United States v. Fortes

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 96-1981

UNITED STATES,

Appellee,

v.

EDWIN FORTES, AKA CHARLES BROOKSHIRE,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. George A. O'Toole, Jr., U.S. District Judge]

Before

Selya and Lynch, Circuit Judges,

and Pollak,* Senior District Judge.

Robert Godfrey, by appointment of the Court, for appellant.

Timothy Q. Feeley, Assistant United States Attorney, with

whom Donald K. Stern, United States Attorney and Antoinette E.M.

Leoney, Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief for

appellee.

January 14, 1998

* Of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by
designation.

POLLAK, Senior District Judge. This appeal challenges
POLLAK, Senior District Judge.

the conviction and the subsequent sentence of Edwin Fortes

(a.k.a. Charles Brookshire). A four-count indictment, handed up

on December 6, 1995, charged that on January 13, 1994 Fortes (1)

was a felon in possession of firearms and ammunition (18 U.S.C.

922(g)(1)); (2) possessed a firearm with an obliterated serial

number (18 U.S.C. 922(k)); (3) possessed cocaine with intent to

distribute (21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1)); and (4) used and carried

firearms during and in connection with the cocaine possession

alleged in count 3 (18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)). Prior to trial the

fourth count was dropped. In May of 1996, having waived a jury

trial, Fortes was tried to the bench on counts 1, 2 and 3. After

a week's trial Fortes was found guilty on all three counts.

Fortes was sentenced in July of 1996. Finding that

under count 1 -- felon in possession of firearms and ammunition -

- Fortes was subject to enhanced penalties pursuant to the Armed

Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1), and the armed

career criminal sentencing guideline, U.S.S.G. 4B1.4, the

district court sentenced Fortes to a prison term of 262 months on

count 1. The district court also imposed concurrent sentences of

60 months on count 2 and 262 months on count 3.

On appeal Fortes challenges several aspects of his

conviction and sentence. Two of the issues he raises merit

discussion. To these we now turn.

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I.

Fortes argues that findings made by the district court

in connection with the conviction under count 3 -- possession of

cocaine with intent to distribute -- are incompatible with a

verdict of guilty. Fortes' precise contention is that certain of

the district court's findings are directly at odds with a

conclusion that, within the intendment of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1),

he "knowingly" possessed the particular units of cocaine that he

was charged with possessing.

The cocaine in question consisted of nine "jums" --

wrapped packages of crack. Law enforcement officers executing a

search warrant on January 13, 1994, at Fortes' aunt's apartment

at 5 Cardington Street in the Roxbury section of Boston, found

the jums on a bureau located in a guest room frequented by

Fortes.1 The search marked the culmination of several months of

1 The district court s findings with respect to Fortes
connection with the guest room in his aunt s apartment were
these:

The execution of the search warrant yielded
not only the evidence of the contraband
itself but evidence that established, I think
powerfully, the defendant s presence in the
premises on the first floor of Cardington
Street and his ability and intention to
exercise control over items in what has been
variously called the guest room or Chucky s
room, that is, the room on the right as you
enter the building.

In particular, there was a large number of
defendant s personal papers. They weren t
simply historical papers, but they were
current operational papers.

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law enforcement efforts inquiring into drug-and-firearms-related

activities of Fortes and others at the Roxbury apartment. These

law enforcement efforts included two controlled drug transactions

in which cocaine was sold at the Roxbury apartment to a

confidential informant: in the first transaction, in September of

1993, Fortes was the seller; in the second transaction, in early

January of 1994, a Fortes confederate was the seller.

The district court made extended findings with respect

to the three counts of conviction -- felon in possession of

firearms and ammunition; possession of a firearm with an

obliterated serial number; and possession of cocaine with intent

to distribute. In order fairly to assess Fortes' challenge to his

conviction on the cocaine-possession count it will be helpful to

quote the entirety of the district court's findings on that

count. To place those findings in proper context, the concluding

portions of the district court's preceding discussion -- the

discussion of the two firearms counts -- will also be set forth:

Among the papers were his current -- I
think the most recent one was in December,
report to his probation officer which
included copies of his paychecks earned
through the month of December and, I think,
in fact, into January, indicating that even
in January 1994, defendant had a present and
ongoing connection with that room by treating
it as a repository for papers that were of
some importance to him.

