United States v. Van

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 95-1919

UNITED STATES,

Appellee,

v.

ANH VAN, A/K/A ANDY,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Nathaniel M. Gorton, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Boudin, Circuit Judge,

Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,

and Stahl, Circuit Judge.

Edward P. Ryan, Jr., with whom O'Connor & Ryan, P.C. was on

brief for appellant.
Michael J. Pelgro, Assistant United States Attorney,

Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force, with whom Donald K.

Stern, United States Attorney, was on brief for appellee.

June 18, 1996

Per Curiam. Anh Van pled guilty to conspiracy to
Per Curiam.

deal unlawfully in firearms, 18 U.S.C. 371, unlawful

dealing in firearms, id. 922(a)(1), and six counts

relating to his unlawful possession of firearms, id.

922(g)(1), 922(k); 26 U.S.C. 5861(d). He appeals to

challenge a four-level increase imposed under the sentencing

guidelines on the ground that he was an organizer or leader

of a criminal activity that involved five or more criminally

responsible participants or was otherwise extensive.

U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(a). Out of an abundance of caution, we are

retaining jurisdiction over the case and remanding for

findings to clarify the district court's basis for its

decision.

Under the guideline, the defendant, in order to

qualify for the four-level adjustment, must have been an

organizer or leader of a criminal activity, and the criminal

activity must have involved five or more participants

(including the defendant) or have been "otherwise extensive."

U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(a). Because the principal dispute in this

case concerns the scope rather than the status determination,

we limit ourselves to the facts pertaining to the scope of

the criminal activity.

Briefly summarized, the undisputed facts in the

presentence report stated that Van sold six firearms to a

federal undercover agent over a period of a year. Prior to

-2-
2

each sale, the agent contacted Van and asked to buy a

firearm. Van made the delivery and collected the money for

one of the transactions, but sent others to complete the

other five. The agent covertly recorded at least some of the

transactions. The presentence report initially concluded

that five or more participants were involved in the

transactions. Van did not dispute that a total of eight

individuals (in addition to himself) were at least present

for one or more of the transactions.

Van did dispute whether some of these individuals

were shown to be criminally responsible participants; the

guideline provides that in order to impose the four-level

increase on the ground that the activity involved five or

more participants, four individuals other than the defendant

must be found to be criminally responsible. U.S.S.G.

3B1.1, comment. (n.1). The probation officer responded with

an addendum suggesting that the presence of the eight other

individuals would show the activity to have been otherwise

extensive, even if the criminal culpability of any four

individuals could not be proven.

The district judge, after a sentencing hearing,

imposed the four-level increase and checked the box on the

judgment form indicating that he was adopting the findings of

the presentence report. But the court did not make explicit

findings of its own, beyond the following statement at the

-3-
3

hearing:

[T]he defendant, Anh Van, was an
organizer or leader of a criminal
activity that involved five or more
participants or was otherwise extensive,
and . . . therefore, a four-level
increase is warranted. . . .

The law governing the district court's obligation

and our own on review is well-settled and easily stated. At

the time of sentencing, the court "shall state in open court

the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence."

18 U.S.C. 3553(c). This requires the court to make

"reasonably specific findings" and to "explain, generally,

how it computed the applicable guideline range." United

States v. McDowell, 918 F.2d 1004, 1012 (1st Cir. 1990). We

have found minimal compliance with section 3553(c) when we

could determine that the court relied on the presentence

report, and the presentence report provided a sufficient

basis for meaningful appellate review. See United States v.

Cruz, 981 F.2d 613, 617-18 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v.

Schultz, 970 F.2d 960, 963 n.7 (1st Cir. 1992), cert. denied,

113 S. Ct. 1020 (1993); cf. United States v. Catano, 65 F.3d

219, 230 (1st Cir. 1995); McDowell, 918 F.2d at 1011-12. The

government bears the burden of proving the facts material to

the application of the guidelines by a preponderance of the

evidence, and the requirements of Fed. R. Crim. P. 32,

dealing solely with fact findings, are somewhat more

demanding than the general directive of section 3553(c).

-4-
4

United States v. Osorio, 929 F.2d 753, 764 n.5 (1st Cir.

1991). Fed. R. Crim. P. 32 allows the court to adopt the

facts set forth in the presentence report "[e]xcept for any

unresolved objection" noted in the addendum submitted by the

probation officer as required by the rule. Fed. R. Crim. P.

32(b)(6)(C), (D). The court must resolve any outstanding

disputed facts or determine that they will not be taken into

account, and must append a written record of its findings and

determinations to the presentence report. Fed. R. Crim. P.

32(c)(1). Although explicit resolution of disputed material

facts is preferable, we have found that the court implicitly

resolved the facts when the court's statements and the

sentence imposed showed that the facts were decided in a

particular way. See, e.g., Cruz, 981 F.2d at 618-19; United

States v. Wells Metal Finishing, Inc., 922 F.2d 54, 58 (1st

Cir. 1991); cf., e.g., United States v. Geer, 923 F.2d 892,

898 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. Levy, 897 F.2d 596, 599

(1st Cir. 1990). In the absence of legal error, the district

court's ruling will be sustained so long as the information

upon which it relied is sufficient to support the findings

under a clearly erroneous standard. United States v.

Morillo, 8 F.3d 864, 872-73 (1st Cir. 1993). Of course, we

have to be able to determine what the district court found

and the basis for the findings to the extent necessary to

permit effective appellate review. McDowell, 918 F.2d at

-5-
5

1012.

