revenues imposed under foreign law. We believe this

added factor pushes defendants' scheme beyond the parameters

of the frauds cognizable under section 1343.

The prosecution, relying on cases upholding wire

and mail fraud convictions for schemes to evade domestic

taxes, argues that customs and tax revenues, even though owed

solely to a foreign governmental body under laws of the

latter's making, constitute money and property for purposes

of the wire and mail fraud statutes.11 See, e.g., United

States v. Dale, 991 F.2d 819, 849 (D.C. Cir.) (federal tax

revenues), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 286 and 114 S. Ct. 650

(1993); United States v. Helmsley, 941 F.2d 71, 93-95 (2d

Cir. 1991) (state income taxes), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1091

(1992); United States v. Bucey, 876 F.2d 1297, 1309-1310 (7th

11. The Supreme Court has held that only frauds affecting
the government's interests as property holder come within
section 1343, see Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 25

(1987); McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 358 n.8

(1987) (mail fraud), although Congress has since criminalized
schemes to deprive another of the intangible right to honest
services as well, see 18 U.S.C. 1346 (effective November

18, 1988), infra. The Court has analyzed mail and wire fraud

offenses similarly, because they share the same relevant
statutory language. See Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 25 n.6.

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Cir.) (federal income taxes), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1004

(1989); see also Otto G. Obermaier & Robert G. Morvillo,

White Collar Crime 9.02[1] at 9-30 n. 64 (1994) (federal

and state tax cases).

But none of the prosecution's cited wire fraud

cases have involved a scheme to deprive a foreign government

of its own taxes and similar exactions.12 The prosecution

urges that section 1343 should apply, because it does not

12. A somewhat similar factual pattern arose, but went
undecided, in this circuit in a civil context in Nodine v.

Textron, Inc., 819 F.2d 347 (1st Cir. 1987).

The case that is perhaps most factually analogous
to the present -- though not particularly helpful here -- is
United States v. Gafyczk, 847 F.2d 685 (11th Cir. 1988),

which involved a scheme to import cigarettes into the United
States and to export them, repackaged with other materials in
mislabeled containers, into Italy without paying duties owed
there. The charges there included violations of 49 U.S.C.
121 (falsely making a bill of lading), 18 U.S.C. 1001
(making a false statement in a matter within the jurisdiction
of a U.S. government agency or department [the U.S. Customs
Service]), and 18 U.S.C. 371 (conspiring to defraud the
United States). Neither wire nor mail fraud was charged;
however, the court of appeals relied on McNally in

interpreting the "intent to defraud" element of section 121
to require that the government assert a pecuniary or property
interest which was the target of the fraud. See id. at 689-

690. Defendants' convictions on these counts were reversed
for failure to show such an interest. See id. ("It is clear

that such a deprivation could have occurred if the

appellants' actions had been even partially intended to evade
the payment of export duties or other levies properly owed to
the United States.") (emphasis supplied). The court added
that "the fact that the evidence may well have established
the appellants' intent to defraud Italy is of no import

because that nation is not identified as the object of the
effort to defraud in violation of 49 U.S.C.App. 121" as
alleged in the indictment. Id. at 690 (emphasis supplied).

The court expressed no opinion as to whether such a theory
would have been viable under section 121 (let alone under the
federal fraud statutes, to which section 121 was compared).

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describe any particular type of victim of a scheme to

defraud. It punishes use of the wires in interstate or

foreign commerce in furtherance of "any scheme or artifice to

defraud." If domestic tax fraud falls under section 1343,

why not foreign revenue frauds as well, it is contended.

Federal wire prosecutions have been based on frauds against

private foreign businesses and individuals. See, e.g.,

United States v. Lewis, 67 F.3d 225 (9th Cir. 1995)

(reversing wire fraud conviction for a scheme to defraud a

foreign bank where the jury instruction did not charge a

property interest as the target of the scheme); United States

v. Van Cauwenberghe, 827 F.2d 424 (9th Cir. 1987) (affirming

wire fraud conviction involving scheme to defraud a Belgian

investment broker and corporation), cert. denied, 484 U.S.

1042 (1988).

However, schemes aimed at depriving a foreign

government of duties and taxes are not the same as domestic

tax frauds, nor are they even the same as private commercial

frauds aimed at foreign business entities or individuals. At

issue is not only whether "money or property," as such, is

being targeted, but more importantly here, the extent to

which constitutional and prudential considerations factor

into our analysis. Foreign customs and tax frauds are

intertwined with enforcement of a foreign sovereign's own

laws and policies to raise and collect such revenues -- laws

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with which this country may or may not be in sympathy and

over which, in any event, we have no authority. In

recognition of this, our courts have traditionally been

reluctant to enforce foreign revenue laws. The "revenue

rule" -- a firmly embedded principle of common law, traced to

an opinion by Lord Mansfield, Holman v. Johnson, 98 Eng. Rep.

