Aversa v. United States

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 95-2216

DANIEL AVERSA, ET AL.,

Plaintiffs, Appellants,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.,

Defendants, Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

[Hon. Mary M. Lisi, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Lynch, Circuit Judge,

Campbell and Bownes, Senior Circuit Judges.

Francis G. Murphy, with whom Kathryn B. Johnston and Hall, Hess,

Kenison, Stewart, Murphy, & Keefe, P.A. were on brief for appellants.

Richard A. Olderman, Attorney, with whom Barbara L. Herwig,

Attorney, Civil Division, Department of Justice, Paul M. Gagnon,

United States Attorney, and Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney

General, were on brief for appellees.

October 21, 1996

BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge. Daniel and Carla
BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge.

Aversa filed a civil action alleging that Patrick Walsh, an

Assistant United States Attorney in the District of New

Hampshire, and Kenneth Claunch, Chief of the Criminal

Investigation Division of the Internal Revenue Service,

falsely stated and implied to the local and national news

media that Daniel Aversa was involved in laundering

illegally-gotten money, tax evasion, drug trafficking and

racketeering activity, and thus committed slander and other

common law torts under New Hampshire law and deprived him of

his right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution of the

United States. Senior District Judge Martin F. Loughlin, who

presided over the related criminal case, found the statements

to have been "totally false," "misleading," "outrageous,"

"self-serving" and "unfair." In this civil action,

Magistrate Judge Lovegreen and District Judge Mary Lisi

agreed with Judge Loughlin's condemnation, adding that the

defendants' conduct showed "extraordinarily poor judgment"

and was "lacking in professionalism." The district court,

however, dismissed the Aversas' lawsuit, finding that Walsh

and Claunch were absolutely immune from suit for the common

law torts, and qualifiedly immune from suit for the

constitutional tort.

The purpose of immunity -- absolute or qualified --

is not to protect erring federal officials from the

-2-
2

consequences of their injurious acts, but to safeguard the

public interest in having responsible governmental employees

faithfully carry out their duties without fear of protracted

litigation in unfounded damage suits. See Wyatt v. Cole, 112

S. Ct. 1827, 1833 (1992); Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292,

295 (1988); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982);

Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 241-42 (1974); Barr v.

Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 565 (1959) (plurality opinion); Wood v.

United States, 995 F.2d 1122, 1126 (1st Cir. 1993);

Buenrostro v. Collazo, 973 F.2d 39, 42 (1st Cir. 1992). In

obvious tension with that objective is that well-founded

damage suits promote the public interest in compensating

victims and deterring unlawful conduct. Harlow, 457 U.S. at

814, 819; Barr, 360 U.S. at 576.

The law of immunity seeks a balance between the

evils inevitable in any available alternative. Harlow, 457

U.S. at 813; Wood, 995 F.2d at 1126. Thus, a federal

employee who allegedly commits a common law tort will be

absolutely immune from suit if he acted within the scope of

his federal employment, 28 U.S.C. 2679(b)(1), but the

plaintiff can proceed against the government unless some

exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act applies. And a

federal official is qualifiedly immune from suit for an

alleged constitutional tort if his "conduct [did] not violate

clearly established . . . constitutional rights of which a

-3-
3

reasonable person would have known," Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818,

even though his actions may have been "despicable and

wrongful" in some more general sense. Souza v. Pina, 53 F.3d

423, 427 (1st Cir. 1995).

Although we affirm, we believe that the false and

misleading information allegedly disseminated to the press in

Aversa's criminal case deserves more than condemnation, and

therefore refer the matter to the appropriate disciplinary

bodies.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Except where otherwise noted, the following facts

are taken from Aversa's complaint. Daniel Aversa ("Aversa")

and Vincent Mento ("Mento") were partners in a legitimate

real estate business.1 In January of 1989, they sold a

parcel of land, splitting the proceeds. At the same time,

Aversa was experiencing marital difficulties with his wife

Carla. In order to conceal some of his assets from his wife

in the event of a divorce, Aversa asked Mento if he could

deposit his share of the proceeds, amounting to $55,000, into

Mento's personal bank account. Mento agreed.

Both men were aware that domestic financial

institutions were required to report currency transactions in

excess of $10,000 to the Secretary of the Treasury, see 31

1. Vincent and Shirley Mento were plaintiffs in this action
but did not pursue an appeal.

-4-
4

U.S.C. 5313(a); 31 C.F.R. 103.22(a)(1), and wished to

avoid causing a Currency Transaction Report ("CTR") to be

filed. Aversa therefore made a series of deposits into

Mento's account in sums just under $10,000.2 At the time,

Aversa was unaware that structuring the transactions to avoid

causing a CTR to be filed was a crime under federal law. See

31 U.S.C. 5324(a).

In June of 1990, IRS agents contacted Aversa and

informed him that he was under investigation for structuring

deposits. He immediately met with Assistant United States

Attorney Walsh, and without an attorney present, explained

that he was hiding the money from his wife, that it was not

derived from an illegal source, and that he did not know that

structuring was illegal. Walsh told Aversa that he and Mento

had been under investigation for some time and that he had no

reason to believe the money was anything but "clean," but

said that he did not need to prove that it was derived from

an illegal source or that Aversa knew that structuring was

illegal. Walsh told Aversa that there was no reason to seek

counsel and encouraged him to plead guilty because all that

2. Aversa's purpose in transferring the money out of his
account was to conceal it from his wife, a purpose we do not
condone. But Judge Loughlin found that Aversa and Mento
wished to avoid a CTR being filed because they believed it
would cause the Internal Revenue Service to hold Mento
responsible for the taxes on the amount, and that Aversa and
Mento each reported his share of the proceeds on his own tax
return.

-5-
5

was needed for a conviction was what Aversa had just told

him. In a later meeting with Aversa's counsel, Walsh said

that he previously had been successful in prosecuting

individuals for structuring in Miami, but that this case

would be his first involving "clean money," and he planned to

use it to "set a precedent" and "educate the public about the

currency transaction reporting requirements."

