UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 96-2333
GAURAV MANGLA,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
BROWN UNIVERSITY,
Defendant - Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
[Hon. Ernest C. Torres, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Boudin, Circuit Judge,
John R. Gibson,* Senior Circuit Judge,
and Pollak,** Senior District Judge.
Douglas A. Giron for appellant.
Christopher H. Little, with whom John E. Bulman and Little
Bulman & Reardon, P.C. were on brief for appellee.
February 2, 1998
* Of the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.
** Of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by
designation.
JOHN R. GIBSON, Senior Circuit Judge. Gaurav Mangla
JOHN R. GIBSON, Senior Circuit Judge.
appeals from a judgment as a matter of law entered in favor of
Brown University following a trial on his breach of contract and
promissory estoppel claims. He argues that the district court
erred in granting judgment, as a reasonable jury could have found
that Brown breached the contract, acted arbitrarily and in bad
faith, and that Brown was estopped from denying him admission to
the graduate school. He argues that the court improperly raised
certain evidence and overlooked and misconstrued other evidence
in reaching this decision. We affirm the judgment of the
district court.
Mangla applied for admission to the Brown Graduate
School in September 1993, and was admitted as a probationary
special student, a category of enrollment that permits the
taking of graduate level courses but which is not in itself a
degree program. His admission in this capacity was recommended
by the Computer Science Department and approved by the graduate
council. Associate Dean Joan Lusk met with Mangla at that time
and explained to him that his admission was probationary because
he lacked the requisite academic background or course work in
computer science. Lusk further told Mangla that in order to be
admitted to the degree program he would need to successfully
complete course work in the Computer Science Department. Mangla
claims to have satisfactorily completed seven of the eight
courses required for a Master's degree.
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After completing such course work, Mangla inquired of
Dean Lusk about his probationary status, and she instructed him
to obtain a faculty advisor for his Master's Project. In
response, Mangla obtained a letter signed by Professor Stanley
Zdonik, stating that Mangla "will be working under my supervision
for his Master's project." Mangla claims that at the time he
believed the letter served as a letter of recommendation for
admission into the degree program.
In September 1995, Brown informed Mangla that his
special student status was discontinued and that he had not been
admitted into the Master's program. Mangla thereafter filed a
new, formal application for admission into the Master's program.
The Computer Science Department faculty reviewed the new
application and voted to recommend that Mangla's application be
denied. Mangla then appealed to the Graduate Council which voted
unanimously to uphold the department's decision.
Mangla brought this action for breach of contract and
promissory estoppel for Brown's refusal to admit him into its
Master's program. The action was tried before a jury, but at the
close of evidence, the judge granted judgment as a matter of law
to Brown and dictated detailed findings into the record. The
district court first decided that there was no breach of contract
because Mangla knew that one of the things he had to do in
performing his side of the contract was to obtain a favorable
recommendation from the Computer Science Department faculty and
there was no evidence that any such recommendation was obtained.
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The court acknowledged Mangla's testimony that Dean Lusk told him
he would absolutely be admitted if he passed his courses or if he
got a faculty member to act as his advisor. The court stated,
however, that the key testimony was Mangla's admissions that
notwithstanding anything that Dean Lusk may have told him, he
knew that a recommendation from the faculty was a requirement for
his admission into the Master's Program.
The court further found that there was no promissory
estoppel because there was no reasonable reliance on any of the
alleged representations. There was explicit language in the
Graduate School manual that even the department does not have the
power to offer admission and that offers of admission have
binding force only when made by the Graduate School in writing.
The court stated that Mangla's argument that he was entitled to
the written offer of admission is nothing more than a
circumvention of the explicit requirement set forth in the
Graduate School manual. Further, the district court stated that
it was quite a stretch to interpret Professor Zdonik's letter as
amounting to a recommendation by the Department that Mangla be
accepted. Even viewing the letter in the light most favorable to
Mangla, the district court determined that it defied logic and
reason to read the letter as a recommendation from the Computer
Science Department. Thus, the district court held that there was
no issue for the jury to decide, and judgment as a matter of law
was granted.
