United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 03-1493
CARMEN L. RODRÍGUEZ-GARCÍA,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
MUNICIPALITY OF CAGUAS; HON. WILLIAM MIRANDA-MARÍN, as Mayor of
Caguas and in his personal capacity; WILFREDO PUIG, as Vice Mayor
of Caguas and in his personal capacity,
Defendants, Appellees.
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Héctor M. Laffitte, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Lynch, and Howard,
Circuit Judges.
Godwin Aldarondo-Girald, with whom Aldarondo Girald Law Office
was on brief, for appellant.
Kenneth Colon for appellees William Miranda-Marín and Wilfredo
Puig.
Grisselle Gonzalez-Negron, with whom Faccio & Pabon-Roca and
Luis E. Pabon-Roca were on brief, for appellee Municipality of
Caguas.
January 7, 2004
LYNCH, Circuit Judge. The American common law rule is
that generally the filing of a prior judicial action does not toll
the statute of limitations. Puerto Rico has chosen a different
rule, permitting such tolling. That rule gives rise to this
appeal.
The federal civil rights claims brought by Carmen L.
Rodríguez-García, a terminated public employee, were not timely
unless they were saved by tolling based on an earlier complaint
that she filed in the courts of Puerto Rico and later amended. Her
claims are tolled only if either her original or her amended
complaint in the Puerto Rico courts was timely and stated causes of
action identical to those in her later federal complaint. In our
federal system of justice built on both federal and state or
Commonwealth courts, this case raises interesting questions about
the meaning of the "identicality" requirement. Given the
generalized pleading rules and the latitude of Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6), it is not always easy to tell whether identical claims
are stated in different complaints. Here, the district court
thought that the claims were not identical and so dismissed the
complaint. Mindful of generous pleading rules and Puerto Rico's
liberal approach to relation-back rules, we reach the opposite
conclusion and reinstate the case.
-2-
I.
On October 25, 2000, Rodríguez-García brought suit in
Puerto Rico Superior Court in Caguas against the Municipality of
Caguas, through its mayor William Miranda-Marín; Luisa Flores, in
her capacity as Director of the Department of Beautification,
Cleaning, and Urbanism and in her personal capacity; and XYZ
Insurance Company. The complaint alleged the following facts.
Rodríguez-García was an executive secretary at the
Department of Beautification, Cleaning, and Urbanism of the
Municipality of Caguas in Puerto Rico. She was assigned to Flores,
who was the Director of the Department. Flores came under
investigation by the Office of Government Ethics, and Rodríguez-
García testified in that investigation. During January and
February of 2000, Rodríguez-García applied to the State Insurance
Fund for medical treatment for an emotional condition caused by
Flores's "uncouth and rude" behavior toward her. When Rodríguez-
García returned to work on February 22, 2000, Wilfredo Puig, vice-
mayor of Caguas, informed her that she had been transferred and
ordered her to report to the Department of Education. He told her
that Flores was under investigation by the Office of Government
Ethics and that Rodríguez-García was being transferred because
Flores did not feel comfortable working with her.
On February 24, 2000, Rodríguez-García reported to the
Department of Education but was told that there was no physical
-3-
space for her there. She was sent to the Human Resources Office,
where director Armando Meléndez told her to go home until a post
was found for her. Several days later, Meléndez called Rodríguez-
García and instructed her to report to the Human Resources Office
and then go to work at the Office of Federal Funds and Affairs. On
February 28, when Rodríguez-García went to the Human Resources
Office, Meléndez's secretary handed her a letter addressed to the
director of the Office of Federal Funds and Affairs. The letter
described Rodríguez-García's placement in that office as temporary
and referred to her transfer as a move that she had requested.
Rodríguez-García informed Meléndez and Puig that she had not
requested this transfer. The next day, Rodríguez-García was
nonetheless transferred to the Office of Federal Funds and Affairs.
No duties were assigned to her there.