On June 28, 1990, Walsh obtained an indictment

charging Aversa and Mento with conspiracy, structuring, and

making false statements, and Aversa alone with attempting to

cause a domestic financial institution to file a report

containing a material omission or misstatement of fact. That

same day, Walsh, Claunch, and the United States Attorney for

the District of New Hampshire, Jeffrey R. Howard (with whom

Aversa alleged Walsh and Claunch conspired but who was not

joined as a defendant) issued a press release and held a

press conference announcing to the local and national news

media, which reported to the public, that Aversa and Mento

had been arrested for money laundering. Walsh and Claunch

knew that Aversa and Mento were not involved in laundering

illegally-gotten money, or in drug trafficking, tax evasion

or organized crime, but created the impression that they

were. An article in the Boston Globe dated June 29, 1990,

reported:

Walsh said money laundering is usually
done for purposes of tax evasion, drug

-6-
6

dealing or organized crime. He would not
say if either of yesterday's indictments
are related to these activities, but
added after the news conference that "it
would be a fair statement" to say
authorities are looking into how [these]
men amassed the sums of money involved.

Walsh also stated that Aversa faced up to forty years in

prison and added that the investigation was continuing and

more charges would be filed.

A front-page article in the Concord Monitor dated

June 29, 1990 reported:

The indictments are a sign that
prosecutors are serious about using the
money laundering laws, a tool that allows
them to charge people for handling money
illegally without having to prove that
the money was gained illegally, said
Jeffrey Howard, U.S.A. attorney for New
Hampshire.

"The indictments are important because
they are examples of the commitment the
I.R.S. has made . . . to use the money
laundering statutes in order to ferret
out tax evasion, drug trafficking and
other crimes," he said.

Prosecutors declined to say how Aversa
and Mento got the money or why they
believe the men tried to evade the
currency laws.

Claunch stated at the press conference that

"[t]hese cases represent the IRS's commitment to ferreting

out money launderers," and that the IRS wanted "to send a

message that money laundering is going to be detected,

investigated and prosecuted to the full extent."

-7-
7

On October 10, 1990, after Judge Loughlin granted

the government's motion in limine to preclude a defense based

on ignorance of the anti-structuring law, Aversa pled guilty

to structuring. The plea agreement stipulated:

1. The United States has no evidence
that the currency involved in these
transactions was obtained from an
unlawful source.

2. The United States has no evidence
that the defendant knew of the
structuring provision, but states to the
Court that such knowledge is not
necessary to establish a violation of
Section 5324.

Aversa reserved his right to appeal the issue of whether a

conviction under 31 U.S.C. 5324 required knowledge that

structuring is illegal.

On October 17, 1990, following Mento's conviction,

Walsh issued a press release in which he stated that the

currency transaction reporting laws and the laws that

prohibit structuring "were passed to assist in the

investigation of related criminal conduct, such as narcotics

trafficking, organized crime and racketeering activity and

tax violations," and that these convictions would send "a

strong clear message that persons who violate . . . and evade

those laws will be vigorously prosecuted." Walsh made oral

statements to the press stating and implying that Aversa and

Mento had violated the anti-structuring law in order to

further an underlying criminal enterprise, and that they

-8-
8

could not account for some of the money involved in the

structured transactions. No evidence had been adduced at

Mento's trial that there was an underlying criminal purpose

or that the source of the money was unexplained.

At Aversa's and Mento's sentencing, Judge Loughlin

found that Aversa and Mento would bear the stigma of the

"totally false" innuendoes reported in the media for the rest

of their lives. In a memorandum opinion ruling on Aversa's

and Mento's post-conviction motions,3 the judge noted that

the government had admitted that Aversa and Mento were "not

involved in drugs and not laundering ill-gotten gains and not

keeping information from the United States," and found that

the prosecutors' statements to the press were "outrageous and

unfair," "misleading and cruel," "self-serving and more than

a little disingenuous," and "smeared the reputation of these

two men."

This court vacated Aversa's and Mento's

convictions, ruling that the willfulness requirement of the

applicable criminal penalty provision, 31 U.S.C. 5322(a),

required the government to prove the violation of a known

legal duty or the reckless disregard thereof, and that an

3. The motions for writ of coram nobis were based on Cheek

v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 604 (1991), decided after

Mento's trial. Judge Loughlin found that in light of Cheek,

he had erred in ruling out the defendants' proposed mistake
of law defense, but found that he could not grant relief
under a writ of coram nobis because other relief, in the form

of an appeal, was available.

-9-
9

unintentional, nonreckless mistake of law was a complete

defense to a structuring charge. United States v. Aversa,

984 F.2d 493, 498, 500, 502 (1st Cir. 1993) (en banc),

vacated sub nom., Donovan v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 873

(1994).4 We remanded for a new trial, but the government

elected not to proceed again against Aversa.

The Aversas then brought a civil action seeking

compensatory and punitive damages against Walsh, Claunch, and

other unnamed defendants, alleging in Count I that the

defendants, acting under color of federal law, deprived

Aversa of his Fifth Amendment right to liberty; in Counts II

and III that they committed the torts of slander and

intentional infliction of emotional distress under New

Hampshire law; and in Count IV that the defendants' conduct

caused Carla Aversa to lose the consortium of her husband.

The complaint alleged that Walsh and Claunch defamed Aversa

for the purpose of personally benefitting in their careers,

and that their false and misleading statements caused

irreparable harm to Aversa's personal and business

4. The Supreme Court ordered our judgment in Aversa vacated

and the case remanded for reconsideration in light of Ratzlaf

v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 655 (1994), in which the Court

had held that the willfulness requirement of 31 U.S.C.
5322(a) required knowledge that structuring is illegal. Id.

at 663. Congress has since amended the statute so that
willfulness is no longer required for a violation of 31
U.S.C. 5324. See Pub. L. No. 103-325, 411, 108 Stat.

2160 (Sept. 23, 1994) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C.
5322(a) (West Supp. 1996)).

-10-
10

reputations and his business goodwill, caused him to be

discharged from his job as an accountant, and prevented him

from finding other employment as an accountant. The case was

transferred from the District of New Hampshire to the

District of Rhode Island. Pursuant to the Federal Employees

Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988, commonly

known as the Westfall Act, the Attorney General certified

that Walsh and Claunch acted within the scope of their

federal employment and the United States was provisionally

substituted as the party defendant. 28 U.S.C. 2679(d)(1).

Aversa was permitted to depose Walsh and Claunch in aid of

his challenge to the scope certification, and he submitted

the depositions and various exhibits to the court.5

Thereafter, Magistrate Judge Lovegreen ruled that Walsh and

Claunch were acting within the scope of their employment,

thus converting the common law claims into claims against the

United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.

