Cambridge Plating Co. v. Napco, Inc.

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit

No. 95-1781

CAMBRIDGE PLATING CO., INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

NAPCO, INC.,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 95-1782

CAMBRIDGE PLATING CO., INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

NAPCO, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. W. Arthur Garrity, Jr., Senior U.S. District Judge]

Before

Selya, Boudin and Lynch

Circuit Judges.

Thomas K. Christo, with whom David B. Chaffin and Hare &

Chaffin were on brief, for Cambridge Plating Co., Inc.

Lawrence S. Robbins, with whom Gary A. Winters, Mayer, Brown

& Platt, Richard L. Burpee and Burpee & DeMoura were on brief,

for Napco, Inc.

June 3, 1996

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LYNCH, Circuit Judge. These cross-appeals arise
LYNCH, Circuit Judge.

out of the sale of a defective wastewater treatment system

for use in an electroplating operation. For want of a $620

part, there was a damages verdict of over $7 million. The

purchaser of the system, Cambridge Plating Co., Inc., sued

the seller, Napco, Inc., for, among other things, failing to

reveal that it had knowingly omitted a critical part from the

system. The complaint alleged breach of contract,

intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation

and a violation of Mass. Gen. L. ch. 93A, 2, 11 ("Chapter

93A"). After a twelve-day trial, Cambridge Plating won on

all counts, with a jury finding liability on the common law

counts and the district court finding liability under Chapter

93A. Both the jury and the district court awarded Cambridge

Plating significant damages. Napco now raises various

challenges to the verdicts. We believe there was error in

the striking of post-judgment motions and that the claims

were timely filed under the Massachusetts discovery rule; we

find the evidence sufficient and affirm on liability (but

reverse the multiple damages under Chapter 93A), and vacate

and remand the award of damages.

I. Background

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We recite the facts as the jury and district court

could have found them. See Sampson v. Eaton Corp., 809 F.2d

156, 157 (1st Cir. 1987).

Cambridge Plating, as part of its metal plating and

metal finishing operations, uses large quantities of water

for bath solutions and rinsing. This water becomes

contaminated with chemicals and metals. Environmental

regulations require that Cambridge Plating decontaminate the

wastewater before discharging it into the sewers.

Napco manufactures and sells wastewater treatment

systems for commercial users. In January 1984, Cambridge

Plating entered into a contract to purchase, for

approximately $398,000, a wastewater treatment system that

would remove the contaminants from the water. As part of the

contract, Napco provided a "performance warranty" under which

Napco warranted that the system, if operated within certain

defined limits, would meet all Massachusetts and federal

pollution abatement requirements. The warranty, however,

excluded liability for all consequential damages or business

loss Cambridge Plating might incur in the event of a breach.

The system Napco sold to Cambridge Plating used a

precipitation process to remove the contaminants from the

water. The wastewater was fed through pipes, and injected

with a polymer solution. The polymers were to attach to the

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contaminants and then aggregate them to form larger

particles, known as "floc." The floc was to settle out of

the water and form sludge at the bottom of a clarifying tank.

The clean water layer on top would be discharged into the

sewer and Cambridge Plating would properly dispose of the

sludge left behind in the tank. "Flocculation," the joining

of the smaller particles into bigger ones, was absolutely

critical to the success of the wastewater treatment system.

Absent proper flocculation, contaminants would remain

suspended in the water and the water could not be discharged

into the sewer.

For proper flocculation to occur, the polymer

solution had to be thoroughly mixed into the wastewater

stream. The system needed some means of creating turbulence

in the stream sufficient to perform that mixing. One

mechanism designed to create the necessary turbulence is a

"static mixer." A static mixer is a section of pipe

containing a series of "baffles," small metal plates placed

at an angle inside the pipe which create resistance and,

consequently, turbulence. The polymer solution is injected

into the waste stream just before the water reaches the

static mixer. Once the water with the polymer solution hits

the baffles, mixing occurs.

There are alternatives to static mixers to create

the required turbulence for a precipitation wastewater

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treatment system. As Joseph Aliota, Napco's expert engineer,

testified, proper mixing can occur if the system is designed

with a series of significant bends in the piping around the

area where the polymer is injected into the stream. Napco

did not opt for that design. The engineering drawings (and

other items) for the Cambridge Plating system clearly

indicate that the system was to include a static mixer.

Napco did not install the static mixer. Nor did it

tell Cambridge Plating that the static mixer had not been

installed. It did, however, provide Cambridge Plating with a

"tech manual" containing blueprints and operating

instructions for the system. This manual, given to Cambridge

Plating upon completion of the system, purported to show what

had actually been built.1 It contained engineering drawings

indicating that the static mixer had been installed in the

system. Napco also provided a control panel that depicted

the static mixer as being part of the system.

Napco's employees were aware that the static mixer

had not been installed. Bob Triplett, Napco's plumbing

subcontractor, testified that he was instructed not to

install the static mixer at the direction of either Carl

1. Although the parties vigorously dispute whether the
drawings in the tech manual can be considered to be "as
built" drawings as that term is used among engineers, the
evidence shows clearly that these drawings were placed in the
manual to show Cambridge Plating what had actually been
built.

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Bredfield, a Napco employee, or Bob DeBisschop, Napco's

project manager on the Cambridge Plating job. John Eason,

Napco's Manager of Pollution Abatement and the person

principally responsible for the design of the system, also

testified that he knew the static mixer was not there,

although he claimed that the static mixer was installed at

first but later removed because it had a tendency to clog.

The system was installed in late 1984. For several

months after installation, the system generally met the

applicable pollution limits. A series of reports from a

testing laboratory that Cambridge Plating forwarded to the

Massachusetts Water Resources Authority ("MWRA") (the

relevant state regulatory body) showed that from roughly

March 1985 until September 1985, the system usually met the

applicable discharge limits.

As time went on, however, the system regularly

failed to meet the applicable pollution limits and Cambridge

Plating complained to Napco about the problems. Starting in

early 1986, Edward Marullo, a Cambridge Plating employee

responsible for running the system, called DeBisschop at

Napco to complain about the poor performance. DeBisschop

told Marullo to manipulate the polymer and pH levels. In

March 1986, Laurence Tosi, Cambridge Plating's President,

called DeBisschop "yelling and screaming" about the system's

failures. Tosi thought that Napco's equipment might be at

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fault, but DeBisschop allayed his concerns, saying that

operator error was the likely cause of the problem. Based on

DeBisschop's assurances, Tosi took no further steps to have

the system inspected for defects. Again, in 1987, Marullo

called Eason at Napco, who, like his colleague DeBisschop,

told Marullo to manipulate the polymer flow and pH level. At

some point, Napco told Tosi that it would be willing to send

engineers to examine the system or to train further Cambridge

Plating's operators. But there was a price tag: Cambridge

Plating had to agree to pay $1000 per day for such service.

Tosi declined. At no time did Napco inform Cambridge Plating

that the static mixer was missing.

During this period, Cambridge Plating hired a

series of experts to determine what was wrong. In December

1986, it hired Patrick Hunt, a waste treatment operator for

Hewlett-Packard who was also an instructor of a licensing

course for wastewater treatment operators at the University

of Lowell. Hunt inspected the system, recognized

"insufficient floc formation" as a problem, and made numerous

suggestions, most of which related to operation. Hunt did

not discover that the static mixer was missing. In May 1987,

Robert Capaccio, also a wastewater treatment expert, visited

Cambridge Plating but failed to detect that the static mixer

was missing. A third group of experts from Memtek, which

designs and manufactures wastewater treatment systems,

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examined the system in September 1987 for the purpose of

proposing a course of action. They recommended a substantial

overhaul of the system at a cost that Cambridge Plating

considered prohibitive. During their review, they did not

notice that the static mixer was missing.

As Cambridge Plating was trying to identify and

solve the problems with the system, it was also becoming a

consistent violator of the MWRA's regulations. In December

1988 the MWRA fined Cambridge Plating $682,250 for

discharging excessive levels of contaminants. Cambridge

Plating challenged the fine, which was later reduced to

$128,500, but at a cost of approximately $54,000 in

attorneys' fees.

Cambridge Plating tried to manage the system's

deficiencies by rigging the system so that the wastewater

would be recirculated and retreated in the system. "Closed

looping," as this practice was called, gave more time for

flocculation to occur. It also slowed down production

considerably. When there was closed looping, the system had

to process both the retreated wastewater and the incoming

wastewater generated by production. From 1985 to February

1989, the closed looping was accomplished by attaching

flexible hoses to the system. In February 1989, Cambridge

Plating replaced the flexible hoses with hard piping to

create permanent closed looping. Cambridge Plating also shut

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down its zinc plating operation because, even with closed

looping, the system could not remove the contaminants from

that operation. Because of its slowdown in production

capacity, Cambridge Plating's business began to deteriorate.