I may note that the defendant in his
probation reports or reports to the probation
supervising probation officer reported that
his residence was 5 Cardington Street.

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So with respect to Count 1, I find that the
defendant did have constructive possession of the items
alleged in Count 1.

Now, let me just say that possession may well have
been joint. I'm not called upon to decide fully
whether it was joint. It's sufficient that the
defendant has possession. The evidence does indicate
that it was joint with others, perhaps, because other
people came and went at the same time.

And, of course, question of ownership is not at
issue. Possession is to be determined apart from
ownership, some preference as to whose guns they were
and that is, I think, legally beside the point.

With respect to Count 2, Count 2 relates to the
weapon with the obliterated serial number. That was
the Interdynamic semiautomatic pistol. It was found in
the right-hand bedroom and is one of the items that I
conclude the defendant constructively possessed
knowingly.

I reach essentially similar conclusion [sic] with

respect to Count 3 which alleges the defendant
possessed a controlled substance knowingly with the
intent to distribute it.

First of all, I think it's clear that it's a
controlled substance. I've read the report of one of
the items. I don't know if it matters the other [sic]

weren't analyzed, whether the one is cocaine base, I
don't think it matters the others are not. I don't
think it matters.

Applying the same principles of possession, I
would conclude from defendant's participation in a drug
sale in September that he knew that was a drug-selling
place and that he intended to participate in it,
intended to possess the drugs that were available for
sale within the premises from time to time; and that as
a willing, knowing participant in that conspiracy to
sell drugs as well as firearms, the defendant knew that
drugs, particularly cocaine base, would be available
and would be sold.

And I find further that he had the intention to
exercise control over -- perhaps jointly with others --
over such drugs as were in the apartment for sale at
any given time through the date of the indictment, date
alleged in the indictment. I'm sorry, through the date
alleged in the Count 3 in the indictment.

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I may say that I do not find that the government
has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
knew of these specific nine items being on top of the
bureau at the particular time.

There's not evidence that the defendant was there
in such a time -- in proximity to the search that he
knew specifically that there were nine individually
wrapped jums on top of the bureau.

I don't think that is necessary because of my
conclusion that he knew of the presence of crack for
sale in the premises generally and intended to possess
that which was present.

But to the extent that may make any difference
legally, I mention that; and I'm not convinced that he
knew of those specific items. And I distinguish those
from the firearms, for example, because I think much
more likelihood, likely that that was a transitory
condition, that nine individually wrapped jum doses
would not remain very long on the top of a bureau
whereas I think firearms stored in safes and behind --
in briefcases behind cabinets, so on, so forth, were
there for longer term storage.

But it's not clear who in the events of the day
may have deposited those individual packages and for
how long they were there. I could not find the
defendant knew of those specifically, but I don't think
that's necessary to the proof.

I think that it's sufficient for the government to
have proved participation in the conspiracy which was
the sale of cocaine, cocaine base, knowing that there
would be a supply and that intended to participate in
that by possessing and exercising control over the
supply as it may been from time to time.

I find further that possession by the defendant
was with the intent to distribute. I find from all the
evidence that sales was [sic] going on, including his

own participation in the sale and in addition from the
evidence the defendant himself did not use cocaine or
cocaine base so that the element -- I find the
government has proved possession with intention to
distribute.

Fortes argues that the key to the district court's

finding that he knowingly possessed cocaine was "that as a

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willing, knowing participant in that conspiracy to sell drugs as

well as firearms, the defendant knew that drugs, particularly

cocaine base, would be available and would be sold." Fortes goes

on to point out that he was not charged with participation in a

conspiracy. In arguing that the district court's

characterization of him as a conspirator undercuts the district

court's verdict on the possession count, Fortes invokes language

of this court in United States v. Zavala Maldonado, 23 F.3d 4

(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 451 (1994). Defendant

Zavala -- like Fortes in the case at bar -- was charged with

possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. And in Zavala's

case, we pointed out that, "given that these offenses

[conspiracy, and aiding and abetting an attempt] were not

charged, it is hardly sufficient to say that this record

contained evidence to support such a conviction," and we there

went on to state that "the conviction for possession can stand

only if a reasonable jury could find that Zavala did possess the

cocaine within the meaning of 21 U.S.C. 841." Id. at 6.