1120 (K.B. 1775) -- holds that courts generally will not

enforce foreign tax judgments, just as they will not enforce

foreign criminal judgments, although they will enforce

foreign non-tax civil judgments unless due process,

jurisdictional, or fundamental public policy considerations

interfere. See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations

483 & n.1 (1987); see also Banco Nacional de Cuba v.

Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 448 (1964) (White, J., dissenting)

("[O]ur courts customarily refuse to enforce the revenue and

penal laws of a foreign state, since no country has an

obligation to further the governmental interests of a foreign

sovereign.") (footnote omitted); Her Majesty the Queen in

Right of the Province of British Columbia v. Gilbertson, 597

F.2d 1161, 1164-1165 (9th Cir. 1979). The rationale of the

revenue rule has been said to be that revenue laws are

positive rather than moral law; they directly affect the

public order of another country and hence should not be

subject to judicial scrutiny by American courts; and for our

courts effectively to pass on such laws raises issues of

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foreign relations which are assigned to and better handled by

the legislative and executive branches of government.

Although this case does not require us to enforce a

foreign tax judgment as such, upholding defendants' section

1343 conviction would amount functionally to penal

enforcement of Canadian customs and tax laws. The scheme to

defraud at issue -- proof of which is essential to conviction

-- had as its sole object the violation of Canadian revenue

laws. To convict, therefore, the district court and this

court must determine whether a violation of Canadian tax laws

was intended and, to the extent implemented, occurred. In so

ruling, our courts would have to pass on defendants'

challenges to such laws and any claims not to have violated

or intended to violate them. Where a domestic court is

effectively passing on the validity and operation of the

revenue laws of a foreign country, the important concerns

underlying the revenue rule are implicated. Of particular

concern is the principle of noninterference by the federal

courts in the legislative and executive branches' exercise of

their foreign policymaking powers. National policy judgments

made pursuant to that authority could be undermined if

federal courts were to give general effect to wire fraud

prosecutions for schemes of this type aimed at violating the

revenue laws of any country. It is noteworthy that the

federal statute criminalizing the smuggling of goods into

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foreign countries punishes such activities only if the

foreign government has a reciprocal law. See 18 U.S.C.

546. A decision to uphold the present convictions would have

the effect of licensing prosecutions against persons who use

the wires to engage in smuggling schemes against foreign

governments irrespective of whether a particular government

had the reciprocal arrangement called for in section 546.

In the case of Canada, to be sure, we cannot say

that this specific legislative judgment would be undermined

by affirming the instant wire fraud conviction.13 We do

not condone defendants' smuggling activities, nor do we

question Canada's revenue laws or the desirability of

cooperation in respect to our mutual border. But application

of the wire fraud statute to a scheme of this type does not,

and cannot, turn upon our attitude towards Canada alone. The

revenue rule has not risen or fallen over the centuries based

on country-by-country judicial assessments of the potential

13. The United States has a treaty with Canada to exchange
information about smuggling across the border. See

Convention to Suppress Smuggling, June 6, 1924, U.S.-Can.
(ratified by Great Britain), 44 Stat. 2067. Yet a cursory
search has failed to make it clear whether a violation of
Canadian revenue or tax laws would be grounds for extradition
of the violator to Canadian authorities, suggesting some
doubt as to the degree of cooperation mutually promised. See

Treaty on Extradition, Dec. 3, 1971, U.S.-Can., 27 U.S.T.
983. We have not made a close examination into the extent of
Canada's reciprocal arrangements such as are contemplated
under 18 U.S.C. 546. Even assuming Canada were to qualify,
we see nothing in the wire fraud statute that would allow us
to limit the statute to wire frauds practiced against the
revenue laws of nations having reciprocal arrangements.

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for a foreign relations conflict. Courts are neither

equipped nor constitutionally empowered to make such

assessments. Prosecutors, who operate within the executive

branch, might of course be expected not to pursue wire fraud

prosecutions based on smuggling schemes aimed at blatantly

hostile countries, but whether conduct is criminal cannot be

a determination left solely to prosecutorial discretion.

Rather, the longstanding rule instructs the courts to leave

this area alone, so that the legislative and executive

branches may exercise their authority and bargaining power to

deal with such issues, and also so that a foreign

government's revenue laws are not subjected to intrusive

scrutiny by the courts of this country.

