Ahern v. O'Donnell

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
For the First Circuit

No. 96-1528

JEREMIAH P. AHERN,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

PHILIP O'DONNELL, PATRICIA McBRIDE, TONIE MORAN, DAVID CELLA,
INDIVIDUALLY AND IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES,
and THE UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS,

Defendants, Appellees.

ERRATA SHEET

The opinion of this Court issued on March 31, 1997, is
amended as follows:

Cover sheet: Delete "1977" and insert in its place "1997."

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit

No. 96-1528

JEREMIAH P. AHERN,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

PHILIP O'DONNELL, PATRICIA McBRIDE, TONIE MORAN, DAVID CELLA,
INDIVIDUALLY AND IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES,
and THE UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS,

Defendants, Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Douglas P. Woodlock, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Boudin, Circuit Judge,

Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,

and Skinner,* Senior District Judge.

Thomas Gilbert Massimo for appellant.

Terence P. O'Malley with whom Joyce A. Kirby was on brief for

appellees Philip O'Donnell, Patricia McBride, David Cella, and
University of Massachusetts.
Janet Nally Barnes with whom William J. Dailey, Jr., Robert G.

Eaton, and Sloane and Walsh were on brief for appellee Tonie Moran.

March 31, 1997

*Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.

Per Curiam. Plaintiff-appellant Jeremiah P. Ahern
Per Curiam.

brought suit in federal court against five individuals and

three entities, seeking declaratory relief and damages for a

variety of civil rights violations and common-law torts. The

complaint alleged that the defendants violated Ahern's rights

under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and asserted

pendent state-law claims for, inter alia, false arrest, false

imprisonment, and infliction of emotional distress. The

claims were based upon events that resulted in Ahern's

involuntary admission to a psychiatric facility and the

subsequent termination of his employment as a police officer

with the University of Massachusetts at Boston ("UMB")

Department of Public Safety ("DPS").

The complaint named as defendants, in both their

individual and official capacities, Captain Philip O'Donnell,

acting director of the UMB DPS at the time of Ahern's

involuntary admission to the Arbour Hospital ("Arbour");

David Cella, director of the UMB DPS at the time Ahern's

employment was terminated; Sergeant Patricia McBride of the

UMB police force; Dr. Tonie Moran, consulting psychologist to

the UMB DPS; and Dr. Michael Malick, the physician who

evaluated Ahern at Arbour and who effected his involuntary

admission to that facility. The three entities named as

defendants were UMB, Arbour, and Ahern's union, the UMB

Patrolmen's Association ("the Union").

Following dismissal of the counts against the Union

and Dr. Malick, the remaining parties filed cross motions for

summary judgment. The district court entered summary

judgment for the defendants on all counts. Ahern now appeals

from that portion of the district court's order entering

summary judgment in favor of Dr. Moran and the UMB

defendants. We affirm.

I.
I.

We view the record evidence in the light most

favorable to Ahern, the party against whom summary judgment

has entered, drawing all reasonable competing inferences in

his favor. See Wightman v. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co., 100

F.3d 228, 230 (1st Cir. 1996). Most of the predicate facts

are not in dispute, although Ahern strenuously disputes the

significance of some of the facts. The salient events are as

follows.

In the early morning of September 19, 1991, shortly

after midnight, Deborah Cate's telephone answering machine

recorded the following message: "Hey. Guess what? We took

care of that crybaby old fuck of yours. The niggers

splattered his face all over Dorchester. He's gone. He's

gone. That fucking crybaby's all gone." Ms. Cate, a UMB

student and employee, was not at home at the time of the call

and did not hear the message until approximately 6:15 that

evening. Cate recognized the voice as that of Ahern, a

former boyfriend, and understood the message to mean that

Ahern had caused James Igoe, another of Cate's former

boyfriends, to be killed.

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At the time of the September 19th message, Ahern

had been a member of the UMB police force for approximately

four years. Cate had dated and become intimate with Ahern

during the spring and summer of 1990. Before, during, and

after that same period, Cate also dated James Igoe, who was

married and had children. At the time these relationships

were going on concurrently, Ahern knew of Cate's relationship

with Igoe. Ahern also knew where Igoe worked.