It is true that here, as in Zavala Maldonado, no

conspiracy charge was laid against the defendant. Thus here, as

there, a charge of possession could not be proved by

demonstrating vicarious accountability -- i.e., possession by a

co-conspirator is not possession by the defendant where the

defendant has not been charged with conspiracy. But -- as in

Zavala Maldonado, so here -- proof of the defendant's possession

rested on the defendant's own conduct, not on that of co-

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conspirators. To be sure, in the case at bar the district court

referred to Fortes' participation in a "conspiracy to sell drugs

as well as firearms," but the district court also referred to

"defendant's participation in a drug sale in September [of

1993]," a datum from which the district court inferred that

Fortes "knew that was a drug-selling place and that he intended

to participate in it, intended to possess the drugs that were

available for sale within the premises from time to time."

Furthermore, the district court noted that execution of the

January 13, 1994 search warrant "established, I think powerfully,

the defendant's presence in the premises on the first floor of

Cardington Street and his ability and intention to exercise

control over items in what has been variously called the guest

room or Chucky's room." See note 1, supra. Given the plenitude of

these findings, and the fact that crack -- like any other drug of

a particular kind -- is an essentially fungible commodity, the

possibility that at the time of the January 13, 1994 search

Fortes may not have known "specifically that there were nine

individually wrapped jums on top of the bureau" does not

destabilize the district court's verdict. What is dispositive is

the district court's "conclusion that he [Fortes] knew of the

presence of crack for sale in the premises generally and intended

to possess that which was present" -- a conclusion amply

supported by the evidence.2

2 The district court s amply supported conclusion also renders
inapposite Fortes reliance on our cautionary observation and
guidance in United States v. Booth, 111 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.), cert.

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II.

Fortes' conviction on the felon-in-possession-of-

firearms-and-ammunition count, under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), gave

rise to a prison sentence on that count of 262 months,

substantially in excess of the ten-year maximum term which,

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 924(a)(2), ordinarily sets a cap on a

sentence of incarceration for a violation of 922(g)(1). This

lengthier sentence was based on the district court's

determination that, given Fortes' criminal history, the ten-year

maximum term was required to be enhanced by virtue of the Armed

Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1), and the Act's

companion sentencing guideline, U.S.S.G. 4B1.4. Fortes

challenges that determination, raising questions of law with

respect to which our review is plenary.

denied, 118 S. Ct. 204 (1997). There the jury was charged that

an inference of constructive possession was permissible "when a
person knowingly has the power and the intention at a given time
of exercising dominion and control over an object or over the

area in which the object is located." Id. at 2 (emphasis in

original). While acknowledging that "knowledge can be inferred
in some circumstances from control of the area," we felt there
was some risk of over-breadth in the proposition that knowing
control of an area might, without more, properly ground an
inference of constructive possession of whatever might be in the
area. Accordingly, without disturbing the verdict in Booth s
case (in which "the jury was told several times that proof of
knowing possession was required; [and] the evidence linking
appellant to the gun was substantial," id.), we cautioned against

the utilization of so elastic an instruction in the future. But
here the district court did not ground its inference of
possession in the fact of knowing control over the area
simpliciter; the district court found that Fortes was aware of,

and intended to participate in possessing, crack that was on the
premises and that was available for sale.

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Section 924(e)(1) of Title 18 provides for a minimum

term of incarceration of fifteen years without parole for any

person "who violates section 922(g) of this title and has three

previous convictions by any court . . . for a violent felony or a

serious drug offense, or both." Although Fortes had, as of the

date of his sentencing in this case, a not unimpressive history

of prior criminal convictions, he takes exception to the district

court's conclusion that more than two of them were "violent

felon[ies]" within the meaning of 924(e)(1).

