United States v. Brewster

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 97-1448

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

CHARLES E. BREWSTER,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE

[Hon. Gene Carter, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Selya, Boudin and Stahl,

Circuit Judges.

Henry W. Griffin, by appointment of the court, for

appellant.
Margaret D. McGaughey, Assistant United States Attorney,

with whom Jay P. McCloskey, United States Attorney, and Donald E.

Clark, Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief, for

appellee.

October 2, 1997

SELYA, Circuit Judge. In this sentencing appeal,
SELYA, Circuit Judge.

defendant-appellant Charles E. Brewster protests an upward

departure that the district court premised in large measure on

prior, uncharged criminal conduct a history of persistent and

vicious domestic violence dissimilar to the offenses of

conviction (being a felon in possession of a firearm and making

false statements in connection with the procurement of firearms).

We affirm the sentence.

I. HOW THE CHARGES AROSE
I. HOW THE CHARGES AROSE

We distill the facts from the plea colloquy, the

undisputed portions of the presentence investigation report (PSI

Report), and the transcript of the disposition hearing. See

United States v. Talladino, 38 F.3d 1255, 1258 (1st Cir. 1994);

United States v. Dietz, 950 F.2d 50, 51 (1st Cir. 1991).

In August 1996, police officers responded to a report

of domestic violence at the abode shared by the appellant and his

wife in Livermore Falls, Maine. The officers observed Mrs.

Brewster's injuries, tried to calm the couple's three children

(ages 10, 11 and 16), took statements from both Mrs. Brewster and

her sister-in-law, and arrested the appellant. While being

transported to the county jail, Brewster spoke volubly about his

ardor for hunting and described the firearms (a 30-30 rifle and

16-gauge shotgun) that he owned and kept in his house. When a

routine criminal record check disclosed a prior felony conviction

for armed robbery, the police repaired to the house and, with

Mrs. Brewster's consent, seized the two weapons. Further

2

investigation revealed that the appellant had purchased two other

rifles without disclosing his status as a convicted felon.

Meanwhile, Mrs. Brewster obtained a state court "protection from

abuse" order, and state authorities released Brewster on bail,

conditioned upon his refraining from all contact with his wife.

The appellant promptly violated this restriction.

In September 1996, a federal grand jury returned an

indictment charging the appellant with one count of making false

statements on a firearm application form in violation of 18

U.S.C. 922(a)(6), 924(a)(2) (1994), and two counts of being a

felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C.

922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) (1994). In due course, the appellant

pleaded guilty to all three counts.

II. HOW THE SENTENCE DERIVED
II. HOW THE SENTENCE DERIVED

The district judge pondered several pieces of evidence

at the disposition hearing. Among these was a handwritten

statement appended to the PSI Report, in which the appellant

admitted to purchasing guns knowing that he was legally forbidden

from doing so. In a second handwritten statement, also appended

to the PSI Report, Mrs. Brewster chronicled 17 years of horrific

domestic abuse. She explained that sheer terror had forestalled

any contact with the authorities before August of 1996: she

feared not only for her life, but also for what might happen to

her children if she were slaughtered. Her fear of bodily harm

stemmed from her husband's repeated minations during years and

years of physical abuse. She described incidents in which the

3

appellant threw her on the floor and stomped on her cranium with

heavy work boots, banged her head against a counter, threw knives

at her, and at various times smothered, kicked, punched, bit, and

strangled her. In addition, she had been threatened "with every

kind of brutal death possible."1

The appellant made little effort to conceal his abusive

behavior. In recorded interviews with the state police, several

neighbors and friends described incidents involving physical

violence and vulgar language, and reported that they had heard

the appellant threaten to kill his wife on several occasions.

After making an upward adjustment for multiple weapons,

USSG 2K2.1(b)(1)(A), and a downward adjustment for acceptance of

responsibility, USSG 3E1.1, Judge Carter settled upon an offense

level (OL) of 18. He then assessed criminal history points for

an armed robbery conviction and a breaking and entering

conviction but overlooked seven other convictions because of

their age or the unavailability of records. The resultant point

score placed Brewster in criminal history category (CHC) III.