Cate dated Ahern through the Fourth of July weekend

of 1990, at which time she told him that she wanted to end

their relationship. Ahern was upset by this and for the

remainder of the summer of 1990 he attempted to convince Cate

to resume the relationship. According to Cate, he constantly

stopped by uninvited to her workplace, interrupting her work,

giving her unwanted gifts, and upsetting her. Ahern

repeatedly told Cate that he hated Igoe; that if it were not

for Igoe, Cate would love Ahern; and that he would "take care

of" Igoe.

Ahern began a campaign of telephone calls to Cate

in which he threatened, among other things, to tell Igoe's

wife and children of the relationship between Cate and Igoe,

and to send Igoe's wife photographs of Cate and Igoe

together. In mid-August 1990, Ahern told Cate that he had

obtained Igoe's home address from the UMB police computer and

that he was going to go there to tell Igoe's wife and

children about Igoe's affair with Cate. Ahern also stalked

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Cate and called her to let her know that he had been

following her. On one occasion, Ahern called Cate while Igoe

was visiting at her apartment. When Cate answered the phone,

Ahern said, "He's there, isn't he?" and told her to look out

the window. When she did, she saw Ahern in a phone booth

across the street from her house, looking up at her and

displaying what appeared to her to be a gun. Ahern does not

dispute these allegations but states that by the fall of 1990

he had ceased his efforts to convince Cate to return to him

and had begun dating another woman.

Beginning in the summer of 1990, after she ended

her relationship with Ahern, Cate also began to receive

obscene and threatening phone calls. In late September or

October 1990, Igoe began to receive harassing and threatening

calls at work. In the calls to Igoe, a male caller referred

to an unnamed woman with whom the caller and Igoe both had

relationships.

The sexually explicit calls to Cate and Igoe

continued through March 1991. Ahern denied making the calls,

though he admitted that he had been "a little crazy" over his

break-up with Cate. In mid-March, Cate told Ahern that Igoe

was still receiving harassing calls and that she believed

that he was the caller. According to Cate, Ahern became

nervous and suggested that the caller might be a friend of

his who was upset with Cate and Igoe for the way they had

treated Ahern. In April 1991, Cate received another sexually

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explicit message, the content of which was the same as a

message left in January.

In early July 1991, against Igoe's wishes, Cate

ended their relationship. In mid-July, Igoe received another

call, in the course of which he exclaimed, "Look, you got

what you wanted. You split Debi and I up." At the end of

July, Cate received more threatening, sexually explicit

messages. She was certain that the caller was Ahern.

In August 1991, Cate reported the obscene and

threatening phone calls to the Boston Police Department, but

did not supply any information about the suspected caller.

She also contacted the telephone company, which placed a

"trap" on her phone for three weeks. The telephone company

then advised Cate that the calls she reported during the

three-week period were made from local telephone booths, some

from the MBTA station near UMB. Cate continued to receive

hang-up calls after the trap was removed.

After listening to the September 19th message, Cate

became frightened and concerned for Igoe's safety because she

thought that the message could be "the real thing." She

called Igoe at work, at home, and at his wife's home, but was

unable to reach him. Panicked, she called the Boston Police

Department. She told a detective about the message and asked

if any serious incidents had been reported that day. The

detective ultimately recommended that Cate call Patricia

McBride, a sergeant on the UMB police force.

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At approximately 6:30 p.m., Cate called McBride to

report the threatening and harassing phone calls. McBride

offered to interview Cate at her apartment, rather than at

the DPS station, because the complaint involved a fellow

officer. At Cate's apartment, Cate suggested that McBride

listen to the disturbing message herself. After listening

for a short time, McBride was convinced that the caller was

Ahern. Cate then told McBride that she was certain that

Ahern was the caller for three reasons: she recognized the

caller's voice as Ahern's; the caller related the same

information in his calls to Cate and to Igoe; and the

information related by the caller was known only to Cate and

Ahern.

While at Cate's apartment, McBride listened to

other recorded messages and to a tape of calls to Igoe that

Igoe had recorded beginning in February 1991. McBride also

collected information from Cate concerning the events of the

past eighteen months. Cate then made two tapes for McBride -

- one contained obscene and threatening messages that had

been left on her answering machine, including the September

19th message and other threats to have Igoe killed; the

second tape was a copy of a tape of phone calls to Igoe,

featuring graphic accounts of the caller's sexual interludes

with Cate and various threats, including threats to have Igoe

killed.

