Koonce v. Pepe-Superintendent

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 96-1458

THOMAS KOONCE,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

PETER A. PEPE, SUPERINTENDENT,

Defendant - Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Richard G. Stearns, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Torruella, Chief Judge,

Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,

and Boudin, Circuit Judge.

Stephen Hrones, with whom Michael A. Goldsmith and Hrones &

Garrity were on brief for appellant.

Ellyn H. Lazar, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Bureau,

with whom Scott Harshbarger, Attorney General, was on brief for

appellee.

November 6, 1996

TORRUELLA, Chief Judge. Plaintiff-appellant Thomas
TORRUELLA, Chief Judge.

Koonce ("Koonce") filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus

under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The sole issue before us is whether the

jury instructions in Koonce's state court murder trial violated

his due process rights by impermissibly shifting the burden of

proof. Like the district court before us, we find that the jury

instructions did not violate Koonce's due process rights under

the Fourteenth Amendment, and we therefore affirm the district

court's dismissal of the petition for habeas corpus.

BACKGROUND
BACKGROUND

The events that led to the murder charge in this case

are detailed in the prior decisions of the Supreme Judicial Court

("SJC"). See Commonwealth v. Koonce ("Koonce II"), 636 N.E.2d

1305, 1306-07 (Mass. 1994). In brief, on the night of July 20,

1987, Koonce and three others from Brockton, Massachusetts,

travelled in a car to a nightclub in Westport, then to a Burger

King in Dartmouth, and finally to a housing project in New

Bedford. At the first two locations fights erupted between

groups from New Bedford and Brockton, but Koonce and his friends

remained uninvolved.1 At the New Bedford housing project,

however, a confrontation arose, which resulted in a large group

of people from New Bedford, including the victim, chasing Koonce

and his friends back to their car, as well as beating a member of

another Brockton group. When Koonce and his friends reached

1 There was testimony that Koonce pulled out a gun at the Burger
King. Koonce II, 636 N.E.2d at 1306.

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their car, their path was blocked by another automobile. There

was conflicting testimony at trial as to how close the crowd got

to the car. Once the path cleared, the driver of the car

accelerated. A shot was fired, and the victim was fatally

wounded. Koonce later went to the police and stated that he had

fired the shot. Id. at 1307.

Koonce was indicted for murder in the first degree.

His first trial before a jury in the Massachusetts Superior Court

ended in a mistrial when the jury was unable to reach a verdict

on the issue of self-defense. See id. at 1306. A second trial

was held in 1992,2 and the jury convicted Koonce of murder in the

first degree. Koonce was sentenced to life imprisonment without

the possibility of parole.

Koonce filed a motion for new trial asserting, inter

alia, that the final instruction given on voluntary manslaughter

violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law.

The trial judge denied the motion, and the SJC affirmed. Id.

Koonce subsequently brought this petition for a writ of habeas

corpus in the district court for the district of Massachusetts.

The district court dismissed the petition, and this appeal

ensued.

DISCUSSION
DISCUSSION

I. The Jury Instructions
I. The Jury Instructions

2 Before his second trial, Koonce sought relief before a single
justice of the SJC, under Mass. Gen. L. ch. 211 3, on common
law double jeopardy principles. Koonce's petition was denied,
and the full bench of the SJC affirmed the order. See Koonce v.

Commonwealth ("Koonce I"), 587 N.E.2d 220 (Mass. 1992).

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This case centers on a single statement made by the

trial court in its instructions to the jury. As the content and

context of that instruction is crucial to our analysis, we quote

here from the trial court's instructions to the jury at length.

The court began by instructing the jury about murder in the first

and second degree. It then turned to manslaughter:

If . . . the Commonwealth has not
proved beyond a reasonable doubt the
elements necessary to prove the defendant
guilty of second degree murder, then you
may consider whether the Commonwealth has
proved the lesser included offense of
manslaughter.
Now, before I define manslaughter, I
made reference earlier to self defense
and let me define that specifically now
before we discuss manslaughter. Evidence
has been offered in this case that the
defendant acted in self defense. A
person may lawfully use reasonable force
to defend himself from a physical attack.
Bear in mind that the defendant does not
have to prove anything.
If evidence of self defense is
present, the Commonwealth must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt he did not act
in self defense. If the Commonwealth has
failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant did not act in self
defense, then you must find the defendant
not guilty. In other words, if you have
a reasonable doubt whether or not the
defendant acted in self defense, your
verdict must be not guilty.