It is true that the existence of a more specific

penal statute, such as the current anti-smuggling statute, 18

U.S.C. 546, would not be deemed impliedly to preempt the

general federal anti-fraud statutes if effect could

comfortably be given to both. See, e.g., United States v.

Brien, 617 F.2d 299, 310 (1st Cir.) (holding that Commodities

Futures Trading Act does not preempt or impliedly repeal wire

or mail fraud statutes and citing related cases), cert.

denied, 446 U.S. 919 (1980); Brewer, 528 F.2d at 498

("[Defendant's] use of the mails to escape regulation added a

different element and a new dimension to her failure to

comply with the [Jenkins] Act."). Effect, however, cannot be

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given to section 1343 in these conditions without threatening

the reciprocity provision in section 546, and offending

generally the salutary principles underlying the revenue

rule. If Congress, notwithstanding these inherent tensions,

had meant to authorize the courts to enforce this kind of

application of the wire fraud statute, we think "it must

speak more clearly than it has." McNally, 483 U.S. at 360.

Our conclusion is further supported by the rule of lenity,

which holds that the harsher of two possible readings of a

criminal statute will be enforced only when Congress has

spoken clearly. See id. at 359-360; Fasulo v. United States,

272 U.S. 620, 629 (1926) ("[B]efore one can be punished [for

mail fraud], it must be shown that his case is plainly within

the statute."). We, therefore, hold that foreign tax and

customs frauds, such as the instant one, are not schemes to

defraud within the meaning of section 1343, and that

defendants' substantive convictions of wire fraud under

section 1343, based on the scheme to defraud Canada and Nova

Scotia of duties and taxes, must be reversed.

Our holding that it was legal error to apply the

wire fraud statute to defendants' Canadian smuggling scheme

requires us to set aside the conspiracy conviction under 18

U.S.C. 371 as well. Jurors "are not generally equipped to

determine whether a particular theory of conviction submitted

to them is contrary to law," though they are generally able

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to analyze evidence and recognize a theory that is factually

inadequate. Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 59

(1991); United States v. Nieves-Burgos, 62 F.3d 431 (1st Cir.

1995) ("Griffin distinguishes cases, like [Turner v. United

States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970)], which concern convictions that

may have rested on a basis that was not supported by the

evidence, from those concerning convictions possibly resting

on an invalid ground as a result of an error of law [such as

in Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957)]). The

district court instructed the jury that it could convict

under section 371 if the government proved beyond a

reasonable doubt that defendants conspired to commit at least

one of the three offenses charged as objects of the

conspiracy. Because it is impossible to tell which ground

the jury based the conspiracy conviction upon, the conviction

cannot stand. See Yates, 354 U.S. at 312.

The government contends that even if the wire fraud

count falls, the conspiracy conviction should be affirmed

based on at least one of the two other objects alleged.

Since the jury found substantive violations of those

statutes, the argument goes, we should infer that it

unanimously found beyond a reasonable doubt that the

conspiratorial agreement extended, with respect to all

defendants, to at least one legally sufficient object. This

contention might be persuasive where a district court does

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not give a "one-is-enough" charge, or a special verdict form

is required of the jury, such that the reviewing court is not

speculating on what the jury did or did not decide. Here,

however, it is at least possible that the jury did not ask

itself whether the conspiratorial agreement extended to the

two valid objects (interstate travel with intent to commit

bribery, and a scheme to defraud another of honest services)

with respect to all defendants, instead focusing on the

overall conspiratorial agreement to transport tobacco into

Canada without paying taxes and duties. Cf. United States v.

Carman, 577 F.2d 556, 567-568 (9th Cir. 1978) ("If the jury,

when considering the conspiracy count, focused only on the

crime embodied in the subsequently overturned substantive

crime conviction the conspiracy conviction also should be

overturned. . . . Criminal sanctions cannot rest on what an

appellate court thinks the jury would have done had the

issues put to it been framed differently."); see also United

States v. Palazzolo, 71 F.3d 1233 (6th Cir. 1995) (where

defendants were convicted of substantive offenses that were

also objects of a conspiracy, and district court gave

erroneous instruction on one offense, court reversed

conspiracy conviction because "the verdict lends itself at

least to the possibility that the jury found the defendants

guilty only of conspiring to violate" the legally inadequate

count); United States v. Musacchia, 955 F.2d 3 (2d Cir.

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22

1991). Further, the two legally sufficient objects of the

conspiracy were not so intricately intertwined with the

invalid wire fraud count that we can necessarily say that the

conspiracy conviction had a legally correct basis. Cf.

United States v. Huebner, 48 F.3d 376 (9th Cir.) ("Under the

facts in this case, it would not have been possible for the

jury to have found a conspiracy to aid and abet attempted

[tax] evasion without also finding a conspiracy to defraud

the United States by obstructing [tax] collection. . . .