On March 8, 2000, Rodríguez-García's attorney sent a
letter to Mayor Miranda-Marín requesting that he reinstate
Rodríguez-García to her previous post. In a letter dated March 27,
2000, Eileen Herrero, Director of Human Resources for the
Municipality of Caguas, replied that if Rodríguez-García wished to
be reassigned to her original post, she would be. But then Leslie
Rodríguez, Acting Director of the Human Resources Office, met with
Flores, who refused to reinstate Rodríguez-García, and Rodríguez-
García was not reinstated.
-4-
Based on these factual allegations, the complaint
asserted that Rodríguez-García had been transferred in retaliation
for her statement before the Office of Government Ethics, and that
such a retaliatory transfer violated 29 P.R. Laws Ann. § 194a,
which prohibits employers from discriminating against employees for
providing testimony, statements, or information before a
legislative, administrative, or judicial forum in Puerto Rico. The
complaint also alleged that "plaintiff's transfer was illegal,
arbitrary, whimsical, violates plaintiff's constitutional rights,
such as the due process of law, procedural as well as substantive,
and violates her record to ownership and to her dignity as a
person" (emphasis added). The complaint did not specify whether
these constitutional claims were based on the Puerto Rico
Constitution or the United States Constitution. Nor did the
complaint expressly refer to political discrimination or the right
to freedom of speech or affiliation. Rodríguez-García sought
damages and injunctive relief reinstating her.
On August 31, 2001, Rodríguez-García amended her
complaint. The amended complaint dropped Flores, who had passed
away, as a defendant. It also included several new allegations.
The amended complaint alleged that the Municipality of Caguas and
Mayor Miranda-Marín refused to reinstate Rodríguez-García to her
position because she had offered information harmful to the Popular
Democratic Party (PDP). It also alleged that Flores remarked that
-5-
she had no confidence in Rodríguez-García because Rodríguez-García
was not a member of the PDP and wanted to harm the party. The
amended complaint further alleged that Rodríguez-García was
"charged of not being a PDP'er ('belonging to the Popular
Democratic Party') and this constitutes a[n act of] political
discrimination" (emphasis added).
On November 7, 2001, Rodríguez-García filed a complaint
in federal district court in Puerto Rico against the Municipality
of Caguas and against Mayor Miranda-Marín and Vice-Mayor Puig in
their personal and official capacities. This federal complaint
alleged that Rodríguez-García had been discriminated against
"because of her political beliefs . . . and in reprisal for
providing information to the Ethics Office regarding an
investigation of the Municipality['s] political affairs." The
complaint sought relief under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,
1983, and 1985; Article II §§ 1, 6, and 7 of the Puerto Rico
Constitution; the general tort laws of Puerto Rico, 31 P.R. Laws
Ann. §§ 5141 and 5142; and the public policy exception to 29 P.R.
Laws Ann. § 185a, see Negrón v. Caleb Brett USA, Inc., 212 F.3d
666, 667 (1st Cir. 2000). The complaint sought injunctive relief,
damages, attorneys' fees and costs, and a declaratory judgment. In
addition to repeating the facts alleged in the amended state
complaint, the federal complaint added allegations that the
-6-
defendants acted intentionally or with deliberate indifference and
that Mayor Miranda-Marín and Vice-Mayor Puig approved or ratified
the discrimination against Rodríguez-García under color of law.
Furthermore, while the original state complaint alleged violations
of Rodríguez-García's constitutional rights, such as due process,
and her right to record of ownership, the federal complaint
replaced this language with allegations that the defendants
violated Rodríguez-García's right to "freedom of speech and
affiliation."
Two days after filing the federal complaint, Rodríguez-
García filed a voluntary dismissal without prejudice of her claims
in the Puerto Rico courts. Most likely, that was because jury
trials in civil cases are available in federal court but not in the
Commonwealth courts. See Grajales-Romero v. American Airlines,
Inc., 194 F.3d 288, 293 (1st Cir. 1999). On October 4, 2002, the
defendants moved for summary judgment in the federal case, arguing
that the federal complaint was time-barred because it was filed
after the applicable statute of limitations had expired. They also
argued in their motion for summary judgment that Rodríguez-García
had failed to establish a cognizable claim for political
discrimination, that the individual defendants were entitled to
qualified immunity, and that §§ 1981 and 1985 do not apply to
political discrimination.