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I.
I.
In ruling on a motion for judgment as a matter of law,
the district court must examine the evidence, and inferences to
be drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the non-
movant. See Rol n-Alvarado v. Municipality of San Juan, 1 F.3d
74, 76 (1st Cir. 1993). Judgment as a matter of law may then be
granted "only if the evidence, viewed from this perspective, is
such that reasonable minds could not differ as to the outcome."
Id. at 77.
When a judgment as a matter of law is appealed to this
court, we must apply precisely the same criteria that constrain
the district court. See Gibson v. City of Cranston, 37 F.3d 731,
735 (1st Cir. 1994). Accordingly, we review the grant of
judgment as a matter of law under a de novo standard. See
Jordan-Milton Mach., Inc. v. F/V Teresa Marie, II, 978 F.2d 32,
34 (1st Cir. 1992).
II.
II.
Mangla argues that judgment as a matter of law was
inappropriate because a reasonable jury could find that Brown
University breached a contract with Mangla by refusing to confer
regular degree status upon him.
The district court, in this diversity case, was
required to apply the substantive law of Rhode Island. However,
after careful research, we have discovered no case in which the
Rhode Island courts have addressed the contractual relationship
between a private academic institution and its students. We
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therefore resolve Mangla's breach of contract claim according to
those legal principles which we believe the Rhode Island courts
would most likely adopt. See Lyons v. Salve Regina College, 565
F.2d 200, 202 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 971 (1978).
The student-college relationship is essentially
contractual in nature. See Russell v. Salve Regina College, 938
F.2d 315, 316 (1st Cir. 1991). The terms of the contract may
include statements provided in student manuals and registration
materials. See Lyons, 565 F.2d at 202 (construing College Manual
and Academic Information booklet as terms of a contract between a
student and college). The proper standard for interpreting the
contractual terms is that of "reasonable expectation -- what
meaning the party making the manifestation, the university,
should reasonably expect the other party to give it." Id.
(quoting Giles v. Howard University, 428 F. Supp. 603, 605
(D.D.C. 1977)).
Mangla maintains that he reasonably expected that if he
satisfactorily performed his course work and obtained a sponsor
for his master's project he would be admitted as a master's
degree candidate in the Computer Science Department. Mangla
bases his claim on the alleged statements of Associate Dean Lusk
and members of the Computer Science Department faculty. However,
Brown University's graduate school catalog specifically provided:
Caveat. Applicants are asked to take
particular notice of the fact that the
individual academic departments, while
having a major role in evaluating the
applications of all candidates, do not
have the power to offer admission, and
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that offers of admission have binding
force only when made by the Graduate
School in writing over the signature of
the Dean of the Graduate School or her
representative.
By its terms, this provision divested faculty members
of any authority to promise admission or to determine the
necessary prerequisites for admission. Because the provision was
included in the graduate school catalog, Brown could reasonably
expect students to be aware of the policy. Thus, it was
reasonable for Brown to expect its students not to rely on oral
statements by individual faculty members as binding promises by
the university.
Likewise, the statements of Associate Dean Lusk did not
give Mangla a right to be admitted. As an apparent
representative of the Dean of the Graduate School, Lusk arguably
had the authority to offer admission. The caveat, however,
restricted the acceptable form of such an offer to a signed
writing. Mangla concedes that no such writing exists in this
case. Therefore, the language of the graduate school catalog
seriously compromises Mangla's claim that Lusk's statements gave
him a contractual right to be offered admission.
As Mangla correctly asserts, the graduate school
catalog is not a wholly integrated contract but instead is only
one part of a more complex contractual relationship between the
student and the college. We do not foreclose the possibility
that, under certain circumstances, the university could obligate
itself through the actions and oral statements of its officials,
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despite the language of the caveat provision. A reasonable jury,
however, could not find that such circumstances exist in this
case.