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Cate spoke to Igoe that evening, while McBride was

with her, and learned that he was fine. McBride then called

Captain Philip O'Donnell, acting director of the UMB DPS, and

told him that she needed him to listen to some tape

recordings. McBride brought the two tapes to O'Donnell's

home. After listening to both tapes, O'Donnell agreed that

the caller was Ahern. McBride and O'Donnell were very

familiar with Ahern's voice, both in person and on the

telephone, from having worked closely with him on a regular

basis. There is no suggestion that either officer, or any

other defendant, bore any animosity toward Ahern.

Concerned about Ahern's potential dangerousness and

the safety of Cate and Igoe, O'Donnell tried to contact

consulting psychologist Dr. Tonie Moran in order to get an

expert opinion as to whether or not the caller presented a

threat to Cate and Igoe, and to ask her advice. O'Donnell

made no attempt to contact Cate, Igoe, Ahern, the Union, or

any municipal police department on the night of September

19th. He did, however, question McBride about the

precautions taken by Cate for the remainder of the evening,

and discussed with her the likelihood that Ahern might pose

an immediate danger.

On September 20, 1991, O'Donnell reported to work

at 7:00 a.m., the time Ahern came on duty. He had asked

McBride to report for work early as well and to monitor

closely Ahern's whereabouts and activities. O'Donnell was

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not concerned that there was any immediate danger to Igoe

because he knew that Igoe lived in New Hampshire and worked

in Waltham. O'Donnell thought it highly unlikely that Ahern

would drive off campus to find Igoe, because that would

certainly have resulted in disciplinary action and possibly

the loss of Ahern's job. As for Cate's safety, O'Donnell had

instructed McBride to tell her to stay off campus entirely if

she could, and in any case to stay away from the UMB boat

dock where Cate worked.

Dr. Moran called O'Donnell at approximately

7:15 a.m., at which time O'Donnell explained the situation,

describing the contents of the tapes in as much detail as

possible. Based upon what O'Donnell told her, Dr. Moran

advised him that the caller might be homicidal or suicidal

and therefore should be evaluated by a mental health

professional, preferably a psychiatrist, in order to

determine whether he posed a danger to himself or others.1

She cautioned O'Donnell that Ahern's career as a police

officer was not necessarily over as a consequence of the

events described; that with intervention and proper

treatment, it was possible that things could return to

normal, with no further problems.

1The record contains contrary accounts as to what Dr.
Moran told O'Donnell to do about the situation. O'Donnell
recalled in his deposition and elsewhere that Dr. Moran said
that Ahern should be taken for evaluation against his will if
necessary. Dr. Moran, however, contends that she never made
this recommendation and that she played no part in the later
decision to admit Ahern to Arbour.

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Dr. Moran stated that she would not be able to

examine Ahern herself that day, but offered to contact

another doctor with extensive experience as a psychiatric

evaluator. It took several hours to make final arrangements

for an evaluation at Arbour, largely due to difficulties in

determining which facilities would be covered by Ahern's

medical insurance carrier. During the same morning,

September 20, O'Donnell played portions of the tapes for

Lieutenant James Wise, without giving him any information

about them, and asked if he could identify the caller. Wise,

who had been Ahern's training officer, and who had worked

directly with him on a daily basis for two years, replied

that the voice was Ahern's.

Ahern reported for work at his usual time of 7:00

a.m. and was assigned an armed and uniformed post patrolling

the UMB campus in a marked police cruiser. At about 1:00 or

1:30 p.m., O'Donnell called him back to the station and

instructed him to change into plain clothes, put his weapon

away, and meet O'Donnell in the DPS director's office.

When Ahern arrived, O'Donnell, McBride, and another

female officer were present. O'Donnell informed him that

Cate had made allegations against him regarding obscene and

threatening phone calls to her and Igoe; O'Donnell said that

Ahern was sick and needed help, and that O'Donnell wanted him

to undergo a psychiatric evaluation. Ahern denied the

allegations.

