No. 96-2215
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
REBECCA B. WHITE,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. Gene Carter, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya, Circuit Judge,
Cyr, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Boudin, Circuit Judge.
David Beneman, with whom Levenson, Vickerson & Beneman was on
brief for appellant.
Margaret D. McGaughey, Assistant United States Attorney, with
whom Jay P. McCloskey, United States Attorney, and Jonathan A. Toof,
Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief for appellee.
July 28, 1997
CYR, Senior
Circuit
Judge. Defendant Rebecca White
challenges a district court ruling which declined to sentence her
below the statutory minimum prescribed by the Sentencing Reform Act
of 1984, 21 U.S.C. S 841(b)(1)(A)(vii), pursuant to the so-called
"safety valve" provisions, see 18 U.S.C. S 3553(f); U.S.S.G. S
5C1.2, on the ground that White had not truthfully provided the
government with all the information and evidence she had concerning
her offense. See 18 U.S.C. S 3553(f)(5); U.S.S.G. S 5C1.2(5).
As
there was no error, we affirm.
I
BACKGROUND
Along with eight codefendants and various other individu-
als, White was involved in a large-scale, long-term marijuana
distribution ring from 1986 to 1994. Led by Stuart Smith and
White's then-boyfriend (and current husband), Gary Dethlefs, the
conspiracy was responsible for importing tens of thousands of
kilograms of marijuana from Arizona, Texas and Mexico for distribu-
tion in Maine and Massachusetts. The business hub of the conspira-
cy was a farm in Mansfield, Massachusetts, owned by White and her
three siblings, at which White and Dethlefs resided. There,
marijuana shipments were received for storage, packaging and
distribution, drug transactions were negotiated, and large cash
sums representing drug proceeds were kept. White, and others under
Since the relevant statutory and sentencing guideline provi-
sions contain identical language, we cite only to the sentencing
guideline.
2
her direction, counted and packaged the cash for delivery to the
marijuana suppliers. White purchased hundreds of thousands of
dollars in money orders and cashier's checks, with which to cover
operating expenses. A calendar recovered at the farm contained
numerous cryptic notations by White, recording marijuana-related
financial transactions in which the criminal enterprise engaged.
Ultimately, White was indicted for,
inter
alia, conspir-
ing to possess, with intent to distribute, more than one thousand
kilograms of marijuana. See 21 U.S.C. SS 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A),
846. After pleading guilty, she submitted to three so-called
"safety valve" interviews by government agents, during which she
proffered information regarding the marijuana conspiracy, including
her role in it. At sentencing, the parties disagreed about whether
the "safety valve" proffer made by White had been fully forthcoming
and truthful.
The government represented to the court that White had
displayed reluctance to make full disclosure. For example, it
emphasized that she had failed to disclose all her information
about a particular marijuana supplier until the agents challenged
her omissions with various notations from her calendar,
supra, and
that she had not been fully forthcoming about an individual who had
supplied her with cocaine for her own use. The government
maintained that White had portrayed herself in the role of a
minimal, passive participant without much direct knowledge of the
Based on these facts, the presentence report ("PSR") de-
scribed White as the money launderer/manager of the conspiracy.
3
criminal conduct in which the enterprise was engaged.
The govern-
ment insisted, on the other hand, that White had played an integral
role in the conspiracy, serving as the financial manager and
"brains" of the drug operation.
At sentencing, Agent O'Donoghue, who had investigated the
marijuana conspiracy and participated in two "safety valve"
interviews, testified that though the information White provided
was consistent, in most respects, with intelligence gathered by the
government from other sources, she had not been forthcoming about
either the marijuana supplier or her personal cocaine supplier and
she had tried to minimize her own role in the conspiracy. The
presiding judge likewise expressed unease that White appeared to
have portrayed herself in a lesser role, stating that he was very
familiar with the case, in part due to his involvement in related
proceedings against certain coconspirators, and that it seemed
White had played a more central role than she admitted to during
her "safety valve" interviews.
White responded that any vagueness in her disclosures
during the "safety valve" interviews had resulted from her alcohol
Notes recorded during the first "safety valve" interview
reflect as follows:
White contended that her role in the conspira-
cy (for which she was convicted) was that of a
minor participant. According to White, she
suspected that there was a lot more criminal
activity than she actually knew about. White
reportedly did not want to know of suspected
drug trafficking activities that were occur-
ring around her, so she insulated herself by
remaining uninformed.
4
and drug abuse, and that she had minimized her role because that
was the way she actually perceived it as a consequence of her
clinical depression syndrome. White supported her theory with a
report and testimony from a psychologist.