Net sales declined from a high of approximately $6.2 million

in 1985 to approximately $4.8 million in 1989.

In February 1989 Cambridge Plating hired Peter

Moleux, another expert in wastewater treatment systems.

Moleux reviewed Napco's proposal and copies of the

engineering drawings. By chance, Moleux had been given a bad

photocopy of the drawings. The portion of the drawings that

depicted the static mixer did not appear on the photocopy.

He decided to look for the static mixer in the system. He

physically examined the system and inspected the area of the

system where the static mixer should have been. Because of

his expertise, he noticed that the piping looked different

than it should have if the static mixer had been installed.

He later confirmed that the static mixer had not been

installed. He told Cambridge Plating that the mixer was

missing.

Shortly thereafter, on March 17, 1989, Cambridge

Plating sent a letter to Napco enclosing a draft complaint

"concerning difficulties" Cambridge Plating had experienced

with Napco. The draft complaint mentioned the missing static

mixer and the letter requested an "amicable resolution."

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Napco ignored the letter, never agreeing to come to a meeting

to seek an amicable resolution nor agreeing to fix the

problem.

Despite Moleux's discovery, Cambridge Plating did

not order the static mixer until December 1989. It arrived

at the plant in January 1990 but was not installed until May

1990. Installation required the plant to be shut down for

one day. Once the static mixer was installed, the system's

performance improved dramatically, and Cambridge Plating was

able to discontinue, for the most part, closed looping. The

static mixer cost $620.

Cambridge Plating sued Napco on June 22, 1990

charging breach of contract (including willful repudiation of

warranty), intentional misrepresentation, negligent

misrepresentation and violation of Chapter 93A. Napco

subsequently moved for summary judgment. The district court

granted the motion, holding that Cambridge Plating's claims

were time-barred. This court reversed and remanded for

trial, see Cambridge Plating Co., Inc. v. Napco, Inc.

(Cambridge Plating I), 991 F.2d 21, 22 (1st Cir. 1993),

holding that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to

whether Cambridge Plating could benefit from the discovery

rule.

On remand, the case was tried to a jury in

September 1994. The district court submitted Fed. R. Civ. P.

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49(b) special interrogatories to the jury on the statute of

limitations question, the three common law counts, and the

Chapter 93A count. The jury answered all of the

interrogatories in Cambridge Plating's favor, returned a

general verdict on each of the common law counts, and awarded

Cambridge Plating $12,183,120. The district court treated as

advisory the jury's answers to the Rule 49(b) interrogatories

on the Chapter 93A count, and, on February 7, 1995, the

district court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law

on the Chapter 93A count. See Cambridge Plating Co., Inc. v.

Napco, Inc. (Cambridge Plating II), 876 F. Supp. 326 (D.

Mass. 1995). In that opinion, the district court concluded

that the Chapter 93A count was timely, that Napco had

violated Chapter 93A, and that Cambridge Plating was entitled

to compensatory damages in the amount of $3,363,120.2 The

district court also concluded that the violation of Chapter

93A was "willful or knowing" and ordered a punitive award of

double damages.

Napco filed post-judgment motions for judgment as a

matter of law, a new trial, remittitur, and amended findings

on the Chapter 93A claim. After Cambridge Plating argued

that the post-judgment motions failed to set forth with

sufficient specificity the grounds for relief, the district

2. The district court also awarded attorneys' fees of
$345,000 pursuant to Mass. Gen. L. ch. 93A, 11.

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court struck all of the motions, except the motion for

remittitur. The district court then granted a remittitur in

the amount of $7,839,000 and gave Cambridge Plating the

option of accepting the remittitur, thereby accepting a

reduced damage award on the common law counts in the amount

of $4,344,120, or submitting to a new trial. See Cambridge

Plating Co., Inc. v. Napco, Inc. (Cambridge Plating III), 890

F. Supp. 55, 59 (D. Mass. 1995). Cambridge Plating accepted

the remittitur.

Napco now challenges the sufficiency of the

evidence, both as to liability and damages. Alternatively,

it seeks a new trial due to instructional error. It also

argues that the district court should have limited the

damages even more. We turn first to the question of our

scope of review.

II. Scope Of Review

The district court's decision to strike Napco's

post-judgment motions affects the scope of our review. Napco

challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to show willful or

intentional misconduct, seeking a judgment as a matter of law

or, in the alternative, a new trial on the "intentional"

counts: intentional misrepresentation, willful repudiation of

warranty and Chapter 93A. This court will not, however,

review sufficiency challenges absent a proper motion in the

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district court for judgment as a matter of law or a new

trial. See Johnson v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R.

Co., 344 U.S. 48, 54 (1952) (motion for j.n.o.v.); Pinkham v.

Burgess, 933 F.2d 1066, 1070 (1st Cir. 1991) (motion for new

trial); cf. Hammond v. T.J. Litle & Co., Inc., Nos. 95-1690,

95-1913, slip op. at 10 (1st Cir. April 30, 1996) ("It is

beyond peradventure that in order to challenge the

sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, a party must first

have presented the claim to the district court, either by

moving for judgment as a matter of law before the case is

submitted to the jury and renewing that motion after the

verdict, Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a), (b), or by moving for a new

trial pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59."). If the district

court acted properly in striking the motions, the motions are

nullities, and, under Johnson and Pinkham, Napco is barred

from challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. We

believe, however, that the district court understandably but

improperly struck the post-judgment motions.

A. Procedural Background

The district court entered judgment on February 8,

1995. The next day, Napco moved for an extension of time for

filing its memoranda in support of its post-judgment motions,

stating:

Plaintiff has prevailed on four separate
and distinct legal claims. Therefore, in
order to obtain postjudgment relief,
Napco must challenge all four bases for

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the judgment. This will require Napco to
argue several substantial legal and
factual issues including, for example,
the recoverability of lost profits for
negligent misrepresentation, the
sufficiency of the evidence of
intentional misrepresentation and of
repudiation of warranty, the statute of
limitations (three-year and four-year),
as well as issues relating to Chapter 93A
and damages.

On February 14, the district court granted the motion, giving

Napco until March 1, 1995 to file the post-judgment

memoranda. On February 17, six days before the 10-day time

limit for filing post-judgment motions expired, Napco filed a

motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) and 59. In summary

fashion, the motion outlined its subject matter and said the

grounds would be set forth in the March 1 memorandum to be

filed later in accord with the Court's extension.3 Also on

3. The text of the motion was:

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) and 59,
the defendant, Napco, Inc., hereby:

(1) renews the motion for entry
of judgment as a matter of law
that it made at the close of
the plaintiff's evidence and
again at the close of all the
evidence;
(2) moves for a new trial on
the common law counts decided
by the jury; and
(3) moves for a remittitur or a
new trial on damages on the
common law counts decided by
the jury.

The grounds for this motion will be set
forth in Napco's Memorandum in Support of

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February 17, Napco filed a similar motion under Fed. R. Civ.

P. 52(b) and 59 seeking either to amend the district court's

findings of fact and conclusions of law or to have a new

trial on the Chapter 93A claim. This motion also said that

the grounds for the motion would be set forth in the March 1

memorandum.

On February 24, 1995, one day after the ten-day

period expired, Cambridge Plating moved to strike Napco's

post-judgment motions, arguing that they lacked sufficient

"particularity" under Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1) and that,

accordingly, no "motion" had been timely filed within the

ten-day period prescribed by Rules 50(b), 52(b) and 59. In

granting Cambridge Plating's motion, except on the remittitur

issue, the district court refused to take into consideration

Napco's extension motion or any of the other surrounding

circumstances.

B. Analysis

Rule 7(b)(1) requires that motions "state with

particularity the grounds therefor." Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1).

Napco's post-judgment motions are subject to the requirements

of Rule 7(b)(1). The particularity requirement, however, is

Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law,
for a New Trial or for Remittitur, which
Napco will file on March 1, 1995 in
accordance with the Court's ruling on
Defendant's Motion for Additional Time to
File Memorandum.

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to be read flexibly in "recognition of the peculiar

circumstances of the case." Registration Control Sys., Inc.

v. Compusystems, Inc., 922 F.2d 805, 808 (Fed. Cir. 1990).

This is because Rule 7 is designed "to afford notice of the

grounds and prayer of the motion to both the court and the

opposing party, providing that party with a meaningful

opportunity to respond and the court with enough information

to process the motion correctly." Id. at 807. When a motion

is challenged for lack of particularity the question is

"whether any party is prejudiced by a lack of particularity

or 'whether the court can comprehend the basis for the motion

and deal with it fairly.'" Id. at 807-08 (quoting 5 C.

Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure 1192, at

42 (1990)).

While Napco's motion was at best sloppy practice,

we believe that it was sufficiently particular when read in

conjunction with the extension motion and prior filings.

Although the extension motion was not filed simultaneously

with the Rule 50(b), 59 and 52(b) motions, it was filed only

a week before, within the ten-day period, and was obviously

closely related to the Rule 50(b) motion. Compare Lac Du

Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin,

957 F.2d 515, 517 (7th Cir.) (supporting memorandum filed

with insufficiently particular motion), cert. denied, 506

U.S. 829 (1992). The extension motion specified the bases of

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the judgment that Napco "must challenge," including the

sufficiency of the evidence on the intentional

misrepresentation claim and the willful repudiation of

warranty claim, as well as issues relating to Chapter 93A and

damages. Napco thus represented to both the court and

Cambridge Plating the grounds for its post-judgment motions.

No claim is made that there was any intervening event that

would have made the representations in the extension motion

unreliable.

Cambridge Plating makes a passing argument in its

brief that it was unable to respond to, or the district court

to process, Napco's motions. If the Rule 50(b), 59 and 52(b)

motions are viewed in isolation, Cambridge Plating has a

point. But the motions cannot be viewed in isolation. In

addition to the closely filed extension motion, significant

briefing on the Chapter 93A issues had just been completed

and Napco had earlier made quite a detailed Rule 50(a)

motion, of which the Rule 50(b) motion was a "renewal." In

short, the record shows that Napco was taking steps

specifically to make evidentiary challenges to the verdict on

all of the major issues litigated at trial. The grounds

Napco would press in its post-judgment motions were

sufficiently known. The motions under Rules 50(b), 59 and

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52(b) were adequate, although barely, under the

circumstances.4

The district court premised its decision on the

belief that the law prevented it from looking beyond the four

corners of the motion to determine whether the motion had

stated its grounds with sufficient particularity. While

understandable, such a view of Rule 7(b)(1) is, in our view,

too narrow. "Overly technical" evaluations of particularity

are disfavored. Wright & Miller, supra, 1192, at 43.

Courts routinely take into consideration other closely filed

pleadings to determine whether sufficient notice of the

grounds for the motion are given and the opposing party has a

fair opportunity to respond. See Chippewa Indians, 957 F.2d

at 517 (motion failing to state grounds is sufficiently

particular where supporting memorandum adequately discusses

the grounds); Brown v. United States Postal Serv., 860 F.2d

884, 887 (9th Cir. 1988) (motion for reconsideration was

adequate under Rule 7 even though a particular ground was

4. As should be clear, the bar places its clients at risk
with this sort of practice and unnecessarily complicates the
litigation. Nevertheless, the circumstances involved in this
case are distinguishable from Riley v. Northwestern Bell

Telephone Company, 1 F.3d 725, 726-27 (8th Cir. 1993), and

Martinez v. Trainor, 556 F.2d 818, 819-20 (7th Cir. 1977),

the cases upon which Cambridge Plating principally relies.
In those cases the moving parties filed only bare-bones
motions within the specified time period. There were no
other closely related documents filed before the expiration
of the time period making it clear to the court and the
opposing party what the moving party would be arguing.

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omitted, where the parties had already briefed and argued the

issue and no prejudice would result); see also King v.

Mordowanec, 46 F.R.D. 474, 477 (D.R.I. 1969) (where grounds

for Rule 60(b) motion were stated at oral argument previous

day and were discussed after filing, during in-chambers

argument, motion did not run afoul of Rule 7(b)(1)

particularity requirement). Accordingly, we reach Napco's

various challenges to the sufficiency (and weight) of the

evidence.5

III. Liability

A. Statute Of Limitations

1. Sufficiency of the evidence.

Napco first argues that none of the claims survive

the statute of limitations. Cambridge Plating filed suit on

June 22, 1990. A four-year statute of limitations governs

the Chapter 93A and breach of warranty claims. See Mass.

Gen. L. ch. 106, 2-725 (contract for sale of goods); Mass.

Gen. L. ch. 260, 5A (Chapter 93A). A three-year statute of

limitations governs the intentional and negligent

misrepresentation claims. See Mass. Gen. L. ch. 260, 2A.

5. Cambridge Plating has cross-appealed the district court's
decision not to strike the motion for remittitur. In light
of our decision that the district court erred in striking the
motions, we reject Cambridge Plating's argument that the
district court should also have struck Napco's request for a
remittitur.

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As established in Cambridge Plating I, 991 F.2d at 27,

Cambridge Plating must rely on the discovery rule to prove

its claims were timely filed. The discovery rule

"'prescribes as crucial the date when a plaintiff discovers,

or any earlier date when she should reasonably have

discovered, that she has been harmed or may have been harmed

by the defendant's conduct.'" Id. (quoting Bowen v. Eli

Lilly & Co., Inc., 557 N.E.2d 739, 740-41 (Mass. 1990)). The

discovery rule here "turns on when the company should have

known that Napco might be responsible for the water treatment

system's failing performance." Cambridge Plating I, 991 F.2d

at 29. The question to be resolved at trial was whether

Cambridge Plating "knew or should have known of its claims

before June 22, 1987 [or June 22, 1986]." Id. Napco argues

that the evidence was insufficient for a jury to conclude

that Cambridge Plating should not have known of its claims

before the pertinent cut-off dates. We disagree.

The question of the timeliness of the breach of

warranty and Chapter 93A claims under the four-year statute

is, we believe, largely answered by the admirable description

of the evidence provided by the district court in light of

our previous opinion in Cambridge Plating I. The evidence at

trial showed that Cambridge Plating was aware that the system

was complex and that the performance warranty Napco provided

contained the implicit condition that the system be operated

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properly. At least at first, Cambridge Plating could

reasonably have believed that its own inexperience, rather

than Napco's defective equipment, was to blame.

Of course, at some point, when things were no

better, Cambridge Plating should have thought that something

other than operator error was causing the problem. And as

Napco points out, there was evidence that such a point came

for Cambridge Plating either in early 1986, when Marullo

complained to Debisschop about the system, or March 1986,

when Tosi "kept yelling and screaming" at Debisschop that the

problems were due to the equipment.

But the critical question is whether Cambridge

Plating reasonably relied on Napco's responses to those early

1986 inquiries that operator error, rather than equipment

defect, was the cause of the trouble. The fact that Tosi

complained vociferously that the equipment was at fault is

not dispositive if DeBisschop was reasonably able to convince

Tosi he was wrong. Napco had considerably superior

expertise in this area. The absence of the static mixer was

not something Cambridge Plating, with its level of expertise,

should have detected. We believe that under such

circumstances, when Napco gave Tosi its "assur[ances]" that

the problem had to be with the Cambridge Plating's operators,

Cambridge Plating reasonably took Napco at its word.

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The misrepresentation claims, governed by a three-

year statute, were also timely. Cambridge Plating did not

sit idle during the next twelve months. When Napco's

suggestions did not solve the problem, Cambridge Plating

hired Patrick Hunt, in late 1986, to evaluate the system. In

January 1987 Hunt gave Cambridge Plating his recommendations,

which suggested operational changes but not that the static

mixer was either missing or not working properly. If Hunt

were unqualified to examine the system, then Cambridge

Plating might have difficulty arguing that it was acting

reasonably. But Hunt was an expert in wastewater treatment

systems and competent to evaluate the system.

Was Hunt's failure to discover that the static

mixer was missing reasonable? See Cambridge Plating I, 991

F.2d at 29-30. We think the jury was entitled to think so.

First, the absence of the static mixer was not something that

could be easily detected from a physical observation of the

system. Indeed, other experts after Hunt who looked over the

system were also fooled. Second, Napco had supplied to

Cambridge Plating drawings representing that the static mixer

had been installed. According to Cambridge Plating, these

drawings were "as built" drawings. Napco disputes Cambridge

Plating's characterization of the drawings, pointing to

testimony that "as built" drawings, as the term is

technically used, were never prepared. Yet regardless of

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whether the drawings technically could be called "as built,"

Napco admitted supplying the drawings to Cambridge Plating in

the tech manual "[t]o show what was built."

Perhaps, given the problems with the system, the

accuracy of the drawings should have been called into

question at this time. The jury was entitled to think

otherwise. The system was extremely complex and the cause of

the malfunction could have been any number of problems,

including, as Napco points out, problems of design. The

factfinder could reasonably conclude on this record that the

probability the drawings were false was sufficiently low that

questioning the accuracy of the drawings would be low on

Cambridge Plating's (or Hunt's) diagnostic checklist. The

evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the claims

were timely. Nor was such a finding against the weight of

the evidence.