2679(d)(1), 1346(b), then recommended that those claims be

dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on

5. The exhibits included copies of press releases dated
June 28, 1990, and October 17, 1990, a newspaper article
dated June 29, 1990, a transcript of Aversa's sentencing
hearing on March 14, 1991, Judge Loughlin's memorandum
opinion dated April 29, 1991, ruling on Aversa's and Mento's
motions for writ of coram nobis, Chapter 7 of the United

States Attorneys' Manual (1988), 28 C.F.R. 50.2, Rule 35 of
the Local New Hampshire District Court Rules, Claunch's job
description, and an Internal Revenue Policy Statement
concerning news coverage.

-11-
11

the exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act for claims

arising out of libel or slander. 28 U.S.C. 2680(h).

Treating the defendants' motion to dismiss the constitutional

claim as a motion for summary judgment, the magistrate judge

recommended summary judgment in favor of Walsh and Claunch on

the basis that they were qualifiedly immune.

Magistrate Judge Lovegreen stated in his Report and

Recommendation that he was in full agreement with Judge

Loughlin's assessment of the defendants' conduct, and added

that the "defendants' extraordinarily poor judgment in making

these statements should not go unnoticed." In adopting the

magistrate's Report and Recommendation in its entirety,

United States District Judge Mary Lisi found that the

defendants' "publication of misleading information [was]

lacking in professionalism and deserving of the opprobrium

articulated by Judge Loughlin and Magistrate Lovegreen."

II. DISCUSSION
II. DISCUSSION

A. The Common Law Claims
A. The Common Law Claims

As an initial matter, the Aversas' complaint

describes a claim for slander under New Hampshire law, which

defines the tort as follows:

In order to be actionable, the language
complained of must tend to lower the
plaintiff in the esteem of any
substantial and respectable group, even
though it may be quite a small minority.
The defamatory meaning must be one that
could be ascribed to the words by hearers
of common and reasonable understanding. .

-12-
12

. . The threshold question . . . is
whether the published words are capable
of conveying the defamatory meaning or
innuendo ascribed to them by the
plaintiff.

Thomson v. Cash, 402 A.2d 651, 653 (N.H. 1979) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted). We agree with the

district court (and the Aversas do not contest) that the

claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and

loss of consortium through "verbal abuse and slander" also

"arose out of" slander within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.

2680(h). See Jiminez-Nieves v. United States, 682 F.2d 1, 6

(1st Cir. 1982) (court must look beyond the literal language

to ascertain the real cause of the complaint; heartland of

the tort of defamation is injury to reputation by the

implicit or explicit communication of an idea).

1. The Westfall Act
1. The Westfall Act

Before 1988, a plaintiff with a tort claim against

a federal employee could proceed against the employee in his

or her personal capacity, and if the employee was "acting

within the scope of his office or employment," 28 U.S.C.

1346(b), could proceed against the United States, instead of

or in addition to the federal employee, under the Federal

Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346, 2671-78, 2680.

Congress, however, expressly excepted certain kinds of claims

from the FTCA's otherwise broad waiver of sovereign immunity,

including any claim arising out of slander and other

-13-
13

specified intentional torts. 28 U.S.C. 2680(h).6 Thus,

while a plaintiff with a claim not excepted from the right to

sue the United States likely would choose to sue the

government rather than or in addition to an individual who

may be judgment-proof, a plaintiff with an excepted claim

like the Aversas' would have no choice but to proceed solely

against the employee. The employee, however, might be found

absolutely immune from suit according to federal common law

principles. See Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593, 597 (1959).

In 1988, the Supreme Court decided Westfall v.

Erwin, 484 U.S. 292 (1988), holding that absolute immunity

from state-law tort actions was available to federal

employees only when their conduct was both "within the scope

of their official duties and . . . discretionary in nature."

Id. at 297-98 (emphasis in original). The Court, however,

invited Congress to legislate standards defining the scope of

6. The legislative history regarding the intentional tort
exceptions is scant, but they appear to rest on concerns
raised by the Department of Justice that those torts would be
"easily exaggerated" and "difficult to make a defense
against." See 2 L. Jayson, Personal Injury, Handling Federal

Tort Claims 13.06[1][a], at 13-48-49 n. 1.2 (1995)
(discussing legislative history). In 1973, Congress removed
from the list assault, battery, false imprisonment, false
arrest, abuse of process and malicious prosecution committed
by investigative or law enforcement officers, in recognition
of the "manifest injustice" of denying a federal remedy when
a federal agent intentionally assaults a citizen in an
illegal raid, while providing the remedy to a citizen run
down by a negligent mail truck driver. See S. Rep. No. 93-

588, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1974, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.

2789. Congress has not otherwise amended the exceptions for
intentional torts.

-14-
14

federal employee immunity, since it was in the best position

to resolve the "complex and often highly empirical inquiry"

whether the "contribution to effective government"

sufficiently "outweighs the potential harm to individual

citizens" to warrant immunity in a particular context. Id.

at 299-300.

Congress responded within the year with the Federal

Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988,

commonly known as the Westfall Act. The Westfall Act amended

the FTCA to make an action against the United States the

exclusive remedy for money damages for injury arising from

the "negligent or wrongful act or omission" of a federal

employee "acting within the scope of his office or

employment," 28 U.S.C. 2679(b)(1), thus eliminating the

discretionary function requirement and making federal

employees absolutely immune from suit for torts committed

within the scope of employment.7 The FTCA is the exclusive

remedy even when, as here, an exception to the FTCA precludes

7. Congress understood prior immunity law as not requiring
the act to have been discretionary in nature, feared
protracted litigation in determining whether the employee
exercised governmental discretion, and intended "to return
Federal employees to the status they held prior to the
Westfall decision." See H.R. Rep. No. 100-700, 100th Cong.,

2d Sess. 4,reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5945, at 5946-47.

-15-
15

government liability. United States v. Smith, 499 U.S. 160,

165-67 (1991).8

The exclusive remedy provision is first invoked

through a certification by the Attorney General or her

delegate that the employee was acting within the scope of

employment.9 28 U.S.C. 2679(d)(1). Once the certification

is made, the suit is "deemed an action against the United

States" under the FTCA and the United States is substituted

as the party defendant, id., but the certification is

provisional and subject to judicial review, after which the

employee may be resubstituted. Gutierrez de Martinez v.