-7-
On March 12, 2003, the district court granted the
defendants' motion for summary judgment based on the timeliness
issue. The court determined that the plaintiff's federal claims
borrow Puerto Rico's one-year statute of limitations for tort
claims and that Rodríguez-García's November 7, 2001 complaint was
untimely because it was filed more than one year after her February
29, 2000 transfer. The court held that the limitations period was
not tolled by Rodríguez-García's filing of her state complaint on
October 25, 2000. The court noted that the federal claims borrow
Puerto Rico law as to tolling, that 31 P.R. Laws Ann. § 5303
provides that the limitations period is "interrupted by [the]
institution [of actions] before the courts," and that Rodríguez-
García had filed a timely state complaint. Quoting Fernandez v.
Chardon, 681 F.2d 42, 47 (1st Cir. 1982), the court determined that
§ 5303 tolls the statute of limitations for claims only when
"identical causes of action" have been filed. The claims in
Rodríguez-García's state complaint, the court found, were not
identical to her federal claims. The court determined that her
state complaint, even after it was amended, never alleged federal
constitutional violations. The court noted that the state
complaint did not refer to a right to freedom of speech or of
political affiliation. Although the Puerto Rico complaint did
allege a violation of due process without indicating whether this
right was based on the federal or state constitution, the court
-8-
found that this was not an assertion of a federal constitutional
claim. Having concluded that the federal claims were untimely, the
court then dismissed without prejudice the remaining claims arising
under Puerto Rico law.
Rodríguez-García appeals from the court's grant of
summary judgment, arguing that her federal claims were timely and
that, in the alternative, the claims arising under Puerto Rico law
were still within the statute of limitations and should not have
been dismissed.
II.
When summary judgment has been granted on the grounds
that a complaint is time-barred, our review is de novo. See
Garcia-Guzman v. Villoldo, 273 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2001). We hold
that the district court erred in dismissing Rodríguez-García's
federal claims as untimely.
Unless the filing of the state complaints tolled the
statute of limitations, the federal claims were not timely.
Sections 1981, 1983, and 1985 borrow the forum state's statute of
limitations for personal injury claims. See Goodman v. Lukens
Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 660-62 (1987) (§ 1981); Wilson v. Garcia,
471 U.S. 261, 277-280 (1985) (§ 1983); Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d
1279, 1283 (11th Cir. 2003) (§ 1985).
Here, the parties agree that the appropriate statute of
limitations is Puerto Rico's one-year period governing tort
-9-
actions, 31 P.R. Laws Ann. § 5298(2). See Guzman-Rivera v.
Rivera-Cruz, 29 F.3d 3, 4-5 (1st Cir. 1994); Altair Corp. v.
Pesquera de Busquets, 769 F.2d 30, 31 (1st Cir. 1985). Federal law
determines the date on which the claim accrued. Rivera-Muriente v.
Agosto-Alicea, 959 F.2d 349, 353 (1st Cir. 1992). Under federal
law, the limitations period begins to run when the plaintiff "knows
or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis for his
claim." Rodriguez Narvaez v. Nazario, 895 F.2d 38, 41 n.5 (1st
Cir. 1990). The parties do not appear to dispute that the claim
accrued on February 29, 2000, when Rodríguez-García was transferred
to the Office of Federal Funds and Affairs. Absent any tolling,
Rodríguez-García had to file her federal complaint on or before
March 1, 2001.
The issue, then, is whether Rodríguez-García's filing of
her state complaint on October 25, 2000, and her later amendment of
that complaint on August 31, 2001, tolled the statute of
limitations. Where suit is brought in Puerto Rico, federal law
under §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985 borrows Puerto Rico law on tolling,
provided that it is consistent with underlying federal policy.