1A brief excerpt illustrates the tone and tenor of the
statement:

[My husband] has tried to drowned [sic] me in
the pool and in the bath tub. On several
occasions I thought I was going to die before
he let me up. . . . He's told me he would
slice my throat while I slept. He has put
knifes [sic] against my throat and pressed
them into my neck, laughing while he did it.
He has sawed my kitchen set up with a power
saw because I cooked the `wrong thing' for
supper and tried to pull me outside to `cut
my hands off.' I hid in the woods for hours
that night, but had to go back for my son.

4

This matrix (OL 18; CHC III) yielded a guideline sentencing range

(GSR) of 33 to 41 months.

The government urged the court to depart upward on the

ground that Brewster's CHC underrepresented the gravity of his

past criminality and the corresponding risk of recidivism. The

appellant objected. The ensuing debate centered around USSG

4A1.3 (1995), pertinent portions of which are reproduced in the

Appendix. Judge Carter expressed concern about whether section

4A1.3's language and structure permitted a departure based on

spousal abuse, especially since that abuse which he considered

relevant but not similar to the offense of conviction had never

been adjudicated as criminal conduct. In the last analysis,

however, the judge opined that the case qualified for a departure

because of the 17-year history of unrelieved domestic violence

and the existence of seven prior convictions for serious crimes

that had not been counted in arriving at the CHC. The judge then

mentioned a third factor, declaring that the appellant's refusal

effectively to pursue an alcohol abuse program or to undertake

domestic abuse counseling "[a]dd[ed] to all of this in terms of

the unusual character of this case."

Turning to the matter of degree, the court determined

that the upward departure should be fashioned by simulating an

increase from CHC III to CHC V. The court stressed that a

sentence at the upper limit of the simulated GSR (51-63 months)

would produce a prison term of approximately five years, which,

when followed by the maximum available term of supervised release

5

(three years), would keep the appellant away from his wife until

their youngest child had reached age 18. At that time, the court

reasoned, Mrs. Brewster would no longer be "held hostage" in an

abusive situation by her concern for her children. The court

added that a sentence of that magnitude was "appropriate in

recognizing the serious nature of this prior criminal conduct as

related conduct to the offense conduct of possession of the

firearm."

When all was said and done, the court sentenced the

appellant to serve an incarcerative term of 63 months, followed

by a three-year term of supervised release (the conditions of

which, among other things, proscribed any contact or

communication with his wife absent written permission from the

court). This appeal followed.

III. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
III. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review departures for abuse of discretion. See Koon

v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2035, 2046-47 (1996). In the

process, we must determine three things: whether the articulated

ground for departure is conceptually appropriate, whether the

record provides sufficient factual support for a finding that the

ground exists, and whether the degree of departure is reasonable.

See United States v. Dethlefs, F.3d , (1st Cir. 1997)

[No. 96-2071, slip op. at 10].

For organizational purposes, we compress the departure

inquiry in this case by examining the legal and factual

sufficiency of the departure grounds in tandem. Only then do we

6

inquire into the degree of departure.

IV. THE GROUNDS FOR DEPARTURE
IV. THE GROUNDS FOR DEPARTURE

The court below departed because it determined that the

appellant's CHC significantly underrepresented his proclivity to

commit future crimes and the seriousness of his criminal past in

two ways: first, CHC III failed adequately to reflect the

gravity and duration of his vicious, assaultive interspousal

behavior; and second, CHC III failed adequately to reflect the

cumulative impact of seven prior convictions that yielded no

criminal history points. We discuss these factors seriatim. We

then discuss the court's allusion to the appellant's failure

effectively to pursue a treatment program for domestic violence

or alcohol abuse.

A. Domestic Abuse as a Ground for Departure.
A. Domestic Abuse as a Ground for Departure.

The guideline that the district court invoked, USSG

4A1.3, permits a departure if reliable information indicates

that the CHC "significantly under-represents the seriousness of

the defendant's criminal history or the likelihood that the

defendant will commit further crimes." The guideline's text

relates that such information "may include, but is not limited

to" the type illustrated in a series of five vignettes. Id.

(emphasis supplied). The first four examples address charged or

adjudicated criminal conduct, and the fifth addresses conduct

which, although unadjudicated (and perhaps uncharged), is similar

to the offense of conviction.