Lamagno, 115 S. Ct. 2227, 2230-31 (1995).

2. State Respondeat Superior Law
2. State Respondeat Superior Law

Before the Westfall Act, federal employee immunity

from suit for state law torts was decided according to

federal common law. The Westfall Act provides that a federal

8. The Act provides that once the United States has been
substituted as the party defendant, the action "shall be
subject to the limitations and exceptions applicable to . . .
any action against the United States filed pursuant to
section 1346(b)," 28 U.S.C. 2679(d)(4) (sentence structure
disregarded), and the legislative history states that "any
claim against the government that is precluded by the
exceptions set forth in Section 2680 of Title 28, U.S.C. also
is precluded against an employee in [sic] his or her estate."
H.R. Rep. No. 100-700, supra, at 5950.

9. The Attorney General has delegated her authority to make
scope of employment certifications to the United States
Attorneys with respect to civil actions brought against
federal employees in their respective districts, subject to
the supervision of the Assistant Attorney General in charge
of the Civil Division. See 28 C.F.R. 15.3(a).

-16-
16

employee is immune if he or she acted "within the scope of

his office or employment," 28 U.S.C. 2679(b)(1), which,

according to the legislative history, is to be determined by

the same law that had previously been used only to determine

whether the United States could be sued under the FTCA: the

law of respondeat superior of the state in which the incident

occurred. See H.R. Rep. No. 100-700, supra, at 5949.

At oral argument, we raised a concern about whether

certain comments in the recent case of Gutierrez de Martinez

v. Lamagno, supra, might indicate that scope of employment is

to be determined according to federal common law rather than

state respondeat superior law. In that case, the Court

concluded that a certification by the Attorney General or her

delegate that the federal employee was acting within the

scope of his or her employment is subject to judicial review

for purposes of permanently substituting the United States as

the party defendant. 115 S. Ct. at 2234-36. Amicus raised a

potential Article III problem -- that if the court concluded

that the employee acted outside the scope of employment, and

the plaintiff and defendant were not of diverse citizenship,

there would no longer be a federal question to support

subject matter jurisdiction once the federal employee was

resubstituted. Id. at 2236. A four-justice plurality

concluded that Article III nonetheless was satisfied because

"there was a nonfrivolous federal question" presented at the

-17-
17

outset of the case. Id. at 2236 (emphasis in original).

Justice Ginsburg wrote:

At that time, the United States was the
defendant, and the action was thus under
the FTCA. Whether the employee was
acting within the scope of his federal
employment is a significant federal
question -- and the Westfall Act was
designed to assure that this question
could be aired in a federal forum.
Because a case under the Westfall Act
thus "raises [a] questio[n] of
substantive federal law at the very
outset," it "clearly 'arises under'
federal law, as that term is used in Art.
III."

Id. at 2236 (citations omitted).

After further briefing in which both parties agreed

that the plurality did not mean that the scope determination

should be resolved by reference to federal rather than state

law, we reach the same conclusion. First, we think that all

the plurality intended to address was whether there is a

sufficient federal predicate to keep a Westfall Act case in

federal court, once a determination has been made that the

defendant was not acting within the scope of his federal

employment. The answer was yes, because at the outset, the

case arose under a law of the United States (the FTCA), and

the United States was a party. See U.S. Const. art. III,

2. Second, even if Justice Ginsburg was referring in some

measure to the scope determination, federal law does

determine whether a person is a federal employee and the

nature and contours of his or her federal responsibilities.

-18-
18

See Ezekiel v. Michel, 66 F.3d 894, 899 (7th Cir. 1995);

Platis v. United States, 409 F.2d 1009, 1011 (10th Cir.

1969). But state law governs whether the person was acting

within the scope of that employment and those

responsibilities. As already noted, the legislative history

is clear that Congress so intended, H.R. Rep. No. 100-700,

supra, at 5949, and although we are the first to grapple with

the meaning of the plurality's remarks in Gutierrez de

Martinez, the courts of appeal, including our own, have

concluded that state law controls. See Heuton v. Anderson,

75 F.3d 357, 360 (8th Cir. 1996); Haddon v. United States, 68

F.3d 1420 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Garcia v. United States, 62 F.3d

126, 127 (5th Cir. 1995); Jamison v. Wiley, 14 F.3d 222, 227

n.4 (4th Cir. 1994); Schrob v. Catterson, 967 F.2d 929, 934

(3d Cir. 1992); McHugh v. Univ. of Vermont, 966 F.2d 67 (2d

Cir. 1992); S.J. & W. Ranch, Inc. v. Lehtinen, 913 F.2d 1538,

1542 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 62 (1991);

Nasuti v. Scannell, 906 F.2d 802, 805 n.3 (1st Cir. 1990);

Arbour v. Jenkins, 903 F.2d 416, 421-22 (6th Cir. 1990);

Washington v. United States, 868 F.2d 332, 334 (9th Cir.),

cert. denied, 493 U.S. 992 (1989).

In a related vein, Aversa argues that we indicated

in Nasuti v. Scannell, supra, that intentional torts are not

within the scope of employment as a matter of law. There, we

stated that "the tort charged (assault and battery) is one of

-19-
19

the 2680(h) exceptions which could not by definition be

within the scope of employment." 906 F.2d at 813 n.16. This

remark, however, does not mean that intentional torts

excepted by section 2680(h) are outside the scope of

employment as a matter of federal law regardless of the law

of respondeat superior of the state in which the tort

occurred. The assault at issue in Nasuti took place in

Massachusetts, under whose law an assault is within the scope

of employment only if done in response to some conduct of the

plaintiff that interfered at the time with the employee's

ability to do his or her job. Id. at 805 n.3 (citing Miller

v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 304 N.E.2d 573, 579 (Mass.

1973)). Because the district court found no evidence of

those circumstances, the assault on Nasuti was outside the

scope of employment as a matter of Massachusetts law.

Generally, however, an intentional tort excepted by section

2680(h) can be within the scope of employment if state

respondeat superior law so requires. See, e.g., Henson v.

NASA, 14 F.3d 1143, 1147-48 (6th Cir. 1994) (under Ohio law,

an employee's acts are within the scope of employment if he

acts within his authority during the course of employment

even though acting intentionally or maliciously, but are

outside the scope if the acts are self-serving and in no way

facilitate the employer's business); Nadler v. Mann, 951 F.2d

301, 305-06 (11th Cir. 1992) (under Florida law, prosecutor's

-20-
20

allegedly slanderous conduct in referring bribery allegation

to FBI was within scope of employment, but leaking the story

to the press was not); Jayson, supra, 9.07[1], at 9-168

(that the employee's conduct was intentional does not

preclude a finding that he was acting within the scope of

employment).