2. Special interrogatory.

Napco alternatively argues that a new trial should

be granted on the misrepresentation counts because the

special interrogatory submitted to the jury on this point was

defectively worded. Over Napco's objection, the court

submitted interrogatory 1(b), which asked: "Should plaintiff

Cambridge Plating reasonably have known before June 22, 1987

of defendant Napco's failure to install the static mixer?"

(Emphasis in original.)

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Review of this interrogatory is for abuse of

discretion. See Frank Briscoe Co., Inc. v. Clark County, 857

F.2d 606, 614 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1048

(1989). Abuse of discretion may be found if the

interrogatories are worded in such a way that they are likely

to mislead or confuse the jury or inaccurately state the

issues. Id. Although Napco's argument has some merit, the

district court did not abuse its discretion.

Cambridge Plating I stated that the appropriate

test for the discovery rule was whether Cambridge Plating

"should have known that Napco might be responsible for the

water treatment system's failing performance." Cambridge

Plating I, 991 F.2d at 29. Napco points out that the opinion

drew no specific distinction among the claims and argues that

it was improper to direct the jury's focus onto the failure

to discover the static mixer specifically.6 Napco also

relies on the passage from the opinion stating that "the

statute of limitations will begin to run once the plaintiff

has enough information to target the defendant as a suspect,

though not necessarily to identify the defendant as a

culprit." Id. at 29-30. Under Napco's reading, all claims -

- warranty, negligence and fraud -- would have the same

trigger date under the discovery rule: when Cambridge

6. Napco requested an interrogatory that asked whether
plaintiff "knew or should have known of its claims against
Napco before June 22, 1987."

-25-

Plating should have thought Napco might be responsible for

the problems with the system.

Cambridge Plating I did not say that. The opinion

does not address the question specifically of what

information is needed to "target the defendant as a suspect"

for a breach of contract as compared to that information

needed to "target the defendant as a suspect" for fraud. The

information needed to target the defendant as a suspect is,

in fact, different for each claim. Although Cambridge

Plating may have had reason to know that Napco might be in

breach of its warranty when the system did not perform up to

snuff and Cambridge Plating had ruled out operator error,

that does not mean that Cambridge Plating had reason to know

that Napco had deceived it. Cf. Childers Oil Co., Inc. v.

Exxon Corp., 960 F.2d 1265, 1275 (4th Cir. 1992) (Luttig, J.,

dissenting) ("[A]lthough appellants knew or should have known

when construction of the station began that Exxon had

breached its contract, appellants did not have reason to know

of the possibility of deception until they learned in 1988

that Exxon had always intended to build a competing

station.").

Under Massachusetts law, a cause of action for

deceit accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have known

of the misrepresentation. See Friedman v. Jablonski, 358

N.E.2d 994, 997 (Mass. 1976) (cause of action for

-26-

misrepresentation in the sale of real estate accrues when the

plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of the

misrepresentation); see also Tagliente v. Himmer, 949 F.2d 1,

5 (1st Cir. 1991) ("The burden is on the plaintiff to prove

that in the exercise of reasonable diligence she could not

have known of the misrepresentation within the statute of

limitations.").7 In this case, the misrepresentation was in

the failure to disclose that the static mixer had not been

installed. Thus, under Massachusetts law, the cause of

action for misrepresentation did not accrue until Cambridge

Plating should have known that the static mixer had not been

installed. The special interrogatory was not erroneous.8

B. Intentional Misrepresentation

Cambridge Plating had the burden of proving that

Napco had engaged in an intentional misrepresentation.

Cambridge Plating alleged in its complaint that Napco

fraudulently induced it to purchase the wastewater system by

falsely promising that the system would contain a static

7. Indeed, in accordance with that case law, Napco requested
an instruction stating that the pertinent issue was whether
"Cambridge Plating knew or should have known of the facts
giving rise to its misrepresentation claims more than three
years before it filed suit on June 22, 1990."

8. Cambridge Plating I was concerned with the question of

whether the plaintiff had acted reasonably diligently in
discovering the claim, rather than whether some theoretically
reasonable investigation would have discovered the claim.
Such a focus of inquiry does not require that distinctions be
drawn among the nature of the claims the plaintiff has
asserted.

-27-

mixer. At trial, however, the district court did not believe

that Cambridge Plating had presented sufficient evidence to

show such fraudulent inducement, and did not submit that

theory to the jury. The district court, nevertheless,

believed that Cambridge Plating had presented sufficient

evidence to show fraudulent nondisclosure9 and, accordingly,

charged the jury on that theory. The jury subsequently

found, as framed in the special interrogatories, that Napco

had "intentionally conceal[ed]" its failure to install the

static mixer "while aware of the System's failure to meet the

applicable discharge limits" and was thus liable for

intentional misrepresentation.

Napco raises two challenges to this verdict.

First, it argues that the evidence was insufficient to show

fraudulent nondisclosure. Second, it argues that, regardless

of the evidence, the intentional misrepresentation verdict

was tainted by a defective jury instruction. It requests

that either judgment be entered in its favor or a new trial

granted.

1. Sufficiency of the evidence.

Napco argues that there was insufficient evidence

to support the jury's finding of fraudulent nondisclosure.

9. The parties have used the terms "wrongful nondisclosure"
and "intentional nondisclosure." We use the term fraudulent
nondisclosure simply to distinguish the theory from negligent
nondisclosure.

-28-

To set aside a jury verdict and enter a contrary verdict for

Napco, we must examine the evidence in the light most

favorable to Cambridge Plating, drawing all possible

inferences in its favor. See Havinga v. Crowley Towing and

Transp. Co., 24 F.3d 1480, 1483 (1st Cir. 1994). To set

aside a verdict and remand for a new trial based on the

evidence, Napco must show that the verdict was against the

great weight of the evidence, viewed in the light most

favorable to Cambridge Plating, or would work a clear

miscarriage of justice. See id. at 1482-83. Napco cannot

meet either standard.

Napco's sufficiency challenge largely rests on a

single proposition: that there was insufficient evidence

from which a jury could conclude that Napco knew or believed

that the static mixer was responsible for the problems with

the system.10 In Napco's words, "every piece of proof

bearing on the issue confirmed that Napco never believed the

static mixer was necessary, and in fact, believed the mixer

might impair system performance." (Emphasis in original.)

But there was such evidence: Napco designed the system to

include the static mixer. It knew that the mixer was

originally included in the system to create the proper mixing

of the polymer solution, without which flocculation would be

10. Napco also argues that the materiality of the static
mixer was not a fact susceptible of actual knowledge. That
argument is without merit.

-29-

hindered. This evidence, when combined with the evidence

that Napco knew the mixer had not been installed (so that the

omission was not mere oversight) and that it knew the system

was not working, adequately supports the conclusion that

Napco intentionally failed to tell Cambridge Plating that the

static mixer was missing, knowing it was responsible for the

system's problems.

Napco protests that it simply made a "good faith

(and, at worst, negligent) professional judgment that a mixer

was not material to the system." After all, it argues, what

did it have to gain from omitting a $620 part from the system

or from hiding a problem that could be inexpensively cured.

Napco relies on testimony from Triplett, Napco's

subcontractor, Aliota, Napco's expert, and Eason, Napco's

manager of pollution abatement. But Triplett's testimony and

Aliota's testimony do not much help Napco. Although both

Triplett and Aliota testified that the use of "elbows," or

pipe bends, could create the necessary turbulence in lieu of

the static mixer, Napco did not show that such "elbows" were

specifically designed into the system. More to the point,

Aliota, who was not a fact witness, did not testify as to

what the people at Napco were thinking in leaving out the

static mixer, and Triplett, at best, had only a "vague

recollection" of "some discussion that when the pumps came

-30-

on they hit the two -- they hit a 90 and a T, and that was

enough turbulence to mix with the polymer."

And, unfortunately for Napco, the jury could have

found Eason's testimony in a number of respects not to be

credible. His account of the events surrounding the decision

to omit the static mixer conflicted somewhat with that of

other Napco witnesses. Triplett testified that the mixer was

never installed, while Eason said it was installed but taken

out. Eason's testimony that the static mixer was omitted

because it was "minor" was damaged by his admission on cross-

examination that he could not find even one other component

depicted on the drawings that was "minor." Napco does not

point to other evidence presented to the jury (for example,

contemporaneous memos showing that Napco had made a judgment

that the mixer was irrelevant) that corroborates Eason's

testimony. In short, the "professional judgment" theory was

largely a credibility question. In light of the shaky

aspects of Eason's testimony, the jury was entitled to

conclude that Eason was not believable and that Triplett's

"vague recollection" was not enough to rebut the

circumstantial evidence (particularly the drawings) that

Napco knew the absence of the static mixer was the problem.