[T]here could be no danger that the jurors based their

conspiracy verdict on finding that the object was to aid and

abet attempted evasion without also finding that the object

was to defraud the United States by obstructing

collection."), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 71 (1994). The

conspiracy conviction is vacated and that count is remanded

for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion,

which may, in the prosecution's discretion, include a new

trial on a properly narrowed indictment. See Yates, 354 U.S.

at 327-328; Palazzolo, 71 F.3d at 1238; United States v.

Ochs, 842 F.2d 515, 529 (1st Cir. 1988).

B. Maine Bribery Statute as a Basis for Violation
B. Maine Bribery Statute as a Basis for Violation
of the Travel Act
of the Travel Act

We turn next to the substantive counts of

interstate travel to facilitate bribery, a crime under Maine

law, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1952 and 2. The Interstate

Travel Act punishes "[w]hoever travels in interstate or

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foreign commerce . . . with intent to . . . promote, manage,

establish, carry on, or facilitate . . . any unlawful

activity, and thereafter performs or attempts to perform"

such an act. 18 U.S.C. 1952(a). Bribery in violation of

state law is an "unlawful activity" within section 1952. See

United States v. Arruda, 715 F.2d 671, 681 (1st Cir. 1983).

The Maine bribery statute, charged here, provides in relevant

part:

1. A person is guilty of bribery in official and
political matters if:

A. He promises, offers, or gives any pecuniary
benefit to another with the intention of
influencing the other's action, decision, opinion,
recommendation, . . . or other exercise of
discretion as a public servant. . . .

17-A M.R.S.A. 602(1)(A) (emphasis supplied). "Pecuniary

benefit" means economic gain, including money or property.

Id. 602(2)(C).

Defendants were convicted of traveling between New

York and Maine during the spring of 1992 with intent to carry

on and facilitate the bribery of Moore, whom they knew was

the police chief of the Passamaquoddy Reservation, and

thereafter performing and causing to be performed acts to

facilitate bribery, and aiding and abetting the offense.

Evidence was presented that Cook and Lazore gave Moore

tobacco at the end of their first meeting on April 15 (at

which he was offered payment for his involvement); Cook paid

Moore $1000 (Canadian) for the tobacco delivery on May 2;

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Boots paid Moore $600 for the delivery on May 16; and

defendants discussed with Moore concerns with law enforcement

on the reservation and elsewhere which might interfere with

their objectives.14

Defendants challenge their convictions for Travel

Act violations on two principal grounds: 1) Moore, as police

chief of the Passamaquoddy Indian Reservation, was not, they

argue, a "public servant" within the meaning of the Maine

bribery statute, supra; and 2) even if a public servant, his

official duties did not include enforcing Canadian or federal

laws and thus were not influenced.15 We do not find merit

in either contention.

"Public servant" is defined in the Maine criminal

code as "any official officer or employee of any branch of

government and any person participating as juror, advisor,

consultant or otherwise, in performing a governmental

14. The indictment charged that Pierro arranged for
additional payments totaling $3000 to Moore between May and
mid-September of 1992. The record indicates that Cook's
original offer of $20 per carton was not precisely carried
out, as Moore and Stanley usually were to share the payments.

15. Defendants also contend that it was legally impossible
for Moore to have been bribed after June 25, 1992, when he
was suspended from office. We agree with the government that
this claim does not get defendants far, since the relevant
dates for the Travel Act violations preceded his suspension.
Defendants have not challenged the Travel Act charge other
than to attack the predicate crime of bribery in violation of
state law.

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function." Id. 2(21) (emphasis supplied). "Government,"

in turn, is defined as:

the United States, any state or any county,
municipality or other political unit within
territory belonging to the State, the United
States, or any department, agency or subdivision of
any of the foregoing, or any corporation or other
association carrying out the functions of
government or formed pursuant to interstate compact
or international treaty.

Id. 2(13). Whether the foregoing definitions encompass the

police chief of the Passamaquoddy Tribe at Pleasant Point

requires consideration of the Tribe's legal relationship with

the State of Maine. That relationship is spelled out in the

federal Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act of 1980, 25 U.S.C.

1721-1735 ("Settlement Act"), which ratified Maine's Act

to Implement the Maine Indian Claims Settlement, 30 M.R.S.A.

6201-6214 ("Maine Implementing Act"). See Passamaquoddy

Tribe v. State of Maine, 75 F.3d 784, 787 (1st Cir. 1996);

Couturier v. Penobscot Indian Nation, 544 A.2d 306 (Me. 1988)

(the purpose of the Implementing Act was "to serve as a

basic, organic document establishing the broad and basic

provisions of the relationship between the State and the

Maine Indians").