The district court established the guideline sentencing
range (GSR) at 108 to 135 months and noted that the statutory
minimum sentence for the offense was 120 months, see 21 U.S.C. S
841(b)(1)(A)(vii). The district court noted, however, that but for
the statutory minimum, it would have departed below the GSR, to 72
months' incarceration. Finally, although the court could have
imposed a sentence below the statutory minimum had White met the
"safety valve" requirements under U.S.S.G. S 5C1.2, it decided
instead to sentence her to 120 months' incarceration on the ground
that she still had not
truthfully provided the government with all
information and evidence she possessed concerning her offense, in
accordance with the requirements of U.S.S.G. S 5C1.2(5) that
not later than the time of the sentencing
hearing, the defendant has
truthfully provided
to the Government
all information and evidence
the defendant has concerning the offense or
offenses that were part of the same course of
conduct or of a common scheme or plan, but the
fact that the defendant has no relevant or
useful other information to provide or that
the Government is already aware of the infor-
mation shall not preclude a determination by
the court that the defendant has complied with
this requirement.
U.S.S.G. S 5C1.2(5) (emphasis added). Specifically, the district
court found that White's "safety valve" interviews untruthfully
minimized her role in the conspiracy and disclaimed direct
knowledge about the conspiracy. The district court further found
5
the report and testimony provided by the psychologist insuffi-
ciently credible or reliable either to explain away or excuse
White's untruthfulness. White asserts several claims of error, to
which we now turn.
II
DISCUSSION
First, White claims that once she had satisfied her
preliminary burden by demonstrating compliance with U.S.S.G. S
5C1.2 through her "safety valve" proffer, the government was
required to rebut her initial showing. See United
States v.
Miranda-Santiago, 96 F.3d 517, 529 & n.25 (1st Cir. 1996). White
argues that she credibly demonstrated that she had provided the
government with all information she reasonably could have been
expected to possess, that the government's attempted rebuttal
failed, see supra note 4, and that she therefore was entitled to
relief under the "safety valve" provision. She likewise assigns
error in a so-called " sua sponte" factual determination by the
district court that her proffer had been untruthful, in that it
portrayed her in a minor conspiratorial role, since no such
The district court supportably determined that the two items
highlighted by the government as examples of incomplete disclosure
by White regarding the marijuana supplier and her personal
cocaine supplier
were irrelevant to the "safety valve" determi-
nation. It determined that White
eventually did disclose all known
information about the marijuana supplier before sentencing, see
U.S.S.G. S 5C1.2(5) ("not later than the time of the sentencing
hearing, the defendant has truthfully provided . . ."), and that
her personal cocaine supplier was not connected with the offense
conduct, see id. ("all information and evidence . . . concerning
the offense or offenses that were part of the same course of
conduct or of a common scheme or plan . . . .").
6
contention was ever raised by the government. Finally, White
contends that the findings of fact made by the district court were
based upon its recollection of the trial and sentencing of her
coconspirators, but that no record evidence in these proceedings
supports its findings. We disagree.
Contrary to White's contention, the record clearly
demonstrates that the government consistently maintained that her
"safety valve" proffer had been untruthful in portraying herself as
a minor participant in the marijuana enterprise. Although the
government did emphasize her lack of disclosure regarding the
marijuana and cocaine suppliers, it cited those instances to
demonstrate its more generalized concerns with the disclosure.
Furthermore, White's suggestion that the district court
Although White likewise represents that it was error to hold
that a defendant cannot benefit from the "safety valve" provision
unless she provides the information in a form useful to the govern-
ment, the district court made no such ruling.
On appeal, interpretations of the "safety valve" provisions,
under the statute, 18 U.S.C. S 3553(f), and the guideline, U.S.S.G.
S 5C1.2, are reviewed de novo. On the other hand, we review for
clear error the factual findings relating to whether a defendant
has qualified for the "safety valve" provisions. See Miranda-
Santiago, 96 F.3d at 527.
For example, at one point the government argued that White
should not receive the benefit of the "safety valve" provision, due
to "her lack of [candor,] . . . . [S]he was less than honest with
us and; secondly, . . . she was the brains behind the outfit in our
estimation, as far as being able to handle the finances and make
arrangements for payment. She is more than a minor participant."
The government later provided clear support for its position, by
asking Agent O'Donoghue to describe White's role in the conspiracy.
O'Donoghue responded that it was his "impression she tried to
minimize or give us the impression of minimizing her particular
role in the conspiracy."
7
somehow acted "sua sponte" in making its findings regarding her
role in the conspiracy cannot withstand scrutiny. For one thing,
the appropriateness of White's portrayal of her role in the
conspiracy was in dispute throughout the sentencing hearing.
Consequently, her claim that the district court committed legal
error by assuming the government's mantle in attempting to rebut
her contention is groundless.