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According to Ahern, he asked what would happen if

he did not agree to be evaluated and was told that he "was

going one way or the other." Ahern says that at this point

he became nervous and frightened; however, he concedes that

he agreed to go. Ahern allegedly asked to speak to a lawyer

or a union representative, but O'Donnell simply grabbed him

"like a buddy" and "carted" him out. O'Donnell testified in

deposition, however, that Ahern was "extremely cooperative"

and never gave any indication that he did not want to go with

the officers.

When they arrived at Arbour, O'Donnell explained

the situation to a staff member and, at some point, gave the

tapes to a staff member. The officers stayed at the hospital

until about 4:30 p.m., when they were informed that Ahern had

refused the option of applying for voluntary admission and

was being admitted involuntarily. Ahern remained in the

hospital for 12 days. Cate received several hang-up calls

during the time that Ahern was hospitalized. She was told by

an Arbour staff member who had contacted her that Ahern had

access to a pay phone.

Ahern was released from Arbour on October 2, 1991.

His discharge summary listed the reason for discharge as

expiration of the ten-day period authorized by statute.

After his release, Cate continued to get "countless numbers"

of harassing phone calls each day. She continued to receive

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such calls until she moved in the spring of 1992. The calls

to Igoe also continued, at least through the winter of 1991.

Ahern was placed on paid administrative leave as of

September 20, 1991, and was instructed in October 1991 to set

up an appointment with Dr. Moran so that she could evaluate

his fitness for duty. They met in November 1991, and Dr.

Moran twice consulted with the attending psychiatrist who

treated Ahern at Arbour. Dr. Moran subsequently issued a

report in January 1992, in which she expressed her opinion

that Ahern could return to full duty on the condition that he

engage in a one-year course of psychotherapy.

In February 1992, David Cella, director of DPS,

informed Ahern that the DPS possessed evidence sufficient to

warrant a finding that Ahern had placed threatening phone

calls to Cate and Igoe. Cella stated that, at a minimum,

Ahern's actions constituted conduct unbecoming an officer and

very likely violated other department regulations. Cella

offered to permit Ahern to return to duty under various

conditions, including the inclusion of a letter of reprimand

in Ahern's file. Ahern refused, on the ground that it would

constitute an admission that he had made the calls.

After Ahern was provided extensive advice about his

rights, a hearing was held in September 1992 as to Ahern's

continued fitness for duty. Ahern apparently did not submit

a rebuttal case, and was terminated from his employment with

UMB on October 2, 1992, for "conduct unbecoming an officer."

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A Union grievance resulted in lengthy hearings before an

arbitrator at which the Union and UMB presented extensive

evidence. In January 1994, the arbitrator found that the

evidence "clearly and convincingly" established that Ahern

had made the calls to Cate and Igoe and that there was just

cause for termination.

Ahern subsequently filed the present action. In

its order granting summary judgment to the defendants, the

district court first found that Ahern had not been seized so

as to implicate the Fourth Amendment because he had agreed to

go to Arbour for psychiatric evaluation. Alternatively, the

district court found that the officers had reasonably treated

the situation as an emergency creating a likelihood of

serious harm by reason of mental illness, and acted

consistently with Massachusetts law, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123,

12(a), and with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment.

The court also ruled that in any case, the UMB

defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and that, on

the state-law claims, Dr. Moran and the UMB officers were

protected by Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123, 22. This provides

for immunity from civil rights suits for, inter alia,

qualified psychologists and police officers who act pursuant

to the provisions of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123. As to Ahern's

claims arising from the termination of his employment, the

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district court held that UMB had satisfied the due process

requirements of notice and opportunity to be heard.

II.
II.

A.
A.

On appeal, Ahern contends that the district court

erred in its rulings on three issues: (i) Ahern's claim

brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that his involuntary

admission to Arbour violated his Fourth Amendment and Due

Process Clause rights; (ii) Ahern's section 1983 claim that

the defendants deprived him of his right to due process with

respect to his termination; and (iii) the district court's

ruling that the defendants were entitled to qualified and

statutory immunity.

Our review of the district court's grant of summary

judgment is de novo. See Wightman, 100 F.3d at 230. Summary

judgment is proper if the record materials "show that there

is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the

moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). After a thorough review of the record

and careful consideration of the arguments presented, we

conclude that the district court's rulings were proper.