At sentencing, the district court concluded that five

of Fortes' prior convictions -- two Massachusetts convictions and

three federal convictions -- qualified as predicate "violent

felon[ies]." The Massachusetts convictions were for assault and

battery on a correctional officer and assault with intent to

murder. The federal convictions were for possession of a sawed-

off shotgun, conspiracy to commit bank robbery, and armed bank

robbery.

In appealing the enhanced sentence, Fortes contends

that three of the five convictions counted by the district court

as predicate offenses were not "violent felon[ies]" within the

meaning of ACCA. The three whose characterization Fortes

challenges are the Massachusetts assault and battery conviction

and the federal possession of a sawed off shotgun and conspiracy-

to-commit-bank-robbery convictions.

Subsequent to Fortes' sentencing, this court, in United

States v. Indelicato, 97 F.3d 627 (1st Cir.), cert denied, 117

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S. Ct. 1013 (1997), had occasion to consider the status, for the

purposes of the federal criminal code, of the Massachusetts

offense of assault and battery -- an offense which Massachusetts

denominates a "misdemeanor," and conviction of which does not

entail a loss of civil rights. As the government acknowledges,

our Indelicato analysis precludes characterizing the

Massachusetts offense of assault and battery as a "violent

felony" under ACCA. The government insists, however, that the

two other offenses called into question by Fortes -- possession

of a sawed-off shotgun and conspiracy to commit bank robbery --

are both "violent felon[ies]." If the government is correct as

to either offense, then that offense, taken together with the two

offenses whose "violent felony" status Fortes does not dispute --

armed bank robbery and assault with intent to murder -- would add

up to the three predicate offenses which bring ACCA into play.

But if Fortes is right that neither possession of a sawed-off

shotgun nor conspiracy to rob a bank is a "violent felony,"

sentencing Fortes as an armed career criminal was not authorized.

We turn, then, to a consideration of whether either of

these offenses is properly characterizable as a "violent felony"

for the purposes of ACCA.

A. Is possession of a sawed-off shotgun a "violent felony"

within the meaning of ACCA?

Possession of a sawed-off shotgun is made an offense by

the confluence of 26 U.S.C. 5861(d) and 26 U.S.C. 5845(a).

Section 5861(d) of Title 26 makes it "unlawful for any person .

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. . to receive or possess a firearm which is not registered to

him in the National Firearms Registry and Transfer Record." And

section 5845(a) instructs that the "term 'firearm' means," inter

alia, "a shotgun having a barrel or barrels of less than eighteen

inches in length." 26 U.S.C. 5845(a). As the Ninth Circuit

observed in United States v. Dunn, 946 F.2d 615, 621 (9th Cir.),

cert. denied, 502 U.S. 950 (1991), "[n]ot all firearms must be

registered under 26 U.S.C. 5861(d). Only those firearms must

be registered that Congress has found to be inherently dangerous

and generally lacking usefulness, except for violent and criminal

purposes, such as sawed-off shotguns and hand-grenades. 26

U.S.C. 5845."

The term "violent felony," as utilized in ACCA, 18

U.S.C. 924(e)(1), is defined in 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B). The

definition is as follows:

[T]he term violent felony means any crime
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year
. . . that --
(i) has as an element the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person of
another; or
(ii) is burglary, arson, or
extortion, involves use of
explosives, or otherwise involves
conduct that presents a serious
potential risk of physical injury to
another.

In considering whether an offense is a "violent felony"

within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1) and 924(e)(2)(B),

courts are, as a general matter, directed to pursue "a formal

categorical approach, looking only to the statutory definitions

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of the prior offenses, and not to the particular facts underlying

those convictions." Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600

(1990).

It would appear clear from the statutory texts that

possession of a sawed-off shotgun -- or, indeed, possession of

any "firearm which is not registered to [the accused] in the

National Firearms Registry and Transfer Record," 26 U.S.C.

5861(d) -- is not an offense which "has as an element the use,

attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the

person of another." 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(i). What cannot be

determined solely by reading the statutory texts is whether

possession of a sawed-off shotgun "involves conduct that presents

a serious potential risk of physical injury to another." 18

U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).

