United States v. Thompson

         United States Court of Appeals
                    For the First Circuit


No. 00-1086

                  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                          Appellant,

                              v.

              JOHN LARKIN THOMPSON, a/k/a MOMO,

                     Defendant, Appellee.


                 CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT BOARD,

                         Intervenor.


      NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS,

                         Intervenor.


          [Hon. Nancy Gertner, U.S. District Judge]

         APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

              FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS


                            Before

                    Torruella, Chief Judge,

                Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,

                  and Boudin, Circuit Judge.
     Adam J. Bookbinder, Assistant United States Attorney, with
whom, Donald K. Stern, United States Attorney, was on brief for
appellant.

     Joan M. Griffin, with whom Casner & Edwards, LLP, was on
brief for appellee.

     Charles W. Rankin, Michelle Menken, and Rankin & Sultan on
brief for Criminal Justice Act Board and Lisa B. Kemler on brief
for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, amici
curiae.




                       December 8, 2000




                              -2-
            BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge.      Determining that the

defendant    exhibited   an   extraordinary   family   situation   and

employment history, the district court (Gertner, J.) departed

downward from the guideline sentencing range (GSR) of 87 to 108

months of incarceration and sentenced the defendant to the

mandatory minimum of 60 months in prison, followed by 48 months

of supervised release.    Finding that the district court erred as

a matter of law when sentencing the defendant, we vacate the

defendant's sentence and remand for resentencing in accordance

with this opinion.

                                  I.

            We recount the facts as stipulated in the Pre-Sentence

Report (PSR):    At the time of his arrest, the defendant-appellee

John Thompson was a 24-year-old African-American male.        He had

one prior conviction and was never incarcerated.1       He lived his


    1     The defendant pled guilty to sufficient facts for the
assault and battery of his fiancée Breii Murray. In the PSR, it
is noted that Ms. Murray advised that she started the fight and
did not want to press charges. The defendant was released on
probation and, according to Ms. Murray, this was the only time
Thompson hit her. The record supports the conclusion that this
was a unique occurrence.

          In September of 1998, the police stopped the
defendant's car and found in his mouth two plastic bags of crack
cocaine. His older daughter was with him in the car. He was
not arrested but summoned to court. Thompson denied any drug
involvement and the case was, ultimately, filed without a change
of plea.


                                  -3-
entire   life        in    the       Bromley    Heath       Housing      Development        in

Massachusetts.            He described his childhood as “rough”; the

majority        of   it        was    spent     without      his     father,      who      was

incarcerated much of the time.                       Thompson dropped out of high

school     in    the      eleventh          grade    when    he     learned       that     his

girlfriend, Breii Murray, was pregnant with their first child.

Ms. Murray and the defendant have been in a steady relationship

for seven years and are engaged to be married.                             They have two

daughters       together.             Ms.   Murray    received       a    Certificate       in

Business Administration from the Roxbury Community College but

does   not      work      so    that    she    can    spend       more    time    with    her

daughters.

             The PSR indicates that Thompson is a good father who

spends   much        time       with    his    daughters       and       enjoys    a     solid

relationship with both of them, particularly Jabria, his older

daughter.        He supports his fiancée, their children, and his

fiancée's       family         both    economically         and    emotionally.            Ms.

Murray's mother, Jessica Gonzalez, is very supportive of the

defendant and considers him to be like a son.                              Likewise, Ms.



          His criminal record also included the following:
possession with intent to distribute class D and class B
controlled substances, both charges were ultimately dismissed;
an arrest for drinking alcohol in a public way,      which was
dismissed; and possession with intent to distribute a class B
substance, which was filed without a change of plea.

                                               -4-
Murray's aunt, Ethel Ejiofor, and her grandmother, Ms. DuBois,

are supportive of the defendant.     In fact, the defendant resided

with them while he was out on bail.    They describe the defendant

as a wonderful person who has made substantial contributions to

the upkeep of their home by running errands and doing chores,

and financial contributions of $100 per week.        They consider

Thompson to be a member of their immediate family.      All of the

women stressed that the defendant is a good man and a wonderful

father, and indicated that the defendant's incarceration would

detrimentally impact their lives and specifically the lives of

his daughters.   Letters were submitted to the court from Ms.

Gonzalez and Ms. Murray that support the PSR's appraisal of

Thompson's family life.