B.
B.

We begin with Ahern's section 1983 claims

concerning his involuntary admission to Arbour. A plaintiff

asserting a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 must show

that the challenged conduct is attributable to a "person" who

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acted "under color of state law," and that it caused the

plaintiff to be deprived of rights, privileges, or immunities

secured by the United States Constitution or by federal law.

See Soto v. Flores, 103 F.3d 1056, 1061 (1st Cir. 1997). By

the terms of the statute itself, a section 1983 claim must be

based upon a federal right. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S.

137, 144 n.3 (1979).

On appeal, Ahern argues that the defendants failed

to comply with the Massachusetts involuntary admission

statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123, 12.2 Ahern cannot assert

a section 1983 cause of action for violation of the state

statute, see McKinney v. George, 726 F.2d 1183, 1188, 1190

(7th Cir. 1984); nor does Ahern claim that the statute itself

is unconstitutional in its prescribed standards and

procedures for involuntary admission to a psychiatric

facility. Still, the statutory provisions may bear upon

analysis of Ahern's Fourth Amendment and due process rights.

We also note at the outset that any section 1983

claim against Dr. Moran is doubtful. She was a private

psychologist who occasionally consulted with the UMB DPS. It

is unclear that she was a state actor or acted under color of

2Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123, 12(a) refers to the
involuntary "admission," rather than "commitment," of an
individual for a period of ten days.

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state law,3 and even more doubtful that she can be deemed

responsible for the admission. But given our disposition of

the underlying constitutional claims, we need not decide

these issues.

We examine in turn Ahern's Fourth Amendment and due

process arguments with respect to his detention and

involuntary admission. We focus our resolution of this

appeal on the constitutional questions presented, rather than

on the qualified immunity defense, in order to clarify the

requirements of the Fourth Amendment in this unique context.

1.
1.

It is now well-settled that the Fourth Amendment's

protections against unreasonable searches and seizures apply

to the involuntary hospitalization of persons for psychiatric

reasons. See McCabe v. Life-Line Ambulance Serv., Inc., 77

F.3d 540, 544 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 117 S.

Ct. 275 (1996). The district court rejected Ahern's Fourth

Amendment argument, based on its finding that Ahern had not

been seized. On this threshold question, we adopt a

different approach.

The Supreme Court has explained that "a person has

been 'seized' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only

if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the

3See, e.g., Rockwell, 26 F.3d at 260; Pino v. Higgs, 75

F.3d 1461, 1465-66 (10th Cir. 1996).

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incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was

not free to leave." United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S.

544, 554 (1980) (footnote omitted). Ahern admits that,

during the confrontation at the UMB DPS station, he agreed to

go for an evaluation. Nevertheless, Ahern contends that

O'Donnell and McBride took him to Arbour against his will,

thereby seizing him for Fourth Amendment purposes. In

support of this claim, Ahern asserts that O'Donnell and

McBride told him that he was "going one way or the other,"

and that he understood that to mean that if he did not go to

the hospital voluntarily, he would be taken by force.

The district court ruled that Ahern had not been

seized, based upon, inter alia, its conclusions that "Ahern's

own evidence demonstrates that despite his protestations of

innocence, he gave all external indications of voluntarily

agreeing to submit to an evaluation," and that Ahern never

"communicated that he had changed his mind." But the

question seems relatively close, and we will assume for

argument's sake that the facts taken in the light most

favorable to Ahern establish that he was seized. We

therefore ask whether the assumed seizure violated the Fourth

Amendment.

To determine the Fourth Amendment standard of

reasonableness that applies to the defendants' actions, some

background explanation is in order. The Massachusetts

statute provides four different categories of procedures for

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seeking the involuntary hospitalization of an individual for

a ten-day period. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123, 12. The first

two categories permit a "qualified physician, psychologist,

or psychiatric nurse" to sign a "pink paper" authorizing

restraint of the person, if the signor believes that the

person would create a "likelihood of serious harm by reason

of mental illness." McCabe, 77 F.3d at 547-48. The fourth

category establishes procedures for obtaining a warrant for

the apprehension of persons who are potentially dangerous by

reason of mental illness. See id. at 548. Ahern, however,

was detained and transported to Arbour under the "category-

three" procedure, which does not require the signing of a

warrant or pink paper. This procedure provides:

In an emergency situation, if a physician,
qualified psychologist or qualified pediatric nurse
. . . is not available, a police officer, who
believes that failure to hospitalize a person would
create a likelihood of serious harm by reason of
mental illness may restrain such person and apply
for the hospitalization of such person for a ten
day period at [an authorized facility]. . . .