Napco properly makes the point that it "strains

credulity" to suppose that Napco would expose itself to such

drastic liability over a $620 part that took one day to

-31-

install. Why Napco would do so is something of a puzzle and

could raise questions about the reliability of the jury's

finding that Napco intentionally concealed the absence of the

mixer. But Napco's behavior is not wholly inexplicable. It

might be explained in terms of the theory of "agency costs":

the aberrant conduct occurred when Napco's interests in

avoiding exposure to drastic liability diverged from those of

its employees. Cf. AMPAT/Midwest, Inc. v. Illinois Tool

Works, Inc., 896 F.2d 1035, 1043 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.)

(seemingly irrational behavior on the part of a corporation

may be explained by the "divergence of objectives" between

the corporation and its employees). For example, the

designer Eason and the project manager DeBisschop may each

have wished to avoid individual blame for the defects in the

system.

Finally, Napco's current focus on plaintiff's proof

of scienter represents a shift from its defense at trial.11

11. At trial Napco's principal defense was that the system
worked fine, i.e. that there never was any breach of

warranty. Napco placed great reliance on discharge reports
sent to the MWRA from March 1985 to September 1985 (shortly
after the system was installed) indicating that the system
was meeting the discharge limits. The importance of these
reports was hotly contested. Cambridge Plating explained
away these reports by noting that the materials it plated
were often different, using different concentrations and
types of chemicals, and that the system could handle some
jobs but not others. Cambridge Plating also noted that its
closed looping masked the inadequacies of the system, but did
not solve them. The finding that the system did not perform
as warranted is not challenged on appeal.

-32-

Its defense to the misrepresentation count principally

focussed on whether the static mixer was in fact material to

the problem. Moreover, Napco's defense to the breach of

warranty claim, which rested in large part on the assertion

that it never had any idea that Cambridge Plating's system

was not meeting the effluent requirements, was in

considerable tension with any defense made on the

misrepresentation claims that, once it heard about the

problems, Napco made a judgment that the static mixer was

unimportant. Not surprisingly, then, there was little

specific testimony that Napco seriously considered Cambridge

Plating's complaints and then made a judgment that the static

mixer was the problem. Napco principally chose to take the

position at trial that it did not know there was a problem,

rather than that it thought there was a problem but the cause

was something else. Since there was competent evidence

showing that Eason and DeBisschop were contacted about the

problems with the system on numerous occasions, and that the

system worked after the static mixer was installed, Napco was

vulnerable on the intentional misrepresentation count.

Cambridge Plating needed to show intentional

misrepresentation only by a preponderance of the evidence.

See Compagnie De Reassurance D'Ile De France v. New England

Reinsurance Corp., 57 F.3d 56, 72 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,

116 S. Ct. 564 (1995). Under this standard, there was

-33-

sufficient evidence of fraudulent nondisclosure, and the

district court was entitled to submit the theory to the jury.

The verdict was also not against the weight of the evidence

and a new trial is not warranted.

2. Instructional error.

In its initial charge, the district court

instructed the jury that Napco's intentional

misrepresentation was in its "silence."12 It instructed

that "[t]he question to be decided here is whether . . .

[the] defendant willfully concealed from the plaintiff the

absence of the static mixer when it knew . . . that the

discharge limits were not being met and that the inclusion of

the static mixer would, at least to some extent, enable the

system to perform as it was intended." Following this

initial charge, plaintiff's counsel requested an instruction

specifying that materiality was to be measured against an

objective standard. In response,the court gave the following

supplemental instruction:

12. The charge was:

The fraud is in the silence, you see,
that characterizes the conduct of the
defendant; that is, their failure to tell
the plaintiff of the absence of this
static mixer while aware that the
discharge limits were not being met. You
see, that's when the duty arises. And
that's when the concealment, if
intentional, is what we call
"actionable," that is, a basis for a
lawsuit.

-34-

[I]n discussing the state of mind of the
defendant with regard to the importance
of the static mixer to the system . . .
the standard is objective. It's not what
the defendant did or did not subjectively
think about it. It's what would a
reasonable manufacturer or seller under
the same circumstances have thought about
it.

Napco argues that this instruction "conflated the torts of

intentional and negligent misrepresentation" and was

"manifestly erroneous."13 In Napco's view, it cannot be

held liable unless it actually knew the static mixer was

material.

The standard under which we review this argument

depends upon whether Napco properly preserved it. Cambridge

Plating protests that Napco has not preserved this argument

because it failed to lodge a proper objection before the jury

retired to consider its verdict. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 51,

objections must "stat[e] distinctly the matter objected to

and the grounds of the objection." Fed. R. Civ. P. 51. An

objection based on one ground does not preserve appellate

review of a different ground. See Wells Real Estate, Inc. v.

Greater Lowell Bd. of Realtors, 850 F.2d 803, 809 (1st Cir.),

cert. denied, 488 U.S. 955 (1988).

13. This point is important because lost profits are not
compensable for negligent misrepresentation under
Massachusetts law, see Section IV-D, and lost profits

represent the bulk of the damages in this case.
Additionally, Napco claims that this instruction tainted both
the willful breach of warranty verdict and the district
court's Chapter 93A decision.

-35-

Napco states that the instruction was given over

its "opposition." But Napco's objection to the charge only

identified three problems with the instruction, and not the

issue it now raises. Napco complained that (1) the complaint

did not fairly disclose the nondisclosure theory, (2) the

theory was not supported by the evidence, and (3) there was

no obligation on the part of the seller to disclose. Napco

did not object that the instruction was incorrect because it

failed to make clear that actual knowledge of materiality was

required for liability, nor did Napco object that the

instruction conflated negligent and intentional

misrepresentation. Thus, Napco failed to "state[]

distinctly" the argument it makes now, i.e., that the

instruction imposed an incorrect scienter requirement.

Napco urges that colloquies occurring days before

the charge satisfy Rule 51. Without considering whether such

colloquies may be used to determine compliance, the

colloquies Napco directs us to do not contain any specific

statement that Napco needed to have "actual knowledge" of the

static mixer's materiality to be liable. Napco's contention

that this lack of specificity should be excused because the

fraudulent nondisclosure theory was "novel" and came as a

"surprise" to counsel is contrary to what the record shows.14

14. Napco characterizes the nondisclosure theory as an
"eleventh-hour reformulation" which was "improvised literally
at the final hour -- at the end of the ninth day of trial and

-36-

In any event, Napco concedes that the district

court charged the jury correctly on the scienter element of

intentional misrepresentation during its initial charge. It

was only after plaintiff objected to the charge, suggesting

that the court make clear that materiality be viewed from an

objective point of view, that the court gave the supplemental

instruction. The supplemental instruction thus created a new

issue, independent of the supposed surprise over the

fraudulent nondisclosure theory. Despite this, Napco's only

objections to the supplemental charge related to the charging

of the fraudulent nondisclosure theory generally, not to the

new ambiguity the instruction created over the scienter

on the eve of closing arguments" to which counsel had no
"foreshadowing." But as early as the third day of trial the
court had asked counsel to research the question of
nondisclosure. The nondisclosure theory was foreshadowed on
the fifth day of trial where, in discussing the
misrepresentation count, the court stated that the
plaintiff's theory was that "upon learning of the absence of
the static mixer, it became defendant's duty to do two
things: first, to install it; and secondly, to tell the
plaintiff that it wasn't in." On the eighth day of trial,
which was a Friday, the district court asked counsel whether
"the lack of disclosure or the absence of the static mixer
[could] serve as a basis of a misrepresentation and fraud,"
and asked them to think about the issue over the weekend. On
the ninth day of trial, the court announced its view that a
fraudulent nondisclosure theory might be a basis for
liability. After having a chance overnight to consider the
objections it would lodge against the district court's
theory, Napco lodged basically the same objections it later
gave to the supplemental instruction. In light of this
record, we do not agree that Napco's failure to object should
be excused because the fraudulent nondisclosure theory was a
surprise.

-37-

requirement. On the question of scienter, Napco remained

silent.15

Absent a proper objection, review is for plain

error. On this record, the plain error hurdle is too high

for Napco to overcome. "Plain error [ ] is a rare species in

civil litigation." Gay v. P.K. Lindsay Co., Inc., 666 F.2d

710, 712 n.1 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 975

(1982); see also Clausen v. Sea-3, Inc., 21 F.3d 1181, 1196

(1st Cir. 1994) ("[T]he plain error standard, high in any

event, . . . is near its zenith in the Rule 51 milieu."