7

In contrast to these examples, the court below

predicated the instant departure principally on Brewster's 17-

year history of unadjudicated, uncharged domestic abuse, which it

termed "the most appalling part of this man's record." Judge

Carter recognized that none of the illustrations contained in

section 4A1.3 applied to this misconduct, as the appellant had

never been charged with, or convicted of, abusive behavior, and

this prior misconduct bore no similarity to the offenses of

conviction. But the judge looked to the guideline's introductory

language and concluded that Brewster's pervasive domestic abuse

"amply demonstrated" the likelihood that he will commit future

crimes. Brewster attacks this finding on three fronts. He

maintains that the domestic abuse, in and of itself, is not a

legally permissible ground for departure under section 4A1.3;

that it is not a relevant consideration here; and that, in all

events, the evidence of domestic violence relied upon by the

sentencing court possessed too few hallmarks of trustworthiness.

None of these arguments is convincing.2

1.
1.

2Given the sentencing court's factual findings, we are
inclined to believe that there is force behind the government's
argument that the prolonged domestic violence which marred the
Brewsters' marriage would have allowed the court to depart upward
under USSG 5K2.0 (permitting departure if the court finds an
aggravating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not
adequately taken into consideration by the sentencing guidelines
that renders the case meaningfully atypical). See, e.g., United

States v. Keester, 70 F.3d 1026, 1027-28 (8th Cir. 1995) (per

curiam) (upholding such a departure). Because we sustain the
upward departure under section 4A1.3, see text infra, we need not

resolve this question definitively.

8

Emphasizing the Sentencing Commission's express

invitation to consider "prior similar adult criminal conduct not

resulting in a criminal conviction," USSG 4A1.3(e) (emphasis

supplied), the appellant posits that the guideline by negative

implication forbids the use of dissimilar, uncharged conduct as a

basis for departure. We do not agree.

In our judgment, the determination of whether prior

criminal conduct that is both uncharged and dissimilar can ever

form a basis for a criminal history departure is neither dictated

nor informed by the language of section 4A1.3(e). After all,

that section states explicitly that the list of five

illustrations is not intended to be exhaustive. What is more, to

infer that the guideline's explicit authorization to consider

similar misconduct as a basis for departure precludes any

consideration of dissimilar misconduct for that purpose not only

would frustrate the "included, but not limited to" caveat that

the Sentencing Commission deliberately inserted in the text of

section 4A1.3, but also would run counter to a fundamental

principle of departure jurisprudence: that, in the absence of an

explicit proscription, courts generally should not reject

categorically any factor as a potential departure predicate. See

Koon, 116 S. Ct. at 2051; Dethlefs, F.3d at [slip op. at

16]; see also USSG Ch.1, Pt. A., intro. comment. 4(b) (stating

that the Sentencing Commission did not intend "to limit the kinds

of factors, whether or not mentioned anywhere else in the

guidelines, that could constitute grounds for departure in an

9

unusual case"). Finally, construing section 4A1.3 to mean what

it says comports with the Commission's emphasis on a case-by-case

approach to section 4A1.3 departures, see USSG 4A1.3, comment.

(backg'd.) ("This policy statement recognizes that the criminal

history score is unlikely to take into account all the variations

in the seriousness of criminal history that may occur.").

For these reasons, we rebuffed a kindred argument in

United States v. Doe, 18 F.3d 41 (1st Cir. 1994). The defendant

there, convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm,

focused on statements in the commentary to USSG 4A1.2 that open

the door for sentencing courts to use outdated juvenile crimes

similar to the offense of conviction as a departure predicate.

See id. at 45-46. Drawing a negative inference from that

language, Doe argued that the court could not use his uncounted,

outdated, dissimilar juvenile crimes as a springboard for

departure. See id. We rejected this argument, noting both that

it contravened the Sentencing Commission's express intention not

to limit gratuitously the kinds of factors that could constitute

grounds for departure in a sufficiently atypical case, and that

the guideline commentary provided no explicit instruction as to

the use of uncounted dissimilar juvenile misconduct. See id. at

46.

Both observations are apropos here. Moreover, the

fundamental lesson to be derived from Doe is "that a court should

not infer from inexplicit Guidelines language, or from language

that authorizes use of a particular factor as a basis for

10

departure in some cases, an absolute barrier in principle against

using certain other factors as grounds for departure in other

unusual circumstances." Id. at 47. We find that lesson to be

instructive in the circumstances at hand.