Under these acts, the Passamaquoddies are declared

to be "subject to the laws of the State and to the civil and

criminal jurisdiction of the courts of the State to the same

extent as any other person . . . therein" unless otherwise

provided. 30 M.R.S.A. 6204; see also 25 U.S.C.

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26

1725(b)(1) (approving the jurisdictional scope set forth in

the Maine Implementing Act). However, the Maine Implementing

Act also grants powers and duties to the Tribe comparable to

those of a municipality (in addition to special authority to

regulate internal tribal matters). See 30 M.R.S.A. 6206(1)

("Except as otherwise provided in this Act, the Passamaquoddy

Tribe . . . shall have, exercise and enjoy all the rights,

privileges, powers and immunities, . . . and shall be subject

to all the duties, obligations, liabilities and limitations

of a municipality of and subject to the laws of the State");

id. 6206(2) (granting a tribe, its officers, and employees

immunity from suit when "the respective tribe . . . is acting

in its governmental capacity to the same extent as any

municipality or like officers or employees thereof within the

State"); Penobscot Nation v. Stilphen, 461 A.2d 478, 488 (Me.

1983). Tribe-appointed law enforcement officers "possess the

same powers and are subject to the same duties, limitations

and training requirements as other corresponding law

enforcement officers under the laws of the State." 30

M.R.S.A. 6210(4). These powers include shared authority

for enforcing state laws within Indian territories (except

for laws, not applicable here, over which a tribe may have

exclusive jurisdiction). See id. 6210(4).

The Maine legislature has thus explicitly equated,

in most respects, the powers and obligations of tribes and

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tribal law enforcement officers with those of municipalities

and corresponding law enforcement officers. See Couturier,

544 A.2d at 308 (tribes share the immunity of municipalities

under the Maine Tort Claims Act by operation of section 6202

of the Maine Implementing Act, and this immunity extends to a

tribe-appointed police officer acting in a governmental

capacity). Since a law enforcement officer employed by a

municipality would undoubtedly qualify as a "public servant,"

see 17-A M.R.S.A. 2(13) & 2(21), so too, we believe, would

a tribe-appointed law enforcement officer. The definition of

"public servant" extends, in any event, to a person (whether

or not an official officer or employee) "participating as

juror, advisor, consultant or otherwise performing a

governmental function." Id. 2(21). Moore was charged with

enforcing state laws and tribal ordinances within the

reservation. We think he fits, therefore, rather easily

within the Maine statute's definition of public servant.

Defendants' reliance upon United States v. Tonry,

837 F.2d 1281 (5th Cir. 1988) is misplaced. Tonry may

initially appear analogous, because it involved charges of

conspiracy to violate and substantive violation of the Travel

Act based on interstate travel with intent to bribe the

chairman of an Indian tribe. However, unlike the instant

case which involves defining "public servant" under Maine

law, the sole question resolved by the Fifth Circuit was

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whether the tribal chairman was a "private fiduciary" under

Louisiana's Commercial Bribery Statute. Defendants call

attention to Tonry because the court indicated that the

tribal chairman was not a Louisiana public official within

the meaning of another statute targeting public bribery. Yet

in that case, the government conceded that issue, given the

particular statutory scheme. Here, in contrast, the Maine

criminal code defines "public servant" quite broadly using a

functional measure, which is notably absent from the public

bribery law referred to in Tonry. More importantly, Maine's

criminal laws operate against the backdrop of the Settlement

Act which ratified the Maine Implementing Act. See Penobscot

Nation, 461 A.2d at 489 ("It was generally agreed that the

acts set up a relationship between the tribes, the state, and

the federal government different from the relationship of

Indians in other states to the state and federal

governments."). Defendants cannot expect the jurisdictional

burdens on the Tribe resulting from these acts to "disappear

merely because they have become inconvenient." Passamaquoddy

Tribe, 75 F.3d at 794.16

16. We similarly dismiss Cook's assertion that the bribery
of Moore to facilitate smuggling operations from New York to
Maine and into Canada is an internal tribal matter protected
from federal and state interference. Cook offers no
statutory support for interpreting the relevant provision of
the Maine Implementing Act this broadly, and indeed, the case
law is to the contrary. See 30 M.R.S.A. 6206(1)

("[I]nternal tribal matters, including membership in the
respective tribe or nation, the right to reside within the