3. Scope of Employment
3. Scope of Employment

We now turn to the merits. It is the plaintiff's

burden to prove the existence of subject matter jurisdiction.

Murphy v. United States, 45 F.3d 520, 522 (1st Cir.), cert.

denied, 115 S. Ct. 2581 (1995). Because it is not in dispute

that Aversa cannot sue the United States for defamation,

there is subject matter jurisdiction only if Walsh and/or

Claunch acted outside the scope of his employment. It was

Aversa's burden to persuade the court that they did. Nasuti,

906 F.2d at 813 n. 16. In ruling on a motion to dismiss for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(1), the district court must construe the complaint

liberally, treating all well-pleaded facts as true and

indulging all reasonable inferences in favor of the

plaintiff. Murphy, 45 F.3d at 522. In addition, the court

may consider whatever evidence has been submitted, such as

the depositions and exhibits submitted in this case. Cf.

Nasuti, 906 F.2d at 808 (trial court may hold evidentiary

hearing to resolve immunity-related factual disputes). We

-21-
21

review the district court's scope of employment determination

de novo.

There is no New Hampshire case resolving a scope-

of-employment question in a defamation case, but we find

sufficient guidance in New Hampshire cases dealing with the

question in the context of assault and in those sections of

the Restatement (Second) of Agency that we feel confident the

New Hampshire Supreme Court would follow. See Croes v.

United States, 726 F.2d 31, 32 (1st Cir. 1984).

An act is within the scope of employment under New

Hampshire law if it was authorized by the employer or

incidental to authorized duties; if it was done within the

time and space limits of the employment; and if it was

actuated at least in part by a purpose to serve an objective

of the employer. See Daigle v. City of Portsmouth, 534 A.2d

689, 698-700, 701-02 (N.H. 1987); Richard v. Amoskeag Mfg.

Co., 109 A. 88, 91-92 (N.H. 1920); Restatement (Second) of

Agency 228(1) (1958). The conduct is not within the scope

of employment if it was "different in kind from that

authorized, far beyond the authorized time or space limits,

or too little actuated by a purpose to serve the master."

Restatement, supra, 228(2).

As there was no dispute that Walsh and Claunch

acted within the time and space limits of their employment,

the magistrate judge focused on whether their conduct was

-22-
22

authorized or incidental to authorized duties, and was

intended by them to serve their employers. He found that

because Walsh and Claunch were authorized to prepare press

releases and participate in press conferences in order to

keep the public informed, and because Howard approved the

press releases, made the decision to hold the press

conferences, and was present for the press conferences, the

statements were either authorized or incidental to authorized

duties. The magistrate judge further found that Walsh and

Claunch acted at least in part to serve their employers'

interests in keeping the public informed of law enforcement

efforts.

Aversa correctly argues that Walsh's defamatory

statements to the press were not authorized. Walsh testified

that as an Assistant United States Attorney, he was expected

to abide by the United States Attorneys' Manual ("the

Manual") issued by his employer, the Department of Justice.

Chapter 7 of the Manual, entitled "Media Relations," provides

that "fairness [and] accuracy . . . must prevail in all

dealings with the news media." Manual, ch. 7, 1-7.001

(1988). News conferences should not be held to announce

indictments or arrests except in "unusual circumstances,"

such as to alert the public about a fugitive from justice,

and then "extreme care" should be taken to avoid statements

branding an accused as guilty of a crime of which he or she

-23-
23

has not been convicted. Id. Written news releases "relating

the essentials of the indictment" may be distributed, and,

with permission of the United States Attorney, an Assistant

United States Attorney "may answer legitimate questions about

indictments or arrests, either in press conferences or in

discussions with individual reporters, but answers should not

go beyond explanation of what is in the public document or

the confines of 28 C.F.R. 50.2." Id. The Manual provides

that 28 C.F.R. 50.2 "defines the types of information that

may be and the types of information that may not be made

available to the news media about pending . . . criminal

cases by employees of the Department of Justice." Id.

(emphasis in original). Employees are to adhere to the

regulation "in both letter and spirit." Id.

The regulation provides that, among other facts and

circumstances not relevant here, Justice Department employees

may make public the "substance or text of the charge, such as

a[n] indictment," and may disclose "only incontrovertible,

factual matters." 28 C.F.R. 50.2(b)(3). Release of

information that would be prejudicial or would serve no law

enforcement function is prohibited. Id. 50.2(b)(3), (5),

(6). Statements which could "reasonably be expected to

influence the outcome of a pending or future trial," and

statements concerning evidence in the case, whether or not

-24-
24

anticipated to be used at trial, are prohibited. Id.

50.2(b)(2), (6)(v).

Walsh also testified that he was subject to Rule 35

of the Local New Hampshire District Court Rules, which

prohibits any lawyer from releasing information that is not a

matter of public record, or is likely to interfere with a

fair trial or otherwise prejudice the due administration of

justice. See D.N.H. L.R. 35.

Walsh admitted that, in dealing with the news media

regarding a criminal case, he was not authorized to say

anything that was inaccurate or misleading, not contained in

a public document, or prejudicial to a defendant's right to a

fair trial, or to otherwise contravene the directives of the

Manual, 28 C.F.R. 50.2, or Local Rule 35. The statements,

as represented in the complaint and appearing in the press

releases and news articles submitted to the court,

transgressedthesepoliciesandrules
andthereforewerenot
authorized.

That Howard approved the press releases, made the

decision to call the press conferences, and was present at

the press conferences does not change that result. Howard

did not approve in advance any of Walsh's oral statements to

the press.10 Moreover, we do not think that Howard's

10. Howard did approve Walsh's statements after the fact.
Judge Loughlin required Howard's presence at the sentencing
hearing and asked him to respond to his criticism of the
"various innuendoes, totally false, in the media that these
crimes were drug related." Howard stated that he "stood by

-25-
25

approval can suffice as authorization for Walsh's defamatory

statements. An employee of the Department of Justice who

wishes to release information beyond that allowed by 28

C.F.R. 50.2 must obtain permission from the Attorney

General or Deputy Attorney General, 28 C.F.R. 50.2(9), not

the United States Attorney, and Walsh did not seek such

approval.