         The PSR also indicates that the defendant was employed

almost consistently from the time he left high school because of

his fiancée's pregnancy.   Thompson obtained many jobs through a

local union, of which he became a member.       At the time of his

arrest, he was employed by M. Solberg Enterprises Corp. and

earned about $2,000 per month setting planks, drilling cords and

cutting concrete.   His employer provided the district court with

a letter in support of his bail and indicated that he was wanted

back at his job and would be welcomed.

                               II.


                               -5-
            A    federal      grand    jury   indicted    the    defendant   on

narcotics violations stemming from an investigation of crack

cocaine trafficking at the Bromley Heath Housing Development.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the defendant pled guilty to one

count of distributing cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(a)(1).

            The district court held a sentencing hearing on August

4, 1999, and August 11, 1999.            The defendant had a base offense

level of 32 pursuant to the United States Sentencing Guideline

(U.S.S.G.) § 2D1.1(c)(4) (1998).2             The defendant's offense level

was   reduced      three      levels    because    of    his    acceptance   of

responsibility and timely plea, pursuant to U.S.S.G §§ 3E1.1(a)

& (b), and he rated a criminal history category of I, pursuant

to U.S.S.G. Chapter 5, Part A.            The defendant, therefore, fell

within the guideline range of 87 to 108 months in prison.                    The

defendant       moved   for   a   downward    departure    to   the   mandatory




      2   Section 2D1.1(c)(4) of the U.S.S.G. provides a base
offense level of 32 if the offense conviction involved at least
50 grams but less than 150 grams of cocaine base. The district
court noted that: “Although Thompson pleaded to one count of
distribution involving 23.6 grams of cocaine base, U.S.S.G. §
1B1.3(a)(2) provides that a defendant can be held accountable
for all acts that 'were part of the same course of conduct or
common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction.' Therefore,
in calculating Thompson's base offense level, the government
used the aggregate of four sales made to undercover agents for
a total of 51.8 grams.”

                                        -6-
minimum of 60 months in prison based on his extraordinary family

obligations and employment history.

          At the first sentencing hearing, the district court

noted   that   “extraordinary     family   obligations”     is    a    “very

difficult category to meet.”       She continued:      “I'm not going to

rule at this moment, but from what I've seen, I don't think that

this comes close . . . .”    Then the district court continued the

sentencing hearing until August 11th and invited the defendant

to present more information on his family and employment.

          At the second hearing, the district court heard from

the   defendant   himself   and   accepted   letters    written       on   his

behalf.   After hearing argument from both sides, the district

judge found that the defendant exhibited extraordinary family

ties and responsibilities and employment history, and departed

downward to the statutory minimum sentence of 60 months.                   The

district court stated, in pertinent part:

                 The guidelines permit me to depart for
          extraordinary family obligations.     And the
          last time I looked at this case from one set
          of eyes and thought that these were really
          not – this didn't rise to the level of
          extraordinary. Since last week, I have done
          more work and reconsidered that.

                 As I said before, the question of what
          is ordinary is nowhere defined. There's no
          – the Sentencing Commission doesn't tell us
          this is the ordinary situation. We are all
          guessing at what's ordinary.      And in the
          course of making those guesses, we feed in

                                  -7-
         our stereotypes, our biases, cultural,
         racial, gender, etc.    And I want to feed
         them out of it.    I want to see if I can
         distill them out of this picture, my biases.

                Where I grew up, families were intact
         and the kinds of things that you're
         describing were not unusual. The kinds of
         relationships that you're describing were
         not unusual.

                In other settings in this country, the
         kinds of things that you're describing are
         unusual. And, in my experience as a judge
         and before that as a lawyer, it was not
         usual to find the kinds of profiles that you
         present, Mr. Thompson, of someone with
         intact employment, going out of his way to
         do the things for his children under the
         circumstances that you have.

                           * * * *

                It seems to me that by any fair
         definition of extraordinary – that's not, by
         the way, as I said, the way I was raised,
         it's not the way others in this courtroom
         were raised.       But certainly, in the
         communities   that    I  have   seen,   your
         relationship to your children, your older
         daughter, is extraordinary.

                           * * * *

                So I will – and I will write this up
         – I will depart to take into account your
         extraordinary       family     obligations,
         commitments to work, and what I believe to
         be an extraordinary rehabilitation,3 as well.



    3     This   was    the last  mention  of   “extraordinary
rehabilitation.”     The district court departed on the sole
grounds of extraordinary family obligations and employment
history and that is all we discuss today.