Considerations of consistency also conduce to following

Doe's lead. The guidelines, while not specifically addressing

the use of uncharged, dissimilar conduct as a factor in section

4A1.3 departures, explicitly provide that the touchstone of any

such departure determination is "that the criminal history

category does not adequately reflect the seriousness of the

defendant's past criminal conduct or the likelihood that the

defendant will commit other crimes." USSG 4A1.3, p.s. Because

the initial CHC determination appraises a defendant's history of

deviant behavior without regard to whether his past crimes are

similar in nature to the offense of conviction, we see no reason

to insist that courts take an artificially narrow view and assess

the CHC's adequacy through a lens that filters out prior

misconduct which is dissimilar in nature to the offense of

conviction, as long as that conduct, alone or in combination with

other known data, involves or portends serious criminal behavior.

On this issue, all roads lead to Rome. Accordingly, we

hold that, in an appropriate case, a criminal history departure

can be based upon prior dissimilar conduct that was neither

charged nor the subject of a conviction.3 In so holding, we

3To be sure, we should approach "dissimilar conduct"
departures, like all other departures, with great circumspection.
Our holding will have force only in instances in which the

11

align ourselves with the Seventh Circuit, see United States v.

Schweihs, 971 F.2d 1302, 1319 (7th Cir. 1992), and note our

respectful disagreement with the Second Circuit, see United

States v. Chunza-Plazas, 45 F.3d 51, 56 (2d Cir. 1995) (vacating

an upward departure based on dissimilar criminal conduct that had

not resulted in conviction and holding that "a court might

properly consider that conduct [under section 4A1.3(e)] only if

it is `similar' to the crime of conviction").

2.
2.

The appellant contends, in the alternative, that the

imposed sentence must be vacated because the court rested its

appraisal of his past sociopathy upon information that lacked

trustworthiness and did not credibly show that the conduct was

meaningfully atypical. This contention is without merit.

We begin with bedrock. Traditional rules of evidence

do not pertain in the sentencing phase, see United States v.

Gonzalez-Vazquez, 34 F.3d 19, 25 (1st Cir. 1994), and trial

courts exercise wide discretion in deciding what information is

sufficiently dependable to rely upon, see United States v.

Tardiff, 969 F.2d 1283, 1287 (1st Cir. 1992). Despite this

uncharged, dissimilar conduct is so serious that, unless it is
factored into the sentencing calculus, the resultant CHC will be
manifestly deficient as a measure of the defendant's past
criminality and/or likely recidivism. Moreover, we anticipate
that we will encounter relatively few defendants who have
substantial records of serious, dissimilar criminal conduct that
has never been brought to contemporaneous official attention.
Indeed, such cases may be limited to those types of misconduct,
such as domestic abuse, in which the very nature of the criminal
behavior itself explains the absence of previous charges and
convictions.

12

latitude, the information upon which a sentencing determination

is based must possess "sufficient indicia of reliability to

support its probable accuracy." USSG 6A1.3, p.s.

Reliability is a flexible, case-specific standard in

the sentencing context, but it always is informed by

considerations of due process and experiential knowledge. See

United States v. Lanterman, 76 F.3d 158, 160-161 (7th Cir. 1996);

Tardiff, 969 F.2d at 1287. Within those wide parameters,

sentencing courts may elect to embrace divers kinds of

information, even hearsay evidence that has never been subjected

to cross-examination. See Tardiff, 969 F.2d at 1287; United

States v. Zuleta-Alvarez, 922 F.2d 33, 36 (1st Cir. 1990).

Moreover, factual averments contained in the PSI Report usually

are deemed reliable enough to be used for sentencing purposes.

See Gonzalez-Vazquez, 34 F.3d at 25; United States v. Morillo, 8

F.3d 864, 872 (1st Cir. 1993) (collecting cases).

Here, the sentencing court relied on Mrs. Brewster's

notarized statement as the principal basis for its findings anent

the history of domestic abuse. In our view, the judge's

determination that this statement accurately portrayed the

salient events is unimpugnable. We explain briefly.

