United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 01-1309
DANA RICHARDSON,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
OFFICER BRIAN MILLER, DETECTIVE STEVEN BLAIR,
BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT, AND CITY OF BOSTON,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya, Circuit Judge,
Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Lipez, Circuit Judge.
Andrew M. Fischer, with whom Jason & Fischer was on brief,
for appellant.
Eve A. Piemonte Stacey, with whom Merita A. Hopkins was on
brief, for appellees.
January 29. 2002
COFFIN, Senior Circuit Judge. Dana Richardson appeals the
district court's denial of attorney's fees in his civil rights
case against the City of Boston ("the City"). Finding no
manifest abuse of discretion, we affirm.
I. Background
On January 25, 2000, appellant was a passenger in a vehicle
driven by Angela Howell. A police officer stopped the vehicle
and requested a driver's license from Howell, who instead
produced a State of Michigan photo identification of "Donald
Beane." Appellant's picture was on Beane's identification. The
officer asked appellant to identify himself. The officer became
suspicious and requested further identification when appellant
told him he was Dana Richardson. In appellant's wallet were
credit cards and picture identifications, all in Beane's name.
Richardson also possessed some personal papers, including his
mother's death certificate and mortgage papers. The officer
seized all of the papers, credit cards and identifications.
Appellant repeatedly and unsuccessfully sought return of the
seized items and ultimately filed a lawsuit in state court
seeking to have the items returned and the government enjoined
from using the materials in any criminal investigation of him.
The City removed the case to federal court, and the district
court heard oral argument on appellant's motion for a
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restraining order. During the hearing, at the district court's
nudging, the parties agreed that the City would return some of
the seized materials to appellant. Because of the continuing
investigation, however, most of the returned materials were to
be photocopies rather than originals. The district court then
denied as moot appellant's motion. After continued negotiation
between the parties, the City returned appellant's wallet and
some of his personal papers. It never returned the so-called
"Beane documents" because they pertained to the criminal
investigation. Appellant was arrested soon thereafter and
charged with four counts of credit card fraud, but the charges
were later dropped for lack of sufficient evidence.
After the materials were returned, appellant offered several
times to dismiss the case. The parties could not agree,
however, on whether the case would be dismissed with, or
without, prejudice. Appellant eventually moved to voluntarily
dismiss and filed a petition for attorney's fees and costs as a
prevailing party under the Attorney's Fee Awards Act of 1976
("the Fees Act"), 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and its state analogue,
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, § 11I. The district court dismissed the
case, with prejudice, but denied the fee petition, reasoning
that appellant was not a prevailing party as contemplated by the
statutes because the court did not issue any substantive rulings
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and the case did not proceed to trial. Appellant appeals from
that order.1
II. Standard of Review
We have long held that we are highly deferential to a
district court's decision whether to award attorney's fees, and
thus will set aside its ruling only if that ruling constituted
a "manifest abuse of discretion." Gay Officers Action League v.
Puerto Rico, 247 F.3d 288, 292 (1st Cir. 2001); see also Foley
v. City of Lowell, 948 F.2d 10, 18 (1st Cir. 2001). Our strict,
but sensible, standard reflects the fact that only the district
court has the "intimate knowledge of the nuances of the
underlying case." Gay Officers Action League, 247 F.3d at 292.
We therefore confine our review to whether the district court
has made a mistake of law or incorrectly weighed (or failed to
weigh) a factor in its decision. See Foster v. Mydas Assoc.,
Inc., 943 F.2d 139, 143 (1st Cir. 1991).
III. Discussion
A. "Prevailing Party" Status Under the Fees Act and the
Massachusetts Civil Rights Law
1 Appellant also conclusorily states that he is appealing
the district court's denial of his motion to vacate the order of
dismissal. Appellant failed to develop that argument and it is
therefore waived. See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17
(1st Cir. 1990).
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Under the Fees Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the district court may
award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party in a
civil rights case brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Like many
others before it, the key to this case is whether the plaintiff
achieved "prevailing party" status. Typically, a plaintiff is
deemed to have prevailed if he can show that he "succeeded on an
important issue in the case, thereby gaining at least some of
the benefit he sought in bringing suit." Gay Officers Action
League, 247 F.3d at 293 (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S.
424, 433 (1983)). To be sure, a plaintiff need not prevail on
every claim and obtain all relief sought to qualify as a
prevailing party. E.g., Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111
(1992); Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760 (1987). Even so,
"[r]espect for ordinary language requires that a plaintiff
receive at least some relief on the merits of his claim before
he can be said to prevail." Hewitt, 482 U.S. at 760 (citing
Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 757 (1980)).
Here, although some of appellant's materials were returned
to him (namely, the mortgage papers, his mother's death
certificate and a few other documents), most of the returned
materials were copies rather than originals, and the police
never returned the Beane documents. Appellant argues that all
of "his" possessions were returned, and that he never sought the
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return of the Beane documents. However, that proposition is
clearly refuted by the complaint, which seeks the return of "all
materials seized."
Moreover, and more fundamentally, the crux of the complaint
is that the seizure of the materials should have been deemed
unlawful and unconstitutional, and that the City thus should
have been enjoined from using the materials in its
investigation. The return of the documents, however, did not
prevent the City from continuing its investigation.2 To the
contrary, the parties agreed that all but a few of the returned
materials would be photocopied so that law enforcement
authorities could continue their investigation. Given the
limited nature of the plaintiff's success, neither the district
court's finding that appellant was not a prevailing party, nor
its refusal to award attorney's fees, was an abuse of
discretion, let alone a manifest one. See, e.g., Gay Officers
Action League, 247 F.3d at 294 (a court is "well within its
rights to deny prevailing party status" if plaintiff's success
was "purely technical or de minimis") (internal citation
omitted).
