United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 99-1465
UNITED STATES,
Appellee,
v.
RICARDO PADRÓ BURGOS, A/K/A RICKY PADRO,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Salvador E. Casellas, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya, Circuit Judge,
Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Lipez, Circuit Judge.
Ignacio Fernández-de Lahongrais for appellant.
Jacabed Rodríguez-Coss, Assistant United States Attorney,
with whom Guillermo Gil, United States Attorney, was on brief
for appellee.
February 6, 2001
BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge. Defendant-appellant
Ricardo Padro Burgos was found guilty by a jury of being part of
a conspiracy to distribute in excess of five kilograms of
cocaine, in excess of five kilograms of cocaine base, and in
excess of one hundred kilograms of marijuana in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 846 (count II). He was also found guilty of violating
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) by using firearms during and in relation
to drug trafficking, and of aiding and abetting the commission
of both offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 2 (count III).
Defendant raises three issues on appeal: (1) the
improper admission of “unfairly prejudicial” statements
purportedly made by coconspirators;” (2) sentencing errors; and
(3) the district court's lack of jurisdiction to hear the case.1
I.
Defendant Padro Burgos was a member of a gang whose
main business was selling cocaine, heroin, and marijuana. Padro
1
The third issue involves the constitutionality of the
appointment of an interim United States Attorney in Puerto Rico.
We recently addressed that issue and upheld the appointment.
United States v. Hilario, 218 F.3d 19 (1st Cir. 2000).
Therefore, this issue will not be discussed further.
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Burgos and eight others were tried together, and all were found
guilty as charged. We consolidated the appeals. Seven of the
defendants, including Padro Burgos, argued orally on September
14, 2000.
The gang to which Padro Burgos belonged controlled two
drug points from which it sold its wares. One of the drug
points was located in a public housing project in San Juan,
Puerto Rico. Another drug point, which mainly sold heroin, was
located within the Hogar Crea detention and drug rehabilitation
facility in Saint Just at Trujillo Alto, Puerto Rico. Padro
Burgos was in charge of the drug point at the Hogar Crea
facility and most of his drug-related activity took place there.
II.
We state the issues as phrased by the defendant.
1. Was appellant Padro deprived of a fair trial
by the allowance of unfairly prejudicial
statements purportedly made by
coconspirators, despite the fact that no
independent evidence, other than the
statements themselves, showed by a
preponderance of the evidence that a
conspiracy existed between the declarant and
the defendant?
A salient exception to the hearsay rule, Fed. R. Evid.
801(c), is that “a statement by a coconspirator of a party
during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy” is not
hearsay. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). In United States v.
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Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161 (1st Cir. 1993), we explained how the
exception works:
To invoke the exception, a party who wants
to introduce a particular statement must
show by a preponderance of the evidence that
a conspiracy embracing both the declarant
and the defendant existed, and that the
declarant uttered the statement during and
in furtherance of the conspiracy. The party
at whom the evidence is aimed must object to
the statement when it is offered; and, if
the district court accepts the evidence de
bene, must then ask the court at the close
of all the relevant evidence to strike the
statement, i.e., to consider whether the
proponent fulfilled the requisite
foundational requirements by a preponderance
of the evidence.
Id. at 1180 (internal citations omitted).
The last sentence of Rule 801(d)(2)(E) states in
pertinent part:
The contents of the statement shall be
considered but are not alone sufficient to
establish . . . the existence of the
conspiracy and the participation therein of
the declarant and the party against whom the
statement is offered under subdivision (E).
See also Sepulveda, 15 F.3d at 1182 ("In other words, to satisfy
the weight-of-the-evidence criteria for that hearsay exception,
there must be some proof aliunde.”). In Sepulveda, we concluded
it was error to admit hearsay statements by two declarants
because “the government developed no independent evidence” of
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what the “status” of the declarants “might have been vis-a-vis
the charged conspiracy.” Id.
We now turn to the case before us. After the
government’s chief witness, William Acevedo Rodriguez, testified
at length about the scope and activities of his coconspirators
and identified the defendant as a member of the conspiracy, the
trial judge ruled:
With the evidence that the court has heard
already, we find, for purposes of this
ruling under 104 and subject to a final
ruling at the end of all of the evidence,
that the government has proven there was a
conspiracy in existence as stated in the
indictment. That the declarant was a member
of this conspiracy. That the defendants
against whom the statements are offered were
members of the conspiracy. These statements
were made in furtherance of that conspiracy.
The statement was made during the course of
this conspiracy.
No objection was made by Padro Burgos or any other defendant;
hence we review the ruling for plain error. See Sepulveda, 15
F.3d at 1180.
There can be no doubt that the testimony of the
principal witness for the government, Acevedo, fell squarely
within the hearsay exception set forth in Fed. R. Evid.
