Walsh v. United States

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit

No. 00-1472

WESLEY WALSH,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant, Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Frank H. Freedman, Senior District Judge]

Before

Selya, Circuit Judge,

Cyr, Senior Circuit Judge,

and Boudin, Circuit Judge.

William T. Walsh, Jr. for appellant.
Karen L. Goodwin, Assistant United States Attorney, with
whom Donald K. Stern, United States Attorney, was on brief for
appellee.
March 2, 2001
 CYR, Senior Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Wesley Walsh

challenges the summary judgment ruling which prompted the

district court to dismiss his Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”)

suit for compensatory damages associated with a “slip and fall”

on snow and ice outside the United States Post Office in East

Longmeadow, Massachusetts, on January 10, 1996, during the

waning hours of an extended snowstorm. Two days earlier, a

blizzard had blanketed the area with approximately two feet of

snow, which was followed by a further accumulation the next day

and windblown snow showers on the day of the accident.

The district court ruled that summary judgment was in

order under the controlling Massachusetts caselaw, see Sullivan

v. Town of Brookline, 416 Mass. 825, 827, 626 N.E.2d 870, 872

(1994), absent evidence that the snow and ice at the accident

site was anything other than a “natural accumulation.” We

affirm the judgment.

I

BACKGROUND

According to Walsh, it was snowing as he exited his car

to walk to the post office. The snow on the sidewalk leading to

the post office was “packed down,” “very, very uneven,” and

“discolored.“ Since the conditions appeared somewhat worse on

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the sidewalk, Walsh decided to walk to the post office through

the adjacent parking lot. He did so without incident.

Upon exiting the post office, however, Walsh chose to

return to the car by way of the sidewalk, largely because it

afforded a more direct route than the one he had taken earlier

through the parking lot. Moments later, at the point where a

handicap-access ramp meets the sidewalk and the sidewalk slopes

slightly to accommodate wheelchairs, Walsh suddenly slipped, his

“leg came right down underneath [him] and [he] went down full

force.” Walsh could recall no preexisting footprints in the snow

where he fell, nor had he noticed any difference between the

conditions at the accident site than elsewhere along the route

through the parking lot.

II

DISCUSSION

The FTCA subjects the United States to tort liability

“in the same manner and to the same extent as a private

individual under like circumstances . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 2674.

Well in advance of its reconfirmation by the Supreme Judicial

Court in 1994, see Sullivan, 416 Mass. 825, 626 N.E.2d 870, this

court had concluded that the “natural accumulation” doctrine

remained alive and well in Massachusetts. See Athas v. United

States, 904 F.2d 79, 82 (1st Cir. 1990) (failure of postal

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employees to remove water accumulation on post office steps,

during ongoing rainstorm, held insufficient to subject landowner

to liability under Massachusetts law) (citing Lowe v. National

Shawmut Bank of Boston, 363 Mass. 74, 77, 292 N.E.2d 683, 685

(1973); Wexler v. Stanetsky Mem’l Chapel of Brookline, Inc., 2

Mass. App. Ct. 750, 751, 321 N.E.2d 686, 687 (1975)). Nor do we

discern any material change in the “natural accumulation”

doctrine since Athas.

The district court, quoting Sullivan, 416 Mass. at 827,

626 N.E.2d at 872, ruled that “[h]ere, just as in Sullivan, ‘the

plaintiff’s evidence tend[ing] to show that the shovelling of the

[handicap access] ramp by the [post office] employees exposed ice

that was already there’ is insufficient to generate liability .

. . .” District Court Order, at 2 (quoting Sullivan, 416 Mass.

at 827-28, 626 N.E.2d at 872). The district court further

observed that, as in Sullivan, “there is ‘no evidence that the

employees’ shovelling altered the condition of the ice on the

[handicap access] ramp.’ Id. (no liability where ‘a property

owner removes a portion of an accumulation of snow or ice and a

person is injured by slipping and falling on the remainder

because the snow or ice remains as a natural accumulation’).”

Id.

III

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 CONCLUSION

As the district court correctly ruled that the United

States was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of

Massachusetts law, we affirm its judgment.

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