(internal quotations omitted)). "[I]t applies only where the

error results in a clear miscarriage of justice or seriously

affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of

judicial proceedings." Clausen, 21 F.3d at 1196 (internal

quotations omitted). Napco cannot show on this record that a

miscarriage of justice will result if the error is not

corrected. There was sufficient evidence adduced at trial to

conclude that Napco knew that the static mixer was the

problem with the system. Nor can Napco show that the error

seriously affects the integrity or impairs public confidence

15. Jerlyn Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Wayne R. Roman Yacht

Brokerage, 950 F.2d 60 (1st Cir. 1991), a case upon which

Napco places great reliance, is inapplicable. In Jerlyn

Yacht Sales there was at least some request that the court

include an instruction on the specific issue raised on
appeal. Id. at 64. There was no such request here. Despite

Napco's claims to the contrary, this is a garden variety
failure to object situation.

-38-

in the proceedings. Under the circumstances, the

supplemental instruction did not reach the "pinnacle of

fault" envisioned by the plain error standard. See id.16

C. Willful Breach Of Warranty

16. Because Napco cannot satisfy the discretionary elements
of the plain error standard, we need not decide whether the
instruction was "plainly" incorrect. Cf. United States v.

Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993) ("Plain is synonymous with

clear or, equivalently, obvious"; the error must be "clear
under current law" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Napco argues that Massachusetts law is clear that knowledge
of materiality is required. According to Napco, under
Massachusetts law, "[a]bsent a showing that the defendant
knew that his statement was false, and intended to induce

reliance, the tort of intentional misrepresentation simply
does not lie." (Emphases in original.) Napco argues that
there must be an "intent to deceive" to be liable for fraud.
But Massachusetts fraud law does not require an "intent to
deceive." Snyder v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 333 N.E.2d 421,

428 (Mass. 1975). Moreover, "knowledge of falsity" in the
sense that Napco urges -- that defendant actually know the
statement is false -- is also probably not required. This
court has said that "[n]othing is clearer than the fact that
under Massachusetts law, plaintiff need not prove that [the
defendant] knew his statement to be false." Nickerson v.

Matco Tools Corp., 813 F.2d 529, 530 (1st Cir. 1987) (citing

Powell v. Rasmussen, 243 N.E.2d 167, 168 (Mass. 1969)

(holding that knowledge or reckless disregard of falsity is
not required for an action of intentional misrepresentation;
it is enough if representation was false and susceptible of
actual knowledge)); see also VMark Software, Inc. v. EMC

Corp., 642 N.E.2d 587, 593 n.9 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994) (same);

Zimmerman v. Kent, 575 N.E.2d 70, 74 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991)

(same). The case upon which Napco principally relies, Danca

v. Taunton Savings Bank, 429 N.E.2d 1129, 1133 (Mass. 1982),

does list "knowledge of falsity" as an element. But this
does not help Napco. Either there is lack of clarity in the
Massachusetts case law, see In re Friedlander, 170 B.R. 472,

476-78 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994) (noting the confusion), or
"knowledge of falsity" does not mean what Napco urges. See

Roadmaster Indus., Inc. v. Columbia Mfg. Co., Inc., 893 F.

Supp. 1162, 1176 (D. Mass. 1995) ("knowledge of falsity"
under Danca does not require that defendant "actually knew

its statement was false").

-39-

Napco's warranty excludes liability for

consequential damages. By its terms, this damages limitation

provision bars Cambridge Plating from recovering

consequential damages and, under usual circumstances, would

be enforceable. See Mass. Gen. L. ch. 106, 2-719(3);

Deerskin Trading Post, Inc. v. Spencer Press, Inc., 495

N.E.2d 303, 306 (Mass. 1986). Massachusetts law provides,

however, that the damages limitation provision is not

enforceable if Napco either willfully repudiated or was

willfully dilatory in performing its warranty obligations.

Cf. Canal Elec. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 548 N.E.2d

182, 186 (Mass. 1990). The jury concluded that Napco

willfully repudiated or was dilatory in performing its

warranty obligations. Napco claims this finding was not

supported by the evidence and, in any event, was fatally

tainted by the district court's "state of mind" supplemental

instruction.

These arguments are worth only brief comment.

Napco concedes that evidence it knew the static mixer was to

blame "might well amount to 'willful repudiation.'" Since

Cambridge Plating adduced sufficient evidence of this fact,

the willful breach of warranty verdict stands.17 As for

17. Other evidence is also relevant to this count. For
example, once Cambridge Plating discovered that the static
mixer was missing, its attorney wrote to Napco's president,
Herbert Fishman, asking for "an amicable resolution" and a
"meeting" to "explore the prospects of such a resolution."

-40-

Napco's claim of instructional error, Napco's challenge

suffers the same fate as it did on the intentional

misrepresentation count: there was no objection and no plain

error.

D. Chapter 93A

Upon making independent findings of fact following

the jury verdict, the district court held that Napco had

violated Chapter 93A and that punitive damages were

warranted. Napco challenges both aspects of the district

court's decision. Review of the district court's findings of

fact is for clear error, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a); review of

its conclusions of law is de novo. Pullman-Standard v.

Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287 (1982).

1. Chapter 93A liability.

Napco ignored the letter and a meeting was never held. Napco
disparages this evidence as a "red herring[]" saying that any
inference that Napco refused to meet "misreads" the testimony
Fishman gave about the letter and that, in any event, the
letter was turned over to lawyers and therefore sheds no
light on whether Napco willfully repudiated its warranty.
Fishman's testimony on this point, however, is hardly helpful
to Napco. Fishman testified that he personally ignored the
letter because it raised only a "minor" issue. By "minor" he
meant that there wasn't enough money involved to get his
attention. At the time, Fishman apparently had other
problems with a "dollar volume [that] was much greater than
what this was here" and "people were supposedly handling this
for [him]." Napco does not seriously dispute that, whatever
Fishman thought about the problem, his "people" did nothing.
Napco's awareness of the problem, its consideration of its
scope as "minor," and its failure to respond, support at
least to some degree an inference of willful repudiation.

-41-

Section 2 of Chapter 93A makes it unlawful to

engage in "unfair methods of competition and unfair or

deceptive acts or practices." Mass. Gen. L. ch. 93A, 2,

11 (section 11 makes section 2 applicable to businesses).

Perhaps by design, the dimensions of Chapter 93A liability

are difficult to discern with precision. Neither "unfair"

nor "deceptive" is specifically defined in the statute; nor

has the case law supplied precise definitions. There is a

rubric: "The objectionable conduct must attain a level of

rascality that would raise an eyebrow of someone inured to

the rough and tumble of the world of commerce." Levings v.

Forbes & Wallace, Inc., 396 N.E.2d 149, 153 (Mass. App. Ct.

1979); see also Quaker State Oil Refining Corp. v. Garrity

Oil Co., Inc., 884 F.2d 1510, 1513 (1st Cir. 1989) (quoting

Levings). But, as the Supreme Judicial Court has recently

observed, the rhetoric of "rascality" is "uninstructive."

Massachusetts Employers Ins. Exch. v. Propac-Mass, Inc., 648

N.E.2d 435, 438 (Mass. 1995).

Chapter 93A liability may exist if the defendant's

conduct falls "within at least the penumbra of some common-

law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness"

or is "immoral, unethical, oppressive or unscrupulous." PMP

Assoc., Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 321 N.E.2d 915, 917

(Mass. 1975). Thus, proof of a common law tort, while not

necessary for liability, see Massachusetts Farm Bureau

-42-

Federation, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Massachusetts, Inc., 532

N.E.2d 660, 664 (Mass. 1989) ("a violation of G.L. c. 93A,

11, need not be premised on a violation of an independent

common law or statutory duty"), may be sufficient. See

Anthony's Pier Four, Inc. v. HBC Assoc., 583 N.E.2d 806, 822

(Mass. 1991) (breach of implied contractual duty of good

faith and fair dealing gave rise to Chapter 93A liability);

VMark Software, Inc. v. EMC Corp., 642 N.E.2d 587, 594 (Mass.

App. Ct. 1994) (intentional misrepresentation provided basis

for Chapter 93A liability).

Under this precedent, Napco's liability under

Chapter 93A follows almost as a matter of course. The

district court appropriately found that:

NAPCO, which knew throughout that the
static mixer was not installed, learned
that the system was not performing as
warranted and nevertheless 1) failed to
reveal knowledge within its possession
which would have stemmed the tide of
damages being caused by its own
misconduct and 2) misdirected plaintiff's
attention to operator error as the source
of the System's shortcomings.