                             -8-
                            * * * *

                I will depart, based on my findings of
         extraordinary        family      ties     and
         responsibilities – and I will write this up
         – under 5H1.6, I will depart also based upon
         your   employment   record,   5H1.5.     And,
         likewise, I will depart because of your
         extraordinary family obligations.      And I
         will depart to a level 25.         You're at
         Criminal History 1. And I will sentence you
         to 60 months.

Neither party objected to the sentencing.   Three months later,

the court issued its sentencing memorandum and judgment.   In it,

the court grappled with the question of how to determine if the

defendant demonstrated an “extraordinary” family circumstance or

employment history.   It stated in pertinent part:

         What is the standard by which to judge
         “extraordinary” family obligations or an
         “extraordinary” work history? What class of
         defendants define “ordinary”?     While the
         Sentencing Commission and the case law offer
         little guidance on the subject, one thing is
         clear: The baseline is not, nor should it
         be, “Ozzie and Harriet,” the fictional two
         parent, two child, suburban home.      In a
         sentencing regime whose aim is to eliminate
         unwarranted disparities between similarly
         situated offenders, “ordinary” should be
         determined by comparing this defendant with
         others convicted of the same crime.

                Here, I compared the defendant, who
         was convicted of crack cocaine sales, with
         others convicted of the same offense in my
         court, and indeed, throughout the District
         of Massachusetts.   I reviewed not only my
         own records of previous sentences, but also
         presentence reports of individuals sentenced
         by other judges within the District.

                              -9-
                               * * * *

           First, I have drawn on my own experience as
           a judge. In addition, I have reviewed the
           presentence reports for offenders similarly
           situated to Thompson with respect to place
           (the Bromley Heath projects), time (1998),
           and offense (sale of crack cocaine), and
           more generally, I have reviewed the PSR's
           [sic] of those convicted of crack cocaine
           sales in this jurisdiction in 1998 and 1999.

(Emphasis added).      This may seem to make sense, but it is

contrary to the law of this circuit.

           In United States v. DeMasi, 40 F.3d 1306, 1324 (1st

Cir. 1994), we held that when a district court contemplates a

downward   departure   based   on    a   discouraged   factor,4   it   must

compare the defendant to others who exhibit that factor, not to

others who have been convicted of the same offense.               We held

that the district court erred in sentencing the defendant, “by

restricting the scope of its comparison to only bank robbery

cases.”    Id. at 1324.    We continued: “A court should survey

those cases where the discouraged factor is present               without


    4     “Discouraged factors” are defined as factors “not
ordinarily relevant to the determination of whether a sentence
should be outside the applicable guideline range. . . .
[A]lthough these factors are not ordinarily relevant to the
determination of whether a sentence should be outside the
applicable guideline range, they may be relevant to this
determination in exceptional cases.” 1998 U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt.
H, intro. cmt; see also United States v. Koon, 518 U.S. 81, 95
(1996). Family ties and responsibilities and employment record
are discouraged factors.   See U.S.S.G. §§ 5H1.6 (family) and
5H1.5 (employment).

                                    -10-
limiting its inquiry to cases involving the same offense, and

only then ask whether the defendant's record stands out from the

crowd.”   Id. (emphasis added).

          Here, the district court did what DeMasi forbids: it

limited its inquiry to cases involving crack cocaine dealers and

then asked whether Thompson's record stood apart from the rest.

Thus, the district court erred as a matter of law.5

                                  III.

          For the reason stated above, we vacate the defendant's

sentence and remand for resentencing.         The court may sentence

the   defendant   within   the   applicable   GSR   or   the   court   may

sentence the defendant by comparing him to others with family

responsibilities and significant employment histories, or a

combination of the two, regardless of the offense of which they

have been convicted.       If it does so, it should provide the

parties with all material not already included in the record

that it intends to consider in determining the sentence and

allow the parties time to object or comment before any sentence

is imposed.   We can defer to another day deciding whether and




      5   We have considered whether Koon has overruled DeMasi,
as urged by the appellant and amicus, and are not persuaded by
the suggestion. Whether DeMasi should be modified in light of
subsequent developments, including case law in other circuits,
is a matter not for the panel but for an en banc petition.

                                  -11-
when the district court may in sentencing appropriately rely on

material that is not made available to both sides.



Vacated and remanded with instructions.




                             -12-