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123, 12(a).4

4The statute does not define "emergency," but does
defines "likelihood of serious harm" to mean:

(1) a substantial risk of physical harm to the
person himself as manifested by evidence of,
threats of, or attempts at, suicide or serious
bodily harm; (2) a substantial risk of physical
harm to other persons as manifested by evidence of
homicidal or other violent behavior or evidence
that others are placed in reasonable fear of
violent behavior and serious physical harm to them;
or (3) a very substantial risk of physical
impairment or injury to the person himself as
manifested by evidence that such person's judgment

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A nonconsensual search or seizure is unreasonable in the

absence of a judicial warrant issued upon probable cause.

See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602,

619 (1989). But "[t]he ultimate standard set forth in the

Fourth Amendment is reasonableness," Cady v. Dombrowski, 413

U.S. 433, 439 (1973), under "all of the circumstances,"

United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537

(1985). "[A]lthough both the concept of probable cause and

the requirement of a warrant bear on the reasonableness of a

search, . . . in certain limited circumstances neither is

required." New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

The Supreme Court has recognized a particular

exception to the warrant and probable-cause requirements in

cases involving "special needs, beyond the normal need for

law enforcement." Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873

(1987) (citation omitted). In McCabe, 77 F.3d 540, we

applied the special needs exception to a Fourth Amendment

challenge to a municipal policy permitting forcible,

warrantless entries into private homes for the purpose of

executing pink papers. In that case, a pink paper had been

issued pursuant to the category-two procedure of the

Massachusetts statute.

is so affected that he is unable to protect himself
in the community and that reasonable provision for
his protection is not available in the community.

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123, 1.

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McCabe did not directly resolve the question before

us here. Under the category-two procedure, police officers

act upon a determination made by a qualified physician,

psychologist, or psychiatric nurse, albeit without benefit of

an examination, and McCabe emphasized "the presence of a

search authorization by an impartial, or at least a

relatively impartial person." 77 F.3d at 552. Under the

category-three procedure, however, police officers make the

decision whether to "seize" the person themselves without

necessarily securing expert advice.

Where, as here, we are arguably dealing with a

police officer's own decision -- rather than that of an

impartial expert -- we think that Fourth Amendment standards

require a showing of probable cause; that is, circumstances

warranting a reasonable belief that the person to be seized

does (as outlined in the statute) have a mental health

condition threatening serious harm to himself or others.

Other circuits have so held,5 and involuntary hospitalization

is no less a loss of liberty than an arrest. We agree with

the Tenth Circuit that:

The state has a legitimate interest in protecting
the community from the mentally ill and in

5See, e.g., Pino v. Higgs, 75 F.3d 1461, 1467-68 (10th

Cir. 1996); Sherman v. Four County Counseling Ctr., 987 F.2d

397, 401 (7th Cir. 1993); Glass v. Mayas, 984 F.2d 55, 58 (2d

Cir. 1993); Maag v. Wessler, 960 F.2d 773, 775-76 (9th Cir.

1991); Gooden v. Howard County, Md., 917 F.2d 1355, 1362 (4th

Cir. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 954 F.2d 960, 968 (4th

Cir. 1992) (en banc); McKinney, 726 F.2d at 1187; In re

Barnard, 455 F.2d 1370, 1373-74 (D.C. Cir. 1971).

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protecting a mentally ill person from self-harm. A
person suspected of mental illness possesses a
right to liberty and a right to freedom from
unfounded charges of mental infirmity. Because a
seizure of a person for an emergency mental health
evaluation raises concerns that are closely
analogous to those implicated by a criminal arrest,
and both are equally intrusive, we conclude that
the "probable cause" standard applies here . . . .

Pino, 75 F.3d at 1468.

The proper inquiry is whether probable cause

existed at the moment the arrest was made, based on the facts

and circumstances within the arresting officer's knowledge

and of which he had reasonably trustworthy information. Beck

v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). Here, then, probable cause

existed if, at the moment Ahern was "seized" for evaluation,

the facts and circumstances reasonably believed by the UMB

officers indicated that Ahern presented a likely threat of

serious harm to himself or others by reason of mental

illness. See Chathas v. Smith, 884 F.2d 980, 987 (7th Cir.