In the first place, Mrs. Brewster's statement was

authored subject to the penalties of perjury. In the second

place, the appellant virtually conceded the statement's accuracy

13

below,4 and failed to dispute the statement's contents in the

face of the district judge's explicit warning that, if accepted

as true, the statement would form part of the foundation upon

which the judge would decide what sentence should be levied.

Although the government must carry the devoir of persuasion in

regard to facts supporting an upward departure and the accused

has no obligation to offer oppugnant evidence, Brewster's refusal

to disavow the government's accusations when given the

opportunity to do so can itself be viewed as an indicium of the

proffered information's trustworthiness. See United States v.

Figaro, 935 F.2d 4, 8 (1st Cir. 1991). This inference is

especially compelling where, as here, the defendant also declines

the court's invitation to cross-examine the declarant at the

disposition hearing. See United States v. Shrader, 56 F.3d 288,

295 (1st Cir. 1995).

Finally, a number of the allegations contained in Mrs.

Brewster's statement were corroborated by other information, such

as the PSI Report's description of the domestic violence incident

from which the federal charges arose, the original police report,

the state police interview transcripts, and the issuance of the

4The following colloquy occurred during the disposition
hearing:

THE COURT: Is there any respect in which you

believe that anything contained in the [PSI]
report or its appendices [i.e., Mrs.
Brewster's statement] as I have just
described them which [sic] is inaccurate or
untrue?

DEFENDANT: No, sir.

14

state court protection order. Such independent corroboration is

a prime indicator of reliability in the sentencing milieu. See

United States v. Ponce, 51 F.3d 820, 828 (9th Cir. 1995).

We need not tarry. On this record, it strains

credulity to characterize Mrs. Brewster's account as unreliable.5

Hence, the district court did not err in accepting and acting

upon the information contained in the statement. See, e.g.,

Shrader, 56 F.3d at 294; Tardiff, 969 F.2d at 1287; Figaro, 935

F.2d at 7.

Before leaving the topic of factual sufficiency, we

pause to discuss two related points. One concerns the question

of relevancy. The appellant hints that, even if the record

reliably reflects a pattern of domestic abuse, that pattern is

not a fair predictor of future criminality along the lines of the

offense of conviction. This suggestion, however, is no more than

a recasting of the argument that prior dissimilar conduct cannot

form the fundament for a section 4A1.3 departure, and we dismiss

it on that basis. Section 4A1.3 permits a departure as long as

the uncounted conduct evidences a general propensity to commit

"other" or "further" crimes. Brewster's pervasive history of

5Brewster's reliability argument leans heavily on our
opinion in United States v. McMinn, 103 F.3d 216 (1st Cir. 1997).

McMinn, fairly read, will not bear the weight that Brewster loads

upon it. In that case, we rejected a reliability challenge and
upheld a section 4A1.3 departure based in part on witness
statements attesting to the seriousness of the defendant's prior
criminal conduct. See id. at 218. Brewster's argument suggests

that, were it not for certain differences between the McMinn

statements and those in issue here, the McMinn court would have

disallowed the upward departure. This is unfounded conjecture,
premised primarily on wishful thinking.

15

domestic violence undoubtedly presages the probability that he

will continue to engage in such offensive behavior.

We add, moreover, that there is indeed a nexus in this

case between Brewster's history of spousal abuse and his felon-

in-possession offense. As Judge Carter pointed out, the

discovery of the offense conduct arose directly from an incident

of domestic violence, and, although the record contains no

inkling that Brewster used the guns to menace his wife, we cannot

fault the district judge's conclusion that the presence of guns

in the home was "a reasonable source of sufficient fear" to

discourage Mrs. Brewster from seeking outside assistance in an

effort to end the unremitting abuse.

Finally, we must ask whether the appellant's immersion

in domestic violence was sufficiently striking to distinguish him

from the mine-run of offenders in CHC III, thereby warranting an

upward departure. See United States v. Carrillo-Alvarez, 3 F.3d

316, 320 (9th Cir. 1993). The district court described the

thoroughly despicable chronicle of physical, verbal, and

emotional abuse as "highly unusual." We believe that the

accuracy of that characterization is self-evident and that the

atypicality requirement of section 4A1.3 is easily fulfilled.

Phrased another way, since the appellant's placement in CHC III

did not compensate at all for this markedly atypical 17-year

history of grievous misconduct, an upward departure under section

4A1.3 was warranted.