Particularly fatal to Mangla's contract claim in this
case was his failure to secure a recommendation from the
department faculty. Mangla admitted at trial that he understood
that a faculty recommendation was a prerequisite to his admission
as a regular degree candidate. Mangla maintains that this
requirement was reasonably met by a letter signed by Professor
Zdonik, a member of the Computer Science department faculty. The
Zdonik letter does not, however, recommend that Mangla be
admitted. Rather, the letter, addressed "To whomever it may
concern," identifies Mangla as a graduate student working under
Zdonik's supervision "for his Master's project" and requests that
Mangla be provided with help and the use of resources for his
research while living in Princeton, New Jersey. Mangla does not
claim to have informed Zdonik of his intent to use the letter as
a letter of recommendation. Indeed, Mangla does not even contend
the letter was a faculty recommendation, but instead contends
that he reasonably believed it was the "equivalent of a
recommendation." No reasonable jury could find that the letter
signed by Zdonik reasonably fulfilled the prerequisite of a
faculty recommendation. As a result, no reasonable jury could
conclude that Brown should have reasonably expected Mangla to
believe that the university was contractually obligated to admit
him.
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III.
III.
Mangla argues that a jury could reasonably find that
Brown acted arbitrarily or in bad faith in refusing to admit
Mangla as a regular degree candidate. Brown responds that
Mangla's claim of arbitrariness must fail because the
university's decision did not substantially depart from
established academic norms.
Under Rhode Island law, contracts contain an implied
duty of good faith and fair dealing. See A.A.A. Pool Service &
Supply, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 395 A.2d 724, 725
(R.I. 1978). Because the parties do not contend otherwise, we
assume for the purposes of argument that Brown's duty of good
faith extended to its review of Mangla's application for
admission as a degree candidate. We thus turn our focus to the
question of whether Brown met that duty.
The decision to grant or deny admission to a student is
a quintessential matter of academic judgment. Courts have long
recognized that matters of academic judgment are generally better
left to the educational institutions than to the judiciary and
have accorded great deference where such matters are at issue.
As the Supreme Court stated in Regents of University of Michigan
v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985), "Plainly, [judges] may not
override [the faculty's professional judgment] unless it is such
a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to
demonstrate that the person or committee responsible did not
actually exercise professional judgment."
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Applying the standard of deference enunciated in Ewing,
we conclude that no reasonable jury could find that Brown acted
arbitrarily or in bad faith in refusing to admit Mangla as a
regular degree candidate. The Computer Science Department
recommended against Mangla's admission on the ground that Mangla
did not demonstrate an ability to undertake the research or
independent work required for a Master's thesis or project. The
department's position was based in part on negative assessments
of Mangla's research capabilities provided by professors who had
supervised Mangla's previous attempts at a research project.
Mangla argues the department's decision was arbitrary
and in bad faith because he was never informed that he would be
judged on his ability to do independent research. Mangla,
however, was aware that a Master's thesis or project was a
necessary component of the Master's program. We believe it is
self-evident that a committee evaluating an application for
admission into a Master's program would be concerned with the
applicant's prospects of successfully completing the degree
requirements.
The evidence establishes that Brown judged Mangla
according to legitimate criteria and had a sufficient basis for
believing that Mangla did not meet those criteria. Consequently,
no reasonable jury could infer that Brown acted arbitrarily or in
bad faith when it decided not to admit Mangla as a degree
candidate.
IV.
IV.
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Finally, Mangla argues that a reasonable jury could
have found Brown liable on a promissory estoppel theory. We
reject his argument.
Under Rhode Island law, "A promise which the promisor
should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the
part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such
action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only
by enforcement of the promise." B.M.L. Corp. v. Greater
Providence Deposit Corp., et al., 495 A.2d 675, 677 (R.I. 1985)
(quoting 1 Restatement (Second) Contracts 90 at 242 (1981)).
Thus, the proper focus of our inquiry is again on the reasonable
expectations of the party making the manifestation.
As we have previously discussed, Brown should not have
reasonably expected Mangla to rely on the oral statements of Dean
Lusk or the individual faculty members as binding promises of
admission. Therefore, we uphold the district court's ruling that
no reasonable jury could find that Brown was estopped from
denying Mangla admission as a Master's degree candidate.
We affirm the judgment as a matter of law in favor of
Brown University.
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