Tr. at 6-61 to 6-62. The trial court continued with instructions

as to what a reasonable person in the defendant's position must

believe in order to have acted in self defense, and what would

constitute excessive force. The instructions then went on:

Remember the defendant does not have
to prove anything. The prosecution must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the

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defendant acted with excessive force.
If there is evidence that the
defendant may have acted in self defense,
then the Commonwealth must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt, as I said earlier, that
the defendant did not act in self
defense. If you determine that the
Commonwealth has failed to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant did
not act in self defense, then you must,
of course, find the defendant not guilty.
In other words, if you have a reasonable
doubt as to whether or not the defendant
acted in self defense, your verdict must
be not guilty.
Now, if the Commonwealth fails to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant did not act in self defense,
but the Commonwealth does prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant used
excessive force in defending himself in
the light of all the circumstances and if
death resulted from the use of excessive
force, then you may consider whether the
defendant is guilty of manslaughter.
Okay?

Tr. at 6-61 to 6-65. The trial court then set out what

manslaughter is, the difference between murder and manslaughter,

what mitigating circumstances might negate the element of malice,

and defined voluntary manslaughter. It continued:

In order to prove the defendant guilty
of voluntary manslaughter the
Commonwealth must prove three elements
beyond a reasonable doubt: first, that
the defendant inflicted an injury upon
the victim and from which injury he died;
second, that the defendant intentionally
killed the victim, but he used excessive
force in self defense; third, that the
homicide was committed unlawfully without
legal excuse or justification.
Now, facts or circumstances as I've
indicated may mitigate or reduce murder
to manslaughter. This is when a person
kills using excessive force in self
defense. That is what the Commonwealth's
theory is. They say that if [the

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defendant] was justified in using self
defense, he used excessive force in
defending himself . . . .
Specifically, if the person initiated
an assault against the defendant so the
defendant reasonably feared that he was
in danger of being killed or suffering
grievous bodily injury at the hands of
the victim, then the defendant has the
initial right to use whatever means are
reasonably necessary to avert the
threatened harm. But if the defendant
used excessive force -- that is, more
force than was reasonable and proper
under the circumstances -- or the
defendant himself became the attacker and
the use of such excessive force resulted
in the death of the victim, then that
would constitute manslaughter. So, you
see it all depends on the facts as you
see them.

Immediately following these statements came the

instruction at issue here:

Also, you may not return a verdict of
guilty of manslaughter unless the
defendant proves beyond a reasonable

doubt that the defendant used excessive

force in defending himself, again in the

circumstances as you see them.

Tr. at 6-68 (emphasis added). The parties are agreed that this

sentence of the instruction was faulty, as it is in fact the

Commonwealth that must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that

Koonce used excessive force in his defense.3 See Commonwealth v.

Rodr guez, 352 N.E.2d 203, 205-06 (Mass. 1976).

The court said no more on the topic of voluntary

manslaughter. Instead, it moved on to instruct on involuntary

3 Counsel for Koonce did not object to the instruction at the
time it was made, but did file a motion for a new trial based on
this same ground. The SJC and the district court both met the
issue on the merits. See Koonce II, 636 N.E.2d at 1308.

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manslaughter and other matters in the case, including the Fifth

Amendment and the defendant's right not to testify. In the

context of the latter, it instructed that

the defendant has an absolute right
not to testify since the entire burden of
proof in this case is on the prosecution
to prove that the defendant is guilty.
It is not up to the defendant to prove
that he is not guilty or he is innocent.

Tr. at 6-77.

II. The Legal Framework
II. The Legal Framework

A. The Standard Governing the Writ
A. The Standard Governing the Writ

In April of 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-132, Title I, 104, 110 Stat.