B. Prior Uncounted Convictions.
B. Prior Uncounted Convictions.

16

The appellant also contests the second pillar

underpinning the upward departure: the district court's reliance

on the seven prior convictions that were excluded from the CHC

calculation. Because the court did not rest its departure

analysis on the pattern of protracted domestic violence alone,

but on the combined effect of that pattern and the litany of

uncounted convictions, we must address this assignment of error.

Section 4A1.3 specifically authorizes courts to

consider prior uncounted convictions, see USSG 4A1.3(a), and an

upward departure is appropriate if convictions that were excluded

from the CHC calculation for reasons such as remoteness "evince

some significantly unusual penchant for serious criminality."

United States v. Aymelek, 926 F.2d 64, 73 (1st Cir. 1991).

Here, the uncounted convictions involved a 1977 assault

with a dangerous weapon; a 1979 conviction for operating a motor

vehicle so as to endanger; four convictions in 1980 (two separate

larcenies, an episode of larceny by check, and an incident that

involved breaking and entering into a motor vehicle); and a 1992

conviction for operating an unregistered, uninsured, and

uninspected motor vehicle. Judge Carter's assessment that the

seven convictions for the most part represented serious offenses

cannot be gainsaid, and, when considered against the backdrop of

the appellant's protracted history of spousal abuse, such

convictions are "sufficient to remove the offender from the mine-

run of other offenders." Id. Under these circumstances, a

departure is appropriate. See id.

17

Swimming upstream against this reality, the appellant

asseverates that the age of these convictions dispels any notion

that they indicate an increased likelihood of recidivism. This

asseveration lacks force. To be sure, the appellant committed

the uncounted offenses between 17 and 20 years ago.6 But, when

considered in conjunction with the counted offenses and the 17-

year history of domestic abuse, they form discernible links in a

long chain of persistent misconduct. Given this solid basis for

a powerful inference of recidivism and for a finding that the

string of uncounted convictions reflect a rather unusual

proclivity for serious criminality, we detect no abuse of

discretion in the lower court's reliance on the uncounted

convictions. See United States v. Pratt, 73 F.3d 450, 453 (1st

Cir. 1996) (ratifying decision to depart upward based, inter

alia, on outdated, uncounted convictions for "serious dissimilar

[mis]conduct"); United States v. Tilley, 964 F.2d 66, 74-76 (1st

Cir. 1992) (similar); Aymelek, 926 F.2d at 73 (holding that a

sentencing court properly relied on seven outdated convictions

"distinguished by their numerosity and dangerousness" in

considering an upward departure); see also Doe, 18 F.3d at 45

(holding that uncounted convictions for dissimilar misconduct,

remote in time, can form the basis for an upward departure).

6The parties, like the sentencing court, focus their
attention on the six convictions that were excluded from the CHC
computation on temporally-related grounds. We follow their lead
and omit any separate discussion of the excluded 1992 conviction
(which, in the overall scheme of things, appears to carry little
weight).

18

C. Refusal to Seek Treatment.
C. Refusal to Seek Treatment.

In pronouncing sentence, the district court mentioned

the appellant's failure to pursue counseling for alcohol abuse

and domestic violence. The appellant claims that the court

erroneously employed this finding as a third factor justifying

the sentence, and contests it both as a matter of law (he asserts

that refusal to seek treatment cannot form the basis for a

departure) and as a matter of fact (he asserts that he had begun

treatment before his arrest).

Speaking broadly, the absence of a mitigating factor

ordinarily cannot be treated as the presence of an aggravating

factor, and, therefore, it might arguably be error to premise an

upward departure on a finding, simpliciter, that a defendant

refused to seek voluntary treatment.7 We decline to pursue the

point for two reasons. First, the record in this case, read as a

whole, casts doubt upon the appellant's claim that the court used

this finding as an independent basis for departing. Rather, the

7This situation is unlike United States v. Shrader, 56 F.3d

288 (1st Cir. 1995), a case in which the defendant unsuccessfully
challenged a criminal history departure granted on the basis that
his CHC significantly understated both his criminal history and
his proclivity for recidivist behavior. We noted, inter alia,
four incidents, not included in the CHC computation, during which
Shrader operated a motor vehicle while under the influence of
alcohol, and we further noted that the CHC "did not account for
the fact that Shrader had thrice been ordered to undergo
rehabilitation programs designed to deter the very behavior
underlying these incidents." Id. at 293. We held that this

"record of persistently disregarding the law" rendered the case
sufficiently unusual to warrant an upward departure. However, it
was not Shrader's failure to seek treatment, but his flagrant
disregard of judicial directives, that helped to establish his
recidivist tendencies.

