UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 97-1496
ARNALDO ORTIZ-CAMERON AND ERIC A. ORTIZ-CAMERON,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
JOSE A. LOPEZ-CACERES,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant - Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Hctor M. Laffitte, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Chief Judge,
Cyr, Senior Circuit Judge,
Lynch, Circuit Judge.
Frank D. Inserni for appellants.
Miguel A. Fernndez, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom
Guillermo Gil, United States Attorney, and Jacqueline D. Novas,
Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief for appellee Drug
Enforcement Administration.
March 16, 1998
TORRUELLA, Chief Judge. Brothers Arnaldo Ortiz-Cameron
("Arnaldo") and Eric Ortiz-Cameron ("Eric") challenge the
district court's order dismissing their complaint against the
Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA") which claimed an interest
in various properties seized in prior civil forfeiture
proceedings. We find that the doctrine of res judicata bars the
brothers' action. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's
decision.
I. BACKGROUND Appellants Arnaldo and Eric are brothers of Luis Hiram
Ortiz-Cameron ("Luis"), a convicted drug smuggler who purchased
several dairy farms as well as animals and farming equipment with
profits from the illegal drug trade. On November 3, 1989, and
November 9, 1989, the government filed two separate in rem civil
forfeiture proceedings against this property. In the first civil
forfeiture action, United States Marshals personally served Arnaldo
with the pleadings on November 4, 1989. On that date, Eric also
was served through his brother Arnaldo. In response, on
December 11, 1989, the brothers filed claims requesting protection
of their alleged interests in the defendant properties, and on
December 27, 1989, they filed an answer to the government's
complaint. However, the district court judge, Jaime Pieras, Jr.,
dismissed their claims because they failed to file their claims
within the 10-day claim period and their answer within the 20-day
answer period established in Rule C(6) of the Supplemental Rules
for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims ("Rule C(6)"). On
appeal, this court affirmed that decision. See United States v.
One Dairy Farm, 918 F.2d 310 (1st Cir. 1990).
In the second civil forfeiture proceeding, U.S. Marshals
served Arnaldo and Eric with the pleadings on November 14, 1989, a
few days after the filing of the action. Arnaldo failed to respond
within the statutory limits, filing his claim on December 11, 1989,
and his answer on December 27, 1989. Eric never filed either a
claim or an answer. Consequently, the district court judge before
whom this second action was filed, Chief Judge Carmen C. Cerezo,
again dismissed their claims, finding that the brothers lacked
standing to challenge the forfeiture of the properties. Despite
these judgments against them, Arnaldo and Eric continued to pursue
their interest in the properties by filing the instant action. On
the DEA's motion for summary judgment, the district court dismissed
their complaint. See Ortiz Cameron v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 959
F. Supp. 92 (D.P.R. 1997). The brothers appeal.
II. DISCUSSION We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. SeeUnited Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Penuche's, Inc., 128 F.3d 28, 30 (1st Cir.
1997). The government asserts that the doctrine of res judicata
bars the present action. The res judicata doctrine entails two
different concepts--claim preclusion and issue preclusion. In
entering summary judgment, the district court relied on claim
preclusion principles. A claim is precluded if three requirements
are met: (1) a final judgment on the merits in an earlier action;
(2) a sufficient identity between the parties in the two suits; and
(3) a sufficient identity of the causes of action in the two suits.
See Porn v. National Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 93 F.3d 31, 34 (1st Cir.
1996). According to the government, final judgment in the prior
civil forfeiture proceedings precludes Arnaldo and Eric from
relitigating claims that were raised or could have been raised in
those proceedings. Since the brothers could have raised in their
One Dairy Farm appeal the same issues they assert here, i.e., the
inadequacy of post-seizure notice and the lack of pre-seizure
notice, the government contends that all of Arnaldo and Eric's
instant claims are precluded.
Appellants do not dispute the presence of the second and
third elements of claim preclusion in this case. However, they
argue that in the prior proceedings they did not have a full and
fair opportunity to have their claims adjudicated on the merits.
In the first civil forfeiture action, Judge Pieras determined that
the brothers lacked standing to pursue their claims because they
failed to comply with the statutory deadlines. This court affirmed
that decision. We thus take it as established as to the first
property seized that Arnaldo and Eric had actual notice of the
seizure, see One Dairy Farm, 918 F.2d at 311, and an opportunity to
litigate their present claims. The same is also true as to the
second seizure. In the second civil forfeiture proceeding, Judge
Cerezo also decided that appellants lacked standing since Arnaldo
filed a late claim and Eric never responded to the government's
complaint. Judge Cerezo also ruled that, even if Arnaldo had filed
a timely claim, his status as an unsecured creditor of Luis
precluded him from recovering under the civil forfeiture statute.
Neither Arnaldo nor Eric appealed Judge Cerezo's ruling to this
court.
Under these circumstances, we find the judgments in the
two prior civil forfeiture proceedings to be "on the merits." As
this court noted in Kale v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 924 F.2d 1161
(1st Cir. 1991), "the dismissal of a claim as time-barred [by the
statute of limitations] constitutes a judgment on the merits,
entitled to preclusive effect." Id. at 1164 (citing Rose v. Town
of Harwich, 778 F.2d 77, 80 (1st Cir. 1985)).
We agree with the district court that the dismissal of
the brothers' claims is analogous to a dismissal on statute of
limitation grounds. The purpose behind Rule C(6) is "to require
claimants to come forward as quickly as possible after the
initiation of forfeiture proceedings, so that the court may hear
all interested parties and resolve the dispute without delay." SeeUnited States v. Various Computers and Computer Equip., 82 F.3d
582, 585 (3d Cir. 1996). If a putative claimant who has received
proper notice fails to file within Rule C(6)'s time limits, he or
she may not bring a future claim for the properties at issue. Cf.United States v. Real Property Located in Fresno County, F.3d
, , 1998 WL 47135, at *6 (9th Cir. Feb. 9, 1998) (Rule C(6)'s
purpose would be "ill-served if any person with an ownership
interest in a property . . . were empowered to challenge a
forfeiture judgment long after judgment had been entered.").
Finding that the 10-day claim period and 20-day answer period
established by Rule C(6) are analogous to a statute of limitations,
we hold that Arnaldo and Eric's claims are precluded by the
doctrine of res judicata.
Arnaldo and Eric also argue that the district court erred
in failing to extend the discovery deadline established in its
initial scheduling order. They allege that the additional time to
conduct discovery would have uncovered evidence that the DEA seized
their property without proper notice as well as recklessly
intermingling their properties. However, as the district court
observed, a finding of res judicata "save[s] the parties the time
and expense of conducting unnecessary discovery." See 959 F. Supp.
at 96. Having decided the res judicata issue in the government's
favor, we need not address whether the district court erred in
denying appellants' request for additional discovery time.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the district court's opinion
and order is affirmed.
Costs to be assessed against appellants.