More importantly, the district court could not rule on
White's request for relief under the "safety valve" provisions
without first making its own independent determination as to
whether she had satisfied U.S.S.G. S 5C1.2, including its require-
ment that all information she possessed about the offense conduct
had been truthfully disclosed, id. S 5C1.2(5). See id. S 5C1.2
("the court shall impose a sentence in accordance with the
applicable guidelines . . . if the court finds that the defendant
meets the criteria. . .") (emphasis added); Miranda-Santiago, 96
F.3d at 530 n.27 ("a plea agreement even a binding one does
not replace the independent determination of the district court as
to whether this [safety valve] provision applies.");
United States
v. Montanez, 82 F.3d 520, 523 (1st Cir. 1996) ("It is up to the
defendant to persuade the district court that he has 'truthfully
provided' the required information and evidence to the government.
. . . such a determination would rest in the hands of the judge,
not the prosecutor.");
United States
v.
Thompson, 81 F.3d 877, 880
(9th Cir. 1996) ("it is the court, and not the Government, that
determines whether a defendant qualifies for relief under S
8
5C1.2"). Therefore, were the sentencing court required to
predicate its "safety valve" determination only on theories raised
by the government, as White insists, its responsibility for
arriving at an independent determination regarding a criminal
defendant's eligibility for relief would be unduly restricted.
White's further argument that the government was required
to produce rebuttal evidence is premised entirely on our statement
in Miranda-Santiago, that once a defendant credibly demonstrates
that she has provided all information she reasonably could have
been expected to possess, "[t]he government cannot assure success
simply by saying 'We don't believe the defendant,' and doing
nothing more." Miranda-Santiago, 96 F.3d at 529. Rather, "the
government must at least come forward with some sound reason to
suggest otherwise." Id. at 529 n.25. White argues that since the
government cannot simply say: "we don't believe," then neither can
the district court. Miranda-Santiago is inapposite to the present
dispute, however.
There was no evidence that the defendant in Miranda-
Santiago had been untruthful in her "safety valve" proffer, even
though the government there incorrectly contended that her "failure
[to be truthful] '[could] be gleaned from the Presentence Report.'"
Id. at 526. The district court apparently adopted the government's
characterization of the PSR, in toto, as it simply concluded that
"5C1.2 does not apply, because [the defendant] has not cooperated
fully as required by guideline Section 5C1.2(5)."
Id. Contrary to
the government's suggestion, however, the PSR had afforded direct
9
support for the defendant's claim that she had played a minor,
passive role in the conspiracy. Id. at 529.
Thus, Miranda-Santiago in no sense suggests that the
sentencing court cannot arrive at an independent determination
regarding a criminal defendant's truthfulness, based on the
evidence before it. Rather, we there held merely that it was clear
error to conclude that the defendant had been untruthful, based
solely on a PSR which directly contradicted the district court's
determination. See id. at 529-530 ("[the] district court's bare
conclusion that [the defendant] did not 'cooperate fully,' absent
either specific factual findings or easily recognizable support in
the record, cannot be enough to thwart her effort to avoid
imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence.").
On the other hand, the district court below made detailed
findings regarding White's untruthfulness:
What troubles me is that early on in this
interview she attempted to minimize her role
in this conduct, the total offense conduct of
this conspiracy. And I am, as certain as I am
sitting here, that she is untruthful in that
respect; she was untruthful. . . . And it is
not at all as she portrayed it and attempted
to portray it. . . . she was a very integral
part of the supervision and management and
operation of this conspiracy. And it was
disingenuous and dishonest of her, in my view,
. . . to portray to the officers and Mr. Toof
in the course of this safety valve debriefing,
that she has a minimal role, that she didn't
know very much about it, that she didn't
understand all of the things that happened,
and to relate the information as if it was
something that came to her by hearsay and by
indirect knowledge. . . .
She had been in this conspiracy for a
long time. The nature of her conduct, as I
know it to have been, was on a daily basis,
10
tending to the business affairs of the con-
spiracy that at any given time involved the
distribution of very significant quantities of
marijuana, the storage of it, the warehousing
of it, the procuring of it, and the managing
of the distribution at any given time of hun-
dreds and thousands of dollars over a period
of time, several times . . .
(Oct. 16, 1996 Trans. at 68-70). Thus, the district court, based
on extensive evidence and after vigorous argumentation by counsel,
made the carefully considered determination that White lacked
credibility. ( See, e.g., Oct. 16, 1996 Trans. at 66: "I have
given a huge amount of thought . . . to this issue . . . and I have
. . . th[is] difficulty with her conduct . . . ."). Its finding
therefore went well beyond the "bare conclusion" relied upon in
Miranda-Santiago, 96 F.3d at 529.
Finally, ample record evidence supported the district
court finding. For one thing, the PSR fairly characterized White
as having played a major role in the conspiracy, as its money
launderer/manager. See
supra note 2. Indeed, most conspiratorial
conduct attributed to her in the PSR was never challenged by White,
who chose instead to debate its
characterization that she had been
a supervisor or manager. Similarly, White declined the opportunity
to cross-examine Agent O'Donoghue, who testified that she had
attempted to minimize her role in the conspiracy and that she was
more actively involved than she wanted the government agents to
believe. Accordingly, there was no error.
11
III
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the district court
judgment is affirmed.
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