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29

Defendants also challenge the predicate state

bribery violation on the ground that Moore's official duties

excluded enforcing federal or Canadian law and thus could not

be influenced. As noted, the statute prohibiting bribery in

official matters punishes one who "promises, offers, or gives

a pecuniary benefit with the intention of influencing the

other's action, decision, . . . or other exercise of

discretion as a public servant." 17-A M.R.S.A. 602(1)(A)

(emphasis supplied). The jury could find on the evidence

presented that, as police chief, Moore was responsible for

general surveillance of the reservation, and that defendants

selected him, in part, with the intention that he divert

other officers on the reservation from patrolling areas of

smuggling activity. Cf. State v. Beattie, 129 Me. 229, 151

A. 427 (1930) (defendant charged with bribing county sheriff

to refrain from seizing liquor and arresting person making an

unlawful sale). Moore testified that he normally would have

referred smuggling activity to the local district attorney's

office and pursued the matter further if so directed. He

also testified to having a mutually beneficial working

respective Indian territories, tribal organization, tribal
government, tribal elections and the use or disposition of
settlement fund income shall not be subject to regulation by
the State."); Penobscot Nation, 461 A.2d at 490 (holding that

operation of beano games is not an internal tribal matter,
for "the term embraces only those matters illustratively
listed in the statute and other matters like them," having
historical cultural importance).

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30

relationship with Canadian authorities which included

exchanging information. It may be conceded that his duties

did not formally include enforcing federal or Canadian law.

But an honest municipal police officer would be expected to

keep his eyes open for and report federal and, in present

circumstances, even foreign criminal violations; receiving

something of value to turn a deliberate blind eye would limit

his discretion in his official capacity as tribal police

chief.

Defendants' related contention that they recruited

Moore simply because of his navigational skills and not his

status as police chief is undermined by substantial evidence

showing that they were aware of Moore's status and concerned

with law enforcement activities from the first meeting

onward. We conclude that bribery was a legally sufficient

foundation for the Travel Act violations, and therefore

affirm those convictions.

C. Wire Fraud: Scheme to Defraud of Honest
C. Wire Fraud: Scheme to Defraud of Honest

Services
Services

A third substantive offense, related to the bribing

of the police chief, was that defendants devised a scheme to

defraud the residents of the Passamaquoddy Reservation at

Pleasant Point of the honest services of their police chief

and knowingly caused the wires to be used in interstate

commerce in furtherance of the scheme, in violation of 18

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31

U.S.C. 1343 and 1346.17 Defendant Lazore asserts,

without development, that the district court should have

issued a judgment of acquittal on these counts in deference

to tribal sovereignty. The government responds that tribes

are, in any event, subordinate to the federal government.

While neither side spells out the dispute, we understand it

to be principally a jurisdictional one, namely, that the

federal government lacks authority to prosecute defendants on

a matter involving internal relations of the Passamaquoddy

Tribe.

The Supreme Court has stated that while Indian

tribes are "'unique aggregations possessing attributes of

sovereignty over both their members and their territory,'"

"[t]heir incorporation within the territory of the United

States, and their acceptance of its protection, necessarily

divested them of some aspects of the sovereignty which they

have previously exercised." United States v. Wheeler, 435

U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (quoting United States v. Mazurie, 419

U.S. 544, 557 (1975)). The tribes generally retain the right

to self-government, id. at 322, but are nonetheless subject

to federal criminal jurisdiction of both a specified and more

general nature. See generally United States v. Markiewicz,

17. Our reversal of the convictions for violating section
1343, supra, does not resolve the challenge here, which is

based upon the distinct theory of scheming to "deprive
another of the intangible right to honest services." 18
U.S.C. 1346.

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978 F.2d 786, 797-802 (2d Cir. 1992) (discussing federal

criminal jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against

an Indian or on Indian territory, as well as over "peculiarly

Federal" offenses), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1086 (1993).

The statutory violations charged under 18 U.S.C.

1343 and 1346 are not specific to Native Americans, but

rather are of general applicability. Cf. Wheeler, 435 U.S.

at 330 n.30 ("Federal jurisdiction also extends to . . .

crimes over which there is federal jurisdiction regardless of

whether an Indian is involved, such as assaulting a federal

officer, 18 U.S.C. 111 (1976 ed.)."). The latter crimes

may involve "an independent federal interest to be

protected," id. at 331 n.32, though it is unclear that one is

required. Compare Markiewicz, 978 F.2d at 800, with United

States v. Begley, 42 F.3d 486, 500 (9th Cir. 1994) (a Native

American may be charged under a federal criminal statute of

general applicability even absent a peculiarly federal

interest, if charge is unaffected by federal enclave law and

Native Americans have not been excluded from the statute's

application), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 93 (1995). Wire fraud

appears to belong to this category of general offenses that

apply equally to Native Americans; even if an independent

federal interest is required to support this application of

the statute, the interest is to prevent use of the wires in

interstate or foreign commerce in furtherance of a scheme to

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defraud. Cf. H.R.Rep. No. 94-1038, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3

(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1125, 1127 (noting in

legislative history of the Indian Major Crimes Act [18 U.S.C.