801(a)(2)(E). He identified each of the defendants, including
Padro Burgos, and described in detail their activities as part
of the conspiracy. Acevedo described Padro Burgos’s role in the
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conspiracy as being in charge of the drug point at the Hogar
Crea facility. Acevedo also identified Padro Burgos as being
part of a group that executed two members of a rival gang that
had temporarily wrested control of the Hogar Crea drug point
from the members of the conspiracy. The district court did not
commit error, plain or otherwise, in admitting Acevedo’s
testimony under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule.
We next turn to the second step in our analysis:
whether there was sufficient independent non-hearsay evidence to
support Acevedo's testimony. As we noted in United States v.
Portela, 167 F.3d 687, 703 (1st Cir. 1999), the extent of such
corroborating evidence is an open question because in Sepulveda,
15 F.3d at 1181-82, there was no corroborating evidence at all.
And as in Portela, 167 F.3d at 703, we find there is sufficient
independent non-hearsay testimony to make it unnecessary to
determine precisely how much corroborating evidence is needed to
meet the requirements of Sepulveda.
The independent non-hearsay evidence came from Ramon
Santiago Cascanzo, who testified as follows: Santiago was an
inmate at the Hogar Crea facility in May of 1994. He had been
transferred there from the jail at Guyamo where he had been
incarcerated for murder, which he claimed was committed in self-
defense. Santiago identified Padro Burgos and testified that he
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was the leader of the inmates at the Hogar Crea facility. As
the leader, Padro Burgos selected the disciplinary committee,
which disciplined inmates who had broken any of the rules set by
the inmate committee governing behavior at the Hogar Crea
facility. One of the rules prohibited the possession of
weapons.
Santiago testified that at 7:30 on the morning of May
16, 1994, “a few of the guys met” and they “ousted Acevedo" (the
government witness, a/k/a Pito Metra) from the Hogar Crea drug
point. Santiago and his three friends, Angel, Reynaldo, and
Melvin, were present when the ousting took place.
Later in the morning, Padro Burgos came looking for
Santiago and his three friends, because the day before some
money had been stolen by Acevedo and Javier Franky Ortiz (a co-
defendant). Stealing money was prohibited under the rules set
by the disciplinary committee.
At the insistence of Padro Burgos and two other
identified members of the conspiracy, Santiago and his three
friends went to a hut on the grounds of or near the Hogar Crea
facility. At the hut, Padro Burgos asked Santiago and his three
friends whether they had weapons. Although Santiago did have a
handgun, which he had obtained at the Guyamo jail, he denied
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having a weapon, as did each of his three friends.2 When
Reynaldo stood up and denied having a weapon, Carlos Peca, one
of the other members of the conspiracy, shot him in the face.
Santiago started running and was shot eight times. He fell
down, looked back and identified those shooting at him: Padro
Burgos, “El Vijeo, Carlos Javier, and the minor.” All of those
named are alleged to be members of the conspiracy. A diagram of
the hut area was entered into evidence. Santiago marked the
position of Padro Burgos and the other shooters on the diagram.
Santiago also testified that Padro Burgos sold heroin regularly
at the Hogar Crea facility and decided who else could sell drugs
there.
This independent non-hearsay corroborating testimony
was more than sufficient to meet the “aliunde” requirement of
the last sentence of Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). Hence, there
was no error in admitting Acevedo's testimony against Padro
Burgos.
2. Did the sentencing court err in assessing a
base offense level of 43 pursuant to an
offense involving 30 kilograms or more of
heroin and the killing of a victim under
circumstances that would constitute murder
under 18 U.S.C. § 1111?
2The gun was marked in evidence.
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On appeal, Padro Burgos challenges the district court's
imposition of a life sentence following his conviction. We
review the district court's application of a particular
sentencing guideline de novo, but review the factual findings
underlying that application for clear error. United States v.
Peterson, 233 F.3d 101, 111 (1st Cir. 2000).
At the inception of Padro Burgos's sentencing hearing,
the district court stated that the presentence report "is made
a part of the record of this case" and "shall form the finding
of fact of this court for purposes of this hearing." The court
then explained its application of the sentencing guidelines:
On July 15, 1998, the defendant Ricardo
Padro Burgos was found guilty by jury trial
of counts 2 and 3 of the indictment in this
case charging violations of Title 21 U.S.
Code section 846 and 18 U.S. Code section
[924(c)(1)]. That is a conspiracy to
distribute heroin and cocaine and use of a
firearm in relation to a crime of violence
and aiding and abetting. The guideline for
a 21 U.S. Code section 846 offense is found
at section 2D1.1 of the guidelines. That
section provides that offenses involving 30
kilos or more of heroin, 150 kilos or more
of cocaine, 1.5 kilos or more of cocaine
base and 100 kilos or more of marijuana have
a base offense level of 38. However, as
victims were killed under the circumstances
that would constitute murder under 18 U.S.
Code section 1111 and the killings took
place within the territorial jurisdiction of
the United States the provisions of Section
2D1.1(d)(1) require the application of
guideline section 2A1.1 dealing with first
degree murder. As such the appropriate
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offense level is 43. Guideline provisions
preclude application of guideline
adjustments to offenses under 18 U.S. Code
section 924(c)(1) as charged in Count 3.