1219, changed the standard governing the issuance of the writ of

habeas corpus. The new language states that

(d) [a]n application for a writ of habeas
corpus on behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court
shall not be granted with respect to any
claim that was adjudicated on the merits
in State court proceedings unless the
adjudication of the claim --
(1) resulted in a decision that was
contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of
the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was
based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in
light of the evidence presented in
the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. 2254(d). The district court's action preceded

enactment of the new standard, and so it reviewed Koonce's

petition under the old standard, i.e., whether the petitioner was

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"in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties

of the United States." 28 U.S.C. 2254(a). Appellee argues

that, notwithstanding the district court's use of the prior

statute, the new standard applies here. However, we need not

determine which standard applies in this context, as we find that

under either statute Koonce's petition must fail.

B. The Applicable Case Law
B. The Applicable Case Law

The district court analyzed Koonce's claim that the

jury instruction violated his due process rights under Hill v.

Maloney, 927 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1990), and Koonce maintains that

we should do the same.

Under Hill, a reviewing court must first

determine whether a reasonable juror
would have interpreted the challenged
portion of the instruction as creating a
mandatory presumption. If so, the court
must then consider whether other parts of
the charge clarified the ill-advised
language with the result that a
reasonable factfinder would not have
understood the instruction to create an
unconsitutional presumption. Finally, if
the court determines that the charge as a
whole left the jurors with an
impermissible impression, the court must
proceed to evaluate the harmlessness vel

non of the error.

Anderson v. Butler, 23 F.3d 593, 595 (1st Cir.) (citations

omitted), cert. denied, U.S. , 115 S. Ct. 331 (1994).

Appellee, however, argues that Koonce's reliance on

Hill is misplaced. Appellee contends that the instruction at

issue here did not create a presumption, mandatory or otherwise.

A mandatory presumption instructs the

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jury that it must infer an "elemental
fact" such as intent or malice from proof
of a "basic fact" such as a knowing act.
. . . A permissive presumption allows but
does not require the jury to infer the
elemental fact upon proof of the basic
facts.

Hill, 927 F.2d at 648-49; see, e.g., Libby v. Duval, 19 F.3d 733,

735-36 (1st Cir.) (finding instruction that "[m]alice is implied

in every deliberate cruel act by one against another" created

mandatory presumption), cert. denied, U.S. , 115 S. Ct. 314

(1994). We agree that no such presumption was established here.

As appellant notes, read literally, the instruction simply

misinforms the jury that to warrant a verdict of manslaughter,

Koonce was required to prove that he acted with excessive force.

The instruction did not state that upon finding certain predicate

facts, the jury could infer that a necessary element of the

Commonwealth's case had been met.

Accordingly, we turn to the traditional harmless error

analysis. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281 (1993).

"The only question for us is 'whether the ailing instruction by

itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction

violates due process.'" Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72

(1991) (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973)). We

must address the instruction "in the context of the instructions

as a whole and the trial record," and "inquire 'whether there is

a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged

instruction in a way' that violates the Constitution." Id.

(quoting Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380 (1990)); see also

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Gilday v. Callahan, 59 F.3d 257, 260 (1st Cir. 1995), cert.

denied, U.S. , 116 S. Ct. 1269 (1996).

III. The Harmlessness of the Error
III. The Harmlessness of the Error

A. The Individual Instruction
A. The Individual Instruction

Taken literally, the erroneous instruction shifted the

burden of proof on excessive force to Koonce. The SJC, and the

district court after it, however, concluded that "[e]ven taken in

isolation the jury would understand that the judge had made an

error because there would be no purpose in the defendant proving

he used excessive force." Koonce II, 636 N.E.2d at 1308.

Koonce, however, maintains that he did have an interest in

proving excessive force. As he states in his brief, if his

"'perfect' self-defense argument failed, he certainly had a

compelling interest in convincing the second jury that he acted

in self-defense, albeit with excessive force, and was therefore

guilty of the lesser crime of manslaughter." Brief of Appellant,

at 13.

We disagree. Koonce's argument would only withstand

scrutiny if the jury were asked to find first, whether Koonce

acted in "perfect" self defense, and if not, second, whether he

acted in self-defense with excessive force. That is not,

however, what the jury was asked to weigh. Instead, it was

instructed as follows:

Now, if the Commonwealth fails to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant did not act in self defense,
but the Commonwealth does prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant used
excessive force in defending himself in

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the light of all the circumstances and if
death resulted from the use of excessive
force, then you may consider whether the
defendant is guilty of manslaughter.