Although an employee's intentionally tortious act

was not authorized, it may nonetheless have been within the

scope of employment if it was "incidental to authorized

duties." According to New Hampshire cases deciding whether

assaults were within the scope of employment, the conduct

must meet three requirements in order to be considered

incidental to authorized duties: (1) the employer authorized

or could foresee that the employee would use a reasonable

degree of force as a means of carrying out an authorized

duty; (2) the employee used excessive force, although

wrongly, as a means of accomplishing an authorized duty; and

(3) the employee's purpose was, at least in part, to carry

out an authorized duty. Daigle, 534 A.2d at 699-702;

Richard, 109 A. at 90-91; Rowell v. Boston & Maine R.R., 68

N.H. 358, 359 (1895). See also Restatement, supra, 229

cmt. b (even though an act is of an entirely different kind

the actions and conduct of the Assistant United States
Attorney in this case throughout."

-26-
26

than that authorized, it may be "incidental to an authorized

act" if it is "within the ultimate objective of the principal

and an act which it is not unlikely that such a servant might

do"). If these conditions are met, it follows that the

employer is liable for the employee's negligent or willful

use of excessive force although the employer did not

authorize it and even forbade it. See Daigle, 534 A.2d at

699-700 (police officer's use of excessive force in effecting

arrest was within scope of employment); Richard, 109 A. at

91-92 (supervisor's use of excessive force in keeping

employee at her work station was within scope of employment);

Rowell, 68 N.H. at 359 (conductor's use of excessive force in

ejecting plaintiff from railroad car was within scope of

employment). If any one of the conditions is not met, the

employee's conduct is outside the scope of employment. Morin

v. People's Wet Wash Laundry Co., 156 A. 499, 500 (N.H. 1931)

(although employee's motive in assaulting plaintiff may have

been to serve his employer, assault was outside scope of

employment because the employment implied no measure of

force).

Here, the Justice Department authorized or at least

could foresee that an Assistant United States Attorney

permitted to inform the public about arrests, indictments and

convictions would convey to the public a reasonable amount of

negative information about the persons involved. Further,

-27-
27

although unfortunate, we think that the Department of Justice

reasonably could anticipate that an employee entrusted with

that power might abuse it. Analogously, the Daigle court

stated that "excessive force in the use of guns and

nightsticks is always foreseeable." 534 A.2d at 700. True,

there were policies and regulations against the kinds of

statements that were made, but an act which is forbidden or

done in a forbidden manner may nonetheless be within the

scope of employment. Restatement, supra, 230. A "master

cannot direct a servant to accomplish a result and anticipate

that he will always use the means which he directs or will

refrain from acts which it is natural to expect that servants

may do." Id., 230 cmt. b. See also Danforth v. Fisher, 75

N.H. 111, 111-12 (1908) (if employee was serving some purpose

of his employer, it is immaterial that he did it in a way

that was unexpected).

We also think that Walsh made the alleged

statements as a means, albeit tortious and contrary to his

employer's policies and rules, of accomplishing the Justice

Department's objective of informing the public of recent law

enforcement efforts. To be sure, Walsh's suggestions that

Aversa was involved in drug trafficking, tax evasion and

racketeering furthered no legitimate law enforcement

objective and actually misinformed the public. But his

statements did inform the public about a recent prosecution

-28-
28

under the anti-structuring laws. The New Hampshire Supreme

Court agrees with the Restatement's view that "the criminal

or tortious character of an employee's act does not, ipso

facto, remove the act from the scope of employment," Daigle,

534 A.2d at 700 (citing Restatement, supra, 231), so long

as it is "exerted in, and for the purpose of, doing the

employer's business." Id. And that court does not

necessarily agree with the Restatement's view that, if these

conditions are met, the degree of outrageousness of the

conduct may remove it from the scope of employment. Id.

(referring to Restatement, supra, 229 cmt. b); Rowell, 68

N.H. at 359 (master is responsible for the acts of the

servant done as a means and for the purpose of performing

that work although done with a wanton or reckless purpose to

accomplish the work in an unlawful manner); Arthur v. Balch,

23 N.H. 157, 161 (1851) (employee acted within the scope of

his employment when he used a horse he had stolen to do his

employer's business).

Finally, we think that Walsh's statements were

actuated, at least in part, by an intention to serve his

employer. Daigle, 534 A.2d at 699; Restatement, supra,

228(1)(c). This inquiry focuses on the subjective intent of

the employee and his notion of how to serve his employer's

interests need not be reasonable or reflective of good

-29-
29

judgment.11 Aversa points out that the complaint, which the

district court was required to take as true, alleged that

Walsh defamed Aversa for the purpose of promoting his own

career, and that Judge Loughlin found at least some of

Walsh's statements to have been "self-serving." The

complaint, however, also alleged that Walsh told Aversa's

attorney that he planned to use the case to "set a precedent"

and "educate the public" about the currency transaction

reporting requirements. During his deposition, Walsh did not

deny that the media accurately reported his words and

testified that he believed he was discharging his duty to

inform the public in making these statements. From this, the

district court justifiably could find that Walsh intended, at

least in part and although misguidedly, to serve an objective

of his employer.

Under these circumstances, we have little doubt

that the New Hampshire Supreme Court would hold Walsh's

employer responsible for his defamatory statements. We find

further support for this conclusion in the Restatement's

11. In Daigle, the New Hampshire Supreme Court found that

the police officer was actuated at least in part to serve a
law enforcement function in that he believed it was
appropriate to beat suspects in the course of serving the law
enforcement objectives of capturing the guilty and
establishing their guilt. 534 A.2d at 700. See also Concord

Bank v. Greg, 14 N.H. 331, 340 (1843) (principal is

chargeable with agent's fraudulent acts done for the purpose
of effecting sale for principal; "[w]ere it otherwise, the
principal would never be liable for the frauds of a special
agent, unless he commissioned him to commit a fraud").