See Fernandez, 681 F.2d at 49-50 (applying this rule to § 1983
claims). Under 31 P.R. Laws Ann. § 5303, "[p]rescription of
actions is interrupted by their institution before the courts, by
extrajudicial claim of the creditor, and by any act of
acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor." When a complaint is
-10-
filed in the Commonwealth courts, the statute of limitations begins
to run anew from the date on which that action "comes to a definite
end." Silva-Wiscovich v. Weber Dental Mfg. Co., 835 F.2d 409, 410
(1st Cir. 1987) (quoting Siva-Wiscovich v. Weber Dental Mfg. Co.,
19 P.R. Offic. Trans. 592, 604, 119 P.R. Dec. 550 (1987)). Here,
that date would be November 9, 2001, when Rodríguez-García
voluntarily dismissed her state complaint. See id. (voluntary
dismissal without prejudice brings action to definite end).
Rodríguez-García's Puerto Rico complaint must assert
causes of action "identical" to her federal claims in order to toll
the statute of limitations as to those federal claims under § 5303.
Rodriguez Narvaez, 895 F.2d at 43 (citing Fernandez, 681 F.2d at
49, and Ramirez de Arellano v. Alvarez de Choudens, 575 F.2d 315,
319-20 (1st Cir. 1978)). "[T]he filing of one action does not toll
the statute of limitations for all claims arising out of the same
facts." Fernandez, 681 F.2d at 49. The Supreme Court of Puerto
Rico has approved this identicality requirement. See Cintron v.
Estado Libre Asociado de P.R., 27 P.R. Offic. Trans. 582, 127 P.R.
Dec. 582 (1990) (holding that a timely filed extrajudicial claim
did not toll the statute of limitations for a suit in the Puerto
Rico courts because it did not "pursue identical claims"). The
identicality requirement prevents plaintiffs from circumventing the
notice function of the statutes of limitations by asserting
different claims in belated federal court complaints. Cf.
-11-
Rodriguez Narvaez, 895 F.2d at 43 (statutes of limitations exist to
prevent defendants from being surprised by long-dormant causes of
action).
In determining whether causes of action identical to
Rodríguez-García's federal claims were brought in her state
complaint, the first question is whether the basis for comparison
is her original or her amended state complaint. The defendants
argue that Rodríguez-García cannot rely on amendments to her state
complaint because those amendments were filed on August 31, 2001,
after the statute of limitations had already expired. Puerto Rico
law, however, is to the contrary. Rule 13.3 of the Puerto Rico
Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[w]henever the claim or
defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct,
transaction or occurrence set forth in the original pleading, the
amendments shall relate back to the date of the original pleading."
32 P.R. Laws Ann. App. III R. 13.3. Both Rodríguez-García's
amendments and her original complaint clearly arose out of the same
transaction: her involuntary transfer because of her testimony in
the Ethics Office investigation of Flores. Under Rule 13.3, her
amendments relate back to the October 25, 2000 date of the original
complaint and are thus timely. As a result, both the amended
complaint and the original complaint are relevant bases for
comparison.
-12-
The next issue is whether Rodríguez-García's original and
amended state complaints contain causes of action identical to her
federal claims.1 Although the question is close, we conclude that
the amended complaint is sufficient to meet the identicality
requirement. We hold that in order to be identical under § 5303,
claims must satisfy several requirements. They must seek the same
form of relief. Ramirez de Arellano, 575 F.2d at 320; cf.
Rodriguez Narvaez, 895 F.2d at 46 (extrajudicial claims, which also
trigger tolling under § 5303, did not toll the statute of
limitations when such claims sought different relief than the
federal complaint did); Fernandez, 681 F.2d at 53 (same); Hernandez
del Valle v. Santa Aponte, 575 F.2d 321, 324 (1st Cir. 1978)
(same). The causes of action asserted must be based on the same
substantive claims. And, provided that other Puerto Rico tolling
statutes do not rescue the claims on other grounds, they must be
asserted against the same defendants in the same capacities; new
defendants should not be added.