In arguing that possession of a sawed-off shotgun, in

contravention of 26 U.S.C. 5861(d), is not an offense that

falls within the purview of 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), Fortes relies on

United States v. Doe, 960 F.2d 221 (1st Cir. 1992). In Doe we

held that possession of a firearm by a felon, in contravention of

18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), was not a 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) offense.

Since possession is the defining criminal act both of 5861(d)

and of 922(g)(1), Fortes contends that "Doe controls and

dictates the conclusion that [possession of a sawed-off shotgun]

does not qualify as a 'violent [felony]'."

Our holding in Doe was based on several considerations.

The concluding consideration built upon the position taken by the

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Sentencing Commission in a 1991 amendment to the commentary

governing the career offender guidelines, U.S.S.G. 4B1.1 and

4B1.2, the close guideline analogues of 18 U.S.C. 924(e). We

said this:

Fourth, the United States Sentencing
Commission, following a statutory
instruction, 28 U.S.C. 994(a), has written
Guidelines with enhancements for those
violent offenders with two prior convictions

for "crimes of violence." U.S.S.G. 4B1.1.
In defining the words "crime of violence,"
the Guidelines use the very language now
before us, namely the words "conduct that
presents a serious potential risk of physical
injury to another." U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(1)(ii).
The Commission has recently amended its
commentary to make clear that these words do
"not include the offense of unlawful

possession of a firearm by a felon."

U.S.S.G. 4B1.2, comment. (n.2)(emphasis
added). The Commission, which collects
detailed sentencing data on virtually every
federal criminal case, is better able than
any individual court to make an informed
judgment about the relation between simple
unlawful gun possession and the likelihood of
accompanying violence. For this reason, and
because uniform interpretation of similar
language is in itself desirable, we believe
we should give some legal weight to the
Commission's determination.

Doe, 960 F.2d at 225.

The Sentencing Commission has not issued a similar

amendment concerning possession of a sawed-off shotgun, or such

other firearms as a silencer or a machine gun whose possession is

also proscribed by 5861(d) (in combination with the

definitional provision, 26 U.S.C. 5845(a)). The reasonable --

indeed, very substantial -- difference between possession of a

generic "firearm" and possession of one of the specialized

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weapons singled-out for particularized treatment by 26 U.S.C.

5845(a) and 5861(d) is illustrated by the Ninth Circuit's

decision in United States v. Huffhines, 967 F.2d 314 (9th Cir.

1992). There the court held that a 1989 Sentencing Commission

amendment to U.S.S.G. 4B1.2 (an amendment adopted two years

prior to the Sentencing Commission's commentary amendment

discussed by this court in Doe) precluded characterizing felon-

in-possession-of-a-firearm as a "crime of violence" within the

meaning of U.S.S.G. 4B1.1 and 4B1.2. See United States v.

Sahakian, 965 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1992); cf. United States v.

O'Neal, 937 F.2d 1369 (9th Cir. 1990). But the Huffhines court,

reaffirming the explication of 5845(a) and 5861(d) announced

in United States v. Dunn, supra (possession of an unregistered

firearm -- in that instance, a sawed-off shotgun -- is a "crime

of violence" for purposes of U.S.S.G. 4B1.1), also held that

possession of a silencer is a "crime of violence" within the

meaning of U.S.S.G. 4B1.1 and 4B1.2. The Ninth Circuit's

Huffhines analysis merits quotation:

The crime of possession of a firearm silencer
does not have as an element the use,
attempted use or threatened use of physical
force required by section 4B1.2(1)(i). See

Tex. Penal Code Ann. 46.06(a)(4) (West 1989
& Supp. 1992). Thus, in order for the
offense to be a crime of violence, it must
"involve[] conduct that presents a serious
potential risk of physical injury to
another." U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(1)(ii).

The unlawful possession of a silencer
presents such a risk. In United States v.