1989).

Applying this standard, we find that the undisputed

evidence demonstrates that the officers had probable cause to

believe that Ahern made the calls to Cate and Igoe, and that,

in view of the content of the tapes and Ahern's past

behavior, Ahern needed to be evaluated by a mental health

professional as soon as possible in order to determine

whether he might be dangerous by reason of mental illness.

Moreover, the belief that Ahern might be dangerous was shared

by Dr. Moran, a qualified psychologist, and corroborated by

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Dr. Malick, a licensed physician, who concluded after

conducting his own examination that Ahern should be admitted

to Arbour.

In response, Ahern claims that the UMB DPS knew of

and was investigating Cate's allegations against him before

the September 19th call. The record contains some support

for this claim, in the form of deposition testimony of other

UMB officers. Nevertheless, we agree with the district

court's conclusion that "even if there were some earlier

investigation, the complaint by Cate on September 19, 1991,

was adequate to trigger an 'emergency' response by the

department" because the September 19th call "represented a

change from threats to do harm, to a representation that harm

had been done."

Ahern next says that the defendants' delay in

acting upon the September 19th call negates the existence of

an emergency warranting a unilateral seizure without more

elaborate procedural safeguards. Cf. McCabe, 77 F.3d at 550

n.10. Ahern places great emphasis on the time that elapsed

between his return to the station on the afternoon of

September 20th and both (i) the recording by Cate's machine

of the September 19th message (about 37 hours), and (ii) the

time that the UMB officers formed the belief that Ahern was

the caller (about 18 hours). Indeed, during the morning and

early afternoon of September 20th, O'Donnell permitted Ahern

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to patrol the UMB campus armed with a gun in a marked patrol

car.

This argument is not without force; in hindsight,

some of O'Donnell's actions are equivocal. Nonetheless, the

objective facts known to the defendants clearly demonstrate

that a reasonable person would have believed that Ahern posed

a "likelihood of serious harm by reason of mental illness"

and to believe that Ahern's continued presence in the UMB

community constituted an "emergency." The speed with which

an emergent problem is resolved is not itself determinative

of the existence vel non of an emergency. We agree with the

district court that the undisputed facts show that the delay

"resulted largely from an effort to take appropriate action

in a safe and measured manner."

Ahern further suggests that the defendants could

not reasonably have viewed him as dangerous because he did

not engage in dangerous behavior between the phone call and

his seizure, and also because he displayed no visible signs

of mental illness while in the defendants' presence.

Probable cause in this context, however, requires only the

likelihood of dangerous activity -- Ahern's threat, coupled

with his history of harassment, threats, and stalking,

sufficed to show that failure to hospitalize Ahern would

create some danger of serious physical harm.

Finally, the summary judgment materials contain no

support for Ahern's allegation that the defendants gave false

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or misleading information to Dr. Malick that suggested that

Ahern might be suicidal. Dr. Malick's notes contained the

remarks, "apparently suicidal threats today" and "told

psychiatrist he planned to kill self too." Ahern says that

he never made such comments to Dr. Malick. This evidence,

however, is simply too insubstantial to create a genuine

dispute of material fact.

Our conclusion is not altered by the fact that

Ahern denied making the phone calls or by the fact that he

was ultimately released from Arbour without a finding that he

continued to pose a threat to himself or others. "If there

is probable cause, it is irrelevant if the suspect turns out

to be noncommitable. The arrest is still legal." Chathas,

884 F.2d at 987; see Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. at 145.

Similarly, it is irrelevant whether the defendants acted in

an ideal manner. We conclude that there is no trialworthy

issue as to the Fourth Amendment claim; the seizure, if such

there was, was lawful under the Fourth Amendment.

2.
2.

The district court dealt extensively with Ahern's

various theories of due process violations in connection with

his involuntary admission to Arbour. On appeal, Ahern has

not attempted to articulate any due process theory entitling

him to relief, but has simply argued that the defendants

lacked authority to use the category-three procedure because

no emergency existed, and that a warrant should have been

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obtained under the "category-four" procedure, Mass. Gen. Laws

ch. 123, 12(e). We therefore treat his other allegations

of due process violations, raised in the district court, as

waived.

