United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 01-2037
WILFRID RACE,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
PEDRO A. TOLEDO-DAVILA, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. José Antonio Fusté, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Circuit Judge,
Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Lipez, Circuit Judge.
Jane A. Becker-Whitaker for appellant.
Leticia Casalduc Rabell, Assistant Solicitor General, with whom
Roberto J. Sanchez Ramos, Solicitor General, and Vanessa Lugo Flores,
Deputy Solicitor General, were on brief, for appellees.
June 4, 2002
Per curiam. Appellant Wilfrid Race claims that the district court
improperly refused to award him attorney's fees in an action under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213. We
find no error. The court correctly concluded that appellant was not a
prevailing party for purposes of the ADA's fees provision, see id. at
§ 12205, and thus was not entitled to recover legal expenses.
This action arose from appellant's encounter with Puerto Rico
police officers who stopped his car because it did not have a valid
registration sticker. Appellant had not yet renewed his registration
because he was in the process of contesting a ticket he had received
for parking in a handicapped space without a Puerto Rico permit. He
could not obtain the new registration until that dispute was resolved.
Appellant is, in fact, disabled, and his vehicle displayed a handicap
permit issued in Ontario, Canada.
Appellant filed suit in federal court claiming a violation of the
ADA and related commonwealth law, and asking that the police be
enjoined from stopping and arresting him for driving with an expired
registration sticker. The district court granted appellant's motion
for a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, and a
short time later the Puerto Rico administrative process ended in his
favor. Appellant then moved for a voluntary dismissal of his federal
complaint. Following the dismissal, appellant filed the request for
fees that is the subject of this appeal.
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Our review is for manifest abuse of discretion. Gay Officers
Action League v. Puerto Rico, 247 F.3d 288, 292 (lst Cir. 2001).
Although fee awards for prevailing parties are "virtually obligatory,"
see id. at 293, the invariable prerequisite is that one must, in fact,
"prevail." Contrary to appellant's suggestion, one does not qualify as
a "prevailing party" simply by obtaining a change in the status quo.
Rather, "a plaintiff 'prevails' when actual relief on the merits of his
claim materially alters the legal relationship between the parties . .
. ." Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111
(1992)).
This case never progressed to the merits of appellant's ADA claim,
even in a prefatory way. Cf., e.g., Coalition for Basic Human Needs v.
King, 691 F.2d 597, 601 (lst Cir. 1982) (awarding attorney's fees for
plaintiffs who obtained injunction pending appeal where the court "made
its decision only after careful consideration of the [plaintiff's]
legal claims"). Although issuance of a preliminary injunction
typically involves a review of the merits to determine whether the
requesting party is likely to succeed on his claim, see EF Cultural
Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 581 (lst Cir. 2001), the
district court confirmed that it intended merely "to safeguard
Plaintiff's rights under the ADA while he was exhausting his
administrative remedies under state law." The court went on to state
explicitly that it did not address the merits of plaintiff's claim.
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The record underscores the absence of substantive review; the case
ended at appellant's request before any action was taken on defendants'
motion to dismiss, which asserted that the complaint failed to state a
viable claim of disability discrimination.*
In sum, an individual may be entitled to attorney's fees "without
having obtained a favorable 'final judgment following a full trial on
the merits,'" Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 756-57 (1980) ( per
curiam) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-1558, at 7 (1976)), but he must
obtain relief based "'on the merits of at least some of his claims,'"
id. at 758 (quoted in Buckhannon Bd. and Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va.
Dep't of Health and Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 603 (2001)). Appellant
did not reach that threshold, and the district court consequently did
not err in refusing a fee award.
*Although the complaint does not specify, we presume that
appellant brought his claim under Title II of the ADA, which
prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities by
"public entities," which includes "any department, agency,
special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or
States or local government." See Parker v. Universidad de
Puerto Rico, 225 F.3d 1, 4 & n.1 (lst Cir. 2000) (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 12131(1)(B)). To succeed with a Title II claim, a
plaintiff must establish:
(1) that he is a qualified individual with a
disability; (2) that he was either excluded from
participation in or denied the benefits of some public
entity's services, programs, or activities or was
otherwise discriminated against; and (3) that such
exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was
by reason of the plaintiff's disability.
Id. at 5.
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Affirmed.
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