-30-
30

special rule for defamation, which embodies the general

principle, recognized in the New Hampshire assault cases,

that an employer should be held responsible when it entrusts

an employee with a duty particularly susceptible of abuse to

cause harm:

A master is subject to liability for
defamatory statements made by a servant
acting within the scope of his employment
. . . . If the scope of employment of a
servant includes the making of statements
concerning others which he believes to be
true and privileged, the master is
subject to liability for untrue and
unprivileged defamatory statements made
by the servant concerning such others, if
the statements are otherwise within the
scope of the servant's employment. . . .
If the master employs a servant to speak
for him, he is subject to liability if
the servant makes a mistake as to the
truth of the words spoken or as to the
justification for speaking them, or even
if he speaks with an improper motive,
provided that he acts at least in part to
serve his employer's purposes. The
master may be liable even though the
servant knows the statement to be untrue,
as where the manager of a store, for the
purpose of obtaining an admission from a
suspected thief, charges such person with
other similar crimes, although having no
belief in his own statements.

Id., 247 & cmts. a, c.

We also conclude that the district court correctly

held that Claunch acted within the scope of his employment.

One of his duties was to inform the public about tax and

other cases in which the IRS was involved in order to deter

violations of the law and to instill public confidence that

-31-
31

the IRS prosecuted violators. The IRS's policy statement on

news coverage required Claunch to act with due regard for an

individual's right to a fair trial and the public's right to

know, and, particularly in view of the "statutory prohibition

on the disclosure of tax information," to strictly limit what

he said to facts that were a matter of public record. IRS

Policy Statement P-1-181. Aversa alleged that Claunch stated

that the case represented the IRS's commitment to ferreting

out, investigating and prosecuting money launderers. Aversa

was indicted for and convicted of violating the anti-

structuring law, which was enacted as part of the "Money

Laundering Control Act of 1986." See Pub. L. No. 99-570,

Subtitle H, 100 Stat. 3207-18 (Oct. 27, 1986). The

legislative history, however, defines "money laundering"

essentially as concealing money from the government (not

one's spouse) for the purpose of covering up illegal activity

or evading taxes. See H.R. Rep. No. 746, 99th Cong., 2d

Sess., p. 16 (1986). Aversa was not, therefore, a "money

launderer." Nonetheless, we have no doubt that Claunch's

employer would be held responsible for his statement under

the principles of New Hampshire law set forth above.

Because Walsh and Claunch acted within the scope of

their employment, the United States was properly substituted

as the party defendant, and the common law claims were

properly dismissed pursuant to the exception to jurisdiction

-32-
32

under the FTCA for claims arising from libel and slander. 28

U.S.C. 2680(h).

B. The Constitutional Claim
B. The Constitutional Claim

A person may sue a federal official in his or her

individual capacity for damages arising out of a

constitutional violation.12 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named

Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

Relying on Bivens, the Aversas alleged in Count I of their

complaint that Walsh and Claunch deprived Aversa of a liberty

interest guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth

Amendment by making false and misleading statements to the

press with willful or reckless disregard of his rights, thus

causing his employer to discharge him from his job as an

accountant, preventing him from finding other employment as

an accountant, and damaging his business goodwill.13

12. Constitutional tort claims are not subject to the
Westfall Act's exclusive remedy provision. 28 U.S.C
2679(b)(2)(A).

13. Aversa contends that the district court erred in denying
him leave to amend Count I to add: (1) that the defendants
violated a federal statutory right by contravening Rule 35 of
the Local New Hampshire District Court Rules, and (2) that
Aversa permanently lost his right to earn a living as an
accountant. Leave to amend "shall be freely given when
justice so requires," Fed. R. Civ. P. 15, but need not be
given if the amendment would not be "a proper subject of
relief." Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). As to

the first proposed addition, a plaintiff may sue for
violation of a federal statute under section 1983 or Bivens

if the statute "create[s] enforceable rights, privileges, or
immunities," which, in turn, depends on whether the provision
"was intend[ed] to benefit the putative plaintiff." Wilder

v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (internal

-33-
33

The district court granted summary judgment in

favor of Walsh and Claunch, finding that they were

qualifiedly immune from suit. Summary judgment is proper if

the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,

show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact

and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as

a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Because no

material fact is in dispute, the question before us is one of

pure law. Our review is de novo and we view the facts in the

light most favorable to Aversa. St. Hilaire v. City of

Laconia, 71 F.3d 20, 24 (1st Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 64

U.S.L.W. 3849 (U.S. June 24, 1996).

An official is qualifiedly immune if his "conduct

[did] not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). In

quotation marks and citations omitted). Local Rule 35,
entitled "Release of Information by Attorneys in Criminal
Cases," limits the information that may be made public before
and during a criminal trial, and can be said to be intended
to protect a criminal defendant's right to a fair trial. We
do not reach the question whether a civil cause of action
could ever rest on Local Rule 35, because we do not think
that Rule 35 was intended to protect against loss of
employment or business goodwill. Thus, denial of the request
to amend was not error. The answer to Aversa's complaint
about the denial of his second proposed addition is that the
court considered Aversa's allegations that he was fired from
his job and lost future employment opportunities as an
accountant and we consider them here.

-34-
34

finding that the right Aversa asserted was not clearly

established, the district court not only relied on the law as

it was in 1990, but on Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226

(1991), which postdated the alleged violation. Qualified

immunity, however, must be decided according to the law in

effect at the time of the alleged violation -- "implicit in

the Harlow formulation . . . is a temporal dimension: the

right must have been clearly established at the time of the

defendants' alleged improper actions." Souza v. Pina, 53

F.3d 423, 425 (1st Cir. 1995). The court's reliance on

Siegert in its qualified immunity analysis stemmed from some

confusing language in that very case:

A necessary concomitant to the
determination of whether the
constitutional right asserted by a
plaintiff is "clearly established" at the
time the defendant acted is the
determination of whether the plaintiff
has asserted a violation of a
constitutional right at all. Id. at 232.

Siegert failed not only to allege a
violation of a constitutional right that
was clearly established at the time of
Gilley's actions, but also to establish
the violation of any constitutional right
at all. Id. at 233.

Some courts have read this language as requiring a

resolution of the merits under current law before beginning

the analysis of the law as it stood at the time of the

alleged violation. See DiMeglio v. Haines, 45 F.3d 790, 795-

97 (4th Cir. 1995) (discussing various interpretations of

-35-
35

Siegert). But we think that these statements, read in

context, simply mean that the plaintiff must assert a clearly

established federal constitutional (or statutory) right, and

not merely a state law tort claim. The Siegert Court

concluded that the damage Siegert alleged "may be recoverable

under state tort law but it is not recoverable in a Bivens

action," Siegert, 500 U.S. at 234, and held that he had

"failed to satisfy the first inquiry in the examination of

such a claim; he failed to allege the violation of a clearly

established constitutional right." Id. at 231.