In this instance, what may have been a slip of the

tongue by the district court has complicated matters. If the

district court had held squarely that the activity involved

four criminally responsible participants plus the defendant,

the court's findings would be adequate for us to conclude

that it implicitly resolved the material disputed facts. As

to three of the other participants, Van does not dispute that

they were criminally responsible. Two pled guilty to

firearms charges and a third (who was indicted but fled the

jurisdiction) was involved in transporting and handing over a

weapon to the government agent during a transaction arranged

by Van. The principal remaining factual dispute concerns the

criminal culpability of a man referred to in the presentence

report as "Michael."

The presentence report stated that Michael was

present in a car with Hieu Minh Nguyen, whose criminal

responsibility Van does not dispute, during a sale of heroin

and a gun to the government agent. The agent purchased a

gram of heroin, then asked about the gun. Nguyen said

something to Michael in Vietnamese; Michael then retrieved a

paper bag which contained a semiautomatic pistol, and the

agent purchased the weapon. The agent said he would be

interested in purchasing more guns, and according to the

probation officer, Michael responded that he would contact

-6-
6

the agent as soon as he had more guns to sell.

In his objections to the presentence report, Van

contended that transcripts of the tape of the conversation

showed that it was Nguyen, not Michael, who discussed the

procurement of more guns. But Van does not dispute that

Michael retrieved the paper bag containing the gun and was

present during the transaction. There is no finding by the

district court as to who made the statement, but it is not

clear that it matters because the district court could

rationally have found that Michael was more likely than not

criminally responsible even if he merely retrieved the

weapon. Of course, in the abstract, it is possible that

Michael was an unknowing dupe who understood nothing of the

transaction and thought he was handing over a box of candy.

But the surrounding circumstances make this unlikely, and the

district court was certainly entitled to draw the inference

that Michael knowingly participated. Cf. United States v.

Kirvan, 997 F.2d 963, 966-67 (1st Cir. 1993).

The difficulty here is that there is no clear

finding by the district judge that he found five criminally

responsible participants. Although the judge checked the box

indicating he was adopting the presentence report's findings,

the cross-reference remains ambiguous because the addendum

does not explicitly state which ground the probation officer

adopted, saying alternatively that there were "at least nine

-7-
7

participants," but that even if there were not at least five

criminally responsible participants, the total of nine

persons involved would support an extensiveness finding. The

district court added (or did not dispel) uncertainty by

phrasing its own finding in the disjunctive. While there

might be reason to guess that the court meant to find there

were five criminally responsible participants, there is no

unequivocal finding.

The problem is exacerbated to the extent that the

court may have relied upon the alternative ground that Van's

criminal activity was "otherwise extensive." Again, given

the disjunctive, we are not even sure the district court made

the "otherwise extensive" finding, and the only circumstance

articulated in the presentence report as supporting such a

finding was that a total of nine individuals, whether

criminally responsible or not, were present during the six

transactions. An "otherwise extensive" finding, however,

must be warranted by "the totality of the circumstances,

including not only the number of participants but also the

width, breadth, scope, complexity, and duration of the

scheme." United States v. Dietz, 950 F.2d 50, 53 (1st Cir.

1991); see also United States v. Graciani, 61 F.3d 70, 76 n.7

(1st Cir. 1995).

All this might not matter if the undisputed facts

required a finding either that Michael was a criminally

-8-
8

responsible participant or that the activity was otherwise

extensive. But even the government does not argue this in so

many words. And such findings would require factual

inferences and characterizations as to which the district

court has considerable latitude. Graciani, 61 F.3d at 75.

Thus, we are hesitant to find that the district court was

compelled to impose the four-level increase and that the

omission of findings is harmless.

Accordingly, we think the best solution, and one we

have used in previous cases, e.g., Geer, 923 F.2d at 898, is

to ask the district court to specify which of the two grounds

(five or more participants, otherwise extensive, or both) it

relied upon and to make brief findings, either by

incorporating pertinent portions of the presentence report or

otherwise, as to each ground relied upon. Cf. Fed. R. Crim.

P. 32(c)(1). The district court is requested to advise us of

its findings by supplemental order within 45 days. When we

receive the findings, we will determine whether any further

briefing or proceeding is required.

Determinations in connection with sentencing are an

odd hybrid in the law. Based on a tradition of discretionary

sentencing, the burden of proof and other procedural

safeguards are rather relaxed in this realm. See Nichols v.

United States, 114 S. Ct. 1921, 1928 (1994); United States v.

Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972). On the other hand, the

-9-
9

mandatory character of the guidelines (subject to departures)

and the significant sentences they entail make guideline

determinations considerably important to defendants, as

reflected in the requirements of 18 U.S.C. 3553(c) and Fed.

R. Crim. P. 32. Our judgment as to whether an error or

ambiguity is harmless has to take account of both of these

somewhat divergent attitudes toward sentencing.

In this instance, we think that the ambiguity in

the findings is patent (even though it may rest on a slip of

the tongue) and is not unequivocally harmless. Given the

stakes for the defendant and the simplicity of obtaining a

clarification, we think the limited remand order is

appropriate. If the district court concludes on

reexamination that the four-level increase should not be

applied, it can so state in its supplemental findings and we

will remand the case for resentencing. This court therefore

retains jurisdiction but remands for supplemental findings.

It is so ordered.

-10-
10