19

sentencing transcript suggests that the court considered the

defendant's failure to seek help primarily as evidence that

Brewster had "every prospect of continuing [the violent domestic

abuse] in the future" and of continuing to "indulg[e] in a

dangerous and highly reprehensible . . . course of conduct."

Second, to the extent if at all that the court

blended this finding into the departure mix, any error would be

harmless. When a departure rests on a combination of valid and

invalid grounds, a reviewing court should uphold it as long as

(1) the extent of departure is reasonable in relation to the

valid grounds, (2) the exclusion of the invalid ground does not

undermine the departure rationale articulated by the sentencing

court, and (3) whole-record review offers an assurance that

excision of the invalid ground probably would not have altered

the sentence imposed. See United States v. Diaz-Bastardo, 929

F.2d 798, 800 (1st Cir. 1991); see also Figaro, 935 F.2d at 7.

In this instance, it is readily apparent that the

district court's decision to depart depended primarily on the

appellant's prolonged campaign of domestic violence and

secondarily on the uncounted convictions. It is equally apparent

that those grounds, standing alone, are fully adequate to support

the departure. What the court perceived to be the appellant's

refusal to seek treatment was at most a throw-in a lagniappe

that in all likelihood did not sway, or even affect, the decision

to depart. Hence, we rule that the district court's superfluous

"refusal to treat" comments, whether or not intended as an

20

additional ground for departure, do not undermine the sentence.

V. THE REASONABLENESS OF THE DEPARTURE
V. THE REASONABLENESS OF THE DEPARTURE

Having determined that the stated grounds are legally

and factually sufficient to support the sentencing court's

decision to depart, our final task is to assay the degree of

departure. The yardstick is reasonableness. See United States

v. Quinones, 26 F.3d 213, 219 (1st Cir. 1994); United States v.

Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d 43, 49 (1st Cir. 1989); see also 18

U.S.C. 3742(e)(3) (1994). This criterion requires us to

consider not only the trial court's reasons for departing, see 18

U.S.C. 3742(e)(3)(B), but also "the overall aggregate of known

circumstances pertaining to the offense of conviction and to the

offender who committed it," United States v. Ocasio, 914 F.2d

330, 337 (1st Cir. 1990). Furthermore, we must determine whether

a sentencing court that purports to undertake a so-called

horizontal departure,8 such as a criminal history departure under

section 4A1.3, has fulfilled its guideline-imposed obligation to

evaluate adjacent criminal history categories in sequence. See,

e.g., Pratt, 73 F.3d at 453 (concluding that a court seeking to

depart pursuant to section 4A1.3 must determine that the

8Departures pursuant to USSG 4A1.3 are considered
horizontal because, in selecting an adequate criminal history
category, "the court moves horizontally across the sentencing
table through successively higher CHCs until it reaches an
appropriate, or `reflective' sentencing range." United States v.

Hardy, 99 F.3d 1242, 1248 (1st Cir. 1996). By contrast, USSG

5K2.0 authorizes a court to depart by moving along the vertical
axis of the sentencing table and selecting an offense level that
reflects the impact of the aggravating (or mitigating)
circumstance which makes the offense of conviction unusual. See

id.

21

offender's criminal history is similar to the criminal histories

of defendants in the CHC to which the court wishes to migrate);

Aymelek, 926 F.2d at 70 (explaining that "section 4A1.3

departures require the use of analogies by, in effect, moving

from one criminal history category to another"); see also United

States v. Tropiano, 50 F.3d 157, 162 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding

that, under section 4A1.3, a court is required to "proceed[]

sequentially from the criminal history category determined by the

defendant's criminal history point score through each higher

criminal history category until it settles upon a category that

fits the defendant"). Because a sentencing court has first-hand

exposure to the accused and a more intimate knowledge of the

circumstances upon which the decision to depart is premised,

appellate courts should disturb determinations implicating

degrees of departure only if it clearly appears that the

sentencing court abused its considerable discretion. See Diaz-

Villafane, 874 F.2d at 49-50.