2
The government's later termination of criminal charges is
immaterial because its decision was not based on the return of
the seized materials.
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Appellant also argues that he achieved his goals in this
lawsuit by receiving something akin to a consent decree. See
Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129 (1980) (permitting attorney's
fees in judicially approved settlements). He concedes that the
district court neither ordered the parties to comply, nor ruled
on the merits, yet he contends that the district court's
brokering of the deal was a de facto, if not de jure,
settlement. The district court, however, found to the contrary
and concluded that its involvement in the case "in no way
represent[ed] the Court's adjudication of the parties' claims."
The district court is obviously in the best position to evaluate
its own actions and their weight. Cf. Lefkowitz v. Fair, 816
F.2d 17, 22 (1st Cir. 1997) (explaining that "uncertainty as to
the meaning and intendment of a district court order can
sometimes best be dispelled by deference to the views of the
writing judge"). The record provides no basis for second-
guessing the court's conclusion that its intervention was not
the equivalent of a consent decree, and we therefore find no
abuse of discretion in the court's determination that appellant
did not prevail in his lawsuit.
Likewise, appellant is not a prevailing party under section
11I of the Massachusetts Civil Rights Law. Appellant contends
that he is entitled to attorney's fees under the Massachusetts
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law because, unlike the federal Fees Act, which permits a
district court to exercise discretion in awarding attorney's
fees, the phrasing of the Massachusetts statute is absolute:
"Any aggrieved person or persons who prevail in an action
authorized by this section shall be entitled to an award of the
costs of the litigation and reasonable attorneys' fees in an
amount to be fixed by the court." Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, § 11
(emphasis added). Thus, appellant argues, he is automatically
entitled to attorney's fees. However, our conclusion that
appellant was not a prevailing party applies to both the state
and federal statutes. The Massachusetts attorney's fees
provision is therefore inapplicable.
B. The Catalyst Theory
Until recently, a plaintiff in a civil rights dispute could
also achieve prevailing party status under the catalyst theory.
This theory permitted attorney's fees if a lawsuit acted as a
"'catalyst' in prompting defendants to take action to meet
plaintiff's claims . . . despite the lack of judicial
involvement in the result." Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275,
279 (1st Cir. 1978). In other words, a plaintiff would be deemed
to have "prevailed" in a lawsuit "even if there [was] no award
or injunction, so long as the lawsuit effectively achieved a
favorable result sought by the plaintiff." Stanton v. S.
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Berkshire Regional Sch. Dist., 197 F.3d 574, 577 (1st Cir.
1999).
The Supreme Court, however, has expressly rejected the
catalyst theory. See Buckhannon Bd. and Care Home, Inc. v. W.
Va. Dep't of Health and Human Res., 121 S. Ct. 1835 (2001).
Although Buckhannon applied to the Fair Housing Amendments Act
and the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Court specifically
noted that the fee-shifting provisions of several other
statutes, including the Fees Act, should be interpreted
consistently. See id. at 1839 n.4. Although we approved the
catalyst theory in the past, see, e.g., Nadeau, 581 F.2d at 279,
we are constrained to follow the Court's broad directive and
join several of our sister circuits in concluding that the
catalyst theory may no longer be used to award attorney's fees
under the Fees Act. See, e.g., Chambers v. Ohio Dep't of Human
Servs., 273 F.3d 690, 691-93 (6th Cir. 2001); Johnson v. ITT
Aerospace/Communications Div. of ITT Indus., Inc., 272 F.3d 498,
500 (7th Cir. 2001); N.Y. State Fed'n of Taxi Drivers, Inc. v.
Westchester County Taxi and Limousine Comm'n, 272 F.3d 154, 158
(2d Cir. 2001); Griffin v. Steeltek, Inc., 261 F.3d 1026, 1029
(10th Cir. 2001); Johnson v. Rodriguez, 260 F.3d 493, 495 (5th
Cir. 2001); Bennett v. Yoshina, 259 F.3d 1097, 1100-01 (9th Cir.
2001).
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Appellant argues that the theory is still viable under
Massachusetts law, and reasons that the lawsuit was a catalyst
for change because the City voluntarily agreed to return the
seized property. However, he does not cite (nor have we found)
a single case in which Massachusetts ever has recognized the
theory as a basis for recovery under the state civil rights
statute. To the contrary, it appears that the Massachusetts
courts have applied the catalyst theory only in awarding fees
under the Fees Act.
Even assuming arguendo that Massachusetts recognizes the
catalyst doctrine, appellant's claim nevertheless fails.
Regardless of the return of some of the seized materials, the
City was still able to undertake its criminal investigation of
appellant and the City never returned many of the seized items.
Thus, the district court concluded that "in the totality of the
circumstances, it is obvious that Richardson did not prevail in
any plausible sense of the word." We find no abuse of
discretion in that determination. See, e.g., Pearson v. Fair,
980 F.2d 37, 44 (1st Cir. 1992) (explaining that party seeking
fees under catalyst theory must show that "whatever changes
[his] lawsuit caused . . . were not de minimis.").
Affirmed.
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