1153], which prescribes federal jurisdiction over 13

specified offenses, that federal criminal jurisdiction also

extends to "crimes that are peculiarly Federal. . . . such as

assaulting a federal officer . . . or defrauding the United

States"); see also United States v. Funmaker, 10 F.3d 1327,

1331 (7th Cir. 1993) (18 U.S.C. 844(i), punishing one who

destroys by fire property used in or affecting interstate

commerce, extends to a Native American who set fire to tribe-

owned gambling hall); United States v. Finn, No. CRIM. 5-95-

12(01), -12(02), -12(03), 1995 WL 783305 at *16-*22 (D. Minn.

Oct. 12, 1995) (denying motion to dismiss for lack of

jurisdiction an indictment charging officers of tribal

corporation with mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1341

and 1346 and other offenses).

As discussed earlier, the United States has an

interest in preventing use of the wires in interstate

commerce to further a scheme to defraud, including one to

"deprive another of the intangible right to honest services"

under section 1346. Defendant has not shown, and we do not

discern, how the application of sections 1343 and 1346 in

this case would interfere with any Native American right

protected by statute or treaty, or right integral to self-

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34

government.18 Cf. Funmaker, 10 F.3d at 1332 ("The

decision-making power of Indian tribes ends . . . at the

point when those decisions would violate federal law designed

to safeguard important federal interests such as the free

flow of interstate commerce."). The convictions for

violations of section 1346, in conjunction with section 1343,

are affirmed.

D. Jury Instruction on Good Faith Defense
D. Jury Instruction on Good Faith Defense

Defendants challenge the district court's refusal

to give a proposed instruction to acquit on wire fraud if the

jury found "that the defendant had a good faith belief that

his status as a Native American entitled him to freely pass

the United States-Canadian border without paying any form of

taxes on the goods he was carrying." The proposed

instruction would not have required the jury to find, as the

district court instructed instead, that their good faith

belief was "objectively reasonable." We need not decide the

challenge to the jury instruction, because the wire fraud

convictions based on the scheme to defraud Canadian

authorities of taxes and duties have been reversed.

18. While Congress has removed federal jurisdiction to
enforce certain federal statutes involving Indian-related
offenses in the State of Maine, wire fraud laws are not so
included. See 25 U.S.C. 1725(c) (removing federal criminal

jurisdiction over sections 1152 through 1156, 1160, 1161, and
1165 of Title 18).

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True, charges under a second theory of wire fraud

(depriving citizens on the reservation of the honest services

of their police chief) have been affirmed. If refusing to

give the proposed instruction relating to aboriginal rights

were error, it might have infected the jury's assessment of

defendants' intent on these additional counts as well.

However, defendants' argument is grounded in the first theory

of wire fraud alone; they say that to the extent that this

case is about having the specific intent to violate Canadian

tax laws, it is analogous to certain federal tax offense

cases, in which an instruction that good faith must be

"objectively reasonable" is inappropriate. See Cheek v.

United States, 498 U.S. 192, 203 (1991). Given our reversal

of the tax-related charges, defendants' initially weak

contention is not even arguably tenable. In any case, the

district court went beyond the legal minimums in instructing

the jury that it could consider good faith as a defense. Cf.

Dockray, 943 F.2d at 155 ("[W]here the court properly

instructs the jury on the element of intent to defraud --

essentially the opposite of good faith -- a separate

instruction on good faith is not required.").

E. Sentencing of Boots
E. Sentencing of Boots

Boots challenges his sentence, which, like Cook's

and Lazore's, was at the low end of the applicable guideline

sentencing range: 18 months imprisonment, to be followed by

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36

two years of supervised release.19 Mandatory special

assessments were imposed. Boots raises four sentencing

issues.

1. Downward Departure
1. Downward Departure

Boots contends first that the district court erred

in refusing to grant a downward departure. He acknowledges

the general rule that jurisdiction does not lie for appeals

from a district court's discretionary decision not to depart

downward. See United States v. Tardiff, 969 F.2d 1283, 1290

(1st Cir. 1992). However, he seeks to fit within the

exception for a refusal to depart based upon a court's

"misapprehension of the rules governing departures." United

States v. Gifford, 17 F.3d 462, 473 (1st Cir. 1994).

The exception is a narrow one, and is not met here.