Rodríguez-García's claims satisfy all of these
requirements, with a few wrinkles that we describe in more depth
1
The defendants argue that Rodríguez-García failed to
argue to the district court that her claims were identical and has
thus forfeited the argument. We disagree. In Rodríguez-García's
opposition to the defendants' motion for summary judgment, she
stated, "Defendants claim that the suit in state court was general
[and] did not specify under what laws it was filed. It is clear
however that [the plaintiff] claimed retaliation, constitutional
rights, and political discrimination." Her argument is preserved.
-13-
below. She sought the same form of relief in both complaints:
injunctive relief and money damages. Although the amount of
damages differs in the two complaints, the allegation of damages in
her state complaint gave the defendants the requisite "fair notice
that [they] might be called upon to defend a damages suit, with
different issues not applicable to a suit for injunctive relief."
Hernandez del Valle, 575 F.2d at 324.
The harder question is whether Rodríguez-García's federal
and state complaints assert the same substantive claims, despite
differences in wording. We conclude that Rodríguez-García's
federal claims and the claims in her state complaint did rely on
the same substantive legal ground: that she was transferred because
she was not a member of the PDP and in retaliation for her
testimony in the Ethics Office investigation of Flores and that
this constituted "political discrimination" in violation of her
"constitutional rights." There are three significant differences
in the wording of the legal claims in her state and federal
complaints. But, as we discuss below, none of those three
differences indicates a change in Rodríguez-García's substantive
claim.
First, Rodríguez-García's state complaint, unlike her
federal complaint, did not expressly claim a violation of her
federal constitutional right to "freedom of speech and
affiliation." But a freedom of speech and affiliation claim was
-14-
certainly implied in the state complaint by the allegations of
"political discrimination" in violation of her "constitutional
rights." The state complaint did not specify whether this claim
was based on the Puerto Rico or federal constitution, and claims
based on political discrimination may be brought under both
constitutions. See P.R. Const. art II, § 1 ("No discrimination
shall be made on account of . . . political or religious ideas.");
Mullin v. Town of Fairhaven, 284 F.3d 31, 37-38 (1st Cir. 2002)
(discrimination against public officers based on their speech can
violate the First Amendment of the United States Constitution). In
some situations, a plaintiff's failure to specify the constitution
upon which a claim is based could raise concerns about fair notice.
But in this instance, the substantive protections for freedom of
speech and association under the Puerto Rico Constitution are at
least as broad as the protections under the federal constitution.
See Empresas Puertorriqueñas de Desarrollo, Inc. v. Hermandad
Independiente de Empleados Telefónicos, 2000 PRSC 71 (2000).
Regardless whether the claim was based on the Commonwealth or the
United States Constitution, the defendants were on notice that
their actions would be held, at a minimum, to the federal
constitutional standard.
Second, Rodríguez-García's state complaint did not
expressly refer to §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985. But that does not
affect the substance of the claims alleged. The defendants were on
-15-
notice of the federal constitutional violation forming the
substantive basis of those claims. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S.
137, 144 n.3 (1979) ("[Section 1983] is not itself a source of
substantive rights, but a method for vindicating federal rights
elsewhere conferred by . . . the United States Constitution and
federal statutes."). In determining whether plaintiffs have
asserted identical legal claims, we look to the substantive rights
asserted, not the procedural vehicles involved. This has been the
Puerto Rico Supreme Court's approach in cases involving
extrajudicial claims. Under § 5303, "[p]rescription of actions is
interrupted by their institution before the courts, [or] by
extrajudicial claims." For an extrajudicial claim to trigger
tolling, just as for a judicial claim to do so, the causes of
action must be identical. Benitez-Pons v. Puerto Rico, 136 F.3d
54, 59 (1st Cir. 1998). In Matos Molero v. Roche Products, Inc.,
132 P.R. Dec. 29 (1993), the Puerto Rico Supreme Court held that
the filing of an administrative complaint before the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission alleging sex discrimination in
violation of Title VII tolled the statute of limitations for an
equivalent cause of action under Puerto Rico law. The causes of
action in Matos Molero were identical because they asserted the
same substantive claim, albeit via different procedural vehicles.