In this context, the Fourth Amendment protection

against unreasonable seizures more specifically applies to

the complained-of conduct than does the Due Process Clause,

and thus defines what process is due in the context of the

specific conduct alleged to have violated Ahern's

constitutional rights. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273

(1994); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125 n.27 (1975);

McKinney, 726 F.2d at 1187. We have already explained, in

discussing the Fourth Amendment point, that the evidence

warranted the police in believing that an "emergency" existed

by virtue of the real possibility that Ahern might harm Igoe

or Cate.

C.
C.

Ahern also raises a separate due process claim,

arguing that he was deprived due process in the proceedings

leading to the termination of his job. There is no dispute

that Ahern enjoyed constitutional protections in his

continued employment with the UMB DPS. See Cleveland Bd. of

Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985). In the district

court, he made several arguments to this effect, but the

district court correctly rejected his challenges to the

adequacy of the notice and opportunity to be heard afforded

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him prior to his termination. On appeal Ahern has waived

these arguments.

Ahern's only argument on appeal with respect to

this due process claim is that the UMB defendants "destroyed

and manipulated evidence in bad faith." In particular, he

claims that the UMB defendants concealed or destroyed a tape

recording of an interview with Igoe conducted by McBride;

this would have proved relevant and exculpatory, Ahern

argues, by showing that Igoe thought that two different

people had made the threatening phone calls to him. Ahern

also claims that the defendants used a log of the calls made

to Igoe that was prepared by McBride, rather than Igoe's own

actual log of calls. According to Ahern, McBride's version

was incomplete and Ahern was thus prejudiced in his ability

to show that some of the calls were not made by him.

We readily reject Ahern's argument. There is no

evidence that witnesses were unavailable for examination by

Ahern prior to his termination hearing; Ahern could readily

have adduced the allegedly-concealed information by

questioning Igoe and McBride. Likewise, he could have

discovered UMB's alleged destruction and manipulation of

evidence by examining Igoe, who would have had no reason to

lie at the pretermination hearing, and who later admitted in

deposition that he believed that two different people made

the threatening phone calls. Furthermore, it appears that at

most, the destroyed evidence would have shown the existence

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of a second caller; Ahern never suggests that with the

additional evidence he would have been able to show that he

never made the harassing and threatening calls. We note that

Ahern was afforded a three-day hearing before an independent

arbitrator, who concluded after reviewing the "plethora of

evidence" presented by both parties that the evidence

"clearly and convincingly" established that Ahern made the

calls to Cate and Igoe. In these circumstances, we cannot

say that Ahern was denied a fair opportunity to contest his

termination.

III.
III.

We need only add a brief word on the subject of

qualified immunity. The district court found that the law at

the time of Ahern's involuntary admission to Arbour "did not

clearly identify that O'Donnell and McBride's actions might

violate the Constitution." See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457

U.S. 800, 818 (1982). On appeal, Ahern's sole argument on

this issue is that the disposition of the qualified immunity

question before the resolution of alleged factual disputes is

premature.

We disagree. The question whether a defendant is

entitled, on a given set of facts, to the protection of

qualified immunity is a question of law. See Elder v.

Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 516 (1994); Wood v. Clemons, 89 F.3d

922, 927 (1st Cir. 1996). Because the entitlement is "an

immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability,"

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Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985), the Supreme

Court has repeatedly "stressed the importance of resolving

immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in

litigation," Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991)

(citations omitted).

Finally, Ahern argues that, on his state-law

claims, the district court erred in ruling that the

defendants are entitled to statutory immunity under Mass.

Gen. Laws ch. 123, 22. This section creates immunity from

civil suits for physicians, qualified psychologists, and

police officers who act "pursuant to the provisions" of

chapter 123. Because we have already determined that the

officers acted in conformance with the statute, they were

entitled to immunity under this provision on the state-law

claims. Dr. Moran similarly acted within the bounds of the

statute, to the extent that she was responsible for the

decision to detain and transport Ahern to Arbour. We find no

error.

IV.
IV.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the

district court is AFFIRMED. Costs on appeal awarded to
AFFIRMED. Costs on appeal awarded to

Defendants-appellees.
Defendants-appellees.

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