[The] statute mandates the imposition of a
fixed consecutive imprisonment term in
accordance with section 2K2.4(a). Based on
a total offense level of 43 and a criminal
history category of 6, the guideline
imprisonment term in this particular case is
life with a fine range of $25,000 to four
million plus a supervised release term of
three to five years.
Accordingly, the court sentenced Padro Burgos to consecutive
terms of life imprisonment on Count 2, the conspiracy offense,
and five years on Count 3, the firearm offense. Padro Burgos
made no objection at the hearing, so we review his claim for
plain error. See United States v. Torres-Rosa, 209 F.3d 4, 8
(1st Cir. 2000).
Padro Burgos first argues that the district court erred
because it made no specific findings as to the quantity of drugs
for which he was responsible, but rather simply adopted the
presentence report findings, which were themselves devoid of
detail. The court based the offense level not on the quantity
of drugs, however, but on the fact that victims were killed,
bringing the sentence within the ambit of U.S.S.G. §
2D1.1(d)(1). That section provides: "If a victim was killed
under circumstances that would constitute murder under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1111 had such killing taken place within the territorial or
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maritime jurisdiction of the United States, apply § 2A1.1 (First
Degree Murder) [setting forth a base offense level of 43]."
Section 2D1.1(d)(1) does not involve consideration of the
quantity of drugs involved. Thus, any error in the district
court's failure to make particularized findings as to the drug
quantity is harmless.
Padro Burgos next takes issue with the application of
§ 2D1.1(d)(1), maintaining that his sentence was driven by the
murders, which were not separately charged, rather than the
charged offense of drug conspiracy. He attacks the lack of
"proportionality" between the sentence he "might have received"
based on drug quantity, § 2D1.1(a), and the life sentence he
received under § 2D1.1(d)(1). As this court discussed at length
in United States v. Lombard, 72 F.3d 170, 176 (1st Cir. 1995),
life sentence enhancements constituting "the tail which wags the
dog of the substantive offense" may raise serious due process
concerns. Id., quoting McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79,
88 (1986). There is no reversible error in this case, however.
As Padro Burgos acknowledges, his sentencing
enhancement under § 2D1.1(d)(1) needs only be based on facts
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proved by a preponderance of the evidence. 3 See id. at 176.
Significantly, Padro Burgos does not contest the district
court's finding that he was, in fact, responsible for murders
meeting the criteria of § 2D1.1(d)(1). His complaint that the
murders were not proven beyond a reasonable doubt thus is
without merit.4
Padro Burgos also suggests that the district court
erred in failing to give a downward departure to remedy the
"disproportion" between the quantity-based sentence he would
have received under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a) and the enhanced
sentence he received under § 2D1.1(d)(1). He argues that the
district court, like the court in Lombard, 72 F.3d at 172, was
unaware of its authority to award a downward departure under
U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0. This analogy is unavailing, however; there is
nothing in the sentencing hearing to indicate that the court
3
After initial briefing in this case, Padro Burgos sought to
supplement his brief to discuss United States v. Apprendi, 120
S. Ct. 2358 (2000), in which the Supreme Court held that certain
facts that increase penalties beyond the applicable statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. We denied that motion without prejudice to
his right to raise Apprendi by way of an application for
collateral relief in the event his direct appeal failed.
4
Nor does he provide any suggestions as to what sentence he
"might have received" under § 2D1.1(a) for purposes of
comparison. Although he states that "the controlled substances
for which [he] should be held accountable will undoubtably be
significantly lower than the original BOL of 38," he does not
offer argument as to what drug quantity would be accurate.
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believed it was unable to adjust the guideline sentence
downward.5 See id. at 172. Padro Burgos never requested such
a departure, and the court did not address the subject.
Furthermore, while the district court in Lombard was
"greatly troubled" by the enhancement of the defendant's firearm
offense based on a related murder, the district court in this
case showed no reluctance or ambivalence about imposing a life
sentence. To the contrary, it stated:
This court wants to send a clear message to
reflect the seriousness of the offense and
to promote respect for the law. The Court
finds that a sentence of life imprisonment
will serve both as a punitive factor against
this defendant and as a deterring factor to
those in our communities that lack respect
for life and for the laws that govern
society.
In sum, there is no reason to believe that the district court
was unaware of its ability to depart downward, or that it would
have preferred such a course.6
5
It is true that the district court stated, "Guideline
provisions preclude application of guideline adjustments to
offenses under 18 U.S. Code section 924(c)(1) as charged in
Count 3." To the extent that this statement indicates that the
court believed it did not have the discretion to adjust
downward, however, it pertains only to the firearm offense, not
to the drug conspiracy offense for which Padro Burgos received
a life sentence.
6Indeed, a life sentence was within the guideline range even
without the enhancement under § 2D1.1(d)(1). With a base
offense level of 38 (as initially calculated by the district
court based on drug quantity) and a criminal history category of
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The conviction and sentence are affirmed.
VI, the applicable sentencing range would have been 360 months
to life imprisonment.
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