A review of the sentencing transcript reveals that the

district court judge was well aware of the applicable case

law, believed he had authority to depart downward, and

declined to do so after carefully weighing the arguments

presented. His discretionary judgment that the case did not

involve such unusual circumstances to justify taking it

19. The guideline range was determined as follows: a base
offense level of 6 pursuant to U.S.S.G. 2F1.1(a),
3D1.2(d), and 3D1.3(b); a seven-level increase for a loss
between $120,000 and $200,000 pursuant to 2F1.1(b)(1)(H);
and a two-level increase for an offense involving more than
minimal planning pursuant to 2F1.1(b)(2)(A), for a total
offense level of 15. With a criminal history category of I,
the applicable range was 18 to 24 months.

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37

"outside the Guidelines' 'heartland,'" United States v.

Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 949 (1st Cir. 1993), was not skewed by

legal errors such as Gifford describes. It is therefore

unreviewable.

2. Acceptance of Responsibility
2. Acceptance of Responsibility

Boots claims that the district court erred in

refusing to grant him a two-point reduction for acceptance of

responsibility for his offenses pursuant to U.S.S.G.

3E1.1(a). He says that at trial he did not contest the

factual basis for the charges, but challenged only the

jurisdictional bases, and should not be punished for

exercising his constitutional right to a trial.

We review for clear error the district court's

decision that Boots did not "clearly demonstrate[] acceptance

of responsibility" for his offense. U.S.S.G. 3E1.1(a); see

also United States v. Lombard, 72 F.3d 170, 187 (1st Cir.

1995). The district court declined to grant a reduction in

part because it believed that if defendant had been solely

concerned with jurisdictional issues relating to his Native

American status, he could have entered a conditional guilty

plea and preserved the issue for appeal rather than going to

trial. The court also considered the fact that defendants

defended against the bribery aspect of the case, insisting

that the payments they offered Moore were not bribery but

rather were salary for a business partner.

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38

A district court's determination of whether such a

reduction is warranted deserves "great deference." U.S.S.G.

3E1.1 comment. (n.5). We see no abuse of discretion here.

Cf. United States v. Crass, 50 F.3d 81, 84 (1995) ("intent,

like any other essential element of the crime charged, may

not be contested by the defendant without jeopardizing a

downward adjustment for 'acceptance of responsibility'");

United States v. Springs, 17 F.3d 192, 196 (7th Cir.) (noting

that defendant who entered conditional guilty plea "was able

to retain the right to challenge the voluntariness of his

confessions, and he still received the maximum possible

acceptance-of-responsibility reduction"), cert. denied, 115

S. Ct. 375 (1994).

3. More Than Minimal Planning
3. More Than Minimal Planning

Boots challenges the two-level increase imposed

pursuant to U.S.S.G. 2F1.1(b)(2) for offenses involving

more than minimal planning. The Guidelines state that this

increase applies where repeated acts are carried out over a

period of time provided they were not "purely opportune," as

well as where steps are taken to conceal the offense. See

U.S.S.G. 1B1.1 comment. (n.1(f)), 2F1.1(b)(2) comment.

(n.2). The sentencing transcript reflects that the district

court judge imposed this increase after considering the

evidence of multiple acts taken by defendants over a several

month period. Among the acts specifically noted was the

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39

bribery of Police Chief Moore, a concealed activity in which

defendants directly participated in the spring of 1992.

While the district court may reconsider this issue upon

remand for resentencing in light of our reversal of the wire

fraud and conspiracy convictions, it was not clear error to

impose the increase.

4. Amount of Loss
4. Amount of Loss

Boots claims that insufficient evidence supported

the district court's calculation of the amount of loss

(between $120,000 and $200,000), which resulted in a seven-

level increase to defendants' sentences. The range was

determined based on testimony at trial and sentencing as to

the quantity of tobacco transported into Canada and the

corresponding duties and taxes owed. Our reversal of the

wire fraud count involving tobacco smuggling, and our

vacating of the conspiracy count, require a remand for

resentencing, at which time the district court may reconsider

the entire question of loss calculations, including the

instant issue. We see no need to deal further with this

matter now.

We have considered defendants' other arguments and

find them to be without merit. The convictions for

violations of 18 U.S.C. 1346 (wire fraud intended to

deprive residents of honest services of their police chief)

and 1952 (Travel Act) are affirmed. The violations of 18

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40

U.S.C. 1343 (wire fraud relative to Canadian duties and

taxes) are reversed. The violation of 18 U.S.C. 371

(conspiracy) is vacated and remanded for further proceedings

not inconsistent with this opinion. We also vacate the

sentences of all defendants and remand for resentencing

consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

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