UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 97-1509
PAUL F. FLORIO, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
ALFRED L. OLSON, A/K/A LEONARD A. OLSON,
Defendant - Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. George A. O'Toole, Jr., U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Chief Judge,
Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Boudin, Circuit Judge.
Joseph G. Abromovitz, with whom John G. Balzer and
Abromovitz & Leahy, P.C. were on brief for appellants.
Thomas E. Clinton, with whom Clinton & Muzyka, P.C. was on
brief for appellee.
November 25, 1997
TORRUELLA, Chief Judge. Appellant Paul Florio sued
TORRUELLA, Chief Judge.
Alfred Olson in the United States District Court of Massachusetts
alleging a maritime tort and claiming federal jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1333. On January 5, 1993, Florio, working
as a line handler, helped to bring the USS Kauffman into drydock.
After the ship was secured, he was asked to fill in at the
capstan controls. A capstan is a large motorized winch which can
increase or decrease tension on a line. This capstan was
operated remotely by electrical button controls. It was being
used on January 5, 1993 to facilitate the movement of the caisson
door, the device which closes and seals the drydock. At some
point, when tension was put on the line running from the capstan
to the caisson, it snapped and seriously injured Florio. It is
undisputed that the caisson door, the capstan and Florio were all
either connected to land or on land at the time of the accident.
Florio's claims were based on allegations that, first,
an inspection of the lines involved in the docking procedure
would have revealed that the line at issue was in a deteriorated
condition inappropriate for use, and second, that inadequate
precautions were in place to prevent injury to the capstan
operator from a parted line. The defendant, Olson, was an
independent dockmaster hired by Florio's employer, General Ship
Corporation, to supervise the docking procedures. After a bench
trial, the court ruled for defendant and this appeal followed.
We conclude that under Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes
Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527 (1995), the district court lacked
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subject matter jurisdiction and thus vacate the judgment and
dismiss the appeal.
Although the district court found that it had proper
jurisdiction over this claim by virtue of general maritime
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1333(1), a reviewing court has an
obligation to inquire sua sponte into the subject matter
jurisdiction of its cases, see White v. Gittens, 121 F.3d 803,
806 (1st Cir. 1997), and to proceed no further if such
jurisdiction is lacking. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (West
1997) ("[w]henever it shall appear . . . that the court lacks
jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the
action").
In Grubart, the Supreme Court elaborated upon the
jurisdictional requirements of 28 U.S.C. 1333(1), articulating
a clear two-part test. 513 U.S. at 531-34. A party wishing to
assert maritime jurisdiction over a tort must satisfy both the
"location" and "connection" requirements of the test. In order
to satisfy the "location" or "situs" requirement, a party must
show either that the injury occurred on navigable water or that
the injury was caused by a vessel on navigable water. Id. at
534. In order to satisfy the "connection" or "nexus"
requirement, the party must show that the type of incident
involved has a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce
and that the "general character" of the activity giving rise to
the incident shows a substantial relationship to traditional
maritime activity. See id.; Evergreen Marine Corp. v. Six
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Consignments of Frozen Scallops, 4 F.3d 90, 93 (1st Cir. 1993).
The district court found jurisdiction based on the
"connection" prong of the maritime jurisdiction test, reasoning
that "[a]lthough both Florio and Olson were 'land-based,' the
accident occurred in the course of a traditional maritime
activity and was of the kind that has the potential to disrupt
maritime commerce." While the district court appropriately
consulted the second prong of the test, it failed to consider the
first prong. Under Grubart, maritime jurisdiction is found only
where the location and the connection prongs are met; one by
itself will not suffice. Therefore, to determine whether
maritime jurisdiction is appropriate in this case, we must
examine whether the injury suffered by Florio satisfies the
location requirement.
Florio was injured while he was working on a drydock.
It is well-established that permanent drydocks are considered
"land" for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. 1333(1). See Victory
Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 212 (1971); Ellis v.
Riverport Enterprises, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 105, 107 (E.D. Ky.
1997) (analyzing numerous cases that treat piers and docks as
extensions of land for the purpose of applying maritime
jurisdiction). Therefore, Florio's injury did not occur on
navigable water.
Florio's injury, then, must have been caused by a
"vessel on navigable water" in order to satisfy the "location"
requirement. However, the vessel in this case was only
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peripherally involved. The USS Kauffman had already been guided
into the drydock. The line that snapped was not attached to the
ship or supplied by the ship. It ran from one part of the
drydock to another part of the drydock, and was controlled from
shore.
Furthermore, none of Florio's theories of negligence
directly implicate the vessel. Florio's claims stem from Olson's
alleged use of a weathered line and failure to warn Florio about
improperly located capstan controls. These claims allege no
causal connection between the vessel and the accident.
In a supplemental memorandum on this issue, the
appellants cite Justice Douglas's dissenting opinion in Victory
Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 216-217 (1971) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting), urging this Court to avoid "narrow, grudging,
hypertechnical definitions" of causation and location. Victory
Carriers applied the jurisdictional standard at issue to an
accident on a drydock which occurred while cargo was being
transferred for loading aboard a vessel.1 In ruling that
1 Victory Carriers, unlike the present case, involved a claim
brought under both the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act ("LHWCA"), 33 U.S.C. 903(a)(1), 905(b), and general
maritime law, 28 U.S.C. 1332, 1333. At the time Victory
Carriers was heard, claims under the LHWCA were subject to the
same jurisdictional requirements as suits brought only under 28
U.S.C. 1333(1). Since Victory Carriers was decided, however,
Congress has substantially amended the LHWCA. See Guilles v.
Sea-land Service, Inc., 12 F.3d 381, 384 (2d Cir. 1993) (tracing
the amendments to the LHWCA). One of the amendments extended
coverage under the Act to include certain contiguous land areas
(such as drydocks) which had traditionally been excluded from
maritime jurisdiction. A separate jurisdictional provision was
added to the LHWCA to accomplish this extension. See 33 U.S.C.
903(a). Therefore, a case brought under the LHWCA today would
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maritime jurisdiction did not apply to the case, Justice White,
writing for the majority, stated:
In the present case . . . the typical
elements of a maritime cause of action are
particularly attenuated: [the injured party]
was not injured by equipment that was part of
the ship's usual gear or that was stored on
board, the equipment that injured him was in
no way attached to the ship, [the equipment]
was not under the control of the ship or its
crew, and the accident did not occur aboard
ship or on the gangplank. Affirmance of the
decision below would raise a host of new
problems as to the standards for and
limitations on the applicability of maritime
law to accidents on land.
Id. at 213-214. This reasoning disposes of the present case.
Jurisdictional boundaries must be respected, even where those
boundaries seem "narrow" or "hypertechnical," lest confusion
result for litigants trying to determine the proper forum for
their claims.
The "location" requirement for maritime jurisdiction
has not been met in this case because no vessel can be said to
have caused Florio's injuries. We therefore need not address
whether the "connection" requirement has been satisfied, nor do
we reach the merits of this case.
For the reason stated herein, the opinion of the
district court is vacated and this case is dismissed.
encounter a less stringent "location" test than a case brought
under the general maritime law as codified at 28 U.S.C.
1333(1). In this narrow sense, the opinion has been superseded
by statutory reform. However, Victory Carriers represents the
Supreme Court's application of the jurisdictional standard which
persists under general maritime law and is at issue in this case.
We note that Florio qualified for benefits under the LHWCA, but
that those claims are not before this Court.
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