This is not to say that currently applicable law

cannot be considered in the course of, in addition to, or

instead of determining the law in effect at the time of the

alleged violation. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 ("On summary

judgment, the judge appropriately may determine, not only the

currently applicable law, but whether that law was clearly

established at the time an action occurred."). For example,

a court of appeals may recognize a right for the first time

in that circuit, but find that it was not clearly established

at the time of the alleged violation. See Calhoun v. New

York State Div. of Parole Officers, 999 F.2d 647, 655 (2d

Cir. 1993). Or a court may look to current Supreme Court law

to determine that, although the right may now exist, it was

not clearly established before. See St. Hilaire, 71 F.3d at

27-28. A court may also bypass the qualified immunity

-36-
36

analysis if it would be futile because current law forecloses

the claim on the merits. See Hinton v. City of Elwood, 997

F.2d 774, 779-80 (10th Cir. 1993). We follow the latter

course in this case because Aversa failed to state a claim

under current law.

Aversa claimed that Walsh and Claunch deprived him

of his right to liberty under the substantive component of

the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which protects

against "certain government actions regardless of the

fairness of the procedures used to implement them." Daniels

v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986). See also Pittsley v.

Warish, 927 F.2d 3, 6 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 879

(1991).14 We have said that substantive due process is

violated if either (1) the government actor deprived the

plaintiff of an identified interest in life, liberty or

property protected by the Fifth Amendment, or (2) the

government actor's conduct "shocks the conscience." See

Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 531

(1st Cir. 1995) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.

1044 (1996). Because Aversa did not address the latter

theory below or in his brief to this court, we limit our

discussion to the former.

14. In contrast, the essence of a procedural due process
claim is that a government actor deprived the plaintiff of
life, liberty or property through procedures that were
inadequate in light of the importance and characteristics of
the affected interest. Pittsley, 927 F.2d at 6.

-37-
37

In Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), the Court

indicated that a claim for defamation could rise to a

constitutional level if accompanied by a loss of employment,

but left unclear whether that loss would have to result from

some further action by the defendant in addition to the

defamation itself. In Siegert v. Gilley, the Court made

clear that it would. Siegert resigned from his job as a

psychologist at a federal hospital in order to avoid being

terminated, then began working at an Army hospital. Because

Army hospitals required "credentialing" by a committee,

Siegert signed a request form asking the federal hospital to

provide his new employer with information regarding his job

performance and privileges. Gilley, Siegert's former

supervisor, sent a letter in response, stating that he could

not recommend Siegert for privileges as a psychologist, and

that Siegert was inept, unethical and the most untrustworthy

individual he had supervised in thirteen years. The

committee denied Siegert credentials. Thereafter, Siegert

was turned down for a position at another Army hospital and

returned to work at the first Army hospital with provisional

credentials. After his administrative appeals were denied,

his federal employment was terminated altogether. Id. at

228-29. The Court found that Gilley's defamatory statements

and their consequences were not actionable as a deprivation

of liberty, stating:

-38-
38

The alleged defamation was not uttered
incident to the termination of Siegert's
employment by the hospital, since he
voluntarily resigned from his position at
the hospital, and the letter was written
several weeks later. The statements
contained in the letter would undoubtedly
damage the reputation of one in his
position, and impair his future
employment prospects. But the plaintiff
in Paul v. Davis similarly alleged

serious impairment of his future
employment opportunities as well as other
harm. Most defamation plaintiffs attempt
to show some sort of damage and out-of-
pocket loss which flows from the injury
to their reputation. But so long as such
damage flows from injury caused by the
defendant to a plaintiff's reputation, it
may be recoverable under state tort law
but it is not recoverable in a Bivens

action.

Id. at 234. Thus, what may have been left open by Davis was

foreclosed by Siegert -- in order to state a cognizable claim

that defamation together with loss of employment worked a

deprivation of a constitutionally-protected liberty interest,

a plaintiff must allege that the loss of employment resulted

from some further action by the defendant in addition to the

defamation. Where it is the defendant who terminated the

plaintiff, the further action is the termination. But where,

as here, a third party discharges or refuses to hire the

plaintiff solely as a result of the defendant's defamation,

the plaintiffhas notdescribed a viableconstitutional claim.15

15. Aversa contends that even if the defamation was not
uttered in conjunction with some other more direct action by
Walsh or Claunch causing him to be discharged from his job,
the defamatory statements stood in the midst of circumstances

-39-
39

III. CONCLUSION
III. CONCLUSION

"Although '[s]tatements to the press may be an

integral part of a prosecutor's job, and . . . may serve a

vital public function,' that function is strictly limited by

the prosecutor's overarching duty to do justice." Souza, 53

F.3d at 427. Those who wield the power to make public

statements about criminal cases must "be guided solely by

their sense of public responsibility for the attainment of

justice." Id. (quoting Young v. United States ex rel.

Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 814 (1987)). The public

statements asserted to have been made in the course of

Aversa's criminal case have been condemned as false,

misleading, self-serving, unjust and unprofessional by every

court to look at them.16

We therefore refer the matter of Assistant United

States Attorney Walsh's conduct to the Office of Professional

Responsibility of the Department of Justice, and to the

wherein the criminal charges never should have been brought.
We previously have expressed doubt, without deciding, that
"an alleged constitutional violation for which the defendant
prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity [such as initiating
criminal charges] can provide the 'plus' needed to satisfy
the 'defamation-plus' test of Paul v. Davis." Celia v.

O'Malley, 918 F.2d 1017, 1021 (1st Cir. 1990). In any event,

Aversa did not present this theory to the district court and
we decline to consider it.

16. The characterizations of the defendants' conduct are
quotations from the various trial judges who have heard the
proceedings in this and the underlying criminal cases. This
court makes no findings itself as to the defendants' conduct,
but acts on the basis of the record.

-40-
40

Professional Conduct Committee of the New Hampshire Supreme

Court. We refer the matter of Agent Claunch's conduct to the

Inspector General of the Department of the Treasury. We also

refer former United States Attorney Howard's conduct to the

Professional Conduct Committee of the New Hampshire Supreme

Court. We do not suggest in any way to the disciplinary

bodies what action, if any, should be taken.

No costs.

-41-
41