See Leon-Nogueras v. Univ. of P.R., 964 F. Supp. 585, 589 (D.P.R.
1997) (noting that Matos Molero is "perfectly consistent with the
-16-
requirement that the substantive claims raised in the extrajudicial
claim must be identical to the substantive claims raised in the
subsequent judicial complaint"). This approach makes sense in the
context of both judicial and extrajudicial claims. The substantive
claim, and not the procedural vehicle, is what matters to
defendants in the initial stages of preparing for litigation and
discovery. And, although § 1983 actions may be brought in state
courts, not all federal procedural vehicles may be used in state
courts. It would be perverse and a source of disharmony in the
federal system to make a state tolling statute turn on the
availability of federal procedural vehicles.
Third, Rodríguez-García's federal complaint added
allegations that the defendants acted intentionally or with
deliberate indifference in discriminating against her and that the
defendants approved or ratified Rodríguez-García's transfer. But
these allegations simply present, in a different form, allegations
already made in her state complaint. To demonstrate political
discrimination under the First Amendment, plaintiffs must show that
"the protected expression was a substantial or motivating factor in
the decision to remove them from their posts." Mullin, 284 F.3d at
38. Thus, by alleging political discrimination in her state
complaint, Rodríguez-García had already alleged, by implication,
that the defendants made a decision to transfer her and that the
decision was an act of intentional discrimination based on her
-17-
political beliefs. In sum, Rodríguez-García's causes of action in
her state and federal complaints were based on the same substantive
claim and sought the same forms of relief.
As to the requirement of identicality of parties,
Rodríguez-García's claims in her federal complaint were not
asserted against exactly the same defendants in the same capacities
as in her state complaint. Her federal complaint added claims
against a new defendant, Vice-Mayor Puig, and against Mayor
Miranda-Marín in his personal, as opposed to official, capacity.
Ordinarily, § 5303 would not toll the statute of limitations as to
these additional claims. Defendants not sued in the original
complaint cannot be expected to be on notice of plaintiffs' claims.
And defendants sued only in their official capacities in the
original complaint cannot be expected to be on notice of the very
different issues raised by claims against them in their personal
capacities. But in this instance, the defendants have waived any
objection to the statute of limitations on this basis. Even
assuming that the defendants' brief reference to the issue in their
motion for summary judgment was sufficient to preserve the argument
below, the defendants failed to mention it at all in their brief on
appeal. The issue is waived. Cashmere & Camel Hair Mfrs. Inst. v.
Saks Fifth Ave., 284 F.3d 302, 309 (1st Cir. 2002).
In finding that Rodríguez-García's federal claims are
timely, we defer to certain choices that Puerto Rico has made.
-18-
Although Puerto Rico construes its tolling rules strictly, see
Rodriguez Narvaez, 895 F.2d at 43, it allows plaintiffs to meet the
statute of limitations as long as their complaints are detailed
enough to put defendants on notice of the general nature of their
claims. "[P]leadings have only one mission: to show in a general
way which are the claims and defenses of the parties." Pressure
Vessels P.R. v. Empire Gas P.R., 137 P.R. Dec. 497 (1994) (emphasis
added). This liberal approach is also evident in Puerto Rico's
relation-back rule for amended complaints. 32 P.R. Laws Ann. App.
III, R. 13.3. Our result reflects the concern that a different
outcome here on the identicality requirement would contravene local
policy choices on an issue on which those choices are to be
honored.
III.
The district court's holding that the plaintiff's federal
claims are untimely is reversed. We vacate the grant of summary
judgment and, noting that the district court has not yet ruled on
the defendants' remaining arguments in favor of summary judgment,
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs
are awarded to Rodríguez-García. So ordered.
-19-