Cambridge Plating II, 876 F. Supp. at 337. This finding,

which was not clearly erroneous, supports the conclusion that

Napco behaved both "deceptively" and "unfairly" under Chapter

93A.18

18. Because the Chapter 93A claim is predicated on conduct
amounting to an intentional misrepresentation and willful
breach of warranty, Napco's limitation of damages provision
does not bar consequential damages on this count. Cf. Canal

-43-

Moreover, Napco's argument -- that Chapter 93A

liability is inappropriate because its decision to omit the

static mixer was simply a professional judgment -- misses the

mark. Even if at the time of installation Napco believed

that the probability was small that the static mixer would

make a difference to the system's performance, the

probability was large enough that it should not have been

ignored once Napco learned that Cambridge Plating was having

problems. Yet even after Cambridge Plating had complained

about the system's performance, Napco never seriously

reconsidered its professed judgment about the static mixer.

Napco also knew all along that it had provided Cambridge

Plating with inaccurate drawings. So Napco also knew that

Cambridge Plating would be handicapped in reaching its own

conclusion on the matter. Where Napco knew the system was

not performing as warranted, Napco was not free to ignore the

fact that Cambridge Plating might benefit from knowing that

the mixer had been omitted. Napco's silence became

sufficiently "unscrupulous" to fall within a "penumbra . . .

of [an] established concept of unfairness." PMP Assoc., 321

N.E.2d at 917. We therefore affirm the district court's

judgment of liability for single damages under Chapter 93A.

2. Punitive damages.

Elec., 548 N.E.2d at 186.

-44-

We part company with the district court on the

question of punitive damages. Punitive damages are awarded

only for "willful or knowing" violations of section 2 of

Chapter 93A. Mass. Gen. L. ch. 93A, 11 (providing for up

to three, but not less than two, times actual damages for

willful or knowing violations of section 2). Here, the

district court imposed double damages based on essentially

the same finding upon which it imposed substantive liability

under Chapter 93A: that Napco failed to disclose what it

knew about the static mixer while knowing that it was

material to the problem. See Cambridge Plating II, 876 F.

Supp. at 346. At first blush, this conclusion may seem

sound, given the "willful or knowing" language of the

statute. Napco's conduct, which also amounts to intentional

misrepresentation (and willful breach of warranty), clearly

involves a certain level of deliberateness.

But shades of culpability are supposed to matter

in applying the punitive damages provision of the statute.

See Kansallis Fin. Ltd. v. Fern, 659 N.E.2d 731, 738 (Mass.

1996) ("[T]he Legislature envisaged multiple damage awards

against those defendants with a higher degree of culpability

than that sufficient to ground simple liability."); Heller v.

Silverbranch Constr. Corp., 382 N.E.2d 1065, 1070 (Mass.

1978) (only "callous and intentional violations" merit

multiple damages); VMark Software, 642 N.E.2d at 596 (court

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refused to multiply damages in intentional misrepresentation

case stating that section 11 multiple damages are an

"extraordinary remedy" not applicable to a case of "dogged

bumbling"); cf. International Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Wilson,

443 N.E.2d 1308, 1317 (Mass. 1983) ("The Massachusetts

legislature consciously enacted a rule whereby defendant's

[Chapter 93A] liability is measured by the degree of his

culpability.").

Liability under Chapter 93A for conduct amounting

to intentional misrepresentation (or breach of warranty like

that here) does not automatically trigger punitive damages.

There must be something more. See VMark Software, 642 N.E.2d

at 595 (liability for intentional misrepresentation supported

Chapter 93A liability, but misrepresentations were not "made

so 'knowingly' as to warrant the punitive sanctions of double

damages under Chapter 93A"); International Totalizing Sys.,

Inc. v. Pepsico, Inc., 560 N.E.2d 749, 757 (Mass. App. Ct.

1990) (defendant liable for "knowing" misrepresentation and

failure to disclose also violated Chapter 93A, but was not

liable for multiple damages because of the absence of

"willful or intentional conduct within the purview of

[Chapter 93A]" (internal quotation omitted)).

The district court appropriately recognized these

principles. See Cambridge Plating II, 876 F. Supp. at 346.

It believed, however, that its findings supported the

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conclusion that Napco's conduct was sufficiently egregious to

warrant a punitive sanction. We do not think so. If Napco's

conduct was fraud and a willful repudiation of warranty, it

was only marginally so. Napco had reason to believe that

operator error was the cause of Cambridge Plating's problems.

The system, after all, had worked for a period of time after

its installation. Indeed, Cambridge Plating itself took

nearly a year and a half to install the static mixer once it

found it was missing. Napco did not stand to profit by its

actions, and there was no evidence that Napco acted

maliciously towards Cambridge Plating or remained silent so

that it could watch Cambridge Plating go into distress.

Rather, as the district court noted, this was a case where

Napco simply ignored the problem hoping that it would somehow

resolve itself. Id.; cf. VMark Software, 642 N.E.2d at 596

("The inept blend of hopeful dissembling and dogged bumbling

displayed by VMark does not, however, reflect the culpable

state of mind required for imposition of 11's extraordinary

damage penalty." (internal quotation omitted)). This evidence

does not rise to the level of callousness or meretriciousness

that would justify multiple damages.19 See Wasserman v.

19. That Napco raises a legitimate argument that it should
not be liable for multiple damages does not undercut the
finding of liability for intentional misconduct. The
considerations discussed above mitigate Napco's culpability;
they do not excuse Napco. See VMark Software, 642 N.E.2d at

596 (intentional misrepresentation "is surely market
disruptive to the same extent whether the promisor is

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Agnastopoulos, 497 N.E.2d 19, 24-25 (Mass. App. Ct.) (setting

aside award of multiple damages because facts as found by the

trial court did not rise to the "purposeful level of

culpability" contemplated by the statute), rev. den., 499

N.E.2d 298 (Mass. 1986).

IV. Damages

The district court awarded Cambridge Plating

$3,363,120 in compensatory damages for the Chapter 93A

violation. The district court then remitted the $12,183,120

jury award on the common law counts to $4,344,120, reasoning

that no rational jury could award more than $4,161,000 in

lost profits.20 See Cambridge Plating III, 890 F. Supp. at

genuinely hopeful of fulfilling his contract, or is
deliberately deceptive and entirely disdainful of [its]
commitments."); accord AMPAT/Midwest, Inc. v. Illinois Tool

Works, Inc., 896 F.2d 1035, 1044 (7th Cir. 1990) (punitive

damages not awarded, but failure to disclose defects was
deemed to be fraud, even though the court indulged the
assumption that (1) there was some reason to believe that it
was the plaintiff's installation, rather than the defect,
that was responsible for the problem, and (2) the defendant
honestly believed that the plaintiff was to blame; "[e]ven
deep conviction of the rightness of one's cause does not
justify fraud").

20. The $183,120 difference between the amount of lost
profits awarded and the total damages awarded on the jury
counts represents the MWRA fine, the attorneys' fees
Cambridge Plating incurred in connection with the fine, and
the cost of the static mixer. Also, the district court's
lost profits award for the 93A count was $981,000 less than
the lost profits awarded after the remittitur of the jury
award because the court believed that the $981,000 in lost
profits was an amount over which fact finders might
reasonably differ. Cambridge Plating III, 890 F. Supp. at

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59. Napco argues that the award of lost profits still

"exceeds any rational appraisal or estimate of the damages

that could be based upon the evidence." See Eastern Mountain

Platform Tennis, Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., Inc., 40 F.3d

492, 502 (1st Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2247

(1995). Napco argues that the entire award of lost profits

should be set aside or be further remitted to reflect (1)

Cambridge Plating's failure to mitigate damages and (2)

Cambridge Plating's failure to account for selling, general

and administrative ("SG&A") expenses associated with the lost

profits. Napco separately argues that the award of lost

profits for the negligent misrepresentation count must be set

aside because such damages are not cognizable under

Massachusetts law.

A. Sufficiency Of The Evidence On Lost Profits

Cambridge Plating had the burden of providing a

reasonably certain basis to believe that Napco's wrongful

conduct caused the loss of anticipated profits, cf. Augat,

Inc. v. Aegis, Inc. (Augat I), 565 N.E.2d 415, 421 (Mass.

1991) (plaintiff must prove losses would not have occurred

but for the wrongful conduct), and proving with sufficient

certainty the amount of those anticipated profits. "The

nature of the business or venture upon which the anticipated

profits are claimed must be such as to support an inference

59.

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of definite profits grounded upon a reasonably sure basis of

facts." Augat, Inc. v. Aegis, Inc. (Augat II), 631 N.E.2d

995, 998 (Mass. 1994) (internal quotations omitted). Because

every calculation of lost profits has some element of

uncertainty, a plaintiff need not calculate lost profits with

"mathematical exactness." Id. But they cannot be "remote,

speculative [or] hypothetical." Id. Napco argues that

Cambridge Plating failed to establish the critical connection

between the defective wastewater treatment system and

Cambridge Plating's inability to do plating work. On this

point Napco is wrong.