Dunn, 946 F.2d 615, 620-21 (9th Cir.), cert.

denied, U.S. , 112 S. Ct. 401, 116

L.Ed.2d 350 (1991), we held that possession

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of an unregistered firearm in violation of 26
U.S.C. 5861(d) constituted a crime of
violence for purposes of section 4B1.1. We
noted that, under 26 U.S.C. 5861(d), not
all firearms must be registered, only those
that Congress found to be inherently
dangerous and lacking in lawful purposes,
such as sawed-off shotguns and grenades. We
reasoned that the possession of an
unregistered firearm of the kind defined in
section 5845 involved a blatant disregard of
the law and a substantial risk of improper
physical force. Id. at 621.

This reasoning also applies to the
unlawful possession of a silencer. A
silencer is specifically listed in section
5845's definition of "firearm." 26 U.S.C.
5845(a)(7). Like a sawed-off shotgun and
other firearms of the kind enumerated in that
section, a silencer is practically of no use
except for a criminal purpose.

Huffhines, 967 F.2d at 320-321.

A year after Huffhines, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed

the Huffhines and Dunn analysis of the guidelines term "crime of

violence" in United States v. Hayes, 7 F.3d, 144 (9th Cir. 1993),

cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1020 (1994), a case involving a sawed-off

shotgun.3

3 The Hayes court said (7 F.3d at 145):

A defendant qualifies as a career offender
if he is convicted of a felony that is a
crime of violence and has two previous felony
convictions for crimes of violence. U.S.S.G.
4B1.1; [United States v.] Young, 990 F.2d

at 470. Section 4B1.2(1) defines a crime of
violence as a felony offense under federal or
state law that "has as an element the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical
force against the person of another, or ...
involves conduct that presents a serious
potential risk of physical injury to
another." Because the statutory definition
of Hayes unregistered shotgun conviction

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In Doe we looked to the jurisprudence attendant on the

career offender guidelines, U.S.S.G. 4B1.1 and 4B1.2, for

assistance in the construction of identical language in the Armed

Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B). We do so

again today. We hold that possession of a sawed-off shotgun is a

"violent felony" within the meaning of ACCA.

B. Fortes' ACCA sentence was warranted

Since Fortes' prior conviction for possession of a

sawed-off shotgun was a "violent felony" for the purposes of

ACCA, that conviction, together with Fortes' prior convictions

for assault with intent to murder and for armed bank robbery,

added up to three predicate "violent felon[ies]," thereby

subjecting Fortes to the enhanced sentence scheme prescribed by

does not involve the use, attempted use or
threatened use of physical force against
another, we focus solely on whether the
charged conduct presented a serious potential
risk of physical injury to another. See

Young, 990 F.2d at 471.

We conclude that in Hayes case it does.
As we said in United States v. Dunn, 946 F.2d

615, 621 (9th Cir.), cert denied. U.S.

, 112 S. Ct. 401, 116 L.Ed.2d 350 (1991),
and United States v. Huffhines, 967 F.2d 314,

321 (9th Cir. 1992); sawed-off shotguns are
inherently dangerous, lack usefulness except
for violent and criminal purposes and their
possession involves the substantial risk of
improper physical force. These attributes
led Congress to require registration of these
weapons. Huffhines, 967 F.2d at 321.

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ACCA for armed career criminals. Accordingly, Fortes' 262-month

sentence on count 1 was warranted.4

III.

We have considered, and find without merit, Fortes'

other contentions: that the district court erred in (1) not

granting a continuance to enable Fortes to locate and call as a

witness a government confidential informant, (2) admitting in

evidence the out-of-court declaration of one found to be a co-

conspirator, and (3) determining that Fortes "possessed [a]

firearm ... in connection with a ... controlled substance

offense" within the meaning of U.S.S.G. 4B1.4(b)(3) and

4B1.4(c)(3) in calculating Fortes' offense level and criminal

history category.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons Fortes' conviction and

sentence are affirmed.

4 We thus find it unnecessary to address the further question
whether Fortes prior conviction for conspiracy to commit bank
robbery was also properly countable as an ACCA predicate "violent
felony." Compare United States v. Preston, 910 F.2d 81 (3d

Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1103 (1991), with United States v.

King, 979 F.2d 801 (10th Cir. 1992).

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