Tr. at 6-64 to 6-65. In short, the jury was instructed to first

determine whether the Commonwealth failed to prove Koonce did not

act in self defense. Thus, the jury would only consider the

excessive force question if it had already determined that Koonce

had acted in self-defense. At that juncture, it was not in

Koonce's interest for the jury to find excessive force, because

if it concluded that he had not acted with excessive force, he

would be acquitted. Therefore, we agree with the SJC and the

district court that Koonce had no interest in proving that he

acted with excessive force, and any reasonable juror would have

understood that it would be illogical for Koonce to carry the

burden of proving excessive force.

What is more, the verdict suggests that the jury never

reached the question of excessive force. See Ducette v. Vose,

842 F.2d 538, 542-43 (1st Cir. 1988) (denying petition for writ

of habeas corpus where there was no "virtually no likelihood"

that the erroneous instruction could have made a difference in

the jury's deliberations). The jury found Koonce guilty of first

degree murder. As the trial court instructed the jury, the first

element of first degree murder is whether the defendant committed

an unlawful killing. According to the instructions, the jury

could only find that this element was met if it found that the

Commonwealth proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Koonce did not

act in self defense. Because the jury found Koonce guilty of

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first degree murder, it must have found that he did not act in

self-defense. The issue of excessive force would therefore never

have arisen.

Koonce attempts to argue that the jury would, in fact,

have applied the erroneous instruction by maintaining that the

error served to shift the burden of proof to him on the question

of self-defense. Acknowledging that the plain language of the

instruction went only to excessive force, he nonetheless contends

that the jury could have construed the misinstruction as an

instruction requiring that Koonce prove he acted in self-defense,

such that a reasonable juror would have believed that

manslaughter was not an option unless Koonce demonstrated beyond

a reasonable doubt that he acted in self-defense.

We find no substance in Koonce's position. First, as

the appellee notes, the judge's statement, given its plain

interpretation, simply did not mean what Koonce claims. The

instruction was that Koonce had to prove excessive force, not

that he had to prove self-defense. Second, the trial court

clearly described self-defense and excessive force as two

separate concepts, with the latter only arising as an issue if

the jury did not find the former. The lines between the two

concepts were not blurred, as Koonce would have us believe.

Simply put, a reasonable juror would not have misconstrued an

instruction about excessive force to apply to the more basic

question of self-defense.

B. The Instruction in the Context of the Whole
B. The Instruction in the Context of the Whole

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The district court found, as did the SJC, that "reading

the charge as a whole, no reasonable juror could have been left

with any other impression than that the burden of proof was on

the Commonwealth with respect to every element of the case and

that the defendant had no burden whatsoever to prove anything."

District Court Memorandum of Decision and Order, at 6. Koonce

argues here that the other portions of the charge cannot explain

away the challenged instruction, especially given the importance

of the issue. Koonce focuses on the fact that this was the

district court's final comment on voluntary manslaughter. He

contends that it is more likely that a juror would follow the

erroneous instruction as it was the judge's last comment on the

topic, and as it included imperative language such as "you may

not."

We disagree. Of course, the mere fact that correct

instructions were given as well as the incorrect one does not

save the instruction. See Libby, 19 F.3d at 737. But the

judge's instructions here as to burden of proof were much more

comprehensive than Koonce would acknowledge. As the SJC put it,

[t]he misstatement in the instruction
came after the judge: correctly stated
that it was the Commonwealth's burden to
prove manslaughter; twice correctly
stated that the defendant did not have to
prove anything; twice correctly stated
that the Commonwealth must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant did
not act in self-defense; twice correctly
stated that, if there was a reasonable
doubt as to whether the defendant acted
in self-defense, the verdict must be not
guilty; and three times correctly stated
that the Commonwealth must prove beyond a

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reasonable doubt that the defendant used
excessive force.