Cambridge Plating provided evidence of causation

principally through three witnesses -- Mssrs. Tosi, Moleux

and Joseph Finn, Cambridge Plating's damages expert. Tosi

testified that, in the plating business, customers insist on

quick turn-around time. He also testified that because the

wastewater treatment system was not working properly

Cambridge Plating had to employ closed looping, which slowed

down the amount of wastewater fed through the system,

consequently slowing down the plating process. Moleux

confirmed that closed looping "required Cambridge Plating to

either partially or totally shut down." Additionally, Tosi

testified that the zinc plating operation closed because the

system was unable to remove sufficiently the contaminants.

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Further, Debisschop directly linked the wastewater treatment

system to a plating operation's profitability.

Finally, Finn testified that until 1985, the first

full year the wastewater treatment system was operational,

Cambridge Plating had generally experienced an increase in

sales. He also testified that for the years following the

installation of the system, Cambridge Plating's revenues

decreased from approximately $6.2 million in 1985 to $4.8

million in 1989, and net income declined from approximately

$284,000 in 1985 to a net loss of approximately $131,000 in

1989. During this time period, the plating industry as a

whole averaged modest growth.

Cambridge Plating provided a simple before-and-

after financial picture of an established company. It also

provided testimony from people expert in plating and in

wastewater treatment that the difference in profits was due

to a slowdown in production and failure to meet effluent

limitations, both of which could be traced back to the

malfunctioning wastewater treatment system. Napco chose not

to present an expert of its own to break the connection

between the financial decline and the malfunctioning system.

Instead, Napco was content to try to poke holes in Cambridge

Plating's damages testimony. "This [was] a risky strategy,

and it failed." AMPAT/Midwest, 896 F.2d at 1046 (internal

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citation omitted). There was sufficient evidence of

causation to support an award of lost profits.

B. Mitigation

"The general principle is well settled that a party

cannot recover for harms that its own reasonable precautions

would have avoided." Knapp Shoes, Inc. v. Sylvania Shoe Mfg.

Corp., 72 F.3d 190, 204-05 (1st Cir. 1995), petition for

cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3709 (U.S. April 11, 1996) (No. 95-

1650). Cambridge Plating did not install the static mixer

until 15 months after it knew in February 1989 that the mixer

was missing. Installation took one day. This was an

inexcusable failure to mitigate damages.

The district court recognized that Cambridge

Plating had failed to mitigate its damages. See Cambridge

Plating II, 876 F. Supp. at 345 ("Once Moleux informed

Cambridge Plating that the System was missing a vital part .

. . . [t]he obvious next step was to buy and install a mixer

immediately."). Nevertheless, in its Chapter 93A decision,

the district court awarded damages for both 1990 and 1991 and

then discounted them. It also did not adjust the jury award

in its remittitur to take account of this failure to

mitigate. We agree with Napco that both the Chapter 93A and

the remittitur rulings were in error.

Cambridge Plating argues that it should be absolved

for its failure to mitigate after February 1989 because there

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would have, in any event, been recovery time. The recovery

time, it says, was needed in order to offset the damage

resulting from its new reputation as a polluter, and to get

word out to customers that it could fill their needs while

complying with the environmental regulations. This is a

plausible theory. But Cambridge Plating did not provide the

type or quantity of proof that Massachusetts law requires to

support damages for this "reputational" injury sufficient to

overcome its failure to mitigate.

Cambridge Plating points to no evidence from

customers that it would not have been able to recover

business because of its reputation as a polluter. The one

customer who testified, Alfred Jacques of General Electric,

did not support Cambridge Plating's reputational injury

theory. The evidence Cambridge Plating relies upon -- a

statement from DeBisschop agreeing that companies "tend" to

lose business when they are found to be polluters, Tosi's

testimony that Cambridge Plating became "known as a

polluter," and an advertisement from Cambridge Plating

touting its system -- provides scant support for the

proposition that there was any reputational harm. This

evidence of reputational injury is also in tension with

Finn's testimony that if Cambridge Plating had a working

wastewater treatment system, it could have replaced its

business "almost immediately." Even Cambridge Plating states

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in its brief that "demand for plating and metal finishing

services such as those provided by Cambridge Plating was

strong throughout the late 1980s and to the time of

trial."21

On this record, Cambridge Plating's theory of

reputational injury is, to say the least, "speculative."

Augat II, 631 N.E.2d at 998. Cambridge Plating can find no

comfort in the case law that allows for some uncertainty in

proving damages in tort cases. See, e.g., Computer Sys.

Eng., Inc. v. Qantel Corp., 740 F.2d 59, 67 (1st Cir. 1984).

Those cases reason that some uncertainty is allowed because

it has been created by the defendant's wrongful conduct. Id.

Here, however, the uncertainty for the period following

February 1989 was largely caused by Cambridge Plating's own

wrongful conduct in failing to mitigate.

Still, Napco has conceded that the period through

November 1989, or nine months after Cambridge Plating should

have installed the static mixer, is a reasonable recovery

period. In the absence of evidence showing Cambridge Plating

mitigated its damages, the outer limit for such damages on

the record before the trial court was November 1989. Cf.

21. Although Cambridge notes that its sales continued to
decline after May 1990, the booming economic times had come
to an end by then. Indeed, the declining sales following the
installation of the static mixer might even suggest that the
missing static mixer had nothing to do with Cambridge
Plating's financial problems.

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Augat II, 631 N.E.2d at 1000 (reducing period of lost profits

to six months).

We also believe that both the Chapter 93A damages

and the remittitur should equally take account of Cambridge

Plating's failure to mitigate. We therefore vacate the

district court's award of Chapter 93A damages and remand to

eliminate all damages occurring after November 1989; we also

vacate the order of remittitur and remand with directions

that the district court grant a further remittitur to

eliminate damages occurring after November 1989. See 28

U.S.C. 2106 (appellate court may vacate any judgment and

remand to require such further proceedings as may be just);

Anthony v. G.M.D. Airline Servs., Inc., 17 F.3d 490, 495 (1st

Cir. 1994) (remanding with directions to district court to

grant a remittitur).22 Of course, plaintiff has the option

to seek a new trial on damages in lieu of the remittitur.

C. SG&A Expenses

Cambridge Plating had to prove lost profits in

terms of net profits, not gross profits. Jet Spray Cooler,

Inc. v. Crampton, 385 N.E.2d 1349, 1359 n.15 (Mass. 1979).

Generally, this requires that gross profits be adjusted for

SG&A expenses. In this case, however, Cambridge Plating

22. Because we believe both the district court damages award
and the jury award must be adjusted in the same manner, we
need not address Napco's argument that the district court
erred in allowing damages on the jury award that exceeded the
damages under Chapter 93A.

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argued that SG&A expenses would not have increased as its

sales increased and thus the anticipated gross profits should

not be reduced by SG&A expenses. The district court accepted

Cambridge Plating's argument, as do we.

Cambridge Plating relies on the testimony of Finn

that "lost gross profit for Cambridge Plating is the exact

same number as the lost net profit for the years in

question." Although, as Napco points out, the consolidated

financial statements from 1980 to 1985 show a general

increase in both sales and SG&A expenses, Finn testified that

SG&A expenses increased only 10%-11% as sales increased 30%

for the period 1982 to 1984. Moreover, in 1984, SG&A

expenses decreased slightly as sales increased. From this

evidence, Finn believed that there was "no dependent

relationship between S G and A and sales" and that SG&A

expenses would not have necessarily increased as gross

profits increased. Although these inferences from the

evidence are weak, they are sufficiently plausible to survive

Napco's challenge on appeal.

D. Negligent Misrepresentation

Lost profits of $4,161,000 were awarded on the

negligent misrepresentation count. This was error.

Massachusetts law does not allow "benefit of the bargain"

damages for negligent misrepresentation. Danca v. Taunton

Sav. Bank, 429 N.E.2d 1129, 1134 (Mass. 1982). Lost profits,

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which are a species of benefit of the bargain damages, are

therefore prohibited. See also Redstone v. Goldman, Sachs &

Co., 583 F. Supp. 74, 76-77 (D. Mass. 1984) (lost profits not

available for negligent misrepresentation). The award of

lost profits on the negligent misrepresentation count is

reversed.

V. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm on liability

(save for 93A multiple damages), but vacate and remand the

Chapter 93A single and multiple damages award and the

remittitur for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion. Parties to bear their own costs. It is so ordered.

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