In this instance, the court leapfrogged over CHC IV and

departed from CHC III to CHC V, thereby upgrading the GSR from a

maximum of 41 months to a maximum of 63 months. It then imposed

a 63-month sentence. The court reasoned that this incarcerative

term, followed by three years of supervised release, would

accomplish two things: it would ensure judicial supervision of

the appellant's activities until his youngest son was old enough

to leave home, and it would appropriately reflect both the

seriousness of the appellant's criminality and the concomitant

22

risk of recidivism. We find nothing unacceptable in the extent

of the departure.

At the threshold, we dismiss out of hand the

appellant's suggestion that the district court failed adequately

to explain its reasons for selecting a departure of this

magnitude. The requirement that courts departing horizontally

must look to adjacent criminal history categories in sequence is

important, but it is not to be construed in a robotic manner.

See Aymelek, 926 F.2d at 70. Here, though the court did not

explicitly discuss the inadequacy of CHC IV, it made the

rationale for its choice of CHC V transparently clear. Moreover,

the court's explanation of why a sentence available under CHC V

satisfied its concerns particularly its concern about Mrs.

Brewster's welfare in relation to the childrens' ages served de

facto as an explanation of why CHC IV would not suffice.

Accordingly, the explanation substantially complies with the

requirement contained in section 4A1.3.

The appellant's related claim that the extent of

departure is draconian deserves scant comment. The court

departed upward by 22 months to a point approximately 50% above

the maximum allowed under the original GSR. We are mindful that

sentencing courts have substantial leeway regarding degrees of

departure. See United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 950 (1st

Cir. 1993); Aymelek, 926 F.2d at 69 (citing United States v.

Aguilar-Pena, 887 F.2d 347, 350 (1st Cir. 1989)); Diaz-Villafane,

874 F.2d at 52. Although the extent of the departure in the

23

instant case is substantial, we believe that the departure-

justifying circumstances and the extent of the departure are in

reasonable balance. No more is exigible. See United States v.

Harotunian, 920 F.2d 1040, 1045-46 (1st Cir. 1990); see also

United States v. Hardy, 99 F.3d 1242, 1253 (1st Cir. 1996)

(affirming upward departure of 300% based in part on defendant's

"persistent ten-year history of violent anti-social behavior").

VI. CONCLUSION
VI. CONCLUSION

We need go no further. We hold that USSG 4A1.3

provided legal authority for the court to depart for uncharged

dissimilar misconduct (here, an ingrained pattern of domestic

violence) of a kind that evinced both the defendant's significant

likelihood of recidivism and the seriousness of his criminal

past. We also hold that, in the unique circumstances of this

case, the long and documented history of spousal abuse, combined

with a plethora of uncounted prior convictions, amply justified

an upward departure of the magnitude essayed by the sentencing

court.

Affirmed.
Affirmed.

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APPENDIX
APPENDIX

If reliable information indicates that the criminal
history category does not adequately reflect the
seriousness of the defendant's past criminal conduct or
the likelihood that the defendant will commit other
crimes, the court may consider imposing a sentence
departing from the otherwise applicable guideline
range. Such information may include, but is not
limited to, information concerning:
(a) prior sentence(s) not used in computing the
criminal history category (e.g., sentences for

foreign and tribal offenses);
(b) prior sentence(s) of substantially more than
one year imposed as a result of independent crimes
committed on different occasions;
(c) prior similar misconduct established by a
civil adjudication or by a failure to comply with
an administrative order;
(d) whether the defendant was pending trial or
sentencing on another charge at the time of the
instant offense;
(e) prior similar adult criminal conduct not
resulting in a criminal conviction.
A departure under this provision is warranted when the
criminal history category significantly under-
represents the seriousness of the defendant's criminal
history or the likelihood that the defendant will
commit further crimes. . . . The court may, after a
review of all the relevant information, conclude that
the defendant's criminal history was significantly more
serious than that of most defendants in the same
criminal history category, and therefore consider an
upward departure from the guidelines. However, a prior
arrest record itself shall not be considered under
4A1.3.

USSG 4A1.3 (1995).

25