Koonce II, 636 N.E.2d at 1309. What is more, although the

challenged instruction was the last word on voluntary

manslaughter, the judge continued his instructions, correctly

apportioning the burden of proof for involuntary manslaughter,

and, most significantly, stating that "the entire burden of proof

in this case is on the prosecution to prove that the defendant is

guilty." Tr. at 6-77. In this context, and given our agreement

with the SJC "that the offending language was meaningless in the

context of the trial and the charge as a whole," id., our review

of the totality of the jury instructions leads us to the

conclusion that any confusion was adequately clarified, and so no

reasonable juror would have applied the unconstitutional

instruction. See Anderson, 23 F.3d at 597; cf. Francis v.

Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 315 (1985) ("Other instructions might

explain the particular infirm language to the extent that a

reasonable juror could not have considered the charge to have

created an unconstitutional presumption.").

Koonce next argues that, for two reasons, viewing the

record as a whole, the trial court's error "'"had substantial and

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's

verdict."'" Libby, 19 F.3d at 738 (quoting Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos v. United

States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946))). First, he reiterates his

position that the instruction placed the burden on him to prove

self-defense, an argument we have already dismissed. Second,

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Koonce maintains that the facts of this case, including his

flight from a large group of people who had just beaten another

man, and the firing of only a single shot, paired with the fact

that the first jury to hear the case could not reach a verdict,

mandate the conclusion that the trial judge's error had a

substantial impact on Koonce's chance for acquittal, or, at the

very least, a manslaughter verdict. These circumstances, he

urges, should lead to "grave doubt" in our minds as to the

harmlessness of the trial court's error, such that we should

treat the error as if it affected the verdict. See O'Neil v.

McAninch, U.S. , , 115 S. Ct. 992, 994 (1995).

Koonce cites no authority for his premise that the

mistrial in his first trial should shade our reasoning in this

case. Even assuming that we should do so, however, we find no

reason to doubt our conclusion that the error was harmless. No

reasonable juror would have applied the erroneous instruction,

given that the instructions as a whole clarified the burden of

proof, that Koonce had no interest in proving excessive force,

and that the jury found Koonce guilty of first degree murder, and

thus should never have had to weigh the question of excessive

force. In essence, Koonce's last argument is really seeking

clemency, based on the tragic circumstances of this case. We

recognize that we are Koonce's court of last resort. A grant of

clemency, however, is not within this court's purview, and so we

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affirm the decision of the district court.4

CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION

For the reasons detailed above, the decision of the

district court denying Koonce's petition for a writ of habeas

corpus is affirmed.
affirmed

4 The Supreme Court has found that the traditional harmless
error analysis does not apply to jury instructions that
constitute a "'structural defect[] in the constitution of the
trial mechanism.'" Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. at 281

(quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309 (1991)). In

Sullivan, the Court found that an instruction that gave an

unconstitutional definition of "reasonable doubt" misdescribed
the burden of proof, such that there essentially was "no jury
verdict within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 280.

The Court stated that "the essential connection to a 'beyond a
reasonable doubt' factual finding cannot be made where the
instructional error consists of a misdescription of the burden of
proof, which vitiates all the jury's findings." Id. at 281.

Koonce cites Sullivan here for the proposition that the error

in this case worked a federal due process violation, but does not
argue that the error was structural, such that the harmless error
standard would not apply. Nonetheless, for the sake of clarity,
we note that this was not a "structural" error, as the
misinstruction did not relieve the Commonwealth of its duty to
prove each element of the crime, but rather, as the SJC found,
"placed the burden on the defendant of proving something
(excessive force) that any reasonable juror would understand was
antithetical to his defense." Koonce II, 636 N.E.2d at 1308.

Examination of Sullivan and the other recognized exceptions to

harmless error analysis reveals that, unlike in those cases, the
error here is not a "'structural defect[] in the trial mechanism'
which affect[s] 'the entire conduct of the trial from beginning
to end' and 'without [which] a criminal trial cannot reliably
serve its function as a vehicle for determination for guilt or
innocence.'" United States v. Brand, 80 F.3d 560, 568 (1st Cir.

1996) (quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309-10); see also

Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309-310 (listing constitutional

violations